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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to reassess Cain and Hopkins’ gentlemanly capitalist explanation 
of British imperialism in Asia during the first half of the nineteenth century through 
examining the lobbying activities of provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests 
against the renewal of the East India Company’s charter during the periods 1812-1813 and 
1829-1833.  This thesis particularly has focused on Glasgow’s lobbying activities although 
Liverpool and Manchester’s cases have also been examined. 
 
In Cain and Hopkins’ model, the position of provincial manufacturing interests was outside 
from the gentlemanly capitalists’ circle consisting of non-industrial capitalists based in 
London and South-east England, such as the landed aristocracy, the merchants and bankers 
of the City and professions.  Economically, there was a split between these gentlemanly 
capitalists and the provincial manufacturing interests, and politically, the provincial 
interests could exercise minor influence on the national politics.  This thesis has 
contributed to three issues related to Cain and Hopkins’ gentlemanly capitalist thesis.  The 
firs issue is the degree of influence of provincial commercial and manufacturing interests 
on the formation of Britain’s imperial policy.  The second issue is the relationship between 
the gentlemanly capitalists in London and the provincial mercantile and manufacturing 
interests.  The third issue is the Scots contribution to the formation of the British Empire, 
to which they failed to give their attention.  
 
Regarding the first issue, this thesis has demonstrated that the provincial mercantile and 
manufacturing interests organised effective lobbying activities for the opening of the East 
India and China trades and succeeded in exerting undeniable influence over the state’s 
decisions in both the first and second campaigns through well-organised lobbying 
strategies, powerful lobbing means, and their access to the centre of the national politics 
through their influential parliamentary supporters.  In this thesis, the provincial lobbyists’ 
economic interests and political backgrounds have closely been examined.  Although the 
provincial lobbyists’ economic and political interests were varied and they split up over 
some economic and political issues, these did not affect their unity in their challenge 
against the London merchants’ dominance in the East India trade.  This contrasts with Cain 
and Hopkins’ argument on the gentlemanly capitalists’ superior influence on the national 
politics.  In terms of the second issue, this thesis has shown that there is no evidence for the 
collaboration between the provincial interests and the London merchants during the 1812-
1813 campaign.  Nevertheless, as the connection between the provincial manufacturing 
interests and the London agency houses grew after the opening of the India trade, in the 
1829-1833 campaign, the provincial lobbyists and some of the London mercantile interests 
showed their collaboration.  Therefore, this thesis supports the application of Webster’s 
more complex model than Cain and Hopkins’ original model to British imperialism in Asia 
during this period.  Finally, in respect of the Scots contribution to the formation of British 
Empire, during these two national campaigns for the opening of the East India trade, the 
Glasgow lobbyists were very active and the GEIA played a significant role in their 
lobbying activities. 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The introduction of the ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’ by P. J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins 
during the 1980s was a highly significant event for British imperial historians, matched in 
the post-1945 period only by the concept of the informal empire addressed by J. Gallagher 
and R. E. Robinson.1  The ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’ rejuvenated debates over the 
British Empire in recent years.  The main points of the ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’ are 
(1) the existence of different economic interests in Britain, i.e. gentlemanly capitalists 
consisting of landowners, merchants, financiers, professions and other non-industrial 
economic interests based in London and its surrounding areas, and the provincial 
manufacturing interests, and (2) the economic and political supremacy of gentlemanly 
capitalists over provincial manufacturing interests.  Since the introduction of this thesis, 
debate has centred on these two issues.  The main purpose of this thesis is to reassess the 
influence of the provincial manufacturers over national politics and the relationship 
between provincial commercial and manufacturing interests and gentlemanly capitalists by 
analysing the lobbying activities of provincial commercial and manufacturing towns 
against the renewal of the East India Company’s (EIC) charter during the periods 1812-
1813 and 1829-1833.  Before examining the debates over the renewal of the company’s 
charter will outline the historiography of British imperialism.   
 
 
1.2. The classical Marxist and non-Marxist theories of imperialism and the 
Gallagher and Robinson thesis 
 
In the classic theories of imperialism, both Marxist and non-Marxist theorists pointed out 
the basic difference of British foreign policy in the periods before and after the fourth 
quarter of the nineteenth century, when one of the rapid expansions of the British Empire 
took place.  The older non-Marxist western views regarded the mid-Victorian period as an 
anti-imperialist era, and then the late Victorian era as a neo-imperialist era. Such views 
derived from their observation of the rise and fall of free trade in the international 
economy.  For example, in his study of the relation between the rise and fall of free trade 
                                               
1 One of the best recent books on the historiography of British imperialism is A. Webster, The Debate on the 
Rise of the British Empire, 2006.  
 2 
and the growth of the British Empire, Langer argued that the mid-Victorian formal empire 
did not expand, but rather seemed to be disintegrating, while in the late Victorian era the 
British formal empire expanded, i.e. the former was the period of anti-imperialism and the 
latter was one of imperialism.2  Between the seventeenth century and the early nineteenth 
century, the British experienced the first expansion of their empire over North America and 
the Indian Continent under the mercantilist policy, although they lost their American 
colonies in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.  However, heavy financial burdens as 
a result of Britain’s conflicts with European rivals, particularly with France, and the 
acquisition and maintenance of foreign territories under the mercantilist policy were not 
favourable to the newly growing industrialists during the Industrial Revolution.  Their 
increasing hostility against this traditional policy was supported theoretically by such 
classical economists as Smith and Ricardo.  Eventually, laissez faire became a main strand 
of British policy during the mid-Victorian period, particularly under the Liberal 
governments.  Nevertheless, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, facing the 
increasing competition from newly-industrialised European countries, British policy 
shifted from ‘anti-imperialism’ to ‘new imperialism’.   
 
Meanwhile, Marxist theorists linked Britain’s imperial expansion with economic 
development in the metropole.  For example, Lenin argued that imperialism was the 
highest stage of capitalism, after financial capitalism began to form in the 1880s.3  Hobson, 
whose study largely contributed to Lenin’s work, also argued that  
 
Overproduction… and surplus capital which could not find sound investments within 
the country, forced Great Britain, Germany, Holland, France to place larger and 
larger portions of their economic resources outside the area of their present political 
domain, and then stimulate a political expansion so as to take in the new areas. 4 
 
Because under-consumption and over-production, caused partly by technological 
innovations and the increase of competition in the domestic market of industrial countries, 
reduced profits for investors, the excess capital needed places for investment overseas. 
This capital was invested in new areas in order to exploit economic resources.  The 
metropolitan countries were manipulated by those who made profit overseas and such 
areas turned into a part of formal empire with the political take-over.  Although Hobson 
pointed out ‘finance’ as the main engine of imperialism, he critically misunderstood that 
                                               
2 See J. Gallagher and R. E. Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’ in The Economic History Review, 
New Series, Vol. VI No. 1, 1953, pp. 2 and W. L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902, 1935. 
3 V. I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 1982. 
4 J. A. Hobson, Imperialism, 1972, p. 80. 
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the major part of foreign investment in the fourth quarter of the nineteenth century was 
absorbed by tropical Africa, where formal empires were created at the period, rather than 
by the White Dominions and the United States. 
 
Although these two groups of theorists never agreed over their views of modern 
imperialism, they had a substantial consensus on the change in the nature of British 
Imperialism in the late Victorian period.  However, Gallagher and Robinson argued that 
these theories cannot explain a paradox of actual historical events.  They make a point that 
Britain’s formal empire actually expanded to New Zealand, the Gold Coast, Labuan, Natal, 
the Punjab, Sind and Hong Kong during the period 1841-1851 in spite of the growth of 
‘anti-imperialism’ ideology.5  The informal empire was their concept to explain such 
paradoxical phenomena.   The core of their thesis was that Britain had a continuous 
imperial policy throughout the nineteenth century, and that the form or mode of imperial 
expansion and the discontinuity of imperial activities were dependent on circumstances in 
non-European countries.6  They argued that an informal empire and a formal empire form a 
continuity of process.  For instance, granting White Dominions a responsible government 
was a change in imperialist control from formal to informal but not a device to separate 
them from the empire. The form of imperialism was decided by circumstances in the 
peripheries.  Gallagher and Robinson insisted that the fundamental policy concerned with 
Britain’s overseas expansion was ‘trade without rule (informal means) if possible’ and 
‘trade with rule (formal annexations) when necessary’.7 
 
During the nineteenth century, Britain experienced rapid economic growth, which was 
coincident with the development of the international economy.  The growth of British 
industries in the Industrial Revolution increased their demand for new markets for their 
manufacturing products and for the importation of raw materials and food.  Gallagher and 
Robinson described imperialism as ‘a sufficient political function of the process of 
integrating new regions into the expanding economy; the character is largely decided by 
the various and changing relationships between the political and economic elements of 
expansion in any particular region and time.’8  For example, in the case of Latin America, 
the general strategy employed by Britain was ‘to convert these areas into complementary 
satellite economies, which would provide raw materials and food for Great Britain and 
                                               
5 Gallagher and Robinson ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, p. 2. 
6 Wm. R. Louis, Imperialism: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy, 1976, p.3. 
7 Gallagher and Robinson ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, p. 13. 
8 Ibid., p. 5. 
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provide widening market for its manufactures.’9  In spite of the initial difficulty for British 
economic interests in penetrating into Latin American countries, they succeeded in 
integrating them into the world economy during the second half of the nineteenth century.  
In Gallagher and Robinson’s thesis, Latin America was the most successful part of the 
British informal empire.  When the markets of underdeveloped regions were opened to 
Britain and integrated into the metropolitan economy, Britain could exercise its influence 
over them in favour of British foreign policy through local collaborators who benefited 
from this relationship.  In the mid-Victorian period, Britain preferred informal control over 
the regions owing to the supremacy of British economic competitive power because this 
means was cheaper and less of a burden on British taxpayers.   
 
However, as Britain faced the growth of other great European powers and increased 
competition from them in Africa and Asia in the late Victorian era, Britain had no means to 
secure its trade with the areas under informal control and needed to change its imperial 
strategy to formal control.  In other words, the expansion of the British formal empire 
reflected her relative decline as the world’s great economic power.  However, in their 
thesis of 1953, a shift from informal to formal rule was not only caused by European 
rivals’ challenge to Britain’s hegemony.  The integration of the peripheral economy into 
the metropolitan economy often destabilised a local political structure.  In the case of 
Egypt, they argued that the local political structure could not bear the impact of western 
economic expansion.  The control of Egyptian finance by Britain and France for the 
liquidation of its foreign debts raised the anti-imperialism movement and brought the 
country into crises.  This culminated in the revolution of Arabi Pasha in 1881 and British 
occupation in the following year to secure the Suez Canal.10  Anthony Webster’s more 
recent study also explained the establishment of British colonial rule in Southeast Asia in 
the nineteenth century from this viewpoint.11  He argued that the expansion of the East 
India trade after the abolition of monopoly in the Indian trade enabled indigenous 
merchants and local chiefs to accumulate wealth and power and that the expansion of the 
Southeast Asian trade led to the influx of Chinese immigrants to this region, who 
established themselves as the significant economic interest group there.  They eventually 
became a factor in internal conflicts and destabilised the central authorities of Southeast 
Asian states, which resulted in direct British intervention. 
 
                                               
9 Ibid., p. 9. 
10 Ibid., pp. 13-14.  
11 A. Webster, Gentlemen Capitalists: British Imperialism in South East Asia 1770-1890, 1998. 
 5 
Gallagher and Robinson do not deny the importance of the economic element in 
imperialism, but they insist that economic expansion was one of several factors related to 
imperial phenomena. Political considerations of security were sometimes superior to 
economic. In British imperial policy in the 1880s and 1890s the protection of the route to 
India and the Indian Empire took precedence.  In their later work, they paid more attention 
to non-economic and non-metropolitan elements, that is to say, the activities of such sub-
imperialists as military officers and other European settlers, who were often out of the 
metropolitan control, and to local collaborators.12   
 
According to Africa and the Victorians, strategic security was the main motive of high 
British statesmen and officials (‘official mind’) for the partition of Africa by the great 
European powers.  Nevertheless, their imperial expansion was initially caused by crises in 
peripheral areas, not by the metropolitan elements.13  In ‘Non-European Foundation of 
European Imperialism’, Robinson argued that imperialism was an interaction between 
European strategy and economics, and indigenous collaboration and resistance.14  Then 
Robinson insisted that controlling the non-European empire largely depended on the 
existence of collaborative system. According to Robinson, 
 
Without the voluntary or enforced cooperation of their governing elites, economic 
resources could not be transferred, strategic interests protected or xenophobic 
reaction and traditional resistance to change contained.  Nor without indigenous 
collaboration, when the time came for it, could not Europeans have conquered and 
ruled their non-European empires.15 
 
The collaborative system tended to consist of separated and isolated collaborators with 
mutual rivalries through native society. They exploited profits from free trade with the 
western ruler to maintain their position.  Because they were politically isolated from each 
other, the collaborators had limited political power.  Therefore, when they faced anti-
European feeling as the result of European penetration, the situation, which was often 
accelerated by other European competitors, required direct intervention and the 
establishment of formal control.  However, since ‘the official mind’ in the metropolis 
                                               
12 Robinson and Gallagher with A. Denny, Africa and Victorians: the Official Mind of Imperialism, 1961 and 
Robinson ‘Non-European Foundation of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration’ in 
Louis Imperialism, pp.128-151.  ‘Non-European’ was originally published in E. R. J. Owen and R. B. 
Sutcliffe (Eds.) Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, 1975, Chap. 5.   
13 For example, the British occupation over Egypt following the ‘protonationalist movement’ and the collapse 
of the native regime resulted in the upset of the power balance among the European rivals and the scramble 
for Africa. 
14 Robinson ‘Non European Foundations of European Imperialism’, p.130. 
15 Ibid. 
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chose a policy to economise on its human and financial resource for the maintenance of 
formal empire, the metropolis still needed the indigenous collaborators. Therefore, after the 
indigenous collaborators lost their authority to the natives, western powers still tried to 
restore their position in the formal imperialism because it was the easiest solution.   
 
Gallagher and Robinson’s works have largely contributed to the development of studies on 
peripheral events.  As will be explained, during the following two decades, their thesis was 
at the centre of debates on British Imperialism.  Whilst their thesis attracted some 
followers, others pointed out its defects.   
 
 
1.3. The debates on the Gallagher and Robinson thesis during the 1960s and 
1970s 
 
One influential historian who argued from a similar standpoint to Gallagher and Robinson 
was D. K. Fieldhouse.  In his article, ‘Imperialism: An Historiographical Revision ’, he 
considered Hobson’s thesis, and stressed the mistaken assumption that the newly acquired 
colonies absorbed a high proportion of overseas investment.   He concluded on the theory 
of ‘imperialism’ derived from Hobson and Lenin that their interpretation of the expansion 
of European empires during the period from the 1870s until the breakout of the World War 
I was ‘unacceptable’.  He argued that: 
 
 As an economic theory it is unsatisfactory because detailed investigations have 
shown that the alleged need of the European investor, monopolist or individual 
capitalists, to find outlets for his surplus capital had little or nothing to do with the 
division of Africa and the Pacific between the European powers. 16 
 
In his later work, he stressed more the connection between local crises that arose on the 
periphery and the colonial expansions in the late nineteenth century.17  In his viewpoint, 
the territorial expansion of European countries in the late nineteenth century was generally 
their passive response to the problems that occurred on the periphery.  In terms of the 
economic factors in the imperial expansion, he explained that ‘all European expansion in 
the whole period [between 1830 and 1914]… was in some way and in some degree 
                                               
16 D. K. Fieldhouse ‘Imperialism: An Historiographical Revision ’, in The Economic History Review, New 
Series, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1961, p. 208. 
17 D. K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire 1830-1914, 1973. 
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influenced by economics’.18  Nevertheless, instead of the immediate and direct link 
between economics and empire, he emphasised their coincidental and indirect link.19  He 
insisted that: 
 
European governments were normally prepared to use political methods to solve 
problems associated with European economics enterprise on the periphery only when 
and because this came up against some otherwise insurmountable non-economic 
obstacle; or alternatively, when economic activity gave rise to some strictly non-
economic problems which again demanded political action.20 
 
Nevertheless, the arguments of Gallagher and Robinson and their followers failed to 
convince some historians.  For instance, E. Stokes criticised those who rejected the 
economic-determined imperialism (in other words, imperialism resulted from pressure 
within the metropole) on the grounds of the defects of the ‘Hobson-Lenin thesis’, including 
Fieldhouse and Gallagher and Robinson.21  He pointed out that their arguments are ‘the 
conflation of the arguments of Hobson and Lenin into a single model.’22  He explained 
that: 
 
… imperialism did not emerge, according to Lenin, until all the ‘unoccupied’ 
portions of the world had already been divided up into colonial or semi-colonial 
territories; for imperialism; which ‘in its economic essence.. is monopoly capitalism’ 
was the struggle for the redivision of the already divided world.23 
 
His argument stressed that Lenin’s theory of imperialism, which aimed at a logical 
explanation of the origins of World War I, was different from Hobson’s argument on 
Britain’s colonialism in the scramble of Africa during the last few decades of the 
nineteenth century. 
 
D. C. M. Platt also developed his critical argument against the Gallagher and Robinson 
thesis.  In 1968, he analysed nineteenth-century British official policy regarding overseas 
trade and investment in Latin America and China, which Gallagher and Robinson regarded 
as examples of Britain’s ‘informal empire’.24  On the one hand, they argued that the British 
policy in Latin America was an example of  the ‘policy of commercial hegemony in the 
                                               
18 Ibid., pp. 463-464. 
19 Ibid., p. 464. 
20 Ibid. 
21 E. Stokes, ‘Late Nineteenth-Century Colonial Expansion and the Attack on the Theory of Economic 
Imperialism: A Case of Mistaken Identity’ in The Historical Journal, XII, 2, 1969, pp. 285-301. 
22 Ibid. p. 288. 
23 Ibid., p. 289. 
24 D. C. M. Platt, ‘The imperialism of Free trade: Some Reservations’ in The Economic History Review, New 
Series., Vol. XXI, No. 2, 1968, pp. 296-306. 
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interest of high politics, or of the use of informal political supremacy in the interests of 
commercial enterprise’.25  On the other hand, Platt insisted that during the nineteenth 
century, Britain maintained its non-intervention in the internal affairs of South American 
countries and restricted their commercial objective to the sustenance of fair and equal 
treatment for British trade in comparison with its rival nations.  Similarly, he also denied 
Gallagher and Robinson’s illustration of Britain’s ‘political hold’ over the Chinese 
government because British officials tended to be reluctant to intervene in the country and 
promote British trade and investment more than on the same footage as other Western 
powers.26  During the late Victorian period, the change of the British governments’ general 
attitude from non-intervention to more active policy for the promotion of foreign trade and 
investment resulted from international pressure.27  He also pointed out the limited 
penetration of British manufacturing products in Latin America, the Levant and China and 
the lack of commodities for return cargoes during the first half of the nineteenth century.28  
Poor communication and transportation, self-sufficient local economies and poverty 
prevented British products from penetrating into the interior.  As a result, British influence 
over these regions was limited.  Therefore, he concluded that: 
 
The “Imperialism of Free Trade”, and the whole notion of an “informal empire” of 
trade and investment so far as it related to the early and mid-Victorian periods, 
developed out of three assumptions: first, the readiness of British governments at all 
times “to establish and maintain British paramountcy by what ever means best suited 
the circumstances of their diverse regions of interests”; second, the determination of 
British manufacturers and merchants to extend their influence throughout the world; 
third, the subordination of primary producers, as suppliers of foodstuffs and raw 
materials to Britain in her chosen role as “Workshop of the World”.  Even if such 
assumptions may in part be relevant to Britain’s attempts to maintain her threatened 
position in the late-Victorian period, it is obviously unhistorical to apply them to the 
period 1830-60.29  
 
Regarding the Scramble for Africa, Gallagher and Robinson insisted on strategic 
considerations, whilst Platt admitted the significance of the economic factors in the British 
government’s policy in West and Central Africa.  He argued that the British territorial 
expansions into these regions were motivated by ‘the fear of being excluded from 
prospective as well as existing markets’ under pressure from the competition with other 
                                               
25 Gallagher and Robinson ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, p. 8. 
26 Platt, ‘Imperialism of Free Trade’, pp. 301-302. 
27 Ibid, ‘Further objections to an “Imperialism of Free Trade”, 1830-60’, in The Economic History Review, 
New Series, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, 1973, pp. 87-88. 
28 Ibid. pp. 79-84 
29 Ibid., p. 87. 
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European rivals.30  During the same period, other historians who examined the case of 
West Africa reached a similar conclusion, including Hopkins.  He regarded the British 
policy in this region as ‘a major triumph for the economic imperialists of Victorian 
England’.31 
 
In addition, concerning India, Gallagher and Robinson insisted that British expansion over 
India directly resulted from existing imperialist interests in India.  In spite of India’s 
important position in the British Empire both strategically and economically, those who 
participated in the Robinson and Gallagher controversy tended to regard India as an 
eighteenth-century legacy and a minor part in the explanation of the British imperial 
expansion in the nineteenth century.32  In this regard, Kiernan argued that if ‘British Africa 
was not much more than “a gigantic footnote to the Indian empire”’ as Robinson and 
Gallagher argued, ‘it merely throws the question of the real motives of empire one stage 
further back.’33  He suggested that India should be given more attention in order to assess 
its real value for the British Empire. 
 
 
1.4. Cain and Hopkins and the Gentlemanly Capitalist thesis 
 
In terms of its impact on the study of modern imperialism, the theory put forward by Cain 
and Hopkins was in line with that of Gallagher and Robinson, and their argument showed 
historians new aspects of British Imperialism.  The ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’ during 
the 1980s was their response to the trend of imperial history after the Robinson and 
Gallagher controversy, in which several historians tried to find the cause of British 
Imperialism within events on the periphery.  They started their interpretation of the British 
Empire by focusing their attention on the metropolitan economy.  
 
Cain and Hopkins contributed three important articles on British Imperialism to the 
Economic History Review during the 1980s.  The first article was ‘The Political Economy 
of British Expansion Overseas, 1750-1914’, published in 1980.34  In this article, they 
                                               
30 Ibid., Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815-1914, 1968, p. 259. 
31 A. G. Hopkins, ‘Economic Imperialism in West Africa: Lagos, 1882-92’ in The Economic History Review, 
New Series, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1968, p. 606. 
32 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914, pp. 318-319. 
33 V. G. Kiernan, ‘Farewell to Empire’ in The Socialist Register, 1964, p. 270 
34 Cain and Hopkins ‘The Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas, 1750-1914’ in The Economic 
History Review, 2nd Ser. Vol. XXXIII, No. 4, 1980, pp. 463-490. 
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offered a new interpretation of British imperialism although they did not propose the 
concept of gentlemanly capitalism yet.  Their argument derived from their scanning of 
earlier studies.  They tried to refute the prevailing notion of British imperial expansion, 
which tended to focus on the peripheral areas of the empire.  First, they devalued the 
significance of the Industrial Revolution for Britain’s economic hegemony.35  They 
insisted that ‘The rise of modern manufacturing was a more protracted process than current 
theories of imperialism suppose.’36  As a source of wealth, even after the nineteenth 
century, the agricultural sector occupied a significant position in Britain.  Secondly, they 
assumed that the influence of the non-industrial sector on Britain’s imperial policy was 
superior to that of provincial manufacturing interests and attempted to explain how 
effectively the landed and City interests excluded manufacturing interests from the national 
politics.  The economic interpretation of British Imperialism that the British imperial 
expansion was led by the manufacturing interests failed to convince.  Cain and Hopkins, 
instead, gave their attention to non-industrial capitalists in order to conceptualise their 
version of British Imperialism. 
 
Several significant works contributed to the conceptualisation of their ‘gentlemanly 
capitalist thesis’.  Traditionally, Britain had been regarded as an industrial society.  One 
pioneering study which revised this view was by Perry Anderson during the 1960s.  He 
pointed out the peculiarity of British society, that is to say, its political structure dominated 
by the aristocracy and landed interests which co-existed with an economy in which 
industrial capitalism played a main role.37  While he emphasised the characteristics of 
British society, during the 1970s, other scholars, such as Nairn and Longstreth, gave their 
attention to the peculiarity of the British economy.38  In their theoretical arguments, these 
two scholars put the City of London or the financial capitalists in a polarising position 
against the industrial capitalists.  The former as a political entity held a large advantage and 
victimised the latter in the formation of British economic policy.  For example, Longstreth 
regarded Joseph Chamberlain’s Tariff Reform campaign for the manufacturing interests 
during the turn of the nineteenth century as the first significant attempt of industrialists to 
                                               
35 They referred to the following studies: A. E. Musson, The Growth of British Industry, 1978, G. N. von 
Tunzelamann, Steam Power and British Industrialization to 1860, 1978, as well as R. Samuel, ‘Workshop of 
the World: Steam Power ad Hand Technology in Mid-Victorian Britain’ in History Workshop, III, 1977, pp. 
6-72.  
36 Cain and Hopkins ‘The Political Economy’, p. 465. 
37 P. Anderson, ‘The Origin of the Present Crisis’ in New Left Review, Jan.-Feb. 1964, pp. 26-53. 
38 T. Nairn, ‘The Twilight of the British State’ in New Left Review, Jan.-April, 1977, pp. 3-61 and F. 
Longstreth, ‘The City, Industry and the State’ in C. Crouch (ed.) State and Economy in Contemporary 
Capitalism, 1979, pp. 157-190. 
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challenge the dominance of the City (or financial capitalists) on British economic policy.39  
The campaign was eventually unsuccessful mainly because the campaigners could not 
overcome the internal divisions within the industrial sectors.  Thus some sectors, such as 
shipbuilding, and the working class, who demanded cheap foods, still supported free trade. 
 
These theoretical arguments were supported by statistical studies on the geographical and 
occupational distributions of wealth in the U.K. by Rubinstein and Lee during the 1970s 
and 1980s.40  Rubinstein’s analysis of wealth holders in the nineteenth-century U.K. and 
income tax records revealed that two different types of middle classes existed in Mid-
Victorian Britain: those who were connected with the commerce and finance based in 
London and those who were related to the manufacturing industry located in the North of 
England.  In number, the wealthiest group in the nineteenth-century U.K was the great 
aristocratic landowners.41  Nevertheless, their economic importance relatively declined 
after the second half of the nineteenth century.  Apart from the landed interests, the largest 
group of the wealthiest during this period was not those who were related to the industrial 
sectors in the North of England but the commercial and financial sectors in London.42  This 
economic supremacy of London in terms of wealth is supported by the figures of income 
tax levied on persons whose annual income was more than £150 (equivalent to the middle-
class) during the period 1879-1880.43  This statistical evidence also confirmed that 
compared to the provincial towns in the North, a disproportionately large size of wealth 
were located in London.  Ten London boroughs with 3,453,300 population was assessed 
for £87,674,000 whilst twenty-eight provincial towns with 5,577,300 population were 
assessed for £78,106,000 (including Liverpool for £11,014,00, Manchester and Salford for 
£10,800,000 and Birmingham for £4,016,000).44  From these facts, he argued that ‘The 
industrial elite was much the weakest of the three, less wealthy either collectively or 
individually… than the commercial elite and vastly less influential than the landowners.’45 
 
Lee reached a similar conclusion.  In his research, he analysed information from the 
Census of Population during the Victorian period for 52 regions with 27 industrial sectors 
                                               
39 Longstreth ‘The City, Industry and the State’ pp. 162-163. 
40 W. D. Rubinstein, ‘Wealth, Elites and the Class Structure of Modern Britain’ in Past and Present, LXXVI, 
1977, pp. 991-112, ‘The Victorian Middle Classes: Wealth, Occupation and Geography’ in The Economic 
History Review, New Seri., Vol. 30, No. 4, 1977, pp. 602-623, Men of Property, 1981, Capitalism, Culture 
and Decline in Britain 1750-1990, 1993, and C. H. Lee, ‘Regional Growth and Structural Change in 
Victorian Britain in The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1981, pp. 438-552. 
41 Rubinstein, ‘Wealth, Elites and the Class Structure’, pp. 102-104. 
42 Ibid., pp. 104-107. 
43 Ibid., pp. 108-112. 
44 Ibid., pp. 109-110. 
45 Ibid., p. 121. 
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in the U.K.  He argued that economic growth all over the country during that period was 
not homogenous but regional differences existed in the type of industrial sectors, 
employment structure and population growth.46  Then, he pointed out that: 
 
… There were three major types of growth regions, as well as the large group of rural 
areas which had little or no growth.  These were the groups comprising Durham, 
Northumberland. Glamorgan and Monmouth; that most consistently represented by 
Lancashire and the West Riding; and finally the greater London area, best defined by 
the Home Counties.47 
 
Lee identified the first group and the second group as the regions whose economic growth 
was largely dependent on the industrial sectors, i.e. coal-mining and textile manufacturing 
respectively, whilst the third type of economic structure in South-east England consisted of 
services, plus consumer and market orientated manufacturing trades.48  He explained that 
London and the Home Counties were the leading population growth area in the Victorian 
period, and that service and construction industries occupied 52 per cent of the net increase 
of new jobs nationally during the period 1841-1911.49  South-east England was particularly 
associated with this type of economic activity.  He concluded that London and 
neighbouring areas with the service/consumer industries held a superior position to other 
regions with export-orientated manufacturing industries in the British economy.   
 
These studies on the economic supremacy of South-east England were further developed 
by other historians who gave their attention to the commercial and financial activities of 
the City of London.  For example, S. D. Chapman extensively used the records of the 
Rothschilds and the Barings and other merchant-bankers.50  He analysed in detail their 
historical development and their activities in merchant-banking business, such as trade 
financing and capital export, in the context of the growth of the international economy 
before the First World War.  L. E. Davis and R. A. Huttenback’s study also revealed 
London businessmen’s preference of overseas investment over investment in domestic 
industry.51 
 
                                               
46 Lee, ‘Regional Growth and Structural Change’ section II-III. 
47 Ibid., p. 447. 
48 Ibid., p. 447-449 
49 Ibid. 
50 S. D. Chapman, The Rise of Merchant Banking, 1984. 
51 L. E.  Davis and R. A. Huttenback, Mammon and The Pursuit of Empire: The Economics of British 
Imperialism, 1988, Chapter 7.  
 13 
In their articles of 1986 and 1987, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion 
Overseas’, Cain and Hopkins defined British capitalism as gentlemanly capitalism, in 
which non-industrial sectors, i.e. landed, financial and service sectors, played the main role 
in Britain’s overseas expansion since the late seventeenth century.52  Later their arguments 
developed further in two volumes of their work, British Imperialism.53 Although they 
admitted the importance of considering peripheral areas in the study of imperialism, they 
argued that it was more significant for historians to return their attention to metropolitan 
factors.  In other words, they reassessed the relationship between economic development in 
the centre and the overseas extension of Britain’s informal or formal control.  At a first 
glance, their emphasis on the metropolis and financial sectors was similar to Hobson’s or 
Lenin’s theory.  However, on the one hand, Hobson and Lenin thought of imperialism as 
the mature stage or the ‘highest stage of capitalism’ in Lenin’s words.  On the other hand, 
Cain and Hopkins found the cause of British imperialism in the continuous development of 
gentlemanly capitalism over three hundred years since the end of the seventeenth century.  
In addition, they paid attention not only to modern capitalism, but also to ‘the fact that 
capitalism was under the social and political direction of older elites’ for the explanation of 
imperialism.54  In this sense, their argument was also influenced by Schumpeter.55 
 
The characteristic of gentlemanly capitalists was that they were non-industrial economic 
interests.  After the Glorious Revolution in 1688, a new politico-economic system in 
Britain dominated by aristocrats and gentry, whose power came from land, was established 
in Britain.  Because this system depended on patronage and national debts, the landed 
interests needed strong financial support. Therefore, they allied with the financial sector in 
the City of London which largely developed after the financial revolution of the 1690s 
(including the establishment of the Bank of England and the creation of the national debt) 
ahead of the Industrial Revolution in the middle of the eighteenth century.  As the state 
could raise necessary funds by issuing national bonds in the City, the City interests 
increased their political influence.  When this old gentlemanly capitalism faced the crisis of 
huge national debt in the continuous wars after the French Revolution, the system needed 
reformation.  This change was gradually achieved by the top of the state, and the policy 
                                               
52 Cain and Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly capitalism and British expansion overseas I. The Old Colonial System, 
1688’ in The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. XXXIX, 4, 1986, pp. 501-525, and ‘Gentlemanly 
capitalism and British expansion overseas II, new imperialism, 1850-1845’ in The Economic History Review, 
New Series, Vol. XL, 1, 1987, pp. 1-26.   
53 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and expansion 1688-1914., and British Imperialism: 
Crisis and Deconstruction 1914-1990, 1993.  
54 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-1914. p. 14. 
55 J. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes, 1951. 
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makers chose a balanced budget and free trade, instead of dependence on the national debt 
and protectionism.  They were aware of the rapid growth of financial and service sectors in 
free trade.  Although its free trade policy forced the landed interests to decline after the 
second half of the nineteenth century, gentlemanly capitalism was reborn with the 
superiority of financial and service sector to the agricultural sector.  Those who worked in 
this sector shared the same sense of values with the aristocratic landed interest as the result 
of their social and cultural merger.  Gentlemanly capitalists shared similar educational 
backgrounds, lifestyle and morals based on the aristocratic values.  Cain and Hopkins’ 
view of the continuity of gentlemanly capitalists’ superior position in the British economy 
and their social and cultural assimilation to the landed elite contrasted with the argument of 
such historians as M. J. Wiener, who insisted that Britain was an industrial society and that 
the ‘gentrification of industrialist’ led to its decline after the 1870s.56 
 
This close relationship between the two interests gave gentlemanly capitalists a strong 
influence on Britain’s economic and foreign policy.  Britain’s free trade policy based on 
the gold standard created the multilateral trading system in the world economy, and 
London established itself as the hub of this system.   This was significant to primary 
producing countries, which were integrated into the international economy, since they had 
to export in order to repay their debts to British investors.  The large surplus of Britain’s 
invisible trade enabled the country to make up the deficit on the balance of trade.  This fact 
also gave the financial and commercial interest groups of the City a strong influence on 
Britain’s economic policy.  The reflection of the City’s interests to Britain’s political and 
economic decision-making led to the relatively weak influence of manufacturing interests 
on state policy.  Cain and Hopkins argued that: 
 
… The number of fortunes amassed by industrialists did not compare with those 
derived from land and from the financial and service sector, and industry’s direct 
political influence remained limited long after the reform of 1832, not least because 
the Bounderbys of the midlands and the north of England… had neither the time nor 
the social connexions to shape national policy, which was directed by the “landcracy” 
and its allies in London.57 
 
The manufacturing interests acquired benefits from the economic and foreign policy as 
                                               
56 M. J. Wiener, English Culture and The Decline of The Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980, Second Edition, 2004, 
p. 154.  He argued that ‘Over the past century, then, high among the internal checks upon British economic 
growth has been a pattern of industrial behavior suspicious of change, reluctant to innovate, energetic only in 
maintaining the status quo.   This pattern of behavior traces back in large measure to the cultural absorption 
of the middle classes into a quasi-aristocratic elite, which nurtured both the rustic and nostalgic myth of an 
“English way of life” and the transfer of interest and energies away from the creation of wealth.’  
57 Cain and Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly capitalism I’, p. 512. 
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long as their view was matched with that of the financial and service sector.  
 
 
1.5. The Gentlemanly Capitalism Controversy 
 
The introduction of the ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’ by Cain and Hopkins led to large 
historical debates.  First of all, their argument that the industrial sector located in the north 
played a less important role in Britain’s imperial expansion than had been traditionally 
assumed by other historians became one of the main points of this controversy.   For 
example, Daunton insisted that ‘the industrial north’ created demands for the financial and 
service sector in south-east England; the City played a role in accepting bills of exchange, 
providing shipping services, insurance and banking for exporting British manufacturing 
products and importing raw materials and foods from overseas.58  Landowners were 
involved in industry to increase the profits from their land, too.   Dumett also pointed out 
that the aristocratic landowners and gentry families invested in or owned mines and 
factories.59  Therefore, in Daunton’s words, ‘industrial growth and the development of the 
financial and commercial services of the City were intimately related rather than 
independent’.60  H. V. Bowen also explained the economic influence of the East India 
Company (EIC), the typical example of the gentlemanly capitalists’ institution in the 
eighteenth century, over the domestic manufacturing industry through the Company’s 
demand for export goods.61  In his recent work, he argued that ‘In general, it can be argued 
that for the period before 1850 Cain and Hopkins have given too much weight to 
metropolitan factors within the dynamic imperialism, and they downplay the importance of 
the British provinces in overseas expansion.’62 ’Moreover, Cain and Hopkins suggested a 
model in which the prominence of the power of the City partly came from ‘one single 
voice’ while disagreements among the industrial interests weakened their own influence 
over state policy.  However, Cannadine argued that ‘the City was never a unified lobby 
that the authors’ [Cain and Hopkins] argument requires it to have been: it was a 
bewilderingly diverse place, in which the few great dynasties like the Rothschilds and 
                                               
58 M. J. Daunton, ‘Home and Colonial’ in Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1995, pp. 356-
357. 
59 R. E. Dumett (ed.) Gentlemanly capitalism and British Imperialism, 1999, p. 8. 
44 Daunton, ‘Home and Colonial’. p. 356.   D. Cannadine also has a similar argument in ‘The Empire Strike 
Back’ in Past and Present.  147, 1995, pp. 190-191. 
61 H. V. Bowen, ‘Sinews of trade and empire: the supply of commodity exports to the East India Company 
during the late eighteenth century’ in The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. LV, 3, 2002, pp. 466-
486. 
62 Bowen, The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756-1833, 2006, pp. 27-
28. 
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Barings were quite untypical of the whole’.63  In addition, in British Imperialism, they 
hardly mentioned the role of the non-English British in the British Empire.  Cannadine 
pointed out that ‘Cardiff exported its coals (and its miners) all over the world.  The 
Scottish were especially important in the affairs of Canada and India.  And so were (and 
are) the Irish in Australia…’ 64  In Cain and Hopkins’ model, the gentlemanly capitalist 
society had a similar social background and was exclusive.  Therefore, it was difficult for 
even English industrialists to enter it, to say nothing of Celtic elements.  
 
The second point at issue in the ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’ concerned the formation of 
British political and economic policies.  In their work, Cain and Hopkins stressed the close 
relationship between the City and Whitehall.  In their model, the gentlemanly capitalists 
and British policy-makers always had a consensus of political and economic views based 
on sharing an aristocratic sense of values.  Therefore, it was always difficult for outsiders 
such as industrialists to break into this interlocked and closed society, and the City’s 
interests always reflected the governmental policies.  In this respect, Y. Cassis developed a 
similar argument in his analysis of bankers in the nineteenth century.65  He pointed out that 
after the period between 1820 and 1840, bankers assimilated into the circle of aristocracy 
by sharing education at major public schools and Oxbridge and the pattern of social life 
with them and creating a genealogical network through the repetitions of inter-marriage 
within these two groups.  This resulted in ‘the identity of views between political and 
banking circles’.66  Nevertheless, according to Daunton’s argument, in the first half of the 
nineteenth century the main objective of the British government’s social and economic 
policies was to protect industrial interests by achieving domestic social stability.  He 
argued that the protectionism in the 1810s to guard the old landed interests led to a 
shortage of food for industrial workers and the social unrest represented by Chartism and 
radicalism, and that the change of economic policy toward free trade in the 1820s aimed to 
increase the import of cheap food and raw materials for industrial interests.67  Cannadine 
had the same view of the formation of imperial policy and indicated that Cain and Hopkins 
coyly admit that one can find some disagreement between the City and policymakers in the 
process of imperial policy-making.68 
 
                                               
63 Cannadine, ‘The Empire Strike Back’, pp. 190-191. 
64 Ibid.  pp. 191.  
65 Y. Cassis, ‘Bankers in English Society in the Late Nineteenth Century’ in The Economic History Review, 
New Series, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1985, pp. 210-229.  
66 Ibid., p. 229. 
67 Daunton, ‘Home and Colonial’.  p.  354. 
68 Cannadine, ‘The Empire Strike Back’. p. 191.  
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The third point of their controversy is the validity of the ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’ for 
the explanation of the three-hundred-year history of British overseas expansion.  The 
‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’ works best in explaining British Imperial activities during 
the second half of the nineteenth century. But adapting their thesis to other periods has led 
to greater debates.  For instance, A. Webster has recently questioned the validity of their 
thesis for the first half of the nineteenth century by examining the London East India 
agency houses and the provincial pressure groups after the total abolition of the East India 
Company’s monopoly in the East India trade in 1833.69  His research showed that the 
relationship between gentlemanly capitalists in London, British private traders in the East 
and provincial commercial and manufacturing interests during this period was not as 
simple as Cain and Hopkins argued.  The gentlemanly capitalists in London failed to unify 
their opinion in the debates over Indian bank schemes and the lobbying activities of 
provincial commercial and manufacturing interests effectively prevented these plans from 
being realised.  In his conclusion, he suggested that a modified version of the ‘gentlemanly 
capitalist thesis’ is necessary for the explanation of British imperialism in the East during 
this period.70 
 
Fourthly, several critics of their thesis argued that they tend to give too much emphasis to 
the economic dominance of London-based gentlemanly capitalists over Britain’s formal 
and informal empires in order to explain the expansion of British influence.  L. Davis cast 
doubt on their definition of informal imperialism by using the case of Latin America and 
the United States.71  He insisted that Cain and Hopkins shared a similar view to Platt that 
‘British governments intervened in South America’s international affairs only when 
international law had been broken or when British lives and property were at risk’.72  
However, he argued that what Cain and Hopkins described as British informal imperialism 
could be normal economic activities in the world economy based on free trade and free 
movement of capital.  He gave examples of similar economic ‘punishment’ which local 
governments of the United States, which was the largest debtor in British investment but 
Cain and Hopkins never regarded as the part of British Informal Empire, and those of Latin 
American countries suffered from when they defaulted on their debts.  Moreover, he 
argued that the flow of capital from Britain to Argentina, Australia, Canada and the United 
                                               
69 A. Webster, ‘The strategies and limits of gentlemanly capitalism: the London East India agency houses, 
provincial commercial interests, and the evolution of British economic policy in South and South East Asia 
1800-1850, in The Economic History Review, LIX 4, 2006, pp. 743-764. 
70 Ibid., p. 762. 
71 L. Davis, ‘The late nineteenth-century British imperialist: The specification, qualification and controlled 
conjectures’ in Dummet, Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Empire,  pp. 84-94. 
72 Ibis. pp. 84. 
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States can be attributed to pull factors (their domestic demands for British capital) in these 
four countries rather than push factors (British policies).73   
 
R. Kubicek also suggested an alternative view of the relation between Britain and the white 
dominions.74  For example, in the Canadian case, he emphasized the importance of the role 
of the Canadian government and local investors as well as British investments in the 
economic development of Canada.  His view of the relationship between the metropolis 
and the dominions was based on interdependence for mutual advantage and the dominions’ 
economic policies aimed to minimise their dependence on the mother country rather than 
being a result of the dominance of British capital over the dominions.  Similarly Cain and 
Hopkins’ London-centred view of nineteenth and twentieth-century Asia was criticised by 
some Japanese scholars, such as S. Akita and K. Sugihara.75  Both insisted on the 
significance of the rapid development of intra-Asian trade in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  The rapid expansion of intra-Asian trade was triggered by Asian 
factors, namely the establishment of a modern cotton industry in both India and Japan, but 
the western impact was also necessary for the development of intra –Asian trade.  In this 
model, Asian countries needed to import capital and manufactured products from Britain 
and other western countries in order to construct infrastructures for the further continuous 
expansion of the trade, while the City’s financial and service sector benefited from the 
growth of trade.  Therefore, Akita and Sugihara insisted that the growth of intra-Asia trade 
and the gentlemanly capitalists in Britain were complementary. 
 
The fifth point of Cain and Hopkins’ controversy was that they explained the cause of 
British imperial expansions by focusing on the expansion of the gentlemanly capitalists’ 
activities over the world.  In other words, they identified the economic interests based 
mainly on London as the main engine of expansion of Britain’s formal and informal 
dominance.  However, some scholars have criticised their view for the narrow Anglo-
centred and economic-determined view.   In British Imperialism, Cain and Hopkins 
stressed the economic factors within Britain, although they admitted the role of military, 
naval and strategic elements for the development of Britain’s world hegemony in the 
nineteenth century.  Some critics argued that this point, especially the role of the Royal 
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Navy in the peripheries, should be emphasised more than the two scholars did in their work.  
In order to integrate these peripheral areas into the metropolitan economy and maintain 
them, Britain often employed its supreme naval power.  According to B. Gough, the navy 
played a part in territorial acquisitions and the defence and maintenance of Britain’s 
overseas assets related to the financial and service sector, and British governments’ policy-
making.76  Nevertheless, at the same time, he insisted that between 1815 and 1890 on many 
occasions the actions of the Royal Navy primarily depended on the assessments of crises in 
peripheries by commanders on the spot.  This means that in these events the reactions of 
the navy were independent from the metropolitan elements related to the ‘gentlemanly 
capitalists’ in the metropolis and derived from consular activities and local financial 
considerations in peripheries.   
 
 
1.6. The East Indies and the gentlemanly capitalist thesis 
 
As one of the major instruments of British Imperialism, the East India Company has 
attracted historians’ interest.  When the ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’ was applied to the 
context of British dominance over India through the EIC, Cain and Hopkins argued that the 
company embodied the old type of ‘gentlemanly capitalists’. 77  Then, they emphasised that 
the company’s decline and demise was due to the gentlemanly capitalists’ attempts to 
overcome the ‘old corruption’ based on patronage and national debts within the company, 
and to maintain and enlarge the structure of overseas remittances from India to Britain.  
For a long time, the abolition of the EIC’s monopoly had been regarded as the result of the 
increase of political influence of provincial ports and manufacturing towns in the progress 
of the Industrial Revolution, but Cain and Hopkins tried to refute this traditional view.  
This thesis examines the validity of the ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’ by analysing the 
lobbying activities of the provincial commercial and manufacturing interests against the 
renewal of the EIC’s charter because their free trade campaigns were serious challenges to 
the dominance of the gentlemanly capitalists over the East India trade.   
 
As has been mentioned, the debates over the renewal of the East India Charter in the first 
half of the nineteenth century have received attention from several historians.  In his 
classic work, The East India Company 1784-1834, C. H. Philips described the progress of 
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77 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-1914, Chapter 10. 
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the negotiation between the state, the EIC and the general deputations of the provincial 
ports and towns in the debates over the renewal of the East India Charter of 1813 and that 
of 1833.78  Webster’s study of 1990 examined the motives of the government in the case of 
renewal of the East India Charter of 1813, and briefly explained that provincial ports and 
manufacturing towns had different interests during the movement.79  He argued that both 
the City of London and provincial manufacturing towns and outports failed to exercise 
their decisive influence on the state.  Instead, he stressed the Government’s role.  He 
explained that the decision on the renewal of the charter was made because of ‘changing 
government economic priorities, resulting from the pressures of war’.80   
 
However, little detailed research has been conducted on the lobbying activities of each 
provincial port or manufacturing town for the opening of the East India trade.  In his PhD 
thesis on the abolition of the EIC’s charter, D. Eyles briefly examined the economic 
interests of Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, Exeter and Sheffield and their lobbying 
activities during the 1820s and the early 1830s.81  Another case study was conducted by J. 
Moss in 1976.82  He analysed Birmingham’s campaigns against the Orders in Council and 
the East India Charter during the period 1812 to 1813.  He argued that the case of 
Birmingham indicated the rise of provincial towns and the growth of ‘the power of 
organised public opinion’ there.  In respect to Liverpool, a few studies have been done.  
Regarding the free trade movement of 1812-1813, Checkland described Liverpool’s 
campaign in a part of John Gladstone’s biography.83   Although he described Gladstone’s 
roles in the campaign and his views on the East India trade, he did not examine Liverpool’s 
lobbying organisation in detail.  In addition, Checkland as well as Tolley very briefly 
described its campaign in the context of the debates over the Orders in Council.84  K. 
Charlton also studied the campaign of the Liverpool merchants against the EIC’s 
monopoly in the 1820s and the early 1830s.85  In this article, his argument focused on the 
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No. 1, 1952, pp. 58-75, and B. H. Tolley, ‘The Liverpool Campaign Against the Orders in Council and the 
War of 1812’, in J. R. Harris, (ed.) Liverpool and Merseyside, 1969, Chapter. 5. 
85 K. Charlton, ‘Liverpool and the East India Trade’ in Northern History, Vol. VII, 1972, pp. 55-72. 
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significant roles of the anti-slavery feelings of its merchants and the shift of their economic 
interests from the West Indies to the East Indies in their campaign.   
 
In this thesis, two campaigns organised by merchants and manufacturers in Glasgow, 
Liverpool and Manchester against the renewal of the East India Charter during 1812-1813, 
and 1829-1833 will be examined, although because of the lack of historical sources, 
Manchester’s case will be confined to the later period.  As the result of the renewal of the 
East India Charter of 1813, the India trade was opened to all British subjects, and then after 
the next renewal of the charter of 1833 the company’s monopoly of the China trade was 
abolished.  In a traditional view, these events have been regarded as the result of the 
increase of political influence of provincial ports and manufacturing towns in the progress 
of the Industrial Revolution.  Those three cities formed a core part of the lobbying 
activities of several outports and provincial manufacturing towns.  During that period, 
Glasgow, Liverpool and Manchester had different local economies; Liverpool was largely 
dependent on commercial activities based on its port; Manchester was the centre of the 
cotton manufacturing industry in Lancashire; and Glasgow played roles as both a trading 
port and a manufacturing centre.  This thesis will explore how these three cities with their 
different economic interests organised their free trade campaigns.   
 
 The five points of issue raised by historians over the ‘gentlemanly capitalists thesis’ have 
already been explained.  This thesis will mainly contribute to the first point, that is to say, 
the historical debate over the position of the provincial commercial and manufacturing 
interests in the formation of the British Empire.  This research will re-examine the degree 
of influence of provincial commercial and manufacturing interests in the formation of 
Britain’s imperial policy by analysing the extensive primary sources on the provincial 
campaigns against the EIC’s monopoly, especially the records of the Glasgow East India 
Association stored at Glasgow’s Mitchell Library, which rarely attracted historians’ 
attention until Webster’s recent work.  As has been described, since the introduction of the 
‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’, the devaluation of the roles of British industrialists in the 
creation of the British Empire has been one of the main debates on Cain and Hopkins’ 
model.  On the one hand, they emphasised the failure of provincial industrialists to unify 
their opinions for political influence over national politics. On the other hand, this thesis 
will show the effectively organised campaigns of provincial interests against the renewal of 
the EIC’s charter during the first half of the nineteenth century in spite of their different 
economic interests.  This thesis will also examine the division between the gentlemanly 
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capitalists in London and the provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests, and will 
show the closer relationship between the provincial commercial and manufacturing 
interests and the gentlemanly capitalists of London than Cain and Hopkins argued, 
especially after the opening of the India trade in 1813.  This research will also give some 
answers to the question of how the Scots contributed to the formation of the British Empire 
by focusing on the lobbying activities organised by Glasgow’s merchants and 
manufacturers.  Cain and Hopkins’ Anglo-centred view failed to give attention to the role 
of Scotland in British Imperialism, whilst the previous studies on the debates on the 
renewal of the EIC’s Charter tend to emphasise the political influence of manufacturing 
interests in Lancashire.  This thesis will reveal that in the campaigns for free access to the 
East, Glasgow played a very significant role, along with Liverpool.   
 
In the following chapters, first the conditions of the EIC and the East India trade will be 
explained.  Then, the campaigns of the provincial lobbying groups in Glasgow, Liverpool 
and Manchester during the periods 1812-13 and 1829-1833 will be examined. 
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Chapter 2.  The East India Company  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In the context of British imperialism, the century after the Battle of Plassey in 1757 is a 
significant period for scholars, who emphasise the significance of the Industrial Revolution 
and the development of industrial capitalists which they regarded as major changes in 
British politics and economy.  During this period, the EIC changed its status from trading 
company to ruler of the Indian Subcontinent and gradually lost its monopolistic trading 
activities and eventually its political operations too.  For those who follow the Marxist 
tradition with respect to the British economy, this period was one of the victory of 
industrial capitalists over the old landed interests’ symbolised by the establishment of free 
trade.  According to Marx, the EIC was a symbol of old mercantilism, and the growth of 
British industry was a significant factor in bringing about changes in the economic and 
political relationship between Britain and India, which had been defined by the 
monopolistic company for over two hundred years.1  On the other hand, although they 
emphasise peripheral elements in their later works, Gallagher and Robinson, who 
attempted to refute both Marxist and the older western views, began their argument by 
presupposing that ‘British industrialisation caused an ever-extending and intensifying 
development of overseas regions’.2   Moreover, though Cain and Hopkins proposed the 
continuity of the dominant position of ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ in the formation of British 
imperial policy after the Glorious Revolution, they also argue that the period was critical 
for British imperialism because the old type of gentlemanly capitalism which was rooted in 
the world of ‘Old Corruption’ faced a ‘crisis’ by the end of this period.  It eventually 
reproduced itself by the merger of landed and financial interests after the 1850s.3  The 
economic and administrative policies of the EIC and the state on the East Indies were 
largely influenced by these changes in the metropolitan economy.  Many historians have 
considered peripheral factors, such as the roles of ‘the men on the spot’, important for 
British colonial expansion over India.  At the same time, as Cain and Hopkins emphasised, 
the metropolitan factors are also influential.4  In this chapter, first, the social and economic 
backgrounds of the directors, stockholders and civil and military servants of the EIC after 
the second half of the eighteenth century will be analysed in the context of gentlemanly 
                                               
1 T. Kemp, Theory of Imperialism, 1967, p. 16. 
2 Gallagher and Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, p. 5.  
3 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism; 1688-1914, chap. 2. 
4 Ibid., pp. 8-11. 
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capitalism through consulting the previous works of Cohn, Parker, Bourne, Bowen and 
other historians.  Second, the EIC’s territorial expansion and the gradual changing of the 
EIC’s function will be described.  Third, economic relationships between trade, shipping 
and remittance under the company’s monopoly after 1757 will be explained.  Fourth, the 
growth of critics against the EIC’s monopoly will be described. 
 
 
2.2. Social and economic background of the EIC’s directors, stockholders and civil 
and military servants  
 
According to Cain and Hopkins, ‘The East India Company was undoubtedly the most 
impressive manifestation of the alliance between land and finance in the eighteenth 
century.’5  As the establishment of Britain’s economic and political dominance over India 
rested on the company until 1858, Britain’s imperial policy in India was largely influenced 
by those who were involved in the company.  The economic backgrounds and social 
origins of these individuals are the most significant elements of gentlemanly capitalism.  
The analysis of those who made up the EIC from the view of these two points will help to 
reveal the nature of the company.  Earlier works had referred to the economic backgrounds 
and the social origins of the company’s directors and the stockholders prior to Cain and 
Hopkins’ development of the ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’.  Philips described the 
formation of Britain’s Indian policy and the relationship between the company and the 
state in the period from the passing of Pitt’s India Act in 1784 until the cessation of the 
company’s trading activities in 1834.  He focused on the rise and fall of different economic 
interests within the proprietors and directors of the EIC, and the members of Parliament.6  
His work provided analytical foundation to the studies conducted by Cohn, Bourne, Parker 
and Bowen.7  Cohn and Bourne mainly focused on the patronage of EIC’s civil and 
military servants, while Parker’s study revealed in detail the individual career of each 
director of the company in the second half of the eighteenth century.  Bowen also 
conducted work on the social background of the company’s stockholders during the second 
half of the eighteenth century.  As will be described in the following, their studies 
                                               
5 Ibid., pp. 320-321 
6 Philips, The East India Company 1784-1834, 1940.  
7 B. S. Cohn, 'Recruit and Training of British Civil Servants in India, 1600-1860', in R. Brailbanti (ed.) Asian 
Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition, 1966, Chap. 3, J. M. Bourne, 'The Civil 
and Military Patronage of the East India Company', PhD thesis, Leicester University, 1977, and   J. G. Parker, 
‘The Directors of The East India Company 1754-1790’ PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1977, H. V. 
Bowen, ‘Investment and empire in the late eighteenth century: East India stockholding, 1756-1791’ in The 
Economic History Review, New Series, vol. XLII, 1989, No. 2, pp. 186-206. 
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generally supported the view that there existed important connections between the EIC and 
gentlemanly capitalists. 
 
 
The Directors of the Company had several different occupational backgrounds. Bourne 
identified seven main backgrounds: bankers, ship-owners, so-called ‘free merchants’, City 
merchants, retired servants of the EIC, the maritime service of the EIC and the Indian bar.8  
Figure 2-1 shows Imai’s data based on works of Bourne and Parker to show the 
composition of the Court of Directors by their occupational backgrounds and its change 
during the period between 1754 and 1858.  The figure shows the connection between the 
gradual development of the company’s political function and the decline of its commercial 
activities, and the change in the nature of the Court of Directors.  Before Clive’s conquest 
of Bengal in the second half of the 1750s and the first half of the 1760s, 80 per cent of the 
directors were merchants or financiers in London (mainly based in the City) and those who 
were related with the shipping businesses, such as ship owners, captains and shipbuilders.  
Their occupations were strongly related to the company’s commercial activities.  The 
merchants of the City were involved in sales of East India produce in Britain and other 
European countries and the supply of merchandise for exporting to India.  The financiers 
provided capital and insurance to the company’s trading businesses.  Meanwhile, those 
who were related to the shipping businesses supplied the company with the ships and 
personnel necessary for voyages.   In spite of its fluctuations, the share of shipping 
businesses was relatively stable until the 1840s, compared with that of merchants and 
financiers, which dramatically declined after the opening of the India trade in 1813.
                                               
8 Bourne, ‘The Civil and Military’, pp. 38-49.  He defines ‘free merchants’ as “Merchants who had secured 
the EIC’s permission to proceed to India (necessary before 1833), but who did not belong to the Company’s 
service.”  They are also often called ‘Private merchants’. 
 26 
Figure 2-1. The Composition of the Court of Directors by Occupational Groups and its Change (1754-1858). 
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Note: C = Merchants and financiers of the City, S = Shipping businesses, I = Those who had worked as Company civil or military servants and P = Private merchants.  A category, ‘Others’, 
includes Directors whose economic interests are unknown.  
Source: S. Imada, Pakusu Buritanika to Syokuminchi Indo, p. 94, Table 2-3.  He calculated from Parker, ‘The Directors of the East Company’, Section 1 for figures in the period between 
1754 and 1790, and Bourne, ‘The Civil and Military Patronage’, pp. 313-23 for between 1790 and 1858. 
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After the EIC’s acquisition of Bengal, the share of those who had worked as Indian civil or 
military servants gradually increased, and in 1814 they became the majority in the Court of 
Directors for the first time.  The reduction of the share of directors whose businesses were 
related to the EIC’s commercial activities and the increase of directors who had experience 
of working in India seems to have been related to a change in the nature of the company 
from a trading company to an administrative institution.  Around the 1800s, merchants and 
bankers of the City who began to show their preference towards free trade, such as Francis 
Barings, gradually lost interest in the company’s monopolistic trade with the East Indies.9  
The opening of the India trade in 1813 lessened the significance of the company for the 
commercial activities of the City merchants and bankers, and the result was a reduction in 
the number of directors who conducted commercial and financial businesses in the City.  
In the meantime, as British territories rapidly expanded over India after the second half of 
the eighteenth century, the EIC’s role as a governing body of India increased in 
significance.  Consequently, this reflected the increase in the number of directors who were 
related to the political dimension of the EIC.  In spite of these changes, the positions of the 
EIC’s directors were occupied by those whose economic backgrounds were compatible 
with those of the gentlemanly capitalists.  Although the Directors’ occupational 
backgrounds were varied, their residences concentrated in certain areas.  For example, 
Cohn explains that: 
 
Of the thirty directors of the company in 1816, twenty-four lived in London; of these 
twenty-four, fourteen lived within an area one mile by one-half mile in Marylebonne, 
on Banker Street, Harley Street, and the square of this area.  Nineteen of the twenty-
four, including the above mentioned, lived within a mile and a half of Regents Park.10 
 
Moreover, he mentions that all the six directors who did not live in London actually 
resided in Surrey, Essex, Hertfordshire and Kent.  So London and the Home Counties 
dominated.11 
 
As can be seen, the main source of the EIC’s directors was wealthy upper-middle class 
merchants, bankers, and professionals (including retired Company civil and military 
servants) who resided in London and its surrounding areas.  These non-industrial 
capitalists were significant for Cain and Hopkins’ concept of gentlemanly capitalism.  
                                               
9 H. Furber, ‘The Beginning of American Trade with India, 1784-1812’ in R. Rocher (Eds.) Private Fortunes 
and Company Profits in the India Trade in the 18th Century, 1997, Chap. II, pp. 257-259. 
10 Cohn, ‘Recruit and Training’, p. 109.  The seats of the EIC’s directors (fixed at 24) were virtually held by 
30 people in rotation. 
11 Ibid. 
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However, the aristocratic landed interest showed only minor direct involvement in the 
company.12  Among a number of directors, those whose blood relations with the 
aristocracy were certainly limited.  There were such men: Josias du pre Alexander (nephew 
of the Earl of Caledon), William Bensley (his wife was a grand-daughter of the Duke of 
Somerset), William Fullarton Elphinstone (son of Lord Elphinstone), Hugh Lindsay (fifth 
son of the 6th Earl of Balcarres), W. H. L. Melville (son of the 6th Earl of Leven & 7th Earl 
of Melville).13  Although the aristocracy had a strong interest in the company, as their 
several attempts to divert the EIC’s profits from its commercial activities and Indian 
landed revenue to the Treasury indicated, they avoided being involved in the company’s 
management directly.  Of course they may have exercised their influence on the EIC 
indirectly through private connections with the directors who were strongly linked to 
gentlemanly capitalists or through the Board of Control.  
 
Table 2-1. The composition of those who held the EIC’s stocks valued over £1,000 by 
titles (April, 1809). 
  £10,000~ £6,000~ £3,000~ £1,000~ Sum   
Lord (and higher) 3 6 9 36 54 2.4% 
Baronet / Knight 4 1 18 45 68 3.0% 
Esquire (Dame) 28 40 188 809 1065 47.8% 
Clergymen 1 3 4 50 58 2.6% 
Military Service 4 8 27 127 166 7.4% 
Mr. (Mrs) 14 12 118 675 819 36.7% 
Sum 54 70 364 1742 2230 100.0% 
  2.4% 3.1% 16.3% 78.1% 100.0%  
Source: S. Imada, Pakusu Buritanika to syokuminchi Indo, p. 96, Table 2-4.  The figures have been 
calculated from A list of the Members of the United Company of the Merchants of England, Trading to the 
East Indies, Who Stood Qualified as Voters on the Company’s Books, the 11th April 1809. 
 
Imada’s study showed some characteristics of the company’s stockholders 20 years later.  
Table 2-1 shows the composition of those who held over £1,000 of the company’s stocks 
by titles.  In other words, these were the proprietors who were qualified as voters in their 
meeting at that time.  In the table, nearly 50 per cent of such stockholders used titles, and 
over 35 per cent used ‘Mr.’ and ‘Mrs.’14  With the examination of only these titles, it is 
difficult to identify occupational backgrounds and social class.  However, when the fact 
that 74.4 per cent of the 2,230 stockholders of this table had addresses in London and 
surrounding counties is taken into consideration, it is probable that those who could afford 
                                               
12 The aristocratic interest’s limited involvement in the Company is argued by Bowen as well as Bourne.  
Bowen, ‘Investment and empire in the late eighteenth century’, pp. 195-196.   
13 Bourne, ‘The Civil and Military Patronage’, pp. 63-64.   
14 It seems that his categorisation ‘Esquire and Dame’ is not adequate because ‘dame’ should be classified as 
the same category with ‘Baronet’ and ‘Knight’.  However, this failure seems to have little influence on this 
analysis. 
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to invest over £1000 in the Company’s stocks were wealthy merchants, financiers and a 
part of the professions and gentry.15  Bowen’s very recent work confirmed this.  His 
research revealed that over 60 per cent of the total amount of the East India stocks were 
owned by investors with their addresses in London and the Home Counties after 1790, and 
he concluded that ‘the Company retained the major defining characteristic… a close 
association with the merchant, financial, professional, titled, and gentlemanly classes who 
lived in and around the metropolis.’16  The table also shows that only 2.4 per cent of the 
total stockholders were those who had ‘lord’ or higher titles, and that the total value of 
stocks which they held was small.  This implies that the tendency of little direct 
involvement in the Company which the aristocracy had shown in the second half of the 
eighteenth century continued in the early nineteenth century.  In addition, regarding the 
geographical location of investors, Bowen also pointed out that the East India stocks 
scarcely attracted investments from North-West and North-East England, and that there is 
no evidence that the provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests exercised their 
influence through their possessing its stocks in order to access the East Indian markets.17  
Consequently, the company’s stockholders were also strongly linked to gentlemanly 
capitalists. 
 
                                               
15 Imada. Pakusu buritanika to shokuminchi Indo, p. 97. 
16 H.V. Bowen, The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756-1833, 2006, p. 
110. 
17 Ibid. 
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Table 2-2. Occupation of Fathers of Appointees to Haileybury. 
 1809-1810 1819-1820 1829-1830 1839-1840 1849-1850   
No. %. No. %. No. %. No. % No. % Total % 
Company service 18 27 26 30 25 26 46 46 33 43 148 34.74 
Gentlemen 12 18 7 8 12 13 3 3 5 7 39 9.15 
Merchant, manufacturing, banking 9 13 10 11 15 16 10 10 9 12 53 12.44 
Clergy 6 9 7 8 10 11 10 10 7 9 40 9.39 
Royal military and naval service 4 6 8 9 22 23 8 8 5 7 36 8.45 
Civil Service 3 4 2 2 4 4   2 3 11 2.58 
Medical 2 3 2 2 4 4 5 5 1 1 14 3.29 
Legal   4 5 3 3 5 5 3 4 15 3.52 
Member of Parliament 1 1   1 1 1 1   3 0.70 
No information 12 18 22 25 10 11 12 12 10 13 66 15.49 
Farmer         1 1 1 0.23 
Total 67 100 88 100 95 100 100 100 76 100 426 100.00 
 
Source: B. S. Cohn, ‘Recruit and Training of British Civil Servants in India, 1600-1860’, in R. Brailbanti (ed.) Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition, 
1966, p. 107. 
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Table 2-3. Fathers' Occupations of Recruits to the East India Company's Military Service, 1796-1854 (%) 
  1796-1800 1801-1810 1811-1820 1821-1830 1831-1840 1841-1850 1851-1854 Average Total 
Company service 5.6 8.4 16.8 15.3 35.6 29.9 36.1 21.0 
Gentlemen 2.7 2.8 9.1 4.0 7.7 8.3 5.2 5.6 
Merchant, manufacturing, banking 0.9 7.5 6.9 6.5 7.7 6.4 5.2 5.8 
Clergy 7.3 8.7 9.1 4.4 6.7 11.8 12.1 8.5 
H. M. Military and naval service 5.4 6.8 11.2 15.2 18.3 15.2 10.3 11.7 
Medical 4.6 1.9 4.2 2.2 7.7 3.4  3.3 
Legal 5.4 2.8 5.6 9.5 4.8 7.4 12.1 6.8 
Government Service 4.6 1.9 3.5 3.3 2.9 2.9 1.7 2.9 
Member of Parliament 5.4 1.6 1.4 1.1    1.4 
Tradesmen 0.9 4.4 5.6 4.0 1.9 0.5 5.2 3.2 
Other 1.8 5.2 4.9 5.8 4.8 3.9  4.5 
No information 63.8 48.0 21.7 28.7 1.9 10.3 12.1 25.5 
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: J. M. Bourne, ‘The Civil and Military Patronage of the East India Company’, unpublished PhD thesis, Leicester University, 1977, p. 187.  
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Along with the directors and proprietors, the company’s civil and military servants were a 
component of the EIC.  The appointments of both civil and military servants depended on 
the company directors’ patronage.  Tables 2-2 and 2-3 show the occupations of fathers of 
appointees to Haileybury and of recruits to the company’s military service, in other words, 
the social origins of the company’s civil and military servants.  Haileybury was the 
company’s college where students were trained to become its Indian civil servants.  After 
1813, those who finished the college were exclusively appointed to the posts of the 
Company’s civil service.  Those who wanted to go to college had to be nominated by the 
directors.  Table 2-2 indicates that in the first half of the nineteenth century, the most 
common source of the company’s civil servants was the families of company servants, 
which supplied nearly 35 per cent of the total appointees.  This category increased its share 
during the period of the cessation of the company’s commercial activities (26 per cent in 
1829-30 and 46 per cent in 1839-40).  The company’s and King’s civil and military service 
and other professions including ‘Clergy’, ‘Medical’, ‘Legal’ (and probably some of ‘No 
information’) occupied the large majority in the total.  The description as ‘Gentlemen’ in 
this case again needs to be handled with caution.18  However, even if ‘Gentlemen’ was 
regarded as only the landed interest, their share is relatively small.   Although those who 
were from the families of merchant, manufacturing, banking families occupied the range 
between 10 per cent and 16 per cent during the period, they were less significant than those 
from professional families.  In spite of some elements in the landed interest of the 
professions, the appointees were drawn from less wealthy middle-class strata rather than 
the City’s merchants and financiers and the aristocratic landed interest.19  Bourne argued 
that: 
 
The recipients of the East India patronage were drawn from the ‘pseudo-gentry’, 
from the genteel poor and from the sons of East India Company servants who were 
effectively barred, by their lack of connexions and lack of cash, from access to the 
traditional area of gentlemanly employment.20 
 
By such men, the EIC service was regarded as an opportunity to satisfy their ambitions to 
achieve both higher economic and social status which gentlemen enjoyed in their life. 
 
                                               
18 Bourne, ‘The Civil and Military Patronage’, p. 193. 
19 For example, it is likely that a student from the family of clergy had the connection with the landed interest 
as a number of the clergy were second sons of large landowners.  See, Cohn, ‘Recruitment and Training ’, p. 
109.  
20 Bourne, ‘The Civil and Military Patronage of the East India Company’, p. 172.   
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Table 2-4. Place of Birth or Place of Residence of Parents of Appointees to Haileybury, 1809/10-1849/50. 
 1809-1810 1819-1820 1829-1830 1839-1840 1849-1850   
  No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % Total % 
London 20 30 27 31 28 29 22 22 19 25 116 27.23 
Rest of England 26 39 19 22 31 33 22 22 17 22 115 27.00 
Scotland 10 15 11 13 9 9 15 15 9 12 54 12.68 
Ireland 2 3 7 8 3 3 4 4 4 5 20 4.69 
Wales     1 1 1 1   2  
India 4 6 21 24 18 19 34 34 22 29 99 23.24 
Other 4 6 1 1 3 3 2 2 4 5 14 3.29 
No information 1 1 2 2 2 2   1 1 6 1.41 
Total 67 100 88 100 95 100 100 100 76 100 426 100.00 
 
 Source: Cohn, ‘Recruit and Training of British Civil Servants in India’, p. 108. 
 
 
Table 2-5. Place of Birth of Recruits to the East India Company Military Service, 1796-1854 (%). 
  1796-1800 1801-1810 1811-1820 1821-1830 1831-1840 1841-1850 1851-1854 Average Total 
London 21.8 20.4 25.8 22.3 24.1 17.2 13.2 20.7
Rest of England 32.7 33.3 32.7 32.1 19.6 31.0 25.0 29.5
Scotland 18.2 22.4 13.6 15.3 8.9 8.6 11.8 14.1
Ireland 11.8 8.2 8.8 9.6 8.0 5.6 5.9 8.3
India 2.7 9.8 12.9 14.2 29.5 27.2 36.8 19.0
Other 4.6 4.3 1.4 2.6 7.2 8.2 7.3 5.0
No information 8.2 1.7 4.8 4.0 2.7 2.2 3.4
 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
 
Source: Bourne, ‘The Civil and Military Patronage’, p. 174.
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Table 2-4 shows significant characteristics of the geographical origins of the company’s 
civil servants.  Again there is the relative concentration of the appointees’ birthplace and 
their families’ resident places in London: some 27 per cent of the total appointees of the 
table were from London.   However, the share of the appointees who were born in India or 
whose families resided in India increased rapidly from only 6 per cent in 1809-1810 to 29 
per cent in 1849-1850.  These features reflected the directors’ patronage.  Their exercise of 
patronage was largely influenced by the connection between the directors and appointees 
(although their connection was not necessarily a direct one).  Many directors were wealthy 
merchants and bankers of London and most lived in and around the capital.  In this 
connection, those who were from London had a geographical advantage for the 
appointment.  Again, directors who had worked as the company’s Indian servants tended to 
nominate the offspring of those who had worked in India for Haileybury.  As the number 
of such directors increased in the first half of the nineteenth century, the number of the 
appointees with Indian backgrounds also increased. 
 
Tables 2-3 and 2-5 on the recruits to the company’s military service show similar 
tendencies to the case of the civil servants, although Table 2-3 has large unknown elements 
in the earlier periods.   However, it is very likely that during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, the share of the recruits whose fathers had worked as company servants rapidly 
increased, especially in the 1830s as the case of Haileybury shows.  A large proportion of 
recruits were drawn from the families of middle-class professions.  In terms of the 
birthplaces of the recruits, London occupied 20 per cent of the average total.  The share of 
those who were born in India rapidly increased from below 3 per cent during the period 
between 1796 and 1800 to 37 per cent a half century later.  
 
Consequently, the change of composition of the Court of Directors reflected the change in 
the company’s nature from a trading company to a territorial power.  In spite of this change, 
the company continued to be composed of those who were related to gentlemanly 
capitalists.  Although the company’s directors had several occupational backgrounds, they 
were mainly drawn from the wealthy upper-middle-class merchants, bankers and 
professions, particularly company servants, and resided in and around London.  
Meanwhile, the aristocratic landed interest showed little direct involvement in the 
company’s management.  Similar characteristics can be seen in the company’s 
stockholders.  A large part of company civil and military servants were from the families 
of the middle class professions, i.e., the EIC’s and King’s civil and military servants and 
 35 
professionals and they were geographically significantly connected to either London or 
India.  They looked for the means of achieving a gentlemanly status and lifestyle.  Their 
social and economic status was lower than that of the directors, but their social status was 
not far from that of the gentlemanly capitalists.  Moreover, the directors and the company 
servants were significantly connected by the patronage system.   
 
 
2.3. The changing of the EIC’s functions 
 
The history of the EIC can be divided into two different phases.  In the first hundred and 
fifty years, the nature of the company was a commercial organisation for the East India 
trade with limited political and military functions.  In the rest of the period, the company 
gradually developed its roles as an administrative institution for India, and at the same time 
ceased its commercial functions.  The effective acquisition of Bengal by the EIC after the 
battle of Plassey brought about changes in the company, and in its relationship with the 
state.  With the expectation of huge revenues from the land, India was no longer only the 
company’s private interest, but became the national interest of Britain.  Therefore, after the 
acquisition of Bengal, the company’s compatibility with a governing body of India became 
one of the main concerns in British politics.  
 
The grant of diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa by the Mughal Emperor in 1765 added a 
new role to the company’s activities.  They were to collect the landed revenues, expected 
to generate between two million and four million pounds annually to the company.21   
Because in the eighteenth century, the EIC was one of the main financial sources of the 
state, the state recognised that the military and political events in Bengal were significant 
for the Treasury.22  Lord Chatham, the elder Pitt, who formed a cabinet in June 1766, 
regarded the revenues as ‘a kind of gift from heaven’ for the repayment of debts amassed 
during the Seven Years War.23  However, the initial response of the state to the new 
situation in India was not an active one.  First, because until the mid-eighteenth century, 
the intervention of the state into the company’s commercial affairs had been minimal, the 
Ministry was not capable of dealing with Indian affairs, lacking adequate means and 
                                               
21 Bowen, ‘Investment and empire’, p. 187.  
22 Bowen, ‘No Longer Mere Traders: Continuities and Changes in the Metropolitan Development of the East 
India Company, 1600-1834’ in H. V. Bowen, M. Lincoln, and N. Rigby (Eds.) The World of The East India 
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knowledge.24  Second, there was a widespread belief in Britain that the company was the 
best means of exploiting India for the national interest.25  However, it was soon proved that 
the traditional and successful framework in which the EIC had been operating its trading 
activities for many years was no longer expedient in the new phase and had to be reformed, 
since it was facing several crises in India and at home.  
 
The state’s intervention into the EIC began in the 1760s with attempts to divert a part of 
the landed revenues to the Treasury.  Bowen explained that Lord Chatham intended ‘to 
secure a share of the company’s revenue for the state through a formal declaration of the 
British Crown’s ‘right’ to those revenues.’26  His aim was to obtain a new source of 
revenues for the state by arranging a new legal framework without accepting territorial and 
administrative responsibility for India, which would remain in the hands of the company.27  
However, he failed to obtain full support even within the Ministry and had to accept 
compromises during the negotiation because it was anticipated that there would be strong 
resistance to the violation of their chartered rights by the state from the City of London, 
which also had serious interests in other chartered companies.28  As a result, after the 
negotiations between the company and the government, although Lord Chatham finally 
succeeded in agreeing with the company for an annual payment of £400,000 to the 
Treasury in 1767, he failed to make the legal status of the company’s possessions clear.29  
This indicated the London mercantile community was powerful enough to resist the 
Ministry’s attempt to intervene in the Indian affairs at that time.  
 
In the following decades, the EIC suffered severely from the consequences of Clive’s 
conquest of Bengal.  The company showed its inability to cope with the new political and 
economic situations both in India and at home.  The Court of Directors failed to control the 
rapid expansion of the company’s territories in India against their wishes or to regulate the 
misconduct of company servants that became a target of criticism in Britain.  As a result, 
the increase in war and administrative expenses greatly affected its trading activities.   In 
his study, Imada pointed out that there was a correlation between the Company’s financial 
standing in India and the size of its ‘investment’ in goods for export to the U.K. by 
contrasting the period of John Shore, the Governor General, who adopted a non-
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25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 537. 
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intervention policy during the period between 1793 and 1798, and the period of Wellesley, 
who succeeded Shore and aggressively expanded the British territories until 1805.30  The 
EIC also faced serious financial crises at home when they could not meet their obligation 
of annual payment to the State and the demands for clearing bills of exchange on London 
sent from the East during the period.   
 
Since the 1760s, the company’s rule from London over military adventurers in India 
weakened because the will of the company was not unified in the administrators’ struggle 
for power.31  The political instability of the company at home was the consequence of 
changing shareholders’ views.   After the battle of Plassey, they began to regard the EIC as 
more than a secure and profitable object for investment and dividends, and tried to seize 
the initiative in the company’s politics for their own interests.32   In an age when there was 
no means of swift communication over a very long distance, India was too far away for 
London to control ‘the men on the spot’.  Since few directors understood local matters of 
India, there was a gap between the perceptions of directors in London and the reality in 
India.33  Consequently, orders from Leadenhall Street were often not adequate and too late, 
and men in India had to take action in response to local crises.34  The directors tried to 
prevent further territorial conquests, but the local commanders often exploited fear of 
external intervention, especially from the French, and magnified the severity of local 
crises, as an excuse for a series of wars and conquests.35  Once the company achieved its 
territorial possessions, it had to defend them and needed to ally with Indian neighbours.  
This did not allow the EIC to choose isolationism and resulted in further involvement in 
complicated local politics and wars.36  As a result, the British territories under the company 
grew at a rapidly accelerating rate.  The same can also be applied to the failure of the 
company to prevent its servants from accumulating private fortunes in a corrupt manner.   
 
                                               
30 Imada, Pakusu Buritanika to shokuminchi Indo [Pax Britannica and the colonial India], 2000, pp. 43-57. 
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Carlos, ‘Principal-Agent Problems in Early Trading Companies: A Tale of Two Firms’ in The American 
Economic Review, vol. 82, No. 2, 1992, pp. 140-145. 
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The series of wars in India seriously disrupted the company’s commercial activities.  
Marshall pointed out that the civil and military costs of the EIC after the acquisition of 
Bengal increased from an average of approximately £300,000 during the period between 
1756 and 1760 to £2.7 million in 1770.37  The rising war and administrative expenses in 
India prevented the company from diverting the landed revenues to their importing trade.  
A shortage of capital for purchasing goods for return cargoes was usually offset by 
borrowing in India.  This borrowing often took the form of issuing bills of exchange on 
London to those who wanted to send their private fortunes from India to Europe, which 
resulted in the company’s further financial obligations to make repayments for the bills in 
London, and was one of the main factors of the company’s default in 1772.38  
  
The EIC’s financial crisis at home was a really ironic event for both the company and the 
state which expected huge profits from the newly acquired revenue source because the 
decision at the Court of Proprietors of the EIC to increase the regular dividends to 12.5 per 
cent and the agreement of annual payment of £400,000 to the state had been made.39  The 
state was not willing to establish an alternative institution for the British territories in the 
East Indies since it was widely believed that the EIC was only a means to transfer Indian 
fortunes from India to Britain.  By this time, the company had so much influence on both 
British politics and economy that the state could not let it go bankrupt and had to take 
some relief measures for this financial crisis.  Finally the government helped the company 
by offering a loan of £1.4 million, but the EIC had to pay a painful price for it by accepting 
reforms to its commercial and administrative activities both at home and in India.40  In 
Bowen’s words, ‘This [the Company’s default] represented a reversal of long-established 
creditor-debtor roles, and it marked the beginning of a heated period of debate about the 
Company’s methods, strategy, and general worth to the nation.’41 
 
By this time, the Ministry recognised the necessity of broadening its knowledge of the 
EIC’s activities as the importance of Indian affairs for Britain’s national interest increased.  
Its efforts at rapid accumulation of knowledge through two parliamentary committees of 
inquiry during the period between 1772 and 1773 paid off in the introduction of North’s 
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Regulation Act of 1773 (13 Geo. III, c. 63).42  According to Marshall, the Acts had two 
main purposes: first, the Act contained some clauses to reform the company by solving its 
organisational shortcomings both at home and in India.43  Second, the other provisions 
aimed to give the state a responsibility to supervise the Company’s administration in India.  
First, in domestic terms, the Act attempted to alter the continuity of authority of the Court 
of Directors by extending the directors’ tenure of office from one year to four years and 
electing only one quarter of the members annually.44  The provisions also tried to improve 
defects such as the practice of ‘splitting’ stocks, in the company’s voting system, by 
increasing the stocks for the qualification for voting from £500 to £1,000 and limiting the 
qualification to those who held stocks for twelve months before voting in the General 
Court.45   These changes gave the Court of Directors stronger leadership the stockholders 
and servants in India, and ultimately strengthened the ability of the state to influence the 
company through the directors.   
 
Second, in the Indian context, the Act created in Calcutta the Supreme Council, which 
consisted of the Governor General and four councillors with limited executive authority 
over two other Presidencies in Madras and Bombay.46  The Supreme Court of Justice was 
also established in Calcutta and a chief justice and three judges were appointed by the 
Crown.47  In addition, the Act regulated commercial activities conducted by company 
servants in India.48  These organisational reforms in India reflected the state’s intention of 
separating the company’s administrative and judicial functions from its commercial 
functions.   
 
In terms of the relationship between the company and the state, the significant meaning of 
the Act was that this event formed a precedent of overcoming the charters.49  Previously, 
the Ministers had restrained themselves from intervening into the company’s affairs for 
fear of being accused of violating the right of ownership, but they had to do it in order not 
only to rescue the company from the financial crisis for the national interest, but also to 
respond to the widespread critics of company servants’ immoral and corrupting behaviour, 
represented by the ‘nabobs’, newly rich with the Indian fortunes. 
                                               
42 For details, see Bowen, Revenue and Reform, Chap. 9. 
43 Marshall, Problem of Empire, pp. 33-34. 
44 S. Mittra, Indian Constitutional Acts: East India Company to Independence, 2003, p. 2. 
45 Before voting, a large company stockholder often split up his stocks to his supporters for increasing the 
number of votes for him. 
46 Mittra, Indian Constitutional Act, p. 3. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., p. 4. 
49 Hamauzu, Sekai saikyo no shosha, pp. 102-3. 
 40 
 
However, in spite of its significant historical meaning for the relationship between the 
company and the state, the Regulation Act and some minor alterations were far from 
perfect and showed defects at several occasions both at home and in India.  For instance, 
under the new system arranged by the Act, neither could the Court of Directors check the 
company’s aggressive territorial expansion over India under the Governor-General, Warren 
Hastings in the 1770s, nor could the EIC avoid another serious financial embarrassment in 
the first half of the 1780s.  The Governor-General and the Councillors in the Supreme 
Court also often experienced deadlocks over their decisions.  Marshall explained that when 
the company was in financial difficulty and in a weak position, regulations were imposed 
on it by the state.50  After the failure of two attempts made by Henry Dundas and Charles 
James Fox, a new bill to replace the Regulation Act, that is to say, Pitt’s India Act (24 Geo. 
III, c. 25) was finally passed by Parliament in 1784.51  The most significant point of the 
Act was the foundation of the dual control over India by the company and the state.  By the 
Act, the State obtained a right to interfere in the political activities of the company.  The 
Board of Control was established in London and it consisted of six members, i.e. a 
Secretary of State, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and four Privy Councillors, by the 
appointment of the King.52  The main role of the Board of Control was to supervise the 
company’s political and diplomatic functions.  By the Act, it was given the authority to 
inspect and amend the company’s correspondence between London and India.  Before the 
India Act, the General Court had had a right to veto a decision made by the Court of 
Directors, but after 1784, the General Court could not overturn a decision approved by the 
Board of Control.  As a result, the power of the company’s proprietors over Indian affairs 
was significantly weakened. 
 
The EIC’s commercial functions and right of patronage remained in its hands.  
Nevertheless, since its commercial and political operations largely overlapped, it was 
impossible to distinguish between these two clearly.  During the debates over the military 
expenses of the King’s army in India, Henry Dundas insisted that: 
 
Under the Bill of 1784, the Board of Control were warranted in applying the revenues 
of the Company’s territorial acquisitions, to the expense of transporting and 
maintaining the four regiments, which Government thought it necessary to send out 
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to India.  And so fully were they authorized to do this, that if it should appear to 
ministers necessary for the security of those territorial possessions, they had the 
power to apply the whole of the revenues of India to that purpose, without leaving the 
Company a sixpence for their investment.53. 
 
 As this example shows, the state tended to broaden interpretation of the Act and intervene 
in the company’s affairs beyond the purely political matters afterwards.  
 
The India Act also included clauses related to the reforms in India.  In order to improve the 
efficiency of administrative functions in India, the power of the Governor-General both 
within the Supreme Council and over the subordinate Presidencies was strengthened.  The 
number of Councillors was reduced from four to three, and later by the amended Act of 
1786, the Governor General was given authority to veto the decisions made by all 
Presidencies.  Respecting these reforms, many historians agree that the new framework 
provided by the India Act showed a certain measure of success.  For instance, Sutherland 
argued that as a result of these reforms ‘the confusion of the past twenty-five years had 
come to an end and a new era had begun in the Government of India and in the relations of 
state and company.’54   Bowen also explained that: 
 
Pitt’s Act was not without its weakness, and contemporary critics complained…  
From the government’s view, however, the India Act represented a reasonably 
successful attempt to eradicate some of the failings of the system established by 
North in 1773.55 
 
In contrast to the fundamental changes of framework of the East India trade which were 
brought about in 1813 and 1833 when the monopolistic trade with India and then China 
was repealed, this new administrative framework was basically the same until the 
company’s administrative role was taken over by the Crown after the Mutiny, although 
several minor modifications were made, such as a Regulation Act of 1786 and a 
Declaratory Act of 1788. 
 
Pitt’s India Act reflected the basic policy of the British government after the conquest of 
Bengal and the grant of diwani.  That is to say, the policy was made in order that the EIC 
should be exploited in the best way for the national interest without increasing the burden 
on the state.  At the same time, the state expected that the company should play a main role 
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as a channel of remittance from India to Britain in the form of East Indian commodities, 
and for this purpose the EIC had to maintain and develop their trade with Asia.  These two 
policies were closely connected, but contrary to each other.  The company’s commercial 
activities were often disrupted by the increase of its administrative and military costs in 
India, which the state would have had to bear if it were responsible for governing the 
British territories there.  The rapid increase in the national debt, resulting from the series of 
wars with the U.S. and France in the second half of the eighteenth century and the first 
quarter of the nineteenth century, did not allow the state to afford further debts, which 
would rise from the direct political responsibility for India. It needed the company to share 
its financial burden for the national interest.  In fact, Robert Dundas, the President of the 
Board of Control, argued in his letter to the Chairman of the EIC that ‘the maintenance of 
the monopoly of the East India Company is EVEN MORE IMPORTANT TO THE 
POLITICAL INTERESTS of the State, than it is to the COMMERCIAL INTERESTS of 
the Company.’56   
 
One good example to show the state’s intention to avoid the financial expenses for Indian 
affairs was the conflict between the state and company over the expenses for sending the 
King’s army to India, which led to the establishment of the Declaratory Act of 1788, i.e. 
‘An Act for Removing Any Doubt Respecting the Power of the Commissioners for the 
Affairs of India, to Direct that the Expenses of Raising Transporting and Maintaining such 
Troops as may be judged Necessary for the Security of the British Territories and 
Possessions in the East Indies, should be Defrayed out of the Revenues Arising from the 
Said Territories and Possessions.’57   On the other hand, the development of the company’s 
trade and the increase in its commercial profits were significant for the state as they would 
help to stabilise the system of remittance and allow the company to continue to pay their 
debts at home, which were institutionalised as ‘Home Charges’ in the nineteenth century.  
The framework that the India Act established contained such a contradiction.  As Imada 
argues, as long as the State depended on the EIC playing a role as its political agency in 
India in order to avoid the increase in the financial burden on the State, the former had to 
take the commercial activities of the latter into consideration in the formation of its 
imperial policy because the maintenance of this administrative system in India basically 
relied on the realization of certain profits from the commercial activities of the Company. 
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58  This is the reason why the British government did not choose the immediate and 
complete abolition of the Company’s right of monopolistic trade till the 1830s in spite of 
strong and increasing criticisms of its monopoly from several parts of Britain.  As will be 
explained in the following chapters, the EIC exploited this argument in the debates over 
the renewal of the charter. The company stressed the significance of its trading monopoly 
for governing British territories in India for national interest. 
 
 
2.4. The economic relationship between trade, shipping and remittance under the 
EIC’s monopoly after 1757 
 
As noted above, the political framework of British rule over India, which was consolidated 
by North’s Regulation Act and Pitt’s India Act, was characterised by the avoidance of 
direct administrative control over India by the British government, and this framework was 
largely dependent on the commercial performance of the company in the East India trade.  
The maintenance and further development of the channel of Indian remittances through 
commodity exports from the East Indies to Europe was a primary concern in the formation 
of Britain’s imperial policy for India after the second half of the eighteenth century.  
However, as the East India trade experienced structural changes during the same period, 
Britain needed to adjust its traditional trading pattern in which the EIC had been enjoying 
the monopolistic trade since the beginning of the seventeenth century, and this was the 
process through which the company’s right of exclusive trade with Asia was gradually 
repealed.  The East India trade was a keystone of the mechanism of British dominance over 
India based on the EIC.  The following section will describe the change of the framework 
of the East India trade and Indian remittances under the company’s monopoly, and how 
this framework became no longer adequate for Britain’s domination of the East India trade 
and Indian remittances. 
 
After the conquest of Bengal, although the EIC governed its territories in India, it remained 
a commercial company owned by its stockholders.  This meant that the ultimate foundation 
of the company was still the realisation of commercial profits from its trading activities, 
i.e. importing Asian goods and making profits from these sales at home.  In the 1750s, 
when the company emerged as a territorial power in India, its commercial activities in East 
Asia were still conducted within the long-established framework that had been completed 
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in 1702 when the United Company had formed.59  In this framework, the EIC was 
permitted to conduct trading activities exclusively with Asia on the ground of the Charter 
Act, and it held three main financial sources for purchasing East Indian products: shipping 
bullion from Britain; the use of profits from the sales of exported products to India; and 
borrowing from European or native merchants in Asia.  However, as the result of granting 
of diwani, the company could use the surplus of landed revenues for financing their trade.  
After this event, the company was expected to play a role as a medium to transfer the 
surplus of landed revenues from India to Britain through the East India trade.  However, 
after the 1770s, as a result of soaring administrative and military costs in India, the surplus 
of landed revenues was insufficient to meet the company’s trading activities.  Instead, the 
shortage of investment for its return cargoes was made up by borrowing capital from 
company civil and military servants through private merchants.  Their salaries were paid 
out from the landed revenues, and this financial source was significant for the company’s 
trading activities. 
 
As the EIC’s territories in India developed, the number of British subjects (company 
servants, soldiers, private merchants.) there also rapidly increased.  According to Marshall, 
before the 1790s, if individuals wanted to transfer their savings to Britain, their remittance 
by the hands of the EIC took some a variety of forms: (1) purchase of privileged cargo 
space from company servants; (2) investment in precious stones, mainly diamonds; (3) 
purchase of bills of exchange from the company; (4) some exceptions applied to such as 
the captains of the company’s vessels.60  Among these channels, the use of bills of 
exchange was most significant.  He roughly estimates the total amount of remittances sent 
from Bengal to Britain on behalf of individuals during the period between 1730 and the 
middle of the 1780s was approximately £18 million, and that out of this figure the amount 
of £12 million was sent in the form of bills of exchange issued by the company in Bengal 
and Canton.61 
 
Such money was often moved among the company’s East India settlements, for example 
from Calcutta to Madras and Bombay, searching for the best terms of remittance to 
                                               
59 The group of merchants who had been excluded from the ‘Old’ East India Company had formed a ‘New’ 
East India Company (or The English East India Company Trading to the East Indies) in 1698.  These ‘Old’ 
and ‘New’ Companies finally merged into the United Company of Merchants of England to the East Indies in 
1702. 
60 P. J. Marshall, East India Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century, 1976, pp. 220-224. 
61 Ibid., p. 255.  The total amount includes remittances made by foreign merchants and traders on behalf of 
British individuals.  
 45 
Europe.62  After 1769, the EIC’s factory in Canton also supplied bills of exchange on 
London at better exchange rates in order to attract money from those who were looking for 
facilities to send fortunes from India to Britain, because the company needed to prepare 
ready capital for purchasing Chinese commodities, especially tea, as this trade grew.  The 
remittance business was very successful and, for example, the EIC raised over £3 million 
between 1769 and 1783.63  However, the supply of silver specie from India to China to 
purchase tea and silk resulted in the contraction of the money supply in Bengal and 
disturbance of the local economy.64 
 
The use of bills of exchange as the means of remittance had advantages and disadvantages 
for the company and individuals.  As an advantage, bills of exchange allowed British 
subjects in India to avoid the risk of losing their fortunes in the form of East Indian 
commodities on the voyage home.65  Meanwhile, for the company, issuing bills was one of 
the important means of financing its commercial and other activities in India as the bullion 
exports to India, which had been a main export from Britain since the beginning of the East 
India trade, was virtually stopped after Clive’s conquest.66  However, since issuing the bills 
on London meant that the debts of the company in India were effectively converted into 
those of the head office in London, the total amount of bills which could be issued in India 
depended on its ability at home to clear these bills.  If the supply of bills of exchange in 
Bengal exceeded the company’s solvency at home, it brought about the company’s 
financial difficulties at home like the event of 1772.  In order to avoid such a crisis, a 
clause of the Loan Act of 1773 prohibited the EIC from issuing bills at more than £300,000 
per annum without the consent of the Treasury, which was applied to all British East 
Indian settlements.67    
 
The EIC’s territorial expansion over India not only needed more human resources to 
maintain its administrative and military operations but also attracted traders and 
adventurers who looked for new opportunities for economic success.  Consequently, the 
rise in the number of British subjects in India increased the demand for the remittances to 
their home.  Although the company’s bills offered British settlers more opportunities to 
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send their fortunes raised there to their home country than the use of the company’s 
commodity trade, i.e. the purchases of the privileged cargo spaces or the investment in 
diamonds, the amount of bills was limited and it could not supply enough bills to such 
individuals.  Making remittances from India to Britain under the monopolistic trading 
pattern was ultimately dependent on the company’s ability to increase the volume of trade 
and the commercial profits from it. 
 
Even if the facilities of the company were not available, its servants or private merchants 
still had a couple of alternative means of remittance.  The first choice was sending East 
Indian goods to European ports using a false flag.  Of course, during this period, this kind 
of conduct violated the Navigation Acts.  The second choice was extending foreign traders 
credit, in other words, purchasing bills of exchange from non-British European or 
American merchants and clearing the bills through their agents in Europe.  For an early 
example, when Clive left Bengal in 1760, he remitted £230,000 in Dutch bills out of a total 
over £300,000, and after his second office in India in 1767, he remitted £54,133 in Dutch 
bills and £20,000 by the French out of a total £165,000.68  In Marshall’s rough estimates, 
bills via the French and the Dutch from 1757 to 1785 amounted to £4,000,000, while 
£750,000 was remitted in Danish bills from 1778 to 1783.69  When the £18 million of total 
British remittance during this period is taken in consideration, although the figures do not 
include Portuguese and other foreign bills, more than one quarter of the total was sent 
through foreign hands.70  Furber also mentions the figures of foreign bills after the above 
period.  After 1785, the London agents of the so-called ‘new’ French East India Company 
received bills of exchange amounting to £757,177 from India by 1790 and likely less than 
one million pounds by 1793.71  In the Danish case, there is evidence that during the period 
between 1783 and 1793, £858,216 was remitted to England in the Danish East India 
Company’s bills of exchange and approximately £2 million through Danish private 
merchants in the same period.72 
 
However, after the second half of the 1780s, especially after the outbreak of the 
Napoleonic Wars in 1792, American merchants were increasingly involved in the 
                                               
68 Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, pp. 235-236. 
69 Ibid., p. 255 
70 Ibid. 
71 H. Furber, John Company at Work: A Study of European Expansion in India in The Late Eighteenth 
Century, 1948, p. 50.  The ‘new’ French East India Company was set up by the French businessmen in 1785.  
72 Ibid., p. 123 and 135. 
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remittance of British subjects from India.73  While many European countries were at war, 
American merchants took advantage of their neutral position to expand their trading 
activities in the East Indies.   After 1796, article xiii of Jay’s Treaty also gave them 
favourable conditions. 74 This article was very ambiguous in terms of the restrictions of 
American trade with the East Indies.  It virtually permitted the American vessels to anchor 
in British possessions in the East Indies ‘unrestrictedly’ for their imports from India to the 
U.S.  Neither did article xiii contain words to restrict American imports from India to their 
domestic consumption nor did it ban their circuitous trade through Europe.  In regard to 
taxation, American ships were levied at the ports of British territories on equal terms with 
British ships.   In addition to this, although the costal trade of India carried out by 
American ships was prohibited, in reality this regulation was not rigidly applied until 
1801.75   
                                               
73 On the growth of the American trade with India in this period, see H. Furber, ‘The Beginnings of American 
Trade with India 1784-1812’, R. Rocher (ed.) Private Fortunes and Company Profits in the India Trade in 
the 18th Century, 1997, Chap. II.  Originally published in The New England Quarterly 11, no. 2, 1938, pp. 
235-265. 
74 Furber, ‘The beginning of American Trade with India’, pp. 243-45. 
75 Ibid., p. 251.   
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Figure 2-2. Exports from Bengal: Regional distribution (1795/1796-1805/1806). 
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Figure 2-3. Import into Bengal: Regional distribution (1795/96-1805/1806). 
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Figures 2-2 and 2-3 show the growth of American trade during the period between 1795-6 
and 1805-6 with Bengal, where the British most successfully established their political and 
commercial foundation in Asia.  Figure 2-2 shows that the values of exports from Bengal 
to America grew rapidly from approximately 1.2 million rupees to 6.1 million rupees from 
1798-9 to 1800-01, and then fluctuated between approximately 3.3 million rupees and 6.7 
million rupees.  In Figure 2-3, the value of imports into Bengal shows a similar trend.  In 
the same period, imports dramatically increased from approximately 1 million to 5 million, 
then fluctuated.  However, the value of the imports from America tended to be higher than 
those from London in the first half of the 1800s.  The trend of trade between America and 
Bengal showed a contrast to those of ports in the European continent, which suffered from 
the chaos of the Napoleonic Wars.  Furber quoted the figures reported to the Court of 
Directors by James Grant and Edward Parry, the directors of the EIC, in 1807.  According 
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to them, during the period between 1795/6 and 1804/5, the remittances, which are 
indicated by an excess of exports over imports, from Calcutta to Britain by foreign ships 
amounted to one hundred and thirty-five lacs of sicca rupee (£1,351,699), of which fifty-
nine lacs (£590,148) were sent by the Americans.76  The remittance from India to Britain 
in foreign ships was strongly criticised in Britain because this was regarded as the supply 
of British capital to foreign merchants who competed with the EIC in the trade.  In their 
memorials to the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, merchants and agents for private 
merchants in India mentioned that: 
 
… from the increased and increasing demand in Europe and America for Indian 
commodities, the produce and manufactures of British India have increased far 
beyond what the Capital of the East India Company, applicable to its investment, is 
capable of exporting…77 
 
And then, in the later part, they continued to insist that: 
 
… a large and undue proportion of the Indian Trade is at present in the possession of 
Foreigners, the Governor General [Wellesley] distinctly asserts and adds his 
deliberate opinion, that unless effectual means be instantly adopted to check them, 
the most serious mischiefs are to be apprehended.  The people who for the present 
seem to have been most successful in their encroachments, are the Americans, who 
having bust little Capital of their own, and few commodities applicable to Indian 
markets, carry on this lucrative traffic for the most part on British Capital and 
Credit…78 
 
The structural defects of remittance under the monopolistic company which reflected the 
limited availability of its remitting facilities and the remittance of British savings in India 
by foreign merchants were significantly related to the growth of private merchants in the 
East Indies in this period.  As Marshall described, the private British merchants had 
already existed in Asia long before 1756.79  This private intra-Asian trade was called a 
‘country trade’, in which the Company had less interest and so allowed them to operate 
with few restrictions.   After some attempts the EIC recognised the difficulty of restricting 
such traders and its inability to engage efficiently in the trade, which was very different 
from the trade between Britain and India.  Because Clive’s conquest of Bengal provided 
                                               
76 Ibid., p. 260. 
77 Parliamentary Papers, Supplement to the Appendix to the Fourth Report from the Select Committee on the 
Affairs of the East India Company, 1812 (151) (182), p. 63. 
78 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
79 P. J. Marshall, ‘Private British Trade in the Indian Ocean before 1800’ in P. J. Marshall, Trade and 
Conquest, 1993, Chap. XIII, originally published in A. D. Gupta and M. N. Person (eds.) India and the 
Indian Ocean 1500-1800, 1987. 
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firmer foundations for the British private traders’ commercial activities in Asia, India 
experienced rapid development of their trade in the second half of the eighteenth century. 
 
As trade grew, the organisational structure of private trade developed.  In the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth century, private trading organisations had usually taken the form of 
joint-stock or small partnerships with senior company servants.80  For example, during this 
period, the governors of Madras, who not only had been in charge of the company’s 
official trade, but also had operated the intra-Asian trade in their own accounts, had taken 
an initiative to organise a large group of investors to purchase shares in one or more 
vessels.81  By the late eighteenth century, such organisations became far more solid and 
permanent, and were called the Agency Houses.  
 
In the late 1780s, Charles Cornwallis, the Governor-General of India, carried out several 
institutional reforms to improve the administrative activities and sweep away the 
corruptions of company servants.  Among his reforms, one of the most important things 
was the prohibition of private trade conducted by its civil servants.  Before the reform, 
company servants had been granted contracts to secure Indian produce for export by the 
Board of Trade under the contract system, which was a hotbed of corruption.82  In the 
reform, this contract system was abolished and company servants could work for either the 
commercial or administrative branch of the company’s institutions in India.  Its servants of 
the commercial branch were still allowed to operate trade on their own account.   Instead 
of earning higher salaries, those who worked for the administrative part were not allowed 
to do their own trade any more.  As a result, in British trading activities in India, the 
private merchants who were developing as the agency houses replaced company servants, 
and increased their influence. 
 
The activities of private merchants extended over the several types of financial and trading 
businesses.83   After their private trade was banned, company servants who often earned 
high salaries and held savings in India needed alternative means of remittance.  They used 
the agency houses as well as the company’s bills of exchange as a medium of remittance.   
                                               
80 Ibid., p. 295. 
81 Ibid., p. 287. 
82 Chaudhuri, ‘Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments’, p. 816. 
83 Regarding the activities of the agency houses, see A. Webster, ‘An Early Global Business in a Colonial 
Context: The Strategies, Management, and Failure of John Palmer and Company of Calcutta, 1780-1830’ in 
Enterprise & Society, 6.1, 2005, pp. 98-133, S. Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain: From the Industrial 
Revolution to World War I, 1992, Chapter 4, Marshall ‘Private British Trade in the Indian Ocean before 
1800’, and A. Tripathi, Trade and Finance in the Bengal Presidency 1793-1833, 1979. 
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They lent the agency houses money out of their savings and later received money from 
their agents in Britain.  This capital was used by the private merchants for their businesses.  
They established their own networks of local trade by accommodating local European 
planters with loans and directly trading with the native merchants.  Such Indian 
merchandise was not only used for their intra-Asian trade but also was an important source 
of the company’s trading activities.  The networks of agency houses provided the EIC with 
Indian products such as cotton textiles and opium which were exported to China in 
exchange for teas, and they also diversified the range of products sold in Europe.  
Moreover, the EIC was dependent on them for their acceptance of its bounds issued in 
India.  Therefore, in the second half of the eighteenth century, the private merchants (the 
agency houses) established themselves as an indispensable element in the company’s 
operation in the East India trade, and the relationship between the company and the agency 
houses was not competitive but mutually supportive.  The position of the houses was 
crucial in Britain’s trade with the East Indies. 
 
 
2.5. Critics of the EIC’s monopoly 
 
By the fourth quarter of the eighteenth century, as the East India trade grew, it was 
gradually recognised that the monopoly of the EIC was an obstacle to the development of 
the trade and a bottleneck on the flow of remittances, and so the anti-monopolistic 
campaigns were developed.  The theoretical arguments of these campaigns were 
strengthened by contemporary British intellectuals often represented by the ideas of Adam 
Smith.84  In his famous work, The Wealth of Nations, Smith argued for the negative 
consequences of the East India monopoly from two angles.  First, he argued that the 
monopoly prevented capital from being distributed adequately among a nation’s economic 
activities.  In his view, by limiting available capital for the East India trade, the monopoly 
deprived the British of the substantial benefits raised from the further increase of British 
manufacturing exports to India and the general development of the trade that could be 
achieved under the condition of free trade.   In order to argue this point, he used the 
example of the Dutch East India Company which could be applied to the British case too.  
He explained that; 
 
                                               
84 Also see Chapter 3 and 4 for the influence of Smith’s idea on the campaign of Glasgow’s merchants and 
manufacturers. 
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The limited stock of the Dutch East India Company probably repels from that trade 
many great mercantile capitals which would otherwise go to it… The trade to the 
East Indies, if it were altogether free, would probably absorb the greater part of this 
redundant capital.  The East Indies, offer a market both for the manufacturers of 
Europe and for the gold and silver as well as for several other productions of 
America, greater and more extensive than both Europe and America put together.85   
 
The second point was the incompatibility of the company’s commercial and administrative 
functions.  He expressed his opinion that ‘the government of an exclusive company of 
merchants is, perhaps, the worst of all governments for any country what ever.’86  
Although the EIC as the sovereign of India should have acted for the welfare of the Indian 
nation, its commercial function prevented it from doing so.  In his view, not only could 
neither Britain nor India benefit from the East India monopoly, but also it actually 
damaged the economic interests of both countries. 
 
While the theoretical arguments on the East India monopoly were getting more 
sophisticated, the actual campaigns against the company were organised by two main 
 groups, i.e. private traders and manufacturing interests.  Furthermore, these private traders 
can be divided into those in the East Indies and in Britain.  The group which initially 
demanded free access to the East India trade was British private merchants residing in 
India.  Their main concern was that the company failed to provide them with adequate 
shipping service for their exports to Britain.87  The private traders regarded the shipping 
service provided by the company as too expensive and too inflexible and that the quota of 
space on its ships was too small to compete efficiently with their competitors in the British 
and European markets. 
 
Historians have advanced several reasons for the company’s high shipping cost.  Because 
the ships employed by the company for the trade were designed to be able to be diverted to 
war use, they were too large and they were over-equipped for just carrying out trade.88   In 
addition, far more ships were engaged in the trade than actually were needed.89  Davis also 
pointed out that the monopoly discouraged the EIC from adopting new technologies which 
                                               
85 A. Smith, M. Cannan (ed.) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1904, p. 131.  
86 Ibid., p. 72. 
87 Imada, Pakusu Buritanika to shokuminchi Indo, chap. 1, especially 1-4. 
88 Marshall, Problems of Empire, p. 81. 
89 Ibid.  For instance, it was reported to a parliamentary committee in 1773 that although only 55 ships were 
actually required for the trade, the EIC possessed 87 ships and that 30 ships were actually sent to the East 
Indies in spite of the fact that 24 ships were enough to carry all cargoes. 
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would allow the company to reduce its freight rate.90  Without competition the company 
did not need to improve its efficiency of shipping.  Those who were exclusively engaged in 
the businesses related to the company’s shipping such as ship-owners, shipbuilders and 
captains organised themselves as the ‘Shipping interest’ and could exercise significant 
influence in the formation of the company’s policy. 91  As they largely benefited from the 
trading structure which kept the Company’s shipping cost high, they always resisted any 
changes which would lead to the reduction of the company’s shipping cost.  These 
characteristics of the company’s shipping became the target of criticism.  One 
contemporary argued that ‘It is the complicated abuses arising from patronage, from the 
collusion and confederacy of the builders, owners, and husbands of the Indiamen, that 
made me think it necessary to hinder, if possible, their mutual influence…’92  
 
The EIC’s high freight rate was thought of as the cause of transferring of British savings in 
India to Europe with foreign ships.  Table 2-6 shows the extent to which the East India 
monopoly was exercised under the traditional trading framework in this period.  In this 
table, the import and export trade conducted by foreign European companies occupied two 
fifths of the total, which indicates that they successfully intruded into this trade.  They also 
largely benefited from English ‘Clandestine trade’ which occupied one fourth in both 
imports and exports.   The trade conducted under the company’s monopoly (the company 
itself, English private merchants licensed by the company and privileged goods shipped on 
the company’s ships) occupied only one third of the total imports and exports.   In the 
Indian imports from Europe, the company itself occupied less than 15 per cent, and in the 
Indian exports, just one fourth.   In the meantime, the size of trade conducted in private 
accounts (‘Clandestine’, ‘Licensed’ and ‘Privilege goods’) overwhelmed that of the 
company’s trade.  In both the imports and the exports, such trade occupied one third of the 
total. 
 
                                               
90 R. Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 1962, 
p. 265. 
91 Marshall, Problems of Empire, p. 81. 
92 Anthony Brough, Consideration on the necessity of lowering the exorbitant freight of ships employed in 
the service of the East-India-Company, 1786, p. 35. 
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Table 2-6. Trade between India and Europe, estimated annual average, 1780-90. 
 Imports into India Exports from India 
 (£) (%) (£) (%) 
Foreign Companies:  
Dutch, French, Danish, Portuguese 992,640  41.5  2,757,763  37.6  
Clandestine trade:  
English trade under foreign flags 615,300  25.7  2,000,000  27.3  
English private trade:  
Licensed by the East India Company 439,600  18.4  403,565  5.5  
East India Company 346,070  14.4  1,962,095  26.8  
Privileged goods shipped on the 
Company's ships   208,146  2.8  
Total 2,393,610  100.0  7,331,569  100.0  
Source: Chaudhuri, ‘Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments’, p. 817, Table 10.1 
 
The monopolistic trade of the company was originally designed to dominate the trading 
route between Europe and Asia for the economic interest of Britain.  However, by the 
fourth quarter of the eighteenth century the company was unable to keep up with the 
further growth of the East India trade, and as a result, a significant amount of British 
capital flowed to foreign European and American merchants, which directly competed with 
Britain’s re-export business of Asian products.  In this period, the East India monopoly 
produced the opposite outcome against the original expectation. 
 
The first significant statutory changes of the East India trade were made in 1793, when the 
East India Charter was renewed.  In this reform, the intention of the State was not the total 
abolition of the company’s monopoly, but its modification to increase the size of trade 
between Britain and India in order to meet the demands from the British commercial and 
manufacturing interests.  Henry Dundas called this change ‘a regulated monopoly’.93  The 
new charter put the EIC under an obligation to provide private merchants with an annual 
capacity of up to 3,000 tons for their cargoes in the holds of ships at the discounted freight 
rates in both outbound and inbound traffic.  Philips argued that the reason why the state 
was not willing to open the whole Indian trade towards the private traders at that time was 
the outbreak of war with France.94  He concluded that this renewal of the monopolistic 
trading right gave an advantage to Britain because the armed convoy of the company was 
likely to prevent Britain’s East India trade from suffering heavy losses by the French 
privateers and the British merchants and manufacturers were given an opportunity to 
                                               
93 Marshall, Problem of Empire, Document 38 ‘Henry Dundas to Francis Baring, 16 Feb, 1793’, p. 215. 
94 Philips, The East India Company, pp. 78-79. 
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establish themselves in the overseas market with the supremacy of its naval power during 
the war period.95  
 
However, the renewed charter could not succeed in satisfying those who claimed free 
access to the East India trade since the services which the company supplied to them could 
not meet their demand.  Therefore, the agency houses in India demanded that the company 
should permit the use of their own Indian-built-ships for their import trade to Britain.  
Against the wish of the directors of the company, especially those who belonged to the 
‘Shipping interest’, the claims of private merchants were supported by Wellesley, who was 
in office as the Governor-General between 1798 and 1805.96  The rapid growth of the 
British territories in India under his aggressive foreign policy resulted in the very familiar 
consequences for the second half of the company’s history, an increase in its debts in India 
and a slump in the India trade.  Moreover, the position of the company was worsened by 
two other factors; a series of wars in Europe and the growing demand for free trade from 
provincial merchants and manufacturers.  As the growth of private trade and the decline of 
the company’s India trade went on before his eyes, Wellesley tried to promote private trade 
and give it more responsibility for British trading activities in Asia.  Wellesley, who had 
been appointed as the Governor-General thanks to his connection with the state rather than 
the company, chose such an economic policy in order to resolve his dilemma of the 
expansion of British territories and the deterioration of the company’s commercial 
performance.97  His view was supported by Dundas and the group of ‘Private Trade 
interest’ within the EIC.98   
 
In spite of the failure to achieve the opening of the East India trade in 1793, the demand for 
free trade increased further by the time when the Charter Act needed to be renewed in the 
first half of the 1810s.  The French blockade of Britain, particularly after they captured 
Holland, Westphalia and the North part of Germany in 1810, severely damaged British 
exports of manufactured goods and re-exports of American and West Indian merchandise 
to the European continent.   The increase of political tension between Britain and the 
United States in a dispute over the Orders in Council, and the outbreak of war between 
these two countries also negatively acted on those who were involved in the American 
                                               
95 Ibid., p. 79.  
96 Imada, Pakusu Buritanika to shokuminchi Indo, Chapter. 1 
97 According to Philips, Wellesley (Lord Mornington) was a friend of Pitt.  He had worked as an Assistant 
Commissioner for the Board of Control under Henry Dundas before his appointment as the Governor-
General of India. The East India Company, p. 93. 
98 Imada, Pakusu Buritanika to shokuminchi Indo, pp. 58-60 and p. 105 
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trade and the manufacturing industry which depended on raw materials from the U.S.  As 
will be explained as a case study later in this thesis, those who took the initiative in the free 
trade movement at this time were provincial commercial and manufacturing interests.  
Private merchants in London, who had initially demanded the opening of the trade, 
changed their attitude in favour of the company because they feared that the claims of the 
provincial interests would go too far and end the special status of London.99   
 
During the period between 1793 and 1813, provincial manufacturing interests in Britain, 
for instance cotton textile manufacturers, changed their perception of the India trade.  
Between the late 1790s and the early 1800s the rapid increase in customs duties on Indian 
cotton textiles resulted from the demands of British textile manufacturers in order to drive 
them out from the British market and this succeeded in doing so.  After the exclusion of 
Indian goods from the British market and the growth of the industry, provincial 
manufacturers regarded India as a market for their products.  These provincial 
manufacturers linked up with the merchants of outports who were excluded from the East 
India trade that was dominated by London merchants.  The representatives from several 
outports and manufacturing towns in Britain and Ireland gathered in London in 1812 in 
order to organise their lobbying activities effectively for the abolition of the EIC’s 
exclusive charter and for their direct participation in the East India trade.   
 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
The conquest of Bengal completed by the grant of diwani in 1765 marked a new phase of 
the history of the EIC and British Imperialism.  After the event, the company gradually 
developed its role as a political institution of India.  As the importance of the EIC’s 
political department increased, the nature of its members also changed accordingly.  In the 
Court of Directors, the number of those who had Indian elements, such as experience and 
connections, gradually increased, while the members who were related with the 
commercial activities of the company declined, especially after its monopoly of trade with 
India was abolished.  Because the patronage for the posts of the company’s civil and 
military service was held by the directors, the nature of company servants reflected that of 
the directors. Although the aristocratic landed interests were a minor element within the 
                                               
99 Philips, The East India Company, p. 182. 
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company, the company represented the gentlemanly capitalists in and around the 
metropolis.   
 
After the acquisition of diwani, the main concern of the British imperial policy became the 
maintenance of the channel of remittance from India to Britain.   Although the company 
and the state hoped to transfer a part of the surplus of Indian landed revenue to Britain after 
the company’s territorial acquisition, its newly acquired political elements led the EIC into 
expensive political and economic turmoil both in India and at home.  Facing these 
problems, the company and the state gradually recognised the need to reform the political 
framework in which the company governed India.  The result was a series of statutory 
reforms, especially North’s Regulation Act and Pitt’s India Act during the 1770s and 1780s.  
These reforms, such as the establishment of the Board of Control, strengthened the 
intervention of the state into the company’s businesses.  The political frameworks created 
by the India Act remained generally untouched until the end of the company’s 
administrative role of India. 
 
Meanwhile, after the 1790s the EIC was gradually forced to abandon their privileges of 
monopoly trade with the East Indies in order to maintain and develop the channel of the 
remittance in the structural change of the East India trade.  The company’s trade as the 
means of remittance could not keep up with the growth of British private traders any more 
by the late eighteenth century.  The EIC’s insufficient facilities for remittances resulted in 
the supply of British capital to foreign European and American merchants.  In other words, 
the company’s monopoly of the East India trade created economic opportunities for its 
foreign rivals.  In order to maintain Britain’s dominance over the trade, the policy which 
the state chose was a so-called ‘regulated monopoly’.  However, the capacity which the 
company could provide to the private traders was still insufficient and inefficient.  In spite 
of the several economic reforms in India and Britain, the company failed to adjust itself to 
the rapidly growing East India trade, on which the ability of Britain’s remittance depended.  
The campaigns of the provincial merchants and manufacturers against the renewal of the 
EIC’s charter developed under such a condition. 
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Chapter 3. The lobbying activities of the Glasgow East India Association 
against the renewal of the East India Company’s charter, 1812-1813 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the lobbying activities of provincial mercantile and manufacturing 
interests in Glasgow between 1812 and 1813.  With the approach of the expiry of the East 
India Charter, both the EIC and their opponents started lobbying.  The Glasgow East India 
Association (GEIA), organised by mercantile and manufacturing interests in Glasgow, was 
one of a number of provincial lobbying groups against the East India monopoly, along with 
similar organisations in the outports of Liverpool and Bristol and in the manufacturing 
towns of Manchester, Birmingham, and Sheffield.   
 
Like other recent works on British Imperialism, studies on the formation of its imperial 
policies in the East have been influenced by the ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’, and tend to 
devalue the political influence of provincial interests.  Regarding the partial opening of the 
East India trade in 1814, Cain and Hopkins argued that: 
 
The abolition in 1813 of the Company’s formal monopoly of trade with India was 
essentially a wartime measure which was implemented principally to improve the 
flow of Indian Commodities to Britain.  The decision was not taken at the behest of a 
lobby representing Britain’s new manufactures…, but with one eye on placating 
provincial outports and the other on the ambitions of London merchants whose 
commercial interests had outgrown the bounds set by Company control.1   
 
Their view has certainly supported Webster’s argument.  Regarding the opening of the 
India trade in 1814, he argued that the government’s concerns, based on its economic 
strategy for resolving the problem of inflation and securing raw materials during the period, 
were more significant than the provincial interests’ lobbying.2  The case studies in this 
chapter and in chapter 4 will identify a more effective and influential campaign organised 
by the provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests against the renewal of the 
company’s charter than Cain and Hopkins or Webster supposed. 
 
Cain and Hopkins gave little attention to the Scots as creators of the British Empire, but 
Devine and Fry’s recent works stressed the contribution of Scots to the formation of the 
                                               
1 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000, 2001, p. 282.   
2 Webster, ‘The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization’, 2006, p. 417.   
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British Empire through their economic, political and social activities.3  In terms of their 
commercial activities, as the following section will describe, for instance, during the 
second half of the eighteenth century, in the Chesapeake tobacco trade, the Glasgow 
merchants succeeded in creating their own trading network and overwhelmed the London 
merchants and other English rivals.4  In the later period, they established themselves as one 
of the major players in the West Indian economy though their trading activities and 
possession of plantations.5  Furthermore, in the traditional historical views, the slavery and 
the slave trade were linked to such English ports as Bristol and Liverpool, but Whyte’s 
recent work illustrated how the Glasgow West India Association (GWIA), which he 
describes as ‘the most powerful group representing slaving interests outside London’, and 
its Scottish opponents lobbied for their interests in the national debates over the abolition 
of the slavery.6  The contribution of Scots to the formation of Britain’s imperial policy will 
be assessed in this chapter by examining the lobbying activities of the GEIA.  The 
significance of the GEIA is that this lobbying group was one of the early efforts of Scottish 
overseas merchants and nascent manufacturers to gain access to the overseas markets from 
which they were excluded in the early nineteenth century.  Moreover, at the national level, 
the Association succeeded in collaborating effectively with other U.K. lobbying groups for 
free trade.   
 
In this chapter, firstly, the economic growth of Glasgow during the second half of the 
eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century will be explained.  Secondly, the 
problems of the East India trade under the charter of 1793 and the establishment of the 
GEIA in March 1812 will be explored.  Then, the economic interests and political status of 
those who were involved in the GEIA’s free trade movement will be analysed.  These three 
aspects will provide essential evidence on the backgrounds to the Glasgow interests’ 
campaign.  Because of the development of the city as one of the country’s major outports 
for overseas trade and as a centre of manufacturing industry (particularly the cotton 
industry) during the second half of the eighteenth century and early-nineteenth century, its 
merchants and manufacturers’ interest in the opening of the East India trade was greater 
than many other British towns.  Finally, the rest of this chapter will explore the 
                                               
3 T. M. Devine, Scotland’s Empire, 2003, and M. Fry, The Scottish Empire, 2001. 
4 T. M. Devine, The Tobacco Lords: A Study of The Tobacco Merchants of Glasgow and Their Trading 
Activities, 1975. 
5 T. M. Devine, ‘An eighteenth-century business elite: Glasgow-West India merchants, c. 1750-1815’, in 
Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 57, 1978, pp. 40-67. 
6 I. Whyte, Scotland and the Abolition of Black Slavery, 1756-1838, 2006. p. 146. 
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Association’s lobbying methods and their contribution to the debate over the renewal of 
the company’s charter during this period.  
 
The main primary sources for analysing the members of the GEIA and its lobbying 
activities are the Glasgow East India Association Minutes and Correspondence which have 
been microfilmed and stored at the Glasgow Mitchell Library.7  These records show how 
the merchants and manufacturers of Glasgow attempted to influence Parliamentary 
decisions on the renewal of the East India Charter by co-operating with other associations 
having similar interest in local ports and manufacturing towns all over Britain and Ireland 
during the first half of the nineteenth century.  Supplementing these documents, 
contemporary articles from the Glasgow Herald and official documents of correspondence 
and proceedings in the negotiations between the company’s directors and the Ministers 
which were published in the form of pamphlets by the company’s supporters and its 
oppositions, have been used, together with other literature.  
 
 
3.2. The growth of Glasgow in the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century 
 
Before the eighteenth century, Glasgow was a local religious and commercial centre in the 
West of Scotland, and already held a significant position in the coastal and the Irish trade 
among Scottish towns.  However, it was only after the 1740s, when Glasgow’s tobacco 
trade with the American colonies began to prosper, that the town obtained a truly important 
status in the British overseas trade.  The tobacco trade was one example of the Scottish 
contribution to the expansion of British overseas trade.  Glasgow’s tobacco trade rapidly 
developed during the period between the 1740s and the first half of the 1770s.  Between 
1741 and 1752, Scottish imports of tobacco increased from 8 million lbs. to 21 million lbs., 
and in 1758 their imports exceeded those of London and other English outports.8  Then in 
1771, the imports reached to 47 million lbs.9   
 
                                               
7 Glasgow East India Association Committee Minute Book 1812-1813 (MS891001/1 The Glasgow Mitchell 
Library), Correspondence Incoming 1812-1813 (MS891001/3 The Glasgow Mitchell Library, and, 
Correspondence Outgoing 1812-1814 (MS891001/12 The Glasgow Mitchell Library). 
8 T. M. Devine, ‘The Golden Age of Tobacco’ in Devine and Jackson, Glasgow, vol. I, Beginning to 1830, 
1995, p. 140. 
9 Ibid. 
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The pattern of the tobacco trade was that of a re-export trade to the European continent.10  
Devine pointed out that raw cotton used in the initial development of the cotton industry 
during the late eighteenth century was mainly imported from the Caribbean, not North 
America.11  Therefore, the importation of tobacco was not directly connected to the 
domestic economic activities in Glasgow and other parts of Scotland.  Moreover, although 
several Tobacco Lords of Glasgow were involved in the establishment of such banks as the 
Ship Bank (in 1749), the Arms Bank (in 1750) and the Thistle Bank (in 1761) in Glasgow, 
direct investment by the banks in the industrial sectors were not a decisive element for the 
industrialisation.12  However, because the consumer goods, such as linen and woollen 
goods, exported by the tobacco merchants from Scotland to the American colonists, the 
contribution of their exporting trade to the domestic industry was not irrelevant.  At the 
same time, some of the tobacco traders who purchased estates became directly involved in 
mineral mining.  Although the conversion of capital from the tobacco trade to the industrial 
sector did not happened to a significant degree in Glasgow, the trade made some 
contribution to Glasgow’s peculiar economy in which its overseas trade and manufacturing 
industry were closely interwoven.   
 
The collapse of the tobacco trade during the American War of Independence during the 
1770s did not end Glasgow merchants’ engagement in overseas trades.  During this period, 
the West Indies became a hub of clandestine trade between the U.K. and America, and 
Glasgow’s trade with that region rapidly grew.  In terms of its share, in 1781, the West 
India trade counted 21% of the total official value of exports from Scotland, then 42 % by 
the end of the eighteenth century, and eventually 65% in 1813.13  As noted above, the West 
India trade more significantly contributed to the early development of the Scottish cotton 
industry than the American tobacco trade by supplying vital raw materials to the industry 
and providing the manufacturers with a necessary market for their goods.   
 
During the second half of the eighteenth century, Glasgow prospered as a commercial town, 
but also experienced the rapid development of manufacturing industry.  As happened south 
                                               
10 For instance, in 1771, when the import of tobacco reached to its peak, around 47.2 million lbs. of tobacco 
was imported to Scotland, and 45.6 million lbs. was re-exported to the European continent, mainly to France, 
Holland and Denmark and Norway.  See H. Hamilton, Economic History of Scotland in the Eighteenth 
Century, 1963, pp. 416-419. 
11 Devine, ‘The Golden Age of Tobacco’, p. 171 and Hamilton, Economic History of Scotland, pp. 412 and 
413. 
12 Discounting of bills was the more common method for their involvement in the industry.  The colonial 
traders also preferred purchasing lands with profits from their commercial activities rather than investing in 
the manufacturing industry.   Campbell, ‘The Making of The Industrial City’, p. 188 and Devine, ‘The 
Golden Age of Tobacco’, p. 172. 
13 Campbell, ‘The Making of The Industrial City’, in Devine and Jackson, Glasgow, vol. I, p. 192. 
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of the Border, industrialisation led to the growth of urban population in Scotland during 
this period.  In 1801, the population of Glasgow was already approximately 77,000; by 
1821, the number was nearly doubled, and it reached 202,000 in 1831.14   This rapid 
expansion of the town has mainly resulted from the inflow of labuor from outside the town, 
such as the Highlands and Ireland, rather than to natural increase.   
 
In the 1780s and 1790s, the centre of the development of the Scottish cotton industry was 
the countryside of Lanarkshire, Renfrewshire, Dunbartonshire, Stirlingshire, and Ayrshire 
as the mills needed waterpower, but much capital for these mills was provided from 
Glasgow.  Although the main financial source of the development of the Scottish cotton 
industry was the capital accumulated within the textile industry, the connection of 
Glasgow’s colonial merchants, especially the West Indian traders, with the industry during 
this phase cannot be ignored.15  After the 1790s, with the adoption of steam power, the 
cotton spinning industry became concentrated in Glasgow and Paisley.16  The rapid growth 
of the Scottish cotton industry can be indicated from the dramatic increase of the 
importation of raw cotton.  The import of raw cotton was 137,160 lb on the eve of the 
American War of Independence, 1,757,504 lb in 1790, and amounted to 11,114,640 lb by 
1812.17  To the cotton textile industry in Glasgow, looking for new markets and securing 
stable sources of raw cotton for their expanding production were big concern.  
 
In terms of heavy industry, the modern production of iron in Scotland developed with the 
increase of demand for iron in Britain during the Seven Years War (1756-1763).  However, 
as Table 3-1 describes, the Scottish iron industry before 1830 developed slowly.  From 
1788 to 1830, output increased by approximately thirty-thousand tons whilst during the 
period 1830-1840 it rose by more than two-hundred-thousand tons.  Compared to the 
development of the cotton industry, the iron industry, which later became one of the 
engines of Scotland’s economic growth, was less successful before 1830.   
 
                                               
14 B. R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, 1988, pp. 26-27. 
15 Respecting the internal accumulation of capital within the cotton industry, see Devine, ‘The Golden Age of 
Tobacco’, p. 170.  In terms of the connection between the West India trade and the cotton industry, for 
instance, Robert Dunmore, who was involved in the tobacco trade and the West India trade, held a 
partnership with the Buchanan Brothers and founded cotton mills in Balfron, Stirlingshire, in 1790.  He was 
also involved in the Duntocher Cotton Wool Company of Dunbartonshire in 1788 through his partnership 
with James Dunlop.  Lythe and Butt, An Economic History of Scotland, p. 167. 
16 In 1839, out of 192 mills in Scotland, 98 were located in Glasgow.  See Lythe and Butt An Economic 
History of Scotland, pp. 185-187.   
17 J. Butt, The Industrial Archaeology of Scotland, 1967, pp. 18-19. 
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Table 3-1. Pig-iron output in Scotland (1788-1852). 
Years Tons 
1788 7,000 
1796 16,086 
1806 22,840 
1823 24,500 
1830 37,500 
1839 196,560 
1840 241,000 
1843 238,550 
1847 539,968 
1852 775,000 
 
Source: B. R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, 1988, p. 28. 
 
In consequence, the success of Glasgow’s merchants in the American tobacco trade and the 
West India trade helped Scotland to expand its commercial activities to the Atlantic Rim 
during the second half of the eighteenth century.  At the same time, domestically, their 
activities contributed to economic prosperity of the town.  Although significant capital 
transfer from the tobacco trade to the Scottish cotton industry did not occur, the colonial 
trade created demand for local manufacturers’ products.  Moreover, the initial development 
of the cotton industry was largely dependent on the importation of raw materials from the 
West Indies, and several West India merchants of Glasgow held stocks in the industry.  As 
the result of the continuing prosperity of its mercantile interests and the newly growing 
manufacturing industry, represented by the cotton industry during this period, Glasgow had 
a more diversified economic structure than other major provincial towns such as Liverpool, 
where foreign trade and related commercial businesses dominated its economy, and 
Manchester and Birmingham, both of which were dependent on manufacturing industries.  
As will be illustrated in the rest of this chapter, the nature of Glasgow’s economy 
influenced its lobbying activities against the renewal of the EIC’s charter. 
 
 
3.3. The Problems of the East India trade under the Exclusive Charter of 1793 and 
the Glasgow East India Association 
 
As has been explained in the previous chapter, after 1793, under certain conditions, British 
private merchants were allowed to trade with India having been excluded on the grounds of 
the company’s privileges for a long time.  However, most private merchants and 
manufacturers, including those of Glasgow, were not satisfied with this relaxation and 
demanded more comprehensive freedom in the East India trade.  In Glasgow, for instance, 
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the Directors of the Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturers complained about the 
regulation of 1793 in their resolution that: 
 
…the Private Trade which British Merchants were allowed to prosecute by the 
regulation of 1793, …, is confined to the actual possessions of the Company; limited 
to their own ships, under all the disadvantages of uncertainty, expense and delay; 
restricted both in the kinds and quantities of the outward and homeward bound 
cargoes; removed from the controul of the proprietors, and conducted in a manner 
which seems to have been intended to insure that the failure of success;…18 
 
The resolution indicates that firstly, in spite of the relaxation of the restriction on the trade 
in 1793, the traders were only allowed to trade within the company’s territories in India.  
They were still excluded from direct trade with the rest of the subcontinent under native 
powers and from trading with other countries and areas between the Cape of Good Hope 
and the Straits of Magellan, including the very lucrative trade with China.  Secondly, space 
on the ships provided by the company for these private merchants’ products was limited, 
expensive and inconvenient which limited profits from the trade.19  Thirdly, because their 
cargoes had to be transported by the company’s ships both inward and outward, the private 
merchants lacked flexibility in their trade.  For example, the Report of the Committee of 
Chamber of Commerce & Manufactures described that: 
 
… the merchant who wish to export was obliged to apply before the 30th of August 
for freightage of the goods which he meant to ship in the month of March or April of 
the following year; in the fifteen days after the application, he was bound to pay or 
secure to the Company the freight of these goods which were not to be shipped till 
six months afterwards; and if, by the end of October, he did not deliver to the 
Company a list of the different kinds of his goods, and the quantities of each kind, the 
freight became forfeited.20   
 
In addition to these conditions, since no British subject was allowed to live within the area 
of the company’s monopoly without their permission, a private merchant was not able to 
send his agents or servants there freely to manage his concerns.21  Thus, private merchants 
not only needed to decide on the type of exported goods and their quantities long before 
                                               
18 The resolutions passed by the Directors of the Chamber of Commerce and Manufactures of Glasgow, held 
on 14 February 1812, in Glasgow Herald, 17 February, ‘Trade to the East Indies’. 
19 Against the free trade supporters’ view, the Company insisted that ‘The Company were required to find 
them tonnage to a certain extent, which has always been allotted at a rate of freight cheaper outward, as well 
as for the returns, than the Company themselves pay, or as the Court think, than private ships could furnish 
it.’  See ‘Letter from the Chairman and Deputy Chairman to the Rt. Hon. Robert Dundas dated 13th, January, 
1809’ in The East India Company, Correspondence and Proceedings in the Negotiation for a Renewal of the 
East India Company’s Charter, 1812, p. 117.   
20 Glasgow Herald, 2 March 1812, ‘Report of the Committee Chamber of Commerce & Manufactures’, p. 1. 
21 Ibid. 
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their shipment but also had difficulty in obtaining up to date and accurate information 
about demand for their goods in the East.  The import trade from India was similar.  As a 
result, private merchants were forced to take risks in estimating demand or lose 
commercial opportunities.    The private merchants believed that they could hardly succeed 
in their trade with the East Indies under such restricted conditions. 
 
In resolutions, the merchants and manufacturers of Glasgow also criticised the condition of 
the East India trade that ‘…by the Act 37th of the same Reign (George III), c.57, the 
Privilege of trading to those countries, although denied to British subjects, is permitted to 
Foreign Nations in amity with his Majesty’.22  This contradictory condition made those 
who were excluded from the East India trade jealous, and many critics of this ‘misconduct’ 
of economic policy believed that the flourishing of American merchants in the East India 
trade at the expense of profits of British subjects partly resulted from British investment in 
American merchants as discussed in Chapter 2.  Their capital could have contributed to 
Britain’s hegemony over this trade if it had been invested in their own commerce rather 
than with foreigners under the condition of free trade.23 
 
Therefore, those who were dissatisfied with the company’s monopoly in the East Indian 
trade regarded the expiration of the charter on 1 March 1814 as another chance for them to 
obtain free entry into the trade.  Early in the New Year of 1812, the question of the renewal 
of the Company’s charter began to be discussed seriously in Glasgow, as in other parts of 
the British Isles.24   
 
The leading part in the free trade movement in Glasgow was its merchants and 
manufacturers.  In February 1812, at the meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of 
Glasgow, Kirkman Finlay, James Dennistoun, James Hopkirk, Francis Garden, James 
Robertson, David Connell, Alexander Campbell, James Buchanan, James Buchanan, junior, 
James Ewing and Dougald Bannatyne were appointed to a committee ‘to consider and 
report what steps ought to be taken upon the approaching expiration of the East India 
Company’s Charter’.25  The Magistrates and Council also named John Hamilton (the Lord 
Provost), Andrew Templeton (a Merchant Baillie), James Black, Kirkman Finlay, 
                                               
22 Glasgow Herald, 17 February 1812, ‘Trade to The East Indies’, p. 1. 
23 Anon., Letters on the East India Monopoly, Originally Published in the Glasgow Chronicle, with Addition 
and Correction, (1812), pp. 22-23.  
24 Committee Minute Book 1812-1813, 29 October 1813, ‘Report of the Glasgow Committee to the 
Subscribers, for the object of obtaining a free Trade to India and China’, p. 65. 
25 Glasgow Herald, 10 February 1812. 
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Archibald Newbigging, and Samuel Hunter (all Councillors) to a committee for the same 
purpose.26  Consideration of lobbying against the renewal of the EIC’s charter by these two 
institutions representing Glasgow’s local economy and its local politics indicated the 
significance of this issue for the commercial elite.  These two committees were the direct 
antecedents of the GEIA.  The GEIA’s Incoming Correspondence contains a letter from 
Thomas Attwood, a High Bailie of Birmingham, dated the 21 February 1812, in which he 
wrote that: 
 
 … to request that we will urge to your Committee the propriety of their immediately 
obtaining private letters from different merchants of Glasgow, addressed to other 
correspondents in the manufacturing districts of Scotland, particularly in the towns 
round Glasgow, pressing the necessity of holding meetings in each town to propose 
petitions against the East India Monopoly. 27   
 
This is one of the earliest contacts between provincial towns that urged them to organise 
the national campaign. During this period, similar letters were sent from Birmingham not 
only to all its neighbouring towns but also Liverpool, manufacturing towns in Northwest 
England, Bristol, Edinburgh, Dublin and other Irish towns.28  As a result, Birmingham, 
Bristol and Liverpool had already decided to send their deputation to London in April.29  
Compared with these towns, the start of Glasgow’s lobbying delayed, but the Chamber of 
Commerce and Manufacturers of Glasgow presented their petition to Parliament on 19 
March.30  The petition from Magistrates and Councillors was also read in the House of 
Commons on 25 March, which indicates that they had already prepared their petitions prior 
to the establishment of the GEIA.31 
 
The establishment of the GEIA was intended to unify and more efficiently organise 
Glasgow’s lobbying for free trade with the East Indies.  The Chamber of Commerce and 
Manufacturers and the Magistrates and Council of Glasgow called a general meeting of 
merchants and manufacturers on 23 March 1812 in the name of the Lord Provost.  It passed 
several resolutions.32  The main points of the resolutions were: (1) the inexpediency and 
prejudice of the charter; (2) the unfairness of the charter for the exclusion of British ships 
                                               
26 Ibid. 
27 Incoming Correspondence 1812-1813, Letter from Thomas Attwood, dated 21 February 1812, letter no.1.  
It seems that ‘Your Committee’ in his letter was one of those two committees, most likely the committee of 
the Chamber of Commerce.   
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 The Parliamentary Debates, Vol. XXII, 19 March 1812.  
31 Ibid., 25 March 1812. 
32 Committee Minute Book 1812-1813, 23 March 1812, ‘Resolution of a general Meeting’, pp. 1-2. 
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from East India trade and legal navigation of foreigners; (3) the determination of their 
resistance against the renewal of the company’s monopoly by the use of every legal and 
constitutional means; (4) their objection to any regulation confining the trade to the port of 
London; (5) the preparation and submission of their petitions to Parliament; (6) the 
appointment of a committee [the General Committee of the GEIA] for the preparation of 
the petitions and the collection of subscriptions for this purpose.  From that time onward, 
the committee appointed by the resolutions played a central role in this movement. 
 
 
3.4. The economic interests and political status of the members of the General 
Committee and the subscribers of the GEIA 
 
In the previous chapter, by consulting the previous researches conducted by Parker, Cohn, 
Bourne, Imada and Bowen, the EIC’s stockholders, directors and officials have been 
defined as a part of gentlemanly capitalists and those who were related to them.  The GEIA 
was founded in order to break their commercial dominance over the East India trade.  
Therefore, before analysing the debates over the renewal of the company’s charter, it is 
necessary to understand what kind of economic interest groups were involved in this 
association. Assessing the characteristics of those involved in the association’s lobbying 
activities can also give clues to know how the GEIA formed its lobbying strategies and 
organised its campaign.  For this purpose, firstly, the characteristics of the members of the 
General Committee of the association will be examined.    Although the committee took 
the initiative in the free trade movement of Glasgow, their activities reflected demands 
from the subscribers to the association.  Therefore, it is also worth understanding the 
interests of the subscribers as a group. 
 
In order to identify the characteristics of the GEIA’s committee and subscribers, 
biographical information on those individuals has been collected.  Some of the basic 
sources are the matriculation books of the Merchants’ House of Glasgow, J. R. Anderson’s 
The Burgesses & Guild Brethren of Glasgow 1751-1846, and Glasgow Postal Directories.  
The first two sources have similar information, such as an individual’s occupation, his 
father’s name and occupation, and, in The Burgesses & Guild Brethren, the names of his 
wife and her father can sometimes be found.33  Although, as will be explained later, these 
sources present a problem with the definition of ‘merchant’ or ‘merchants’, they provide 
                                               
33 For example, J. R. Anderson, The Burgesses & The Guild Brethren of Glasgow 1751-1846, 1935.  
Merchants’ House of Glasgow Matriculation Books (T-MH-17 Glasgow City Archives).  Glasgow Post 
Office Directories, 1812-1814. 
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useful basic information for cross-reference.  To extend the biographical information from 
those, several near-contemporary publications have been used.34  
 
Appendix I shows the names of members of the General Committee and the secretary, 
those of firms in which members had an interest and descriptions of these companies.  The 
General Committee consisted of forty-six people through almost all of the period 1812-
1814.35  Most were leading businessmen in the city in terms of the size of the firms in 
which they had an interest and their personal wealth.  Because the Chamber of Commerce 
and Manufacturers and the Magistrates and Councillors took the initiative to establish the 
association, it was a natural outcome that most of those who had previously been appointed 
to the committees of these two different public bodies retained their posts in the newly 
established General Committee.  Except for James Buchanan, junior, all of the members of 
the Chamber of the Commerce and Manufacturers committee were elected to the new 
committee. From the committee of the Magistrates and Councillors, four of six members, 
viz. John Hamilton (Lord Provost), James Black, Kirkman Finlay (who had also been on 
the committee of the Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturers), and Archibald 
Newbigging were appointed.   
 
From Appendix I, it is clear that the economic interests of the General Committee were 
varied: the West India and American tobacco trade, cotton spinning and manufacturing, 
sugar refining, iron manufacturing and so on.  Nevertheless, two main economic interests 
can be identified among the committee members.  The first notable characteristic is the 
presence of a significant number of Glasgow’s Atlantic traders, that is American and West 
Indian merchants, especially the latter.  This interest group was already well organised 
with social and political connections.  In 1807, ‘the Planters and Merchants in Glasgow 
interested in the trade with the British West Indies’ had established the Glasgow West 
India Association (GWIA) had been established for ‘the common good, and benefits which 
would naturally arise by their united action in all cases associating the West India Trade’.  
John Gordon was appointed to chairman of the Association, Robert Dennistoun, Francis 
Garden, Alexander Campbell and Robert Bogle junior were directors, and James Ewing 
was secretary.36  In fact, as can be seen in Table 3-2, which shows the General Committee 
                                               
34 G. Stewart, Curiosities of Glasgow Citizenship, 1881.  J. MacLehose, Memoirs and Portraits of One 
Hundred Glasgow Men, 1886, and A. Thomas, The Old Country Houses of The Old Glasgow Gentry, 1878. 
35 Only Andrew Reid was named a member of the Committee about a week after the foundation of the GEIA, 
and Alexander Oswald died on 8 June 1813.  See Committee Minute Book 1812-1813, 31 March 1812, p. 8, 
and SC36/48/8 (Scotlandspeople) the list of inventories of Alexander Oswald, dated 18 March 1814.   
36 Abstract of the Minute Book of the Glasgow West India Association, pp. 1-2. 
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members who also subscribed to the GWIA and their West Indian firms, all of these main 
figures of the GWIA were members of the General Committee of the GEIA.  Moreover, 
fourteen names of the General Committee (including the said merchants) were identified as 
those who made individual subscriptions to the GWIA, and at least two committee 
members had stock in the companies listed on the company subscriptions.37  This indicated 
the involvement of Glasgow’s merchants who organised themselves as an interest group 
based on their engagement in one trading region in the GEIA. 
 
Table 3-2. The General Committee members who subscribed to the GWIA and their 
West Indian firms. 
Name Company 
Robert Bogle Robert Bogle Jun. & Co. 
James Buchanan Dennistoun, Buchanan & Co. 
Alexander Campbell John Campbell Sen. & Co. 
Colin Campbell John Campbell Sen. & Co. 
David Connell David & James Connell 
Adam Crooks Leitch & Smith 
Robert Dennistoun G. & R. Dennistoun & Co. 
James Ewing James Ewing & Co. 
Francis Garden Francis Garden & Co. 
John Gordon Stirling, Gordon & Co. 
Robert Hagard  
(John Hamilton) John Hamilton & Co. 
(James Hopkirk) Hopkirk, Cunninghame & Co. 
John McCaul  
Charles Stirling Stirling, Gordon & Co. 
Alexander Wighton Watson, Wighton & Co. 
 
Note: a name in brackets means he has been identified as the member of the GWIA from a company 
subscription. 
Source: Appendix II and the list of subscribers to the GWIA in the Minute Book of the Glasgow West India 
Association. 
 
Even when the West India trade held a dominant position in Glasgow’s economy (although 
it was to a lesser extent than the American tobacco trade and lasted only a short period), 
those Glasgow’s merchants who engaged in this trade were looking for new opportunities 
in order to diversify their business in order to spread their business risks.  As Checkland 
and Devine described, the West India trade was risky.38  According to Devine, ‘The 
hazards of a speculative trade, dependent essentially on climatic influence were 
compounded by the effects of the American War of Independence and the Napoleonic 
                                               
37 Ibid., Company and Individual subscriptions, pp. 6-8. 
38 S. G. Checkland, ‘Two Scottish West Indian Liquidation After 1793’ in Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy, 1957, vol. 4, pp. 127-143, and Devine ‘An eighteenth-century business elite’, p. 50. 
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Wars on the Caribbean economy.’39  A series of bankruptcies of major West India firms 
actually happened during this period.  Alexander Houstoun & Co, which had dealt with 
between one-third and one-half of sugar cargoes imported to the Clyde in the 1770s and 
1780s, bankrupted in 1795.  Other major failures were R. Bogle & Sons in 1772; Robert 
Dunmore in 1793; McNeil, Stewart & Co. in 1802 and John McCall & Sons in 1819.40  In 
addition, as early as 1807, when the slave trade on which the West Indian economy 
significantly depended was banned in the British colonies, the anti-slavery movement 
seems to have thrown the promise of the West India trade into doubt.  The attendance of a 
significant number of the West Indian merchants in the General Committee of the GEIA 
can be explained by their desire for diversification of their trading activities and spreading 
their business risks in the wartime period.  
 
In the movement against the renewal of the East India Charter, the interest of the West 
Indian merchants was taken into consideration at both the national and the local level.  On 
22 April 1812, the General Deputation of provincial manufacturing towns and outports 
who gathered in London for their lobby passed the motion of Richard Spooner, 
representing Birmingham’s interest, and seconded by Kirkman Finlay, that: 
 
…in endeavouring to promote a free trade to the East, it is the opinion of this 
Meeting that due care should be taken to prevent any measures being adopted, which 
may prove prejudicial to the West India or manufacturing interests…41   
 
From the fact that the above motion was seconded by Finlay, it is clear that the interests of 
the GEIA were consistent with those of the General Deputation in this respect.  At the 
meeting of the GEIA’s Sub-Committee of Correspondence on 18 December 1812, ‘the 
danger which might rise from a free inspection of East India Sugars, and their interference 
with that produced by our West India Colonies in the home market’ was placed on the 
agenda.  They recommended that: 
 
… instruction be given to the Delegation to London, to suggest and enforce such 
means as seem to them best calculated to protect the trade to the West Indies, without 
imposing undue restraints on the importation of the products of Asia.42 
 
Although among the GEIA’s minutes and correspondence letters during the period, only a 
                                               
39 Devine, ‘An eighteenth-century business elite’, p. 50 
40 Ibid. 
41 Committee Minute Book 1812-1813, Instruction to London Deputation, darted January 1813, p. 32. 
42 Ibid., 18 December 1812, p. 25. 
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few directly refer to the interest of the West Indian traders, their interest certainly 
influenced the policy of the association.  In Moss’s research on Birmingham’s free trade 
movement, because the town’s economy was mainly based on manufacturing industry and 
its campaigners represented it, he failed to identify the West Indian interests as one of the 
key players in the national campaign.43  On the national level, the interest of the West 
Indian merchants was embodied by the establishment of the different rates of duties 
between East and West India sugars.  After the opening of the trade with India, the West 
India sugars succeeded in maintaining their advantage over the East India counterparts as 
the duty on the former was 27s. per cwt, while 37s. was levied on the latter.44  This 
arrangement was reasonable for the West Indian interests who also joined in the GEIA’s 
campaign.  The GEIA and other similar provincial associations during this period lobbied 
for the removal of restrictions imposed on the East India trade, but these events indicated 
that the provincial lobbyists needed to sacrifice their East Indian interests in favour of the 
existing economic interests in the provincial towns.  In the long-term this arrangement 
worked negatively for the East Indian interests.  As the later chapters will show, fewer of 
the West Indian merchants actually entered the East India trade after 1814 than the West 
Indian interests who subscribed to the association, and most of them remained as the West 
Indian merchants.  In the 1820s and the 1830s, the West Indian interests and the East 
Indian interests conflicted with each other over the equalisation of the sugar duties. 
 
Another significant economic group in Appendix I is those with interests in the 
manufacturing sector, especially in the cotton industry.  Many held stocks in overseas trade.  
This reflected the duality of the town’s economic activities, which was different from other 
major provincial towns.  Of the forty-seven members of the General Committee plus the 
secretary in this table, at least twenty-eight members were directly related with several 
kinds of manufacturing industries.  Among them, at least twenty-one held stocks in cotton 
spinning and manufacturing and other textile businesses, such as cloth manufacturing and 
linen drapery.  Among the individuals and firms in Appendix I, for instance, in the New 
Lanark Cotton Company during the period 1812-1814, Robert Dennistoun took four shares 
(£28,800 in value), Alexander Campbell three shares (£21,000) and Colin Campbell also 
three shares alongside Robert Owen ten shares (£70,000) out of the total 26 shares.45  
Kirkman Finlay, Archibald Buchanan, and John Gordon were the partners of James Finlay 
                                               
43 J. Moss, ‘Birmingham and the Campaigns against the Orders in Council and East India Company Charter 
1812-1813’ in Canadian Journal of History, Vol. XI, Issue 1, 1976, pp. 173-188. 
44 Philips, The East India Company, pp. 250-251.  Also see Chapter 5, pp. 171-174 of this thesis. 
45 I. Donnachie, Robert Owen: Owen of New Lanark and New Harmony, 2000, p. 102 
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& Co., another famous cotton manufacturing firm.  In 1800, out of the firm’s stock of 
£65,000, Kirkman Finlay held £16,000, the house of   Leitch & Smith £10,000, Alexander 
Gordon £2,000 and John Gordon £8,000.46  In their cotton manufacturing business, the 
firm bought the Ballindalloch mills on the Endrick in 1798, Catrine mills on the Ayr in 
1801, and Deanston on the Teith 1806.47  In the operation of these mills, Kirkman Finlay 
exploited his family connection with the Buchanan cousins.  James Buchanan was a close 
friend of Sir Richard Arkwright, and his younger brother, Archibald, had trained under 
Arkwright and obtained know-how to operate cotton mills before he entered the firm of 
James Finlay & Co.48   
 
In the early 1810s, Britain was suffering from a general economic depression, and 
Glasgow and its surrounding areas were not exceptions.  This coincided with the 
intensification of the Napoleonic War.  After the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, Napoleon 
shifted his tactics against Britain from direct military invasion to economic warfare.  He 
assumed that the dominance of French merchants and manufacturers over the continental 
economy and the reduction of Britain’s bullion reserves and inflation would make Britain’s 
financial support to its foreign coalitions more difficult.  These goals were to be achieved 
by blocking Britain’s manufacturing goods and colonial re-exports to the European 
continent.49  In November 1806, the Berlin decree was introduced, which prohibited 
vessels from the U.K. and its colonies from entering any ports controlled by France and its 
satellite countries.  Under the Milan decrees of November and December of 1807, the 
restrictions were extended to the confiscation of British or British-borne goods carried by 
neutral vessels which had called at British ports before entering territories under the French 
control.50  British exports to the continent were further limited in 1810, when France 
annexed Holland, Westphalia and the Northern Germany and defeated Austria, which shut 
the door on British manufacturing products.  The history of James Finlay & Co. describes 
how Kirkman Finlay made successful effort to break the economic blockade through 
establishing a commercial network over the European continent during the war.51  
Nevertheless, as explained below, in the dislocation of overseas trading activities, 
                                               
46 James Finlay & Co. Balance book, 1789-1800 (UGD91/1/4/1/3/1 Glasgow University Archives). 
47 C. Brogan, James Finlay & Company Limited, 1951, Chapter X and XI. 
48Ibid., p. 6 and pp. 61-62. 
49 Ellis, The Napoleonic Empire, 2003, pp. 110-112.   While Napoleon attempted to exclude British exports 
to the European continent, its imports were less restricted as France needed to obtain cash.  For instance, 
grain was largely exported from France to Britain during the bad harvest of 1810.   
50 Ibid. 
51 C. Brogan, James Finlay & Company Limited: Manufacturers and East India Merchants, 1750-1950, 1951, 
Chapter III.  According to his testimony in the Select Committee, the company had about 700 correspondents 
in the Continent in 1803.  See Ibid., p. 18. 
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Glasgow’s local economy suffered economic depression.   
 
At the same time, the relationship between the U.K. and America was gradually 
deteriorating after the issuing of the Orders in Council of 1807, which insisted that the 
ships of neutral countries, including the U.S. trading with Europe call at British ports.  The 
Orders and the Milan decrees put U.S. vessels into a difficult position as they had to risk 
detention or confiscation by either Britain or France.52  The Americans strongly opposed 
these regulations and retaliated with the Embargo Act and the Non-Intercourse Act, and 
eventually declared war against Britain in June 1812.  Thus, during this period, Glasgow’s 
cotton manufacturers needed to seek new markets for their produce and the stable supply 
of raw materials. 
 
One of their attempts to solve the problem was diversification of their trade to other 
countries and regions.  Nevertheless, the end of the speculative trades with South America, 
the West Indies and the Iberian Peninsula worsened the difficulties of British 
manufacturers in 1810.53  In Parliament, the Select Committee on the State of Commercial 
Credit reported on economic conditions during this period that: 
 
… the extent of the difficulties experienced by those engaged in trade and the 
expediency of any assistance being afforded by Parliament. Memorials were 
presented to the Treasury stating the distress felt among manufacturers in the cotton 
trade in Glasgow and Paisley and asking for public assistance. The Committee 
attributed the distress to extensive speculations started when the South American 
markets were opened up to British merchants. As a result of the slackness in trade, 
many manufacturers were obliged to cease production, the price of produce fell and it 
became extremely difficult for merchants to obtain credit from banks.54 
 
Kirkman Finlay was well positioned to know the economic situation of Glasgow as he had 
been a director and the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and he was engaging in 
both manufacturing and mercantile business.  He commented in 1811 on the considerable 
depression in Glasgow and its neighbouring manufacturing districts since the end of 1810: 
 
I really cannot say exactly, but as compared with 1809 and the former part of 1810, 
which were years of uncommon and unnatural extent; the falling off must have been 
very considerable, and the falling off must have been very considerable if there had 
been no impediment to the trade; but the falling off is certainly very considerable 
from those causes… The trade was at the worst probably, about the month of May 
                                               
52 H. Hamilton, The Industrial Revolution in Scotland, 1966, pp. 134-135. 
53 E. F. Heckscher, The Continental System: An Economic Interpretation, 1922, pp. 176 and 239-240. 
54 State of Commercial Credit. Report from the Select Committee, 1810-11, Vol. II, p. 7. 
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and June 1811, and probably July; but from that period it has gradually, but very 
slowly continued to improve.55 
 
Although the economic condition of manufacturers in Glasgow was showing a little 
improvement after the middle of 1811, the recovery was still very slow and Britain’s long-
term war with France was having a negative impact on trade with the European continent 
around the period when the GEIA was established in 1812.  Glasgow’s cotton and other 
manufacturing interests wanted to seek new overseas markets in the East Indies.   
 
The urban middle-class was concerned that social unrest could result from unemployment 
and the low wages of the working-class who were engaged in the rapidly-growing-
manufacturing industry in the town and surrounding areas.  In the petition of merchants 
and manufacturers of Glasgow, it was argued that: 
 
… it is of the utmost importance to secure the peace of the community, by affording 
full work and fair wages to operative classes…the skill, industry and capital of the 
manufacturing are inadequately occupied and consequently a part of the population 
remains unemployed.56   
 
They hoped that the opening of the East India trade would improve demand for their 
manufacturing goods and secure raw materials as well as solve the problems of 
unemployment and low wages in manufacturing industry, which would help to maintain 
public order during the difficult time of war. 
 
Previous historical studies pointed to different motives for which provincial manufacturing 
towns and outports joined the free trade campaign.  For instance, on the one hand, Moss 
said that: 
 
Collaboration with other towns did not prove difficult and Birmingham was joined by 
Liverpool, Bristol, Plymouth, Glasgow and Sheffield.  Unhappily only Sheffield 
shared Birmingham’s conception of problem; the others were chiefly concerned with 
commercial and shipping rivalry with London rather than the export market per se.57 
 
On the other hand, Webster explained that ‘Birmingham industrialists and Liverpool 
merchants saw India as a potential market, while Hull, Bristol, and Plymouth wanted a 
                                               
55 Brogan, James Finlay & Company,  p. 21 
56 Committee Minute Book 1812-1813, Petition ‘to the Honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom’, p. 
28. 
57 Moss, ‘Birmingham and The Campaigns’, p. 180. 
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share in the shipping and import trade of the E.I.C.’.58  Nevertheless, Glasgow’s case 
indicated that even within one city, lobbyists’ motives for joining the campaign were 
different.  Because of the city’s economic structure, the Glasgow Association represented 
both commercial interests who wanted to enter a branch of foreign trade where the London 
interest had a monopoly and manufacturing interests who were looking for a new market 
for their manufactured goods. 
  
                                               
58 Webster, ‘The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization’, p. 405. 
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Table 3-3. List of the Magistrates & Town Council of Glasgow (1811-1814). 
 Offices 1811-12 1812-13 1813-14 
Lord Provost Hamilton, John Finlay, Kirkman Finlay, Kirkman 
Merchant Baillies 
  
  
Gaithrie, John 
Heywood, Joshua 
Templeton, Andrew 
Heywood, Joshua 
Parker, Charles S. 
Leckie, William 
Parker, Charles S. 
Hunter, Samuel 
Dalglish, William 
Trades Baillies 
  
Ferrie, Robert 
Tennent, Robert 
Tennent, Robert 
Rodger, William 
Rodger, Eilliam 
Newbigging, Archibald 
Dean of Guild Mackenzie, Daniel Mackenzie, Daniel Guthrie, John 
Deacon Convener Ronald, Basil Ronald, Basil Ferguson, Walter 
Treasure, Councillors 
ex officiis Brown, Nicol Austin, Robert Berry, John 
Master of Works, 
Councillors ex officiis Smellie, Richard Smellie, Richard   
Baillie on the River 
and Firth of Clyde Leckie, William Newbigging, Archibald Templeton, Andrew 
Depute do. Hunter, Samuel Burns, James Heywood, Joshua 
Principal Baillie of the 
Barony of Gorbals Rodger, William Dalglish, William Hood, Robert 
Resident Baillies 
  
Jamieson, Robert  
Barclay, Arthur 
Lancaster, Thomas 
Cross, James 
Niven, David 
Richardson, Ebenzer 
Baillie of Provan Morison, John Morison, John Morison, John 
Baillie of Port-
Glasgow Falconer, Archibald Johnston, David   
Visitor of Maltmen Tennent, Hugh     
Councillors From the 
Merchant 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Black, James 
Glen, William 
Rutherfurd, George 
Monteith, Henry 
Berry, John 
Eccles, William 
Dennistoun, James 
Hunter, Samuel 
Parker, Charles S. 
Leckie, William 
Finlay, Kirkman 
Dalgleish, William 
Rutherfurd, George 
Monteith, Henry 
Berry, John 
Guthrie, John 
Hamilton, John 
Eccles, William 
Dennistoun, James 
Templeton, Andrew 
Hunter, Samuel 
Dalglish, William 
Mackenzie, Daniel 
Ryburn, John 
Heyhwood, Joshua 
Guthrie, John 
Hamilton, John 
Eccles, William 
Dennistoun, James 
Templeton, Andrew 
Leckie, William 
Mackenzie, Daniel 
Ryburn, John 
Dennistoun, Robert 
More, John 
  
Councillors From the 
Trades 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Austin, Robert 
Ferguson, Walter 
Brand, William 
Graham, John 
Mirrlees, William 
Newbigging, Archibald 
Rodger, William 
Cleland, James 
Machen, John 
Burns, James 
Hood, Robert 
Ferrie, Robert 
Brand, William 
Graham, John 
Mirriees, William 
Newbigging, Archibald 
Cleland, James 
Machen, John 
Burns, James 
Hood, Robert 
Ronald, Basil 
Jamieson, Robert 
Tennent, Robert 
Graham, John 
Mirrlees, William 
Cleland, James 
Machen, John 
Burns, James 
Hood, Robert 
Ronald, Basil 
Jamieson, Robert 
Mitchell, William 
Hunter, James 
 
Note: Names in bold type indicate that they were the members of the General Committee of the GEIA. 
Sources: Glasgow Herald, 11 October 1811, 16 October 1812 and 15 October 1813, ‘List of the Magistrates 
& Towns Council of Glasgow’. 
 
In terms of local politics, members of the General Committee held several significant 
offices.  Table 3-3 lists the Magistrates and Town Council of Glasgow during the GEIA’s 
campaign; names in bold type indicate the committee members.  As has already been 
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mentioned, John Hamilton (Lord Provost/Councillor), James Black (Councillor), Kirkman 
Finlay (Lord Provost/Councillor) and Archibald Newbigging (Bailie of the River and Firth 
of Clyde/Councillor) transferred from the committee of the Magistrates and Councillors 
into the General Committee.  In addition to them, Daniel MacKenzie (Dean of 
Guild/Councillor), Basil Ronald (Deacon Convener/Councillor), William Dalgleish 
(Principal Bailie of the Barony Gorbals), Ebenzer Richardson (Resident Bailies), James 
Black, Henry Monteith, James Dennistoun, William Dalgleish, Robert Dennistoun and 
John More (all Councillors) were also appointed to the committee.  Many other members 
of the General Committee later had experience of such offices at some point in their life.  
For example, committee members who had experience of holding the office of Lord 
Provost were James Black (elected in 1808, 1809, 1816 and 1817), Henry Monteith (in 
1814, 1815, 1818 and 1819), Robert Dalgleish (in 1830 and 1831) and James Ewing (in 
1832).  In addition, some of the committee members were elected as MPs.  Apart from 
Finlay, who represented the city in the Parliament during the second half of the campaign, 
Henry Monteith, James Ewing and James Oswald were to be MPs in the 1820s and the 
1830s.  This indicated the strong connection between the GEIA and the centre of local 
politics. In his work, Moss identified Richard Spooner and Thomas Attwood, who led 
Birmingham’s lobbying group, as members in the council of Birmingham, and the latter 
was High Bailiff at that time.59  This connection enabled the association to get full support 
from the local corporation easily and exploit its authority as the examples of the petition 
from the Magistrates and Councillors to Parliament and the Lord Provost’s attendance at 
the General Deputation showed.   
 
In terms of number, the General Committee was dominated by businessmen who belonged 
to the Merchants’ House, in which political power was concentrated in pre-reform 
Glasgow as the result of the long-term contribution of the overseas trade to the economic 
development of the city.60  Out of the forty-six members of the General Committee plus the 
secretary, thirty-five were members of the Merchants’ House, only three were from the 
Trades’ House, and another nine did not belong to either institution or are unknown.  The 
apparent dominance of the Merchants’ Houses over the Trades’ House does not mean that 
the political influence of those who engaged in domestic industry was weak.  By the early 
nineteenth century, following the rapid growth of the city and its economy, occupational 
status of burgess membership did not accurately describe the type of business which was 
                                               
59 Moss, ‘Birmingham and the Campaigns against Orders-in-Council’, p. 175. 
60 I. Maver, ‘Politics and Power in the Scottish City: Glasgow Town Council in the Nineteenth Century’ in 
Devine, Scottish Elites, 1994, Chap. 5. 
 79 
actually conducted there.61  Many overseas merchants who belonged to the Merchants’ 
House had developed their interest in the rapidly-developing manufacturing industry in the 
process of diversifying their business, and their interests were well-represented in local 
politics. 
 
Appendix II is the list of subscribers to the GEIA, the sums of their payments in the first 
and second subscriptions, and the descriptions of their main businesses.  The table has been 
created from the Glasgow business directories.  Some care is needed in using this 
contemporary source.  In the Glasgow business directories (and also other sources), both 
individuals and companies are very often described as ‘merchant’ or ‘merchants’.  In the 
description of the subscribers’ business quoted from the directory, out of 145 individual 
and company subscribers, 35 are described as ‘merchant’ or ‘merchants’, and they are the 
largest group in terms of the descriptions of their businesses.  According to Nenadic’s 
work, in nineteenth-century Glasgow, ‘merchant’, especially ‘overseas merchant’ was 
regarded as an occupation with high prestige.62  At the same time, occupational titles 
describing manufacturing sectors were less prestigious in the contemporary city than they 
may have been regarded in other British industrial towns.63  Moreover, as has already been 
explained, many of Glasgow’s Atlantic traders held both mercantile and manufacturing 
interests.  For these reasons, in Glasgow, the titles, ‘merchant’ and ‘merchants’ were often 
used by various types and size of businesses, that is to say, not only very wealthy foreign 
traders, but also small shopkeepers and even manufacturers described themselves as 
‘merchants’.  For example, in the directories, James Finlay & Company is described as 
‘merchants’ although Kirkman Finlay’s firm was known as one of the most successful 
cotton manufacturing companies in Scotland. 
 
In order to solve such a problem, the descriptions of the subscribers’ businesses from the 
business directory are supplemented by additional information from the sources used for 
Appendix I, although the information in the table is still incomplete.  Conversely, it seems 
to be reasonable to say that occupational titles other than ‘merchant’ and ‘merchants’ in the 
directory can be regarded as indicating the main businesses of listed individuals and 
companies.  Taking this point into consideration and then looking at the table, it is known 
that the types of business in which the subscribers were engaged were varied.  The range of 
                                               
61 Ibid., p. 101. 
62 S. S. Nenadic, ‘The structure, value and influence of the Scottish urban middle class Glasgow. 1800 to 
1870’ unpublished PhD. thesis, University of Glasgow, 1986, pp. 57-58. 
63 Ibid. 
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activities were similar to those in which the GEIA’s General Committee were involved:  
The West India trade, the American trade and other overseas trades, cotton spinning and 
manufacturing, iron manufacturing, banking, and so on.  
 
Table 3-4. The relationship between the subscribers who paid more than £15.15s to 
the GEIA and the General Committee members 
Name of subscribers Name of the General Committee (1) 
Name of the General 
Committee (2) 
Name of the General 
Committee (3) 
James Finlay & Co. A. Buchanan K. Finlay J. Gordon 
Henry Monteith & Co. H. Monteith   
New Lanark Co. C. Campbell R. Dennistoun R. Owen 
John Campbell, Sen. & Co. A. Campbell C. Campbell  
Dennistoun, Buchanan & Co. J. Buchanan J. Dennistoun [possibly]  
Stirling Gordon & Co. J. Gordon C. Stirling  
William Stirling & Co. W. Stirling   
Leitch & Smith A. Crooks   
John McIlwham    
Findlay, Duff & Co.    
William Scott & Co.    
G. & R. Dennistoun & Co. R. Dennistoun   
Corbett, Buchanan & Co.    
Blair, Steven & Co.    
Neilson & Hunter    
Alexander & Jamese Crum J. Crum   
D & J Connell D. Connell   
Douglass, Brown & Co.    
James Ewing J. Ewing   
Thomas & James Edgar    
J. & G. Buchanan    
John McCaul J. McCaul   
John McCall & Co. J. McCall   
M & J. Preston    
Hopkirk & Cunningham J. Hopkirk   
 
Source: created from Appendix I and II. 
 
If Appendix I and Appendix II are compared, those who volunteered more subscription 
than others significantly match the firms where the General Committee members had 
stocks or the members themselves.  For example, Table 3-4 created from these appendices 
shows the relationship between the subscribers who paid more than £15.15s to the GEIA 
and the General Committee members.  Among all twenty-five subscribers on the list, 
fifteen of them were the firms where the committee members had stocks or the committee 
members themselves.  Because subscriptions were voluntarily collected, it can be said that 
the members of the committee were not only those who were most economically and 
politically powerful but also were those eager for the opening of the East India trade in the 
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city.  
 
As their presence was remarkable in the General Committee, the Atlantic traders, 
especially the West Indian merchants, were again a significant group in the subscribers to 
the GEIA.  Out of one hundred and forty-five individual and company subscribers, at least 
twenty-three are identified as West Indian and American merchants.  Moreover, among 
fifty-two subscribers paying more than £10, at least twenty-two engaged in trade with the 
West Indies and America.  If twenty-six subscribers, who paid more than £15, are looked 
at, half of them were Atlantic traders.  In value, Atlantic traders contributed £373.16s. of 
the total subscription of £1410.19s. (including £315 from the Chamber of Commerce and 
Manufacturers).  Therefore, in terms of the number of subscribers and the size of their 
subscriptions, the contributions of the Atlantic traders, especially the West Indian 
merchants, were more than the average.  As the involvement of a large number of the 
Atlantic traders in the General Committee showed, this also indicated the East India 
question mattered more to this economic interest group than others. 
 
Meanwhile, by analysing Appendix II, at least fifty-three subscribers are identified as those 
who held their main economic interest in several types of manufacturing industries and 
businesses related to them.64  Among them, at least twenty-one subscribers definitely 
engaged mainly in cotton/linen manufacturing industry and its related businesses.  This 
figure may be a minimum since many businesses described as ‘manufacturer’ or 
‘manufacturers’, some unknown businesses and those described as ‘merchant’ or 
‘merchants’ in the business directories appear to have been cotton/linen manufacturers.     
 
In the first and second subscriptions, the top three subscribers were leading cotton 
manufacturers in Scotland, that is to say, James Finlay & Co., Henry Monteith, Bogle & 
Co., and New Lanark Cotton Company.  In the General Committee, shareholders of all 
three companies were included.  Apart from the Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturers, 
which subscribed £315 in these two collections, the total subscription of £155.10s. made 
by Kirkman Finlay’s James Finlay & Co. was exceptional.   As has been described, 
although Finlay and his firm operated both mercantile and manufacturing businesses like 
many West Indian merchants, his business was more strongly connected with the spinning 
and manufacturing of cotton (and trade with the European continent) during this period 
than many of the other leading mercantile families and their firms.  According to his 
                                               
64 ‘Business connected to manufacturing industry’ here includes such businesses as ‘cotton-brokers’ and 
‘(cotton/iron) warehouses’.   
 82 
testimony in Parliament, his cotton manufacturing business employed about two to three 
thousand people, which was matched to the number of employees at New Lanark mills.65  
Henry Monteith of Henry Monteith, Bogle & Co., was the third son of James Monteith, a 
weaver in Anderston.  He was involved in his father’s business and became one of the 
most successful cotton manufactures in Scotland.  As an extensive cotton manufacturer, he 
carried on cotton spinning, weaving and bleaching, and later extended his business to 
turkey red dying and calico-printing.66  Most of the big subscribers who had paid in the 
first collection, including many West India magnates, reduced their payment by half in the 
second collection or did not make any payment, while the three cotton textile firms 
increased their subscriptions or paid the same amount in the second collection (with the 
exception of the Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturers).  As will be explained in the 
following section, the timing of the second collection was not favourable to the lobbyists 
as the public started to lose their interest in the East India question.  Excluding the 
subscription from the Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturers, the collection of the 
second subscriptions amounted to £427.2s., and subscriptions from these top three firms 
reached £149, in other words they paid more than one thirds of the total subscriptions.  
From the fact that they did not reduce their subscriptions in the second collection, it is clear 
that the leading cotton manufacturers remained the keenest part of the anti-monopolist 
group in Glasgow throughout the whole campaign period. 
 
In consequence, those who were appointed to the General Committee were the most 
notable businessmen and politically most prominent figures in Glasgow.  In particular, 
several members of the committee had interests in the local cotton manufacturing industry 
as well as of the West India trade.  Therefore, the Glasgow Committee represented the 
interest of local ‘merchants’, with long experience in foreign trade with the West Indies 
and America, who were seeking new opportunities to expand their trade to the East Indies. 
It also represented local ‘manufacturers’ who were experiencing difficulty in their export 
to Continental Europe due to Napoleon’s economic blockade and were looking for 
alternative markets.  The group of subscribers showed a similar range of economic interest.  
The lobbying activities of the GEIA were largely supported by both mercantile and 
manufacturing interests.  Finlay’s enthusiasm for the campaign against the renewal of the 
East India Charter has already been mentioned, but along with him some of other leading 
cotton manufacturers showed their great eagerness for free trade. 
 
                                               
65 Ibid., p. 17, and I. Donnachie Robert Owen; Owen of New Lanark and New Harmony, 2000, p. 98. 
66 G. Stewart Curiosities of Glasgow Citizenship, 1881, p. 113-114. 
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According to Cain and Hopkins, who support the ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’, the 
provincial interests’ inability to influence the state’s policy partly resulted from the 
diversity of their interests and the lack of unity.  For instance, they argue that the failure of 
the Fair Trade movement and the Tariff Reform, anti-free trade campaigns during the 
1880s and 1900s, when the British domestic industry were facing strong competition from 
other European countries, resulted from the lack of unity within the provincial interests.67  
Such industries as iron, steel and engineering were for protectionism, whilst the cotton 
industry and shipping industry remained to support the free trade.  The involvement of a 
large number of the West Indian interests in the free trade campaign during this period and 
their demand for protecting their own interests by sacrificing the East India trade appear to 
support these claims.  Nevertheless, it is still necessary to measure the degree to which the 
diversification of provincial lobbyists’ interests affected their campaign.  In fact, as the rest 
of the chapter will illustrate, in spite of the diversity of their interests, the lobbying of 
provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests maintained its unity. 
 
 
3.5. The methods of lobbying activities of the GEIA 
 
The main activities of the GEIA against the renewal of the EIC’s charter for its monopoly 
in the East India trade consisted of (1) collecting signatures for petitions and subscribed 
money from the citizens of the town, (2) printing circulars and pamphlets and writing 
letters which were forwarded to cities and towns all over the U.K., and publishing 
resolutions and other related articles in the newspapers, and (3) sending their deputation to 
London for collaborating with other delegates from all over the U.K. to lobby the Ministry 
and MPs.  In this section, the first two activities will be described.  Then, in the following 
section, the lobbying activities of their deputation in London will be examined because 
their activities were more complicated than the other two, and it seems easier to understand 
their activities and influence if they are described in the context of the course of the 
debates over the renewal of the charter.  
 
3.5.1. Subscribing activities 
 
The GEIA needed to collect as many signatures for the petitions as possible in order to 
prove that their activities represented the collective opinion of the citizens of Glasgow 
against the renewal of the East India Charter.  At the same time, in order to maintain their 
                                               
67 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-1914, Chapter 7. 
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lobbying activities, the association had to secure financial resources.  Their lobbying 
activities totally relied on the voluntarily subscribed money which was the weakest point 
of the Association.  Throughout the period between 1812 and 1813, how to secure their 
financial resources was one of the association’s prime concerns. 
 
Although two members were appointed to ‘a committee for the special purpose of 
procuring subscriptions to defray the expenses’ in the first meeting of the General 
Committee on 24 March 1812, the GEIA recognised that ‘the subscription of the petitions 
to Parliament, proceeded very slowly’ and decided to extend the number of the sub-
committee members to eleven.68   After the extension of the sub-committee, they started to 
collect subscriptions at local banks and counting houses.69  The association also set up the 
opportunity to collect signatures from the public for petitions to Parliament in the Tontine 
Coffee Room and some other places.70   The money was subscribed not only by Glasgow’s 
citizens.  Subscriptions from Port-Glasgow, which amounted to £73.19s, were added to the 
GEIA’s funds.71  
 
However, as the Report of the Sub-Committee of Correspondence dated 23 April 1812 
described, their lobbying activities, especially sending their delegates to London, involved 
heavy expense.  How to meet such expenses was often on the agenda of the meetings of the 
General Committee and the Sub-Committee of Correspondence and of Subscription.72  In 
order to collect subscriptions more efficiently, the members of the Sub-Committee of 
Subscriptions were divided into five, and ‘each division taking a different range, or class of 
inhabitants…’ was given lists of potential subscribers by the secretary.73  Nevertheless, 
regarding the second collection of subscriptions, as the secretary remembered in his letter 
that ‘… I before signified to you the backwardness experienced among almost all classes 
of people here when subscription was proposed…,’ the collection of subscriptions was 
again not an easy task at all for the GEIA.74  Furthermore, on 1 March 1813, the sub-
committee decided to postpone the collection of subscriptions for their lobbying activities 
                                               
68 Committee Minute Book, 1812-1813, 31 March 1812, pp. 6-7. 
69 Ibid., 2 April 1812, p. 9. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid, p. 52.  Cash from Archibald Falconer, a Baillie of Port-Glasgow (£3.19s) is included in this amount. 
72 Ibid., 23 April 1812, p. 12-13. 
73 Committee Minute Book 1812-1813, 27 November 1812, p. 24. 
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because at the time ‘the subscriptions for the Russia sufferers’ was progressing and they 
wanted to avoid interrupting this activity.75    
 
In this difficult situation, the GEIA made some attempts.  They decided to divide the city 
into five districts.  Each division of the Sub-Committee of Subscriptions would be in 
charge of each district and set the date for their collection of subscriptions in advance.76   
Moreover, it was agreed in the General Committee that each of those who attended this 
meeting would subscribe half the amount of his former subscription, and that they would 
also encourage absent members and former subscribers to do so.77  In spite of such 
encouragement for subscriptions, only one third (33 of 95) of the first subscribers (which 
exclude the Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturers) made their second subscriptions, 
and it seems that even some of the members of the sub-committee or their firms did not 
subscribe money because of loosing their interests.  As a result, their subscriptions 
amounted to just £313.10s.  Significant contributions from James Finlay & Co. and the 
Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturers, which doubled their previous subscriptions 
(from £52 to £105 and £105 to £210), enabled the association to raise the total amount of 
£637.2s. which allowed them to sustain their lobbying activities. 78   
 
As can be seen, the GEIA’s financial sources, which largely depended on the voluntary 
subscriptions, was unstable and it faced the problem of collecting the subscriptions for its 
lobbying during the campaign.  Moreover, these events were an actual example showing 
the Glasgow lobbyists’ difficulty in keeping the same level of public enthusiasm after the 
second half of the 1812, when the economic conditions gradually improved.  Nevertheless, 
the GEIA’s activities were financially maintained by strong efforts of certain Glasgow 
businessmen represented by Kirkman Finlay and the Chamber of Commerce, which were 
closely connected to the association, as its establishment indicated. 
 
3.5.2. Letters, and printed circulars and pamphlets   
 
In order to stir up public opinion in Glasgow and other Scottish towns and persuade 
influential politicians to join their movement against the renewal of the EIC’s charter, the 
GEIA instructed Archibald Buchanan, its secretary, to send several letters to those 
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concerned with the debate and also to print circulars and pamphlets.  During this period, 
Glasgow was the centre of the free trade campaign in Scotland. 
 
Following the letter from Thomas Attwood in Birmingham, in which he urged Glasgow to 
persuade its neighbouring towns to present their petitions against the East India monopoly 
to Parliament, the Glasgow Association’s Sub-Committee of Correspondence ordered the 
secretary to print ‘circular; together with Resolution of General Meeting [held two days 
ago], and forward copies to every Towns of United Kingdom of any note… and the 
Noblemen and Members of Parliament...’on 25 March 1812.79  ‘The Noblemen and 
Members of Parliament’ to which the association sent its circulars and resolutions included 
the Marquis of Douglas, the Duke of Montrose, the Marquis of Landsdown, the Marquis of 
Wellesley, the Earl of Bathurst, the Earl of Liverpool, the Earl of Lauderdale, Viscount 
Melville, Lord Dundas, Lord Archibald Hamilton, Spencer Perceval, George Rose, 
Thomas Turton, Bart and other nine MPs.80  This is an example of the provincial interests’ 
attempts to lobby influential politicians for obtaining their supports.  In his article, Webster 
identified the Board of Trade as one of the main players in the government’s decision on 
the renewal of the company’s charter, but he failed to show evidence for the provincial 
lobbyists’ contact with the Board of Trade.81  However, the list of politicians contains the 
President and Vice-President of the Board, that is the Earl of Bathurst and George Rose.  
This is clear evidence for the communication between the Board and the provincial 
lobbyists.   
 
The names of the towns to which GEIA’s secretary sent the letters and the copies before 
the summer of 1812 are unknown.  However, as the economy of Glasgow’s neighboring 
towns such as Paisley and Port Glasgow had close ties with the city, their interests were 
almost identical with that of Glasgow.  During the period between March and June, several 
neighbouring towns of Glasgow (Paisley, Port Glasgow & Newark, Kilmarnock, Renfrew, 
Dumbarton, Lanark, and Rutherglen) presented their petitions to Parliament.82  In addition, 
Greenock, which was a main port for Western Scotland and had large interests in overseas 
trade, had already sent its petition to Parliament in February 1812 before the GEIA started 
its lobbying.  During the period, approximately fifty-five U.K. towns and regions 
submitted petitions against the renewal of the charter.  Scottish towns apart from Glasgow 
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and its surrounding areas were Kirkcaldy, Dundee, Arbroath, Leith, Edinburgh, Perth, 
Dumfries, Dunfermline, Stirling, Montrose, Linlithgow and Aberdeen.  Taking the fact that 
22 of the 55 places which petitioned Parliament were in Scotland into consideration, the 
significance of the Scottish free trade movement during the period is evident.    
 
Prior to and after the opening of the new Parliament in the winter of 1812, the GEIA again 
delivered their letters and circulars to other Scottish burghs, such as Peebles, Paisley and 
Lanark, to encourage new petitions or deputations to London.83  During the campaign, 
none of its neighbours dispatched a deputation to London along with Glasgow, but Paisley, 
Port Glasgow and Newark, Greenock, and Rutherglen did hand their petitions to 
Parliament.84   
 
The letters were often accompanied by printed pamphlets and circulars.  Printed forms of 
protest were conventional among the middle-class in Britain for more than a century, and 
in the debate over the renewal of the East India Charter, the publication of pamphlets was 
one lobbying activity that was widely employed by the EIC and their opponents.85 
According to Philips, during the period 1812-13, more than thirty pamphlets were 
published in which the East India monopoly was criticised.86  One of the most widely 
circulated pamphlets against the renewal of the East India Charter published in Glasgow 
during the period was Letters on the East India Monopoly.87  Articles originally published 
in the Glasgow Chronicle were republished in the form of a pamphlet in Edinburgh, 
London and Liverpool as well as Glasgow.  During their stay in London, Glasgow’s 
deputation asked Mr. Watson, the editor of the Edinburgh Correspondent, to print 1,000 
copies of the pamphlet, which seems to have been this title, and send to London in April 
1812.  The GEIA ordered a further 200 copies in 1813, and 300 in 1814, after the new 
charter was passed in Parliament.88  
 
Resolutions of the General Meeting were also often published in Glasgow’s newspapers, 
such as the Glasgow Courier and the Glasgow Herald, and also in papers in Edinburgh and 
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even London.89  Payment for pamphlets, the publication of resolutions and other form of 
advertisements was the second largest category in the GEIA’s expenditure, exceeded only 
by the expenses for their deputation to London.90  Together with sending its deputation and 
petitions to London, the GEIA’s activities were not confined within the local area, but 
played a major role through using these lobbying networks spread throughout the U.K.   
 
 
3.6. Glasgow’s deputation in London and the proceedings of the renewal of the 
East India Charter  
 
Examining the activities of Glasgow’s deputies and their allies in London is a touchstone 
for measuring the influence of the provincial lobbyists over Britain’s Imperial policy and 
the significance of GEIA’s activities in this nationwide campaign. 
 
The GEIA prepared its petition to Parliament while communicating with similar public 
bodies throughout Britain, such as those in Liverpool and Birmingham.  According to the 
resolution of the General Committee of 24 March 1812, they decided to send their 
deputation of John Hamilton, Kirkman Finlay and Robert Dennistoun to London at the 
beginning of April.  They were part of the General Deputation with other delegates from 
principal cities and towns of the U.K. that lobbied Parliament to oppose the renewal of the 
EIC’s charter.91  The deputation to London was given a letter of instruction by the General 
Committee for negotiation with the Government: 
 
… you are to be guided …not to argue on any Consideration to abandon the 
undoubted right of all British subjects to a free Trade to all these countries [India 
China and the other countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope] on an equal footing, 
you will also direct your particular attention to those provisions which may relate to 
residence in India, China & so it being our decided opinion that no advantage can be 
derived from a free trade if Merchants are prevented from sending their own Agents 
and Servants to India in the some way as to other British possessions. 
 You are further directed to insist on the right of all ports in the United Kingdom to 
trade with those countries on the same footing as the port of London, and invert to 
consent to any arrangement which shall not secure their exercise of this right.92 
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This instruction was based on the resolutions of the General Meeting on 23 March 1812.  
Three main objects can be identified: (1) the entire abolition of the EIC’s commercial 
monopoly in trade with India, China and other countries and areas, which were specified in 
the charter; (2) freedom of residence in India, China and other countries and areas for their 
agents or servants; and (3) the removal of restrictions confining both exports from and 
imports to the port of London. 
 
Before gathering in London, the representatives of the outports and provincial 
manufacturing towns already had some positive expectation of the opening of the Indian 
trade through their knowledge of several communications between the company’s directors 
and the Ministers.93  Although in an 1800 communication relating the renewal of the 
charter, Henry Dundas expressed his satisfaction for the ‘propriety of continuing a 
monopoly of the trade in the hand of the East India Company’, the Government’s attitude 
to the renewal of the EIC’s charter gradually changed by 1812.94  In 1808 and 1809, Robert 
Dundas, Henry’s son and the President of the Board of Control, pointed to the necessity of 
an enlargement of the private trade with British India and proposed the admission of 
private merchants into the India trade under necessary regulations.95  Furthermore, in a 
communication between the Board of Control and the company, Dundas confirmed that: 
 
… it is now… the fixed intention of His Majesty’s Government, to withhold their 
concurrence from any proposition which might be submitted to Parliament for 
continuing to the East India Company their privileges of exclusive trade on their 
present footing.96 
 
In commercial terms, the continuity of the China trade and the opening of the export trade 
from outports to India were already agreed at this point, whilst it appeared that the import 
trade from India would be confined to the port of London.97  According to Philips, the 
pressure of the agency houses and London merchants forced the EIC to recognise the 
necessity of the relaxation of the company’s monopoly, and before the debates over the 
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new charter began, the chairmen of the EIC privately agreed with the Ministry that the 
opening of the export trade to India would be pursued.98  Regarding the opening of the 
export trade to India, the lobbying of a part of the gentlemanly capitalists and their nexus, 
in other words, the private trading interests in London and the East, played a more 
significant role than the provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests.  This devalues 
the influence of the provincial lobbyists on the national politics.  Nevertheless, as will be 
described below, the London interests’ attitude in the debates over the renewal of the 
charter after April 1812 indicated that they did not wish for further relaxation of the East 
India trade beyond the opening of the export trade. The real debates between the provincial 
merchants and manufacturers and the London mercantile interests were over the remaining 
restrictions.   
 
In April, the General Deputation of the provincial manufacturing towns and outports who 
gathered in London started their lobbying for the abolition of the EIC’s trading monopoly, 
and during the session of the Houses of Parliament, they continued their negotiations with 
the Ministry.  On 10 April, Glasgow’s deputies held a meeting with Spencer Perceval, the 
Prime Minister, for the first time.99  In this interview, the deputies found that there still 
remained the possibility of changing the Government’s intention to confine the import 
trade to the port of London, rather than such other issues as the Company’s monopoly in 
the China trade, if they could show evidence of securing collection of public revenues from 
the customs duties on imports at local ports.   After this event, in their correspondence to 
Glasgow, they wrote that ‘we suppose the Committee will consider the gaining this point 
as the virtual accomplishment of our wishes, and that consequently our time and attention 
ought to be particularly directed to remove these objections’. 100  Therefore, the possibility 
of secure and efficient collection of the public revenues at outports became the main 
question in the commercial aspects of the renewal of the charter.   
 
On 15 April, the members of the General Deputation held an interview with Perceval, 
Robert Dundas and Lord Buckinghamshire.101  These three statesmen were the key figures 
in the debates over the renewal of the charter.  The details of this meeting are unknown 
because a letter dated 16 April, by which the deputies informed the association on the 
details of the interview, is unfortunately missing.  However, according to other 
                                               
98 Philips The East India Company, p. 181. 
99 Incoming Correspondence 1812-1813, 10 April 1812, letter no. 7. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., 15 April 1812, letter no. 9. 
 91 
communication between them, the collection of the revenues in outports must have been 
discussed again: in reply to the deputies’ letter of 16 April, the association’s secretary 
informed them that the association had just found a person who could give the complete 
information on the collection of the revenues at the local port.102  In their interview, 
Dundas showed his objections to the opening of the China trade and the import trade from 
India to the outports.103  However, he was to be replaced by Lord Buckinghamshire as the 
former was appointed to the Admiralty in a cabinet re-shuffle.  Therefore, in spite of 
Dundas’ objections, it seems that the result of the meeting was very positive to the General 
Deputation, as Finlay expressed two days later that: 
 
We have the greatest satisfaction in being able to say that the result of the canvass of 
the last two days tends more than ever to convince us of the great impression which 
has already been made of the sentiment of the Members of both Houses in favour of 
this great cause.104 
 
As the results of these interviews with the Ministry, the provincial commercial and 
manufacturing interests understood that they needed to provide the Ministry with their 
evidence.   
 
Their opponents also strongly lobbied the Ministry for their own interests.  The company 
defended restriction of the import trade from India to the port of London by arguing that 
because their public auctions determined the values of commodities accurately under the 
present system, the revenue of ad valorem duties could be fairly collected.105  Nevertheless, 
unlike the public auction in one place, private sales elsewhere would trouble the 
ascertainment of the values of these goods because the market values would be different 
among the ports, which could result in frauds.106  Their arguments were supported by 
London’s merchants who held interests in the sale of East India piece goods. As has been 
mentioned, the London mercantile interests had originally supported the opening of the 
East India trade.  However, according to Philips’ explanation, as they faced the strong 
lobby organised by the provincial interests, they changed their position and supported the 
company to protect their advantages over the outports.107  They were in the circle of the 
gentlemanly capitalists.  On 21 April, the London merchants, represented by Thomas 
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Brown, held a meeting at the City and sent their petitions to Perceval for the confinement 
of the return cargoes to the port of London and also requested an interview with him.108  
While they pointed out the advantages of the long-established system of collection of 
duties at the port of London, they also warned that cotton manufacturers in Glasgow, 
Manchester and other manufacturing towns would need to compete directly with the Indian 
cotton pieces if they were imported to the outports.109  They clearly showed their opposing 
position against the provincial interest groups. 
 
In order to convince the Ministers, the General Deputation called those who were familiar 
with the details and could bear witness to information on the secure collection of revenue 
at the local ports under free trade.  They also presented their scheme for the collection of 
duties.110  For instance, because Glasgow did not have a witness with this knowledge the 
General Committee sent to London Archibald Falconer, the chief magistrate of Port 
Glasgow, where the customs house revenue was collected.111  He arrived at London on 26 
April to assist the General Deputation.112   
 
As explained, the GEIA sent their letters and the copies of resolutions to several influential 
politicians, including the President and the Vice-President of the Board, at the end of 
March 1812 before it sent the deputy to London.  Webster referred to George Rose’s 
intervention to the issue on the renewal of the company’s charter on 3 April 1812 although 
he failed to give direct evidence indicating the connection between the Board and the 
provincial interests.  If Rose’s sudden intervention and the provincial lobbyists’ contact 
with the Board of Trade in March are taken into consideration, it is reasonable to argue that 
the provincial lobbyists succeeded in persuading the Board to intervene on the issue.  The 
records of the GEIA showed that the provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests 
continued to lobby the Board of Trade.  On 13 April, the General Deputation had a meeting 
with Rose.113  In this meeting, Rose said that: 
 
He had read with very great attention every written and printed paper which had been 
sent to him, that although he had opinions they led him to investigate farther and to 
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induce him to wish more discussion of the subject, at the same time while he thought 
the Trade of India would be open, he said that the Company should not have an 
exclusive right to the trade of China.114   
 
These records showed that provincial merchants and manufacturers strongly lobbied the 
Board of Trade and that information from the outports and manufacturing towns persuaded 
Rose, who had said that ‘the whole subject [the renewal of the charter] is new to me’ in his 
communication in early April, to form his favourable attitude to the opening of the East 
India trade.115  
 
However, regarding reasons for the opening of the India trade, Webster gave more 
emphasis on the government’s economic strategy to ‘combat inflation and secure essential 
supplies of cheap raw materials, thus helping to maintain social stability’ than the 
provincial interest groups’ influence.116  Nevertheless, the social stability and securing 
alternative sources of raw materials were also demands from the provincial mercantile and 
manufacturing interest groups.  The provincial middle-class men were more sensitive to 
the instability of local society than any others as they employed a large number of workers.  
In fact, in the three midland counties of England, more than one thousand stocking frames 
had been destroyed by the Luddites by February of that year, and a considerable number of 
properties were also damaged in Northern manufacturing counties of England in social 
unrests.117  Many petitions from the provincial interests expressed their concern about their 
working-class’ economic distress.  For instance, a petition from Dudley expressed that: 
 
… there was at this moment the greatest distress prevailing, from the very high price 
of provisions; that the higher classes of manufacturers in that town and 
neighbourhood… had always endeavoured to alleviate the distresses of the working 
men, by expending their capitals in giving them employment, in hope that the 
American markets would soon be opened, and the monopoly of the East India 
Company done away…118 
 
 At the same time, as has been described, the provincial interests were also seeking stable 
sources of raw cotton because of the deterioration of the political relationship between 
Britain and the United States.  Furthermore, in his letter to the Earl of Clancarty, who 
succeeded the Earl of Bathurst as the President of the Board of Trade, John Gladstone, who 
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represented the Liverpool interests in the General Deputation in London at that time, 
strongly insisted that the American raw cotton imported to the U.K. should be replaced by 
Indian product.119  What Webster called ‘the government’s economic strategy’ was in fact 
a response to the demands from the provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests who 
suffered from the depressed economic conditions in wartime.  In consequence, the 
influence of the provincial interests on the Board of Trade should not be devalued. 
  
On 27 April, Glasgow’s deputation communicated to their hometown their optimistic 
views as they were indirectly informed that ‘the strong point will be the China trade and 
that all others will be cancelled probably with little difficulty.’120  In fact, on the same day, 
following the meeting between the deputation of the EIC and the Ministry, Lord 
Buckinghamshire notified the EIC of the Government’s opinion that the import trade 
should not be confined to the port of London.121  By this time, the Government and the 
company held different views over the effects of the opening of the import trade to the 
outports.  The EIC thought that ‘It appeared in the conference [held on the 25th of April]… 
with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and your Lordship [Lord Buckinghamshire], to be 
his opinion that checks could be devised to prevent an indefinite extent of smuggling tea, 
ruinous to the Company, which we fear from opening the outports to the India trade’.122  
The company strongly opposed this sudden change, and the General Court of Proprietors 
passed their resolution that ‘this court has learnt with deep concern and surprise, that His 
Majesty’s Ministers have been induced to change the view…’.123  The General Deputation 
maintained their direct access to the key figures of the national politics. On 9 May 1812, 
their deputies were interviewed by Perceval and Lord Buckinghamshire, again.124  In this 
meeting, Perceval confirmed to them that he had given his consent to the opening of the 
import trade from the East Indies to the major ports of the country.125   
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However, the Ministry did not intend to lay any bills before Parliament ‘in consequence of 
the advanced state of the session, and various other important considerations’.126  At that 
time, the priority of the Government was to resolve problems related to the Napoleonic 
Wars, especially those of the Orders in Council, against which the provincial commercial 
and manufacturing interests also lobbied strongly.127  Moreover, Perceval was assassinated 
by John Bellingham on 11 May 1811.  For these reasons, further progress of the measure 
was suspended.  Eventually, the General Deputation was dissolved and each deputy 
returned home.128  Consequently, in spite of the objection from the London mercantile 
community, the General Deputation’s lobby through their direct access to the key figures 
of the national politics, including Perceval, the Earl of Buckinghamshire and George Rose, 
and the supports from their hometowns succeeded in changing the Ministry’s opinion 
regarding the opening of the import trade to the outports. 
 
Communications between the Board of Control and the EIC in November and December 
1812 indicated that the opening of the import trade from the East Indies to outports had 
already been decided in May, although the Government thought that some modifications 
which would confine the import trade to those ports with adequate facilities would be 
necessary.129  The claims of the provincial manufacturing towns and outports were 
supported by the answers of the surveyor of the King’s Warehouse and his Assistant to 
queries on the possible increase of frauds and smuggling to the U.K. under the condition of 
free trade with the East Indies.130  Most of the officers supposed that the opening of the 
East India trade would increase smuggling to the country, but that it would not increase 
more than the growth of the whole East India trade.  At the same time, they suggested that 
it would be necessary to confine the trade to the major outports, which had proper facilities, 
such as Liverpool, Bristol and Glasgow.  Moreover, in his letter dated 24 December, the 
Earl of Buckinghamshire referred to the effective lobbying of the provincial manufacturing 
towns and outports: 
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They [the provincial interests] urged their claim to an equal participation in the 
general trade to India, and their conviction, that the ground upon which the exclusion 
in favour of the port of London was defended, viz. the additional danger of 
smuggling, could not be supported, and they were satisfied that the alleged danger 
might be obviated by revenue regulation.  They also entered largely into the subject 
of the China trade, contending strenuously against the renewal of the Company’s 
Charter; and stated their reasons for believing that measures might be adopted by 
which that trade could be opened, without injury to the revenue, and without 
hazarding the continuance of the intercourse with the Emperor of China’s dominions. 
 The importance attached to these representations, induced His Majesty’s 
Government to revise the arrangement which had been in contemplation; and 
although they did not see cause, under all the opinion they had entertained, of the 
propriety of continuing the existing restrictions upon the commercial intercourse with 
China, and of preserving to the Company the monopoly of tea trade, they 
nevertheless felt, that the merchants belonging to the outports had established a claim 
against an absolute restriction of the import trade to the port of London…131 
 
He admitted the provincial lobbyists’ claims regarding the extension of import trade to 
outports although he thought it would be proper for the company to maintain its monopoly 
in the China trade.  In fact, his statement was regarded as the triumph of their campaign by 
the provincial lobbyists.  They referred to the Earl of Buckinghamshire’s’ decision that: 
 
… ability and zeal of the Deputation of last year have produced a decided conviction 
on the minds of his Majesty’s Ministers with regard to the propriety of permitting to 
the Outports a free exercise of the Import and Export Trade with India…132 
 
In September 1812, Parliament was dissolved and the general election was held.  From the 
constituency of Glasgow and other Clyde burghs, Kirkman Finlay was elected.  The 
significance of having a Parliamentary member who directly represented the provincial 
interests can perhaps be indicated by an example of Birmingham’s manufacturing interests 
having difficulty in the debates over the Orders in Council, which was described by 
Moss.133  Like Glasgow, before 1832, Birmingham was not a single constituency but 
formed a country constituency of Warwickshire with other neighbouring towns.  
Nevertheless, the MP for Warwickshire disturbed the Birmingham interests’ campaign by 
giving his unfavourable remarks in Parliament.  Men whom Philips identified as the more 
prominent members in the first General Deputation were Gladstone, Brackenbury, 
Littledale and Waignwright from Liverpool; Macadam and Schonswar from Bristol; 
                                               
131 An Impartial Reporter, The preliminary debate at the East India House, p. 47, Appendix No. IX ‘Letter 
from the Right Honorable the Earl of Buckinghamshire to the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East 
India Company dated 24th, December 1812’. 
132 Committee Minute book 1812-1813, January 1813, p. 33.  
133 Moss, ‘Birmingham and the Campaigns against the Orders-in-Council’, pp. 184-185. 
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Broadley from Hull; Spooner from Birmingham; Loudon from Edinburgh.134  Among these 
leading members, only Kirkman Finlay became the MP.  In the House of Commons, he 
played an important role in opposition to the renewal of the company’s exclusive charter. 
 
In this time, the provincial mercantile and manufacturing interest used their network again.  
With the approach of the opening of the new session, the GEIA prepared new petitions to 
Parliament and appointed Robert Dennistoun, Charles Stirling and James Oswald as their 
new deputation to London.  This was in response to a request from the Liverpool 
Committee to reassemble the General Deputation, although it appears that only Stirling and 
Oswald actually left for London.  The new deputies received similar instructions to those 
for the pervious deputation from the General Committee, i.e. to insist on (1) their equal 
participation in the East India trade, (2) the residence of their agents and servants in India, 
(3) the opening of the China trade, (4) the safety of the state revenue from the customs 
duties collected at the outports, (5) the extension of export and import to the outports.135  
The two men represented Glasgow in the General Deputation in London till March 1813.  
After the Government’s opinion shifted to the opening of the import trade to the outports, 
the China trade became the main agenda in the negotiation between the General 
Deputation and the Ministry although other topics such as the restriction on the size of 
ships for the trade with the East Indies still needed to be discussed further as their 
interview with Lord Liverpool indicates.136  The provincial interests succeeded in bringing 
up this topic for discussion in their individual meetings with the Ministry and in Parliament, 
but their lobbying showed little success.   
 
After the end of March, the two deputies expressed to the Glasgow Committee their 
opinion that ‘the Business of the Deputation may be managed by one of us only’.  So only 
Oswald remained in London to continue lobbying for his home town.137  However, he 
expressed his desire to return to Glasgow in April for personal reasons, and, in spite of the 
request from the General Committee that ‘he stays in London,’ he left London before the 
end of April.138  Following his resignation, the GEIA lost their representative in the 
General Deputation so it was urgent for them to appoint a replacement.  Eventually, with 
James Ewing’s appointment to the Deputation on 2 May 1813, Glasgow had a voice in the 
                                               
134 Philips The East India Company, p. 182. 
135 Committee Minute Book 1812-1813, January 1813, pp. 31-32, letter to Robert Dennistoun, Charles 
Stirling and James Oswald Esquires. 
136 Incoming Correspondence 1812-1813, February 1813, letter no. 24. 
137 Committee Minute Book 1812-1813, 29 March 1813, p. 39. 
138 Ibid, 15 April 1813, p. 43, and Incoming Correspondence, 1812-13, 24 April 1813, Letter No. 33. 
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General Deputation again.139  Nevertheless, during the absence of Glasgow’s deputy, 
Kirkman Finlay was still in London as a representative for the city in Parliament and kept 
up a correspondence with the association.140   
 
On 23 March 1813, Lord Castlereagh introduced the question on the renewal of the charter 
in the House of Commons and moved resolutions to that end.  The main points were that 
the charter, including the exclusive right for the China trade, should be renewed, but the 
relaxation of the Indian trade should be allowed for the opening of both import and export 
trade between the outports and India.141  By the end of the month, the Glasgow General 
Committee was very pessimistic about the opening of the China trade, including the tea 
trade, and gave its consent to the deputation to seek the possibility of shortening the 
duration of the company’s monopoly to seven or ten years.142  In terms of the China trade, 
in spite of the provincial interests’ strong lobby and George Rose’s opinion for the opening 
of the China trade, the Board of Control maintained its coherent opinion against these 
claims during the debates.  Regarding this point, Philips and Webster’s view that the 
advice for the continuity of the company’s monopoly in the China trade from Sir George 
Staunton, who had worked as a supercargo at Canton and was familiar with the conditions 
of the China trade, influenced Buckingham’s opinion, seems right.143  In the Select 
Committee, a number of witnesses were called in the next two months by the EIC in order 
to argue the danger of the opening of the East India trade.  The facts given by those who 
were called from a number of positions of the company’s service were often biased in 
favour of the company’s arguments.  For example, Archibald Buchanan, the secretary to 
the Glasgow Committee, commented on the evidence given by Colonel Munro that: 
 
I look upon as very important, & the more so that the Witness seems to have had a 
strong bias towards the Co.…feelings of the gratitude or interest, or private 
friendship restrain’d him from giving that testimony, directly which has been 
apparently dragoon’d out of him that the native have no prejudices, but the very 
rational one of not choosing to pay too high a price for foreign article…144 
 
In spite of their bias to the company, these testimonies failed to convince the Ministers and 
Parliament of the advantages of the continuing the EIC’s exclusive privilege in the India 
                                               
139 Committee Minute Book 1812-1813, 2 May 1813, p. 44. 
140 Incoming Correspondence 1812-1813, 29 April 1812 and 3 May 1813, letter no. 34 
141 Committee Minute Book 1812-1813, 29 October 1813, pp. 67-68. 
142 Ibid. 29 March 1813, Meeting of the General Committee. 
143 Phillips, The East India Company, p. 186, and Webster, ‘The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization’, 
p. 412. 
144 Outgoing Correspondence 1812-1814, 24th, April, 1813, Letter to James Oswald Esq.  
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trade.  Correspondence between the Glasgow General Committee and their deputies to 
London seem to imply that, although they regretted that the China trade would not open to 
the outports, they were optimistic about the influence of their evidence on the 
Parliamentary decision and they often thought that some testimonies practically supported 
free trade.145  Although in the following two months, approximately fifty witnesses were 
called to the Committee of Whole House and the Select Committee, the Ministry’s opinion 
remained same.  
 
While the General Deputation was preparing evidence to support their claims, after May 
they began to fear that the final decision over the renewal of charter might be postponed 
until another session.146  They knew that as the economic condition of the country 
gradually improved, the question over the charter attracted less attention from the public 
than before: 
  
It will not have escaped your notice that the zeal manifested on the part of the 
Country, is much less ardent than it was last year at the close of the session, and if 
Parliament be again allowed to rise without passing the Bill, it is much to be fear’d 
the task will be more & more difficult & the result less & less beneficial in 
proportion to the time the question may be delayed.147 
 
Regarding this situation, Webster explains that: 
 
When trade with Europe became easier after 1812, the economic pressures which had 
forced the provincial interests together became less acute. From then on, it proved 
very difficult for the provinces to organize further campaigns which could replicate 
the breadth and unity of 1812.148 
 
At this stage, the provincial interests were forced to admit that they needed to change their 
lobbying strategies.  Lord Castlereagh, who also wished to finish this debate in this session 
as the Ministry wanted to concentrate on the war, suggested that the General Deputation 
not call their witnesses.149  As these two parties had consensus on their best interests, the 
                                               
145 Webster explained that ‘Even though Munro defended the E.I.C. monopoly, he claimed that free trade 
would reduce freight charges and stimulate greater involvement by British merchants in the Indian raw cotton 
trade, thus bolstering raw cotton prices in India and leading to increased production by Indian cultivators’. 
Regarding his testimonies, Archibald Buchanan, the secretary of the GEIA commented that ‘The Evidence of 
Col: Munro is much more favor of the Open Trade than any hitherto ex’d.’ See Webster ‘The Political 
Economy of Trade Liberalization’, p. 409, and Outgoing Correspondence 1812-1814, 24 April 1813, Letter to 
Robert Dennistoun. 
146 Ibid., 7 May 1813, Letter to Kirkman Finlay Esq.   
147 Ibid., 24 May 1813, Letter to James Ewing Esq. 
148 Webster ‘The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization’, pp. 416-417. 
149 Committee Minute Book 1812-1813, 29 October 1813, pp. 68-69 and Philips, The East India Company, 
pp. 188-191. 
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outports’ deputies decided not to give their evidence and the resolutions were passed in the 
House of Commons on 31 May.150  On the one side, in the first resolution, the EIC was 
empowered to continue the administration of the British territories in India for another 
twenty years, and in the second resolution the company’s exclusive trade with China was 
approved.  On the other side, the third resolution allowed the free entry of all licensed 
British merchants to the Indian trade.151  Before the end of this session, the Bill was finally 
placed before Parliament.  After several modifications were discussed and made, the new 
Bill passed both Houses, and the Royal Assent was granted on 21 July 1813. 
 
The Report of the Glasgow Committee summarised the commercial terms of the new 
charter.152  Firstly, after the expiration of the old charter on 10 April 1814, all British 
subjects equipping themselves with ships of 350 tons or more were to be legally permitted 
to participate in commercial intercourse with countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope to 
the eastward under the license granted by the Court of Directors of the EIC, with the 
exception of the Chinese trade where private traders were to be excluded.  Secondly, with 
regard to the trading articles, the import of tea by private merchants remained forbidden, 
and the outports were allowed to import commodities manufactured of silks, hair and 
cotton wool only for the purpose of re-export.  Thirdly, the same duties were imposed on 
the company’s commodities as on private traders, and the company was to keep books at 
home and in India in order to show the separation between their political and commercial 
affairs.  Moreover, the EIC was required to submit the accounts to Parliament every year 
for examination and to place all duties on their goods to the debit of the commercial branch.  
Fourthly, without the consent of the Board of Control, the appropriation of part of the 
revenue to commercial purposes was not to be allowed.  Then, all residents in India were 
subject to the company’s local governments.  Finally, Parliament was to reserve powers for 
altering the Bill for proper reasons, and the Charter Act was to last for twenty years.  
Compared with the previous charter, most of the terms were favourable to provincial 
merchants and manufacturers in Britain.  Although they failed to convince the Government 
of the merits of the opening of the China trade, the reversal of the Ministry’s decision on 
the opening of the import trade to outports was the result of their successful lobbying, and 
this was their triumph over the gentlemanly capitalists. 
 
After James Ewing returned to Glasgow at the end of October 1813, a General Meeting of 
                                               
150 Outgoing Correspondence 1812-1814, 28 May 1813, Letter to James Ewing Esq. 
151 Philips, The East India Company, p. 190. 
152 Committee Minute Book 1812-1813, 29 October 1813, pp. 70-72. 
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the subscribers was held on 2 November.153  This was the last major event of the GEIA in 
the early 1810s.  In this meeting, they celebrated the abolition of the company’s monopoly 
in the India trade and resolved their thanks to Kirkman Finlay for representing the city in 
Parliament, to the members of the deputation and the secretary.154  In the meeting, a new 
committee was set up ‘for attending to the progress of the Bill to be introduced in the next 
session of Parliament, for regulating the important subject of the circuitous trade to and 
from India, and to communicate with other Committees’, and Robert Dennistoun, Charles 
Stirling, James Buchanan, John More, David Connell, Henry Monteith, James Ewing and 
James Oswald were appointed to the posts.155  The activities of this committee are 
unknown.  What is clear is that after the opening of the India trade in 1814, some of 
Glasgow merchants started their trade with the East Indies.  For instance, it is known that 
Kirkman Finlay sent the first ship named the ‘Earl of Buckinghamshire’ from the Clyde to 
Bombay directly in 1816, then in the following year, he sent the ‘George Canning’ to 
Calcutta.156  Nevertheless, as will be explained in Chapters 4 and 5, Glasgow’s East Indian 
interests failed to maintain their association.  Because of this, after the opening of the India 
trade, their lobbying became inactive until 1829.     
 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, GEIA and its lobbying activities in the early 1810s have been examined.  
The organisation represented both the mercantile and manufacturing interests of Glasgow, 
especially among the members of the General Committee and the subscribers to the 
association.  The presence of those involved in the West India trade and the cotton 
spinning and manufacturing industry, which dominated the economic activities of city and 
its neighboring areas, was remarkable.  On the one hand, the involvement of various 
different economic interests in the campaign indicated that the lobbying activities were 
widely supported by the business elite of the city.  On the other hand, the case of the West 
Indian merchants, who demanded the protection for their existing trade at the expense of 
the East India trade during the campaign, shows that the provincial interests had some 
divisions.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that such divisions critically affected the 
provincial lobbyists’ ability to organise their campaign.  They formed effective groups and 
their lobbying was influential enough. 
                                               
153 Committee Minute Book 1812-1813, 2 November 1813, pp. 78-79. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
156 J. MacLehose, Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men, Chapter 21. 
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Before the lobbying activities of the General Deputation in London began in April 1812, 
the continuation of the monopoly in the China trade had already been agreed as a result of 
the negotiations between the EIC and the Board of Control.  The Ministry had also decided 
to remove the restriction which prevented vessels from leaving U.K. ports for the East 
Indies except the port of London.   After their initial negotiations with the Ministry, the 
Glasgow deputation and other provincial towns and outports recognised that the Ministry 
would change their opinion if they could prove that the opening of the import trade to the 
outports would not have negative impact on the secure and efficient collection of customs 
duties.  Therefore, they set this topic as their main target and strongly lobbied the Ministry.  
In the debates over this subject, they could exercise their influence enough to persuade the 
Ministry to change its opinion.  In the face of strong lobbying from the provincial interests, 
Lord Buckinghamshire decided the import trade would be opened to the outports and 
admitted their influence in his communication with the company.  In this issue, the 
influential lobby of the provincial interests contrasted with the inability of the gentlemanly 
capitalists in the metropolis. 
 
The case-study also shows that the limited influence of the provincial lobbyists and the 
significance of the opinion of the Board of the Trade in the East India question on which 
Webster insists also appear to be overstated.  The records of the GEIA show the clear 
evidence that the provincial interests strongly lobbied the President and Vice-Presidents of 
the Board.  Although Webster stressed the significance of the government’s economic 
strategies more than the provincial lobbyists’ influence, its wartime economic strategies 
were in fact a response to demands from the provincial mercantile and manufacturing 
interests.  Consequently, from Buckinghamshire’s statements and the provincial lobbyists’ 
influence on the Board of Trade, it is clear that the Ministry’s change of its opinion on the 
import trade from India was the result of the strong lobby organised by the provincial 
interest groups.   
 
During the Parliamentary sessions of 1812 and 1813, the contribution of Glasgow to the 
free trade campaign was significant.  Although the GEIA made attempts to encourage other 
Scottish towns to join the campaign, their activities were not confined within Scotland.  
The association sent their letters to influential politicians, whilst their resolutions and 
pamphlets were widely circulated in the whole country.  The GEIA’s close communication 
with other major provincial towns helped them create their campaign strategies.  In London, 
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the deputation of the GEIA formed the General Deputation with those from several other 
towns and strongly lobbied the Ministry and the Parliament.  The GEIA was undoubtedly 
one of the most active institutions in the campaign. 
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Chapter 4.  The lobbying activities of the Glasgow East India Association 
against the renewal of the East India Company’s charter, 1829-1833 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
After the renewal of the EIC’s charter of 1813, the East India interests in Liverpool, 
Manchester and other towns in North England organised during the 1820s further lobbying 
activities, such as petitioning Parliament for the equalisation of the duties levied on East 
Indian sugar and West Indian sugar. But the Glasgow interests were relatively inactive.  
However, their lobbying was revived by the foundation of the new Glasgow East India 
Association in 1829, five years before the expiry of the charter.  Unlike the previous GEIA 
of 1812 and 1813, the new Association, which represented the East India interests of the 
city, was a permanent organisation established in order to promote free trade in the East 
Indies.  That is to say, the association wrestled not only with the EIC’s attempts to renew 
the charter, but with several other problems which British merchants and manufacturers 
were facing in this branch of overseas trade.  For instance, the equalisation of the duties 
levied on the East and West India sugar and the heavy duties imposed on British 
manufactures in the Dutch possession of the island of Java.  The organisation continued its 
activities after the EIC’s charter was eventually renewed in 1833. 
 
In terms of the opening of the China trade and the end of the EIC’s commercial branch in 
1834, Greenberg argued ‘The decisive pressure against the East India Company’s 
monopoly came not from Canton but from Manchester’.1  The influence of the commercial 
and manufacturing interests in provincial towns and outports, especially those in 
Lancashire, has often been emphasised by many historians as in the case of the opening of 
the India trade two decades earlier.  In his doctoral thesis, Eyles concluded that: 
 
The decision to end the trade was influenced mainly by the noisy efforts of the free 
traders in Britain who were both numerous and vocal.  The outports and industrial 
centres who were responsible for influencing Parliament, never really understood the 
real nature of the Canton trade, but their numbers and influence were enough to 
ensure that the Company’s monopoly of the tea trade was destroyed.2 
 
These historians argued that the industrialists’ need to find new export markets for their 
manufactured goods and the increasing in demand for raw materials in their expanded 
                                               
1 M. Greenberg, British Trade and The Opening of China 1800-42, 1961, p. 179. 
2 D. Eyles, ‘The Abolition of The East India Company’s Monopoly 1833’ unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Edinburgh, 1955, p. 304. 
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production capacity after the Industrial Revolution encouraged them to put more pressure 
on the company’s China monopoly.  In contrast, more recently, some historians have 
emphasised a non-industrial element. Cain and Hopkins argued that ‘The end of the 
Company’s last monopoly was not the outcome of pressure exerted by Manchester’s 
manufactures but the result of efforts made by merchants based in London and India who 
were keen to open markets for Indian cotton goods and opium in south-east Asia and Far 
East.’3  Bowen also stressed that unprofitability of the EIC as a commercial organisation 
predated the abolition of its monopoly.4  In contrast, Webster supported Tripathi’s 
explanation on the provincial merchants and manufacturers’ effective lobby during the 
1829-1833 campaign.5  But Tripathi’s explanation failed to clarify the connection between 
the provincial lobbyists and the agency houses during the campaign.6   
 
The free trade campaign during the period 1829-1833 was not a simple movement 
organised only by provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests.  Nevertheless, it is 
also wrong to regard the opening of the China trade as a sole product of gentlemanly 
capitalists and their nexus.  The records indicate not only that John Crawfurd, a former EIC 
servant and a Scottish Orientalist, acted as a general agent for the interest of the private 
merchants in the East Indies in the free trade movement, but also that the provincial 
lobbyists collaborated with some of the gentlemanly capitalists in London during the 
campaign.  Therefore, this chapter emphasises the influence of the provincial interest 
groups over the policy-making process and the Scottish roles in the British Empire.  It also 
supports Webster’s model of a more complicated relationship between the province and the 
metropolis after the opening of the India trade.   
 
In this chapter, the foundation of the GEIA in 1829 and the beginning of its lobbying 
activities against the renewal of the EIC’s charter will be first described.  Secondly, the 
economic interests and political status of the members of the GEIA during this period will 
be assessed.  Thirdly, the Association’s lobbying methods, and then the debates and 
proceedings of the renewal of the EIC’s charter will be described.  
 
 
                                               
3 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, p. 325. 
4 H V Bowen, The Business of Empire, 2006, pp. 252-259. 
5 Webster, ‘The Strategies and Limits of Gentlemanly Capitalism’, p. 749. 
6 A. Trapathi, Trade and Finance in The Bengal Presidency 1879-1833, 1979, pp. 198-199. 
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4.2. The re-establishment of the Glasgow East India Association 
 
The renewal of the company’s charter in 1813 represented a mixture of success and failure 
of the lobbying organised by Glasgow and other provincial merchants and manufacturers.  
Under the new charter of 1813, all British merchants were permitted to trade with both the 
company’s and natives’ territories in India after 10 April 1814.  But the company 
succeeded in retaining its privileges in the trade of teas and the China trade.   As a result, 
although the EIC continued its trade with India, it specialised in the China trade, which still 
produced large profits.  As industrial sectors played a prime role in the growth of the 
national income during this period, the Industrial Revolution and the growth of urban 
population in the provincial manufacturing towns became the key factor in the growth of 
the consumption of tea in Britain.7  Figure 4-1 shows profit and loss of the company on the 
India and China trade in the 15 years after the renewal of the charter.  During this period, 
the profit from the China trade shifted between approximately £760,000 in 1822-23 and 
£1.4 million in 1814-15; the average profit was just above £1 million per year.  Meanwhile, 
its India trade deteriorated.8  After 1820-21, with the exception of 1824-25, the trade 
operated at a loss, which in 1828-29 amounted to approximately £555,000.  Merchants in 
Glasgow and other outports were excluded from the lucrative tea trade.  Adam Smith and 
other classical economists made arguments on free trade that the system of freely moving 
prices under the free economic condition can be beneficial for the consumers.9   From the 
viewpoint of free trade supporters, the company’s exclusive trading right for their tea trade 
was against the interest of all consumers in the United Kingdom.  It was believed that the 
state’s interference in the East India trade, by granting the charter of the exclusive trade to 
the company, resulted in higher prices of imported commodities.   
                                               
7 J. R. Ward, ‘The Industrial Revolution and British Imperialism, 1750-1850’ in The Economic History 
Review, New series, XLVII, I, 1994, pp. 44-65. 
8 Regarding the EIC’s trade with India and China during this period, also see Bowen, The Business of Empire, 
pp. 252-259 
9 P. Mathias, The First Industrial Nation: An Economic History of Britain 1700-1914, 1969, p. 201. 
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Figure 4-1. Profit and Loss of the EIC on India and China Trade between 1814-15 and 1828-29. 
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Source: British Parliamentary Papers, Minutes of Evidence taken before the select committee on the affairs of the East India Company; and also an appendix and index, II. Finance and 
Accounts-Trade, 1832, Appendix No. 3, p. 45.  
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Moreover, the EIC needed to transfer capital from India to Europe in the form of their 
‘investment’ in the Chinese produce in order to settle their financial obligations in 
England, especially, payments of dividends to the proprietors and interest on debts derived 
from the administration of India.  Before the previous renewal of the charter of 1813, Lord 
Lauderdale had argued that ‘it was the amount of the tribute collected, and of the fortune 
the EIC’s servant wished to remit, and no consideration of the state of our European 
markets, that decided the quantity of exports from India…’10  Similarly, J. R. McCulloch 
insisted that ‘A Company which carries a sword in the one hand, and a ledger in the other- 
which maintains armies and retails tea, is contradiction.’11  Tea was the most important 
single commodity for the company to operate the system of this international financial 
transfer between Europe and Asia during this period, and those who were opposed to the 
company thought that its price was distorted by political considerations, which harmed the 
interests of all British subjects.  At the same time, it was expected that the opening of the 
China trade would give private traders an effective means of sending their returns from 
India, in which they were facing great difficulty resulting from the company’s need to 
process government remittances.  McCulloch argued that the institution which managed 
the remittance to England was not necessary, and that instead of remittance through the 
medium of ‘investment’ in Chinese produce, this could entirely be done by bills of 
exchange.12  
 
In addition to the import of tea, many British manufacturing interests regarded China as a 
potential market for their own manufactured goods. James Mill, who followed the views of 
Adam Smith, had argued before he accepted an executive position in the company that ‘it 
would, indeed, be a matter of astonishment, if the acuteness and ardour of private 
adventurers should not find means of producing commodities to the taste of every people 
in the world who have enough to give for them.’13  In the first sixteen years after the 
opening of the Indian trade, Indian exports in the hands of private traders (average 
£5,451,452 per year) overwhelmed the company’s (average £1,882,718 per year).14  
Traditionally, the directors of the company and their supporters defended their exclusive 
trade with the East Indies by arguing that little increase in British exports to the East Indies 
would be achieved even if the trade was opened towards all British subjects because the 
                                               
10 J. Maitland, [Lord Lauderdale], An Inquiry into the Practical Merits of the System for the Government of 
India under the Superintendence of the Board of Controul, 1809, p. 137. 
11 D. P. O’Brien, J. R. McCulloch: A Study in Classic Economics, 1970, p. 340. 
12 Ibid., p. 341. 
13 W. Barber, British Economic Thought and India 1600- 1858, 1975, p.134.  Originally quoted from ‘East 
India Monopoly’ in Edinburgh Review (November, 1812), p. 476. 
14 R. Dutt, The Economic History of India under Early British Rule, 1956, p. 293. 
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local demands for British products were already satisfied by the Company’s exports.  
Nevertheless, as the result of the growth of British exports to India after 1814 and the 
American merchants’ success in this trade, such an argument became less convincing.  
 
The opening of the India Trade to British private traders in 1814 created new East Indian 
interests in outports although some private traders had already engaged in ‘country trade’ 
or used limited facilities provided by the company.15  Nevertheless, it seems that in 
Glasgow those who had interests in the East India trade failed to organise themselves to 
lobby the state for their own interests before the end of the 1820s.  It is very difficult to 
answer why they failed to organise their lobbying during this period. However, one 
probable reason was Kirkman Finlay’s gradual withdrawal from Glasgow’s affairs during 
the same period.16  As described in the previous chapter, he was a key figure in the 
previous free trade campaign.  Nevertheless, he lost his parliamentary seat for the Clyde 
burghs in 1818, and was elected for Malmesbury, Wiltshire.  He also bought a property in 
Cowal, Argyll, and developed the lands there.  Although he became President of the 
Chamber of Commerce again during the period 1823 to 24, he was less active in both 
commercial and political affairs of the city than he had been during the 1810s.  In contrast, 
as K. Charlton’s work and the following chapters describe, Liverpool’s East Indian 
merchants, who had already been represented by their own East India Association, and 
Manchester’s manufacturers, whose Chamber of Commerce dealt with the matters of the 
East India trade, were more active than Glasgow’s East Indian interests.17  In particular, 
Liverpool played a central role in debates over the trade with the East Indies during the 
1820s such as the abolition of the limitation of the tonnage of ships for the trade and the 
equalisation of duties on East India sugar and West India sugar.  Moreover, the inactivity 
of Glasgow’s East Indian interests contrasted strikingly with their West Indian counterpart 
who organised powerful lobby against the abolition of slavery during the same period.18  If 
the year of the foundation of the GEIA is taken into consideration, the reason for its 
establishment is obvious.  As the expiration of the charter was approaching five years later, 
it was essential for the merchants and manufacturers of the city to organise a lobbying 
group to promote their own interests effectively, that is to say, the abolition of the EIC’s 
                                               
15 J. G. Parker, ‘Scottish Enterprise in India, 1750-1914’ in R. A. Cage (ed.) The Scots Abroad: Labour, 
Capital, Enterprise, 1750-1914, 1985, Chap. 7. 
16 C. Brogan, James Finlay & Company Limited, Manufacturers and East India Merchants, 1750-1950, 1951, 
pp. 28-29 
17 K. Charlton, ‘Liverpool and The East India Trade’, pp. 56-63. 
18 I. Whyte, Scotland and The Abolition of Black Slavery, 1756-1838, 2006. 
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remaining commercial monopoly and other restrictions imposed on the East India and 
China trade. 
  
Kirkman Finlay remained a leading figure in the lobbying activities in Glasgow against the 
renewal of the EIC’s charter in the late 1820s and early 1830s.  He had played a key role 
around 1812-1813.  In the 1810s and 1820s, he was the President of the Chamber of 
Commerce in the city at that time, so was in a position to be influential.  On 16 April 1829, 
Finlay and eight other businessmen of Glasgow gathered to hold a meeting at the Tontine 
Hotel to discuss the foundation of the new GEIA.19  A public meeting of those who had 
interest in the free trade with India and China then took place on 22 April.20  In his speech 
at this meeting, Finlay reiterated his strong preference for free trade by referring to Adam 
Smith and heavily criticised the company’s monopoly for its old-fashioned mercantilist 
character and prohibitive nature: 
 
…some of the conductors of the public press, even in this city, regardless of the 
principles and demonstrations of the eminent man [Adam Smith] who had added 
celebrity to our University and to his City, and immortalized his own name by 
enlightening mankind with his admirable works; some of these gentlemen advocated 
the wildest and most confined views of mercantile monopoly, and did not blush to 
condemn every trade which carried from us gold and silver.  These admirable 
supporters of antiquated, exploded, and absurd doctrine- these students of the 
balance-of-trade school, would not leave to mercantile prudence the care of not 
parting with their gold unless something more precious than gold could be given for 
it- they should interdict and destroy all trade that requires an export of the precious 
metals, virtually proclaiming by their strange and extraordinary doctrines that these 
are more valuable even than the necessaries of life.  These same gentlemen, however, 
were never unwilling to take gold and silver in exchange for our produce; but if this 
island were surrounded by a brazen wall, and nothing were allowed to come into the 
country but gold and silver, what, in the name of common sense, would they make of 
their heaps of these metals? – they would not exchange it in the purchase of the first 
necessaries of life, and then where would be its values?21 
 
In this meeting, they resolved that ‘an Association be formed for the protection and 
furtherance of the general interests of the Trade with the East Indies under the designation 
of the Glasgow East India Association’ and that ‘all Merchants, Manufacturers and others 
residing in this City and neighbourhood interested in success of the Trade with India be 
insisted to become Members of this Association.’22  Then, the GEIA was officially funded 
                                               
19 The Glasgow East India Association Committee Minutes, 1829-1847 (MS89001/2, Glasgow Mitchell 
Library), 16 April 1829, p. 1.  The other eight participants in the meeting were, Charles Todd, Rowan Ronald, 
James Anderson, William Graham, Hugh Cogan, James Buchanan, John Weighton and Andrew Tennant. 
20 Ibid., 22 April 1829, pp. 1-3. 
21 Glasgow Herald, 24 April 1829, ‘EAST INDIA TRADE’. 
22 Committee Minutes 1829-1847, p. 1. 
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by thirty-two gentlemen who signed up as members.23  In order to achieve the purposes of 
this Association, it was also decided to establish a general fund by an entry subscription of 
five guineas and an annual subscription of half a guinea from each member.24   
 
In this meeting, Finlay also referred to his receipt of a letter from the East India 
Association in Liverpool.25  In this letter, the Liverpool Association expressed its intention 
to send a deputation to London in May in order to discuss with other deputations the proper 
means to oppose the renewal of the East India Company’s charter.26  They had been 
making an arrangement for a meeting with the Duke of Wellington through its MP, 
William Huskisson, who held the office of the President of the Board of Trade at that time, 
and invited other deputations to it.27  The receipt of the letter from Liverpool indicated that 
the communication between Glasgow and Liverpool played an important part in the re-
establishment of the Glasgow Association.  Finlay shared the Liverpool businessmen’s 
opinion that it was proper to persuade the Government to give its early attention to the 
subject of the renewal of the company’s charter and to make the case the total abolition of 
its monopoly to the Ministers.28  The meeting supported his view and resolved that ‘it is 
the firm purpose and determination of this Meeting to claim by every proper and 
constitutional means the entire abolition of the East India Company’s Commercial 
monopoly in every branch of the Trade to India & China and it is the earnest wish of this 
Association to further this object by meeting with other Mercantile Bodies associated for 
the same purpose’.  Alexander Garden, the Lord Provost of Glasgow, and Robert Dalglish 
were appointed as deputies from the city to London.29  Later, Robert Douglas Alston, 
George Stirling and James Ewing joined them.30  On 6 May, in order to manage the affairs 
of the association, a committee of eighteen members was appointed and the offices of a 
chairman, a deputy chairman and a treasurer and secretary were set up.  At the next day’s 
meeting, Finlay and James A. Anderson were unanimously elected as chairman and deputy 
chairman, and William P. Paton, who had deep knowledge of the East India trade through 
his own experience of residing in the Malay Archipelago, was chosen as secretary and 
treasurer.31  By the appointment of these office-bearers, the organisation was fully 
                                               
23 Ibid., p. 3 
24 Ibid., p. 2 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 M. Greenberg, British Trade and The Opening of China 1800-42, pp. 181-182. 
28 Glasgow Herald, 24 April 1829, ‘EAST INDIA TRADE’. 
29 Committee Minutes 1829-1847, p. 2. 
30 Ibid., 28 April 1829, p. 4. 
31 Ibid., 7 May 1829, p. 8 and Glasgow Herald, 8 May 1829, ‘EAST INDIA MONOPOLY’. 
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established to begin their lobbying activities against the renewal of the EIC’s charter and 
deal with other aspects of the East India trade in earnest. 
 
 
4.3. The economic interests and political status of members of the GEIA 
 
This section will analyse the economic interests and political status of the GEIA’s 
members in order to understand the characteristics of the members of the Glasgow 
Association as a group, and how these influenced their lobbying strategies.  Appendix III is 
the list of the 146 members of the GEIA between 1829 and 1833, their occupations and the 
firms in which they had interests.  As has been explained in Chapter 3, the short-lived 
GEIA of the previous campaign consisted of both the mercantile and manufacturing 
interests of the city.  This table indicates that the economic interests of the members of the 
re-established GEIA were also varied.  Nevertheless, it also shows that the Association had 
some different characteristics from the previous organisation.   
 
First of all, in the table, according to the information of advertisements of shipping in the 
Glasgow Courier, 100 Glasgow men and records of the GWIA and other sources, 23 
members of the new GEIA were engaged in the overseas trade.  The records of the GWIA 
and other sources on James Finlay & Co. and Dennistoun, Buchanan & Co. also identified 
another 6 members as foreign traders.  Therefore, in total, at least 29 members of the GEIA 
were clearly engaged in foreign trade and shipping businesses.  Among them, 14 members 
were involved in the East India trade.  Although the information in this table is limited and 
there is a possibility that the number of overseas traders, particularly the East Indian 
traders, could increase by conducting further research, what the table indicates is that 
whilst many of the foreign traders and shipping interests of the Association were engaged 
in the East India trade, the destinations of their trade were not confined to this area.  They 
were also involved in other branches of foreign trade, including the West Indies, South 
America, British North America, United States, Europe.  This shows that the existence of 
varied foreign trading and shipping interests within the association.  Their varied trading 
destinations reflected the diversification of Glasgow’s foreign trade during this period. 
 
During the 1812-1813 campaign, the West Indian interests had been one of the largest 
economic interest groups which lobbied for the end of the East India and China monopoly 
in Glasgow, and influenced the association’s strategies.  Nevertheless, while such 
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mercantile firms as James Finlay & Co. and Walter Buchanan’s Buchanan, Hamilton & 
Co. engaged in the East India trade, the presence of the West Indian interests in the trade 
and the new Association was limited.  The names of the West Indian merchants who 
attended at general meetings, annual general meetings, and meetings of its directors can be 
found in the records of the Glasgow West India Association.  Compared with Appendix II, 
in which at least 22 company and individual subscribers for the previous GEIA can be 
identified as the members of the GWIA, among those who attended at these meetings of 
the GWIA during the period 1823-34 (nearly fifty names can be identified), only James 
Bogle, Arthur Connell of D. & J. Connell and later A. & J. Connell, James Ewing and 
William Matheison of James Ewing & Co., and George Scheviz were on the list of the 
members of the new GEIA.  In Appendix III, apart from them, James Buchanan of 
Downhill and his son, James, were also one of the leading West Indian firms of the town, 
partners of Dennistoun, Buchanan & Co., which also engaged in the East India trade 
through Buchanan, Brown & Co.32  
 
Some reasons can be identified for a small number of the West Indian merchants who 
actually carried on the East India trade after the opening of the India trade.  The first reason 
was that the motives of the West Indian merchants for attending the previous campaign 
was their hardship during the dislocation of the West India trade caused by the Napoleonic 
Wars.  As has been revealed in Chapter 3, although at the beginning of Glasgow’s previous 
campaign its West Indian interests were one of the groups which most seriously pursued 
the opening of the East India trade, when economic conditions improved after the second 
half of 1812, Kirkman Finlay and some cotton manufacturers remained as the keenest part 
of the city’s free trade movement rather than those who were involved in the West India 
trade.   
 
The second reason was the different nature of the East India trade from the West India 
trade.  For instance, according to one of the testimonies at the Select Committee: 
 
… a ship which would go from Liverpool to the West Indies, and bring a good and 
sufficient cargo from thence, could not convey indigo, silk and saltpetre, with 
advantage to the ship-owner, on the terms at which the East India Company now 
engage that class of shipping… although a small leak would in no degree be 
detrimental to a West Indiaman, it may create a very considerable loss to a ship that 
has an East India cargo on board.33 
                                               
32 Minute Book of Dennistoun, Buchanan & Co. Glasgow 1806-42 (MS Murray 605, Glasgow University 
Special Collection Department), 14 February 1825.   
33 Parliamentary Paper, Minute of Evidence Taken Before the Committee of the Whole House, and the Select 
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It seems that without altering vessels themselves or their outfits, vessels employed for the 
West India trade were not suitable to the East India trade with longer shipping routes and 
time.  The West Indian interests also needed to obtain knowledge and establish trading 
networks to enter the East India trade, which had been monopolised by the company.  
Checkland’s work describes that although John Gladstone, who had established himself as 
a prominent West Indian merchant after the 1810s, entered the East India trade, he 
struggled to make profits in the Indian market after the initial expansion of the trade in 
spite of his abilities of reducing risks in the longer distant trade with the East Indies.34  
These cases refer to Liverpool, but the principles also apply to Glasgow.  These may have 
partly prevented Glasgow’s West Indian interests from entering the East India trade to an 
extensive degree.  
 
Thirdly, the East Indian traders and the West Indian traders showed the incompatibility of 
their interests after the opening of the India trade.  Although the old GEIA had made 
attempts to defend the West Indian interests as well as to promote free trade in the East 
Indies during the period 1812-13, the new association did not do so.  In fact, at national 
level, the East Indian interests and the West Indian interests had prolonged disputes over 
the equalisation of the customs duties between the East Indian and West Indian sugars 
during the 1820s and the 1830s. The annual report in 1824 by the chairman and directors 
of the Glasgow West India Association stated that: 
 
Uniting with the party of Mr. Wilberforce they [the East India opponents] have struck 
a blow at the vital interests of the [West Indian] colonies and threatened their very 
existence with the most indefatigable industry they circulated statement through the 
whole country representing the conduct of the planters in the most hideous light 
denouncing the cultivation of sugar though the medium of Negro labour and calling 
on the whole people of Britain to come forward and petition the legislative for the 
immediate improvement and ultimate emancipations of the slaves.35 
 
The West Indian interests in Glasgow showed their strong opposition to the alteration of 
the duty on East India sugars for home consumption, and they condemned the East Indian 
interests for their connection with the anti-slavery movements for this purpose.   In 
                                                                                                                                              
Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company, 1813.  24 November 1812 – 22 July 1813. Vol. VII, p. 
397. 
34 S. G. Checkland, ‘John Gladstone as Trader and Planter’ in The Economic History Review, New series, Vol. 
7, No. 2, 1954, pp. 217-222.  
35 Abstract of the Minute Book of the Glasgow West India Association, Minutes (MS891002, Glasgow 
Mitchell Library), vol. 3 ‘Annual Report by the Chairman & Directors of the West India Association’, dated 
15 January 1824, pp. 481-482. 
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consequence, after the renewal of the company’s charter of 1813, the interests of the East 
India traders deviated from those of the West Indian traders.   
 
Consequently, in Glasgow, the majority of the West Indian merchants did not have serious 
interests in the East India trade during this period in spite of their significant participation 
in the previous free trade campaign.  In case of Liverpool, Charlton mentioned that ‘The 
campaign of the Liverpool merchants to ‘free’ the East India trade is an important part of 
the port’s history, showing its ability to diversify its interests when a traditional one [the 
West India trade] was lost’ and stresses the involvement of the West Indian interests, 
particularly John Gladstone, in the lobbying against the renewal of the company’s 
charter.36  Nevertheless, in Glasgow’s case, although the opening of the India trade in 1814 
and of the China trade in 1834 diversified Glasgow’s overseas trading activities, it does not 
seem that its West Indian traders actually exploited or tried to exploit opportunities 
presented by the abolition of the company’s commercial privileges.   
 
                                               
36 Charlton, ‘Liverpool and The East India Trade’, p. 54. 
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Table 4-1. Manufacturing interests in the GEIA, 1829-1833. 
Categories Number 
Cotton manufacturing and related industries 45 
Other manufacturing industries 8 
‘manufacturer(s)' 24 
‘merchant(s)' 26 
Unknown 23 
Others 20 
Total 146 
 
Note: the category of 'Cotton manufacturing and related business' includes spinners, weavers, calico-printers 
& bleachers, pullicate manufacturers, yarn warehouses, dyeworks, cotton works, calenderers and their 
equivalents, plus the members of Ellis, Bleaymire & Co. yarn warehouses are regarded as this category 
because warehousemen provided their yarns to hand-loom weavers in the putting-out system.  'Other 
manufacturing businesses' includes saddlers, engineers, drysalters, wholesale woollen drapers, and their 
equivalents.  'Manufacturer(s)' includes those who are identified just as 'manufacturer(s)', but if their 
businesses are known, i.e. those who belong to the first two categories, they are excluded from this category.  
'merchant(s)'  includes those who are identified just as 'merchant(s)'  but those who belong to the first three 
categories, i.e. those who were clearly engaged in some kinds of manufacturing industries, are excluded.  
‘Others’ includes foreign traders shipping agents, bankers, accountants and writers, wholesale stationers and 
other occupations, but those who belonged to the above categories were excluded.  
Source: created from Appendix III. 
 
 
Whilst the majority of Glasgow’s West Indian interests did not significantly contribute to 
the new free trade campaign, the table shows that the cotton manufacturing interests and 
their nexus kept a position as one of the major economic interest groups in the re-
established association.  Table 4-1, which has been created from Appendix III, shows, in 
the new association, the cotton manufacturing interests kept a position as one of the major 
economic interest groups.  Among the members of the Association, at least 45 members, in 
other words nearly one-third of the total, were obviously engaged in cotton manufacturing 
and its related industries, including, spinning, weaving, calico-printing and bleaching, 
yarn-warehouse.  However, their number was almost certainly much greater.  From the 
comparison between the number of those who were involved in the cotton manufacturing 
and its related businesses and that of other manufacturing businesses, it can be estimated 
that the large majority of 24 members identified just as ‘manufacturer(s)’ were also 
engaged in these businesses.  In addition, some of those who are identified just as 
‘merchant(s)’ and a part of those whom this research has failed to identify must have 
belonged to these businesses.  Therefore, approximately a half of the Association’s 
members were probably involved in cotton manufacturing and its related industries. 
 
The attendance of a large number of the cotton manufacturing interests in the re-
established association can be explained by their significant involvement in the East Indian 
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trade during this period.  After the partial opening of the East India trade in 1814, the 
exports of British manufacturing goods to India increased, contrary to the company’s 
arguments.  Goods produced in the provincial manufacturing towns were largely sent to the 
East upon consignment by the London agency houses which specialised in the export of 
manufactures, as well as provincial mercantile houses like James Finlay & Co.37  These 
agency houses provided such financial arrangements as advances to the manufacturing 
interests.  It seems that the system of advances was particularly significant to those in 
Glasgow.  According to George G. de H. Larpent’s testimony before the Select Committee 
on Manufactures, Commerce and Shipping: 
 
… a very large proportion, probably to the extent of three-fourths, is conducted in 
that manner [advance by agency houses to manufacturers]… I believe from what I 
have seen of our own operation, that taking advances is not the system there 
[Manchester] to any considerable extent; at the same time, I believe that their 
shipments have not been upon so large a scale as the Glasgow ones.38   
 
It is difficult to ascertain whether all members of the association who were involved in the 
cotton textile industry actually consigned their goods to the East, or not.  Nevertheless, 
some evidence of involvement of the members of the association in the trade to the East 
Indies can be found.  One of these manufacturing firms in Glasgow was Ellis, Bleaymire & 
Co.  Septimus Ellis and William Bleaymire, both members of the GEIA, were among its 
partners.  The firm, which liquidated in the early 1830s, manufactured cotton goods at 
Bankton mill and exported them to Calcutta, Bombay and Singapore as well as Lima and 
Trinidad.39  Another example was the firm of Archibald McIndoe & Co., merchants and 
calico printers, in which Archibald McIndoe and Francis Brand were partners as Appendix 
III shows.  The bankruptcy records of the firm of 1836 include information on the 
consignment of their shawls and handkerchiefs to Canton and the location of the firm’s 
supposed creditors in Singapore, Calcutta and Batavia, which indicated the firm’s large 
engagement in the East India trade.40  A. & J. Connell, which manufactured cotton and 
linen goods at a factory in Anderston, also consigned their goods to agents in London and 
Liverpool for export to the East.41  Such evidence supports Webster’s emphasis on Scottish 
manufacturers’ connection with gentlemanly capitalists in London.  He refers to Thomas 
                                               
37 Webster, ‘The Strategies and Limits of Gentlemanly Capitalism’ p. 747, and Records of James Finlay & Co. 
Ltd., December 1818-December 1854 Book of overseas consignments of stock-monetary value and account 
(University of Glasgow Archives, UGD91/1/5/5), p. 21. 
38 Parliamentary Papers, Minutes of Evidence Before the Select Committee of the House of Commons on 
Manufactures, Commerce and Shipping, 1833, vol. VI, p. 142. 
39 Scottish Record Office, Court of Session productions c.1760-1840, c1987, p. 461. 
40 Ibid., p. 502. 
41 Ibid., p. 503. 
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Speir and his brother Robert, who were partners in the manufacturing firm of R. & T. 
Speirs.  Robert was an original member of the GEIA, and the brothers held a close 
connection with the London-based agency house, Cockerell, Trail & Co., which 
extensively engaged in the East India trade.42  In addition, the table shows that thirteen 
members of the association who registered as a ‘foreign merchant’ in Merchant House 
engaged in manufacturing businesses.  It is likely that they were also involved in the East 
India and other foreign trades.43   
 
In consequence, the list of the re-established GEIA’s subscribers indicates that the 
organisation represented the city’s various economic interest groups, which reflected 
contemporary Glasgow’s economy based on foreign trade and manufacturing industry.  
This was similar to the previous association’s characteristics.  Nevertheless, whilst the 
activities of Glasgow’s foreign merchants and shipping interests who subscribed the 
GEIA’s membership were not confined to the East Indies but extended to various countries 
and regions, the West Indian interests, who had played a major role in the previous 
campaign, became a minor part in the re-established association.  Meanwhile, among the 
manufacturing interests in the GEIA, the cotton manufacturing interests and their nexus 
occupied the most significant position.  Before 1814, goods produced by Glasgow’s 
manufacturers may have been exported by the company or with the limited cargo spaces 
allocated to private merchants.  Nevertheless, after the opening of the India trade, many 
manufacturing interests in Glasgow developed the trading pattern of consigning goods to 
the East Indies by the agency houses.  As a result, whilst the East India trade became more 
significant to Glasgow’s manufacturing interests than any previous periods, as Webster 
argues this also created the connection between the provincial manufacturing interests and 
the mercantile interests in London.  Therefore, the presence of a large number of such 
manufacturing interests implies that there was a connection between the Glasgow 
Association and the gentlemanly capitalists in London. 
 
In political terms, members of the GEIA held significant positions in the local council as 
they had done during the period 1812-13.  Only a limited number of the West Indian 
                                               
42 Webster, ‘The Strategies and Limits of Gentlemanly Capitalism’, pp. 14-15. 
43 These ‘foreign traders’ were: David Bell (pullicate manufacturer), William Church (William Church & Co, 
manufacturers), A. S. Dalglish and Robert Dalglish (Dalglish, Falconer & Co., calico printers), Henry Dunlop 
(James Dunlop & Sons, cotton spinners), Alexander Fletcher (John Todd & Co., calico printers), Robert 
Freeland, Junior (manufacturer), Alexander Glasgow (Frew, Glasgow & Co., manufacturers), Henry 
Houldsworth (Henry Houldsworth & Sons, cotton spinners), Alexander Johnstone (Johnstone, Galbraith & 
Co., manufacturers & merchants), Mathew Perston, junior (M. & J. Perston, manufacturers), James Struthers 
(Thom & Struthers, yarn warehouse), and James Wright (Findlay, Connal & Co., the cotton department and 
yarns and calico manufacturing). 
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interests, who had held strong influences in local politics during the late eighteenth century 
and the early nineteenth century, were among the members of the association.  But 
Appendix IV shows, during the period of the free trade campaign, that all Lord Provosts 
(Alexander Garden, Robert Dalglish and James Ewing) were members of the association.  
Moreover, members of the association occupied many positions in the Merchants Houses. 
That is to say, 7 out of all 15 baillies and approximately half of all councillors elected from 
the Merchants Houses were GEIA members.  A large number of the GEIA’s members in 
the Magistrates and Town Council which enabled the association to obtain the local 
authority’s support easily.  For instance, in order to decide the propriety of sending a 
petition to Parliament, they called a public meeting in the name of the Chief Magistrate on 
5 May 1829.44  Consequently, the petition sent from Glasgow would be claimed to 
represent the wish of whole inhabitants of Glasgow rather than that of the particular 
interest group.   
 
The influence of the GEIA’s members was not limited to local politics.  As will be 
explained later, the association succeeded in having representatives in Parliament as the 
result of the victories of James Oswald and James Ewing in the General Election of 1832 
as Kirkman Finlay had done during the 1812-1813 campaign.  Consequently, the strong 
backup from the local authority and the city’s MPs, who were involved in the national 
politics, helped the association organise their effective lobbying activities. 
 
 
4.4. The lobbying activities of the GEIA during the period 1829-1833 
 
During the period between 1829 and 1833, the GEIA employed similar means to those of 
the previous movement in order to promote their free-trade arguments.  Among the 
different lobbying activities, this section will explore their subscribing activities and their 
use of letters, printed circulars and pamphlets.  Then, the next section will analyse the 
activities of the GEIA’s deputation in London in collaborating with other East India 
associations and their supporters. 
                                               
44 Glasgow Herald, 8 May 1829. 
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4.4.1. Subscribing activities 
 
The Achilles heel of the previous GEIA’s lobbying activities against the renewal of the 
EIC’s charter was its financial resources, since it was largely dependent on voluntary 
subscriptions from the public.  In contrast, the financial resources of the free-trade 
movement during the period 1829-1833 came largely from the entry and annual 
subscriptions of its membership, plus a general fund raised for ‘the especial purpose of 
opposing the renewal of the East India Company’s Charter’.45   
 
According to the resolution of the public meeting on 22 April 1829 and the rules and 
regulations agreed by its members on 6 May, the entry subscription of five guineas to be 
paid by new members and annual subscription of half a guinea by all existing members 
were fixed in order to raise the general fund for its lobbying activities.46  At the end of 
March 1830, 137 members were counted in the association.47  By calculating from the 
number of the members, the association must have raised ₤719.5s. from the entry 
subscriptions in the first year.   
 
From the amount of the entry subscriptions, the sum of three hundred guineas was 
transferred to a general fund set up for ‘the special purpose of opposing the renewal of the 
East India Charter’.48  By the time of the first Annual General Meeting, the amount of 
subscription reached around ₤1,500, and during this meeting, ‘A considerable sum’ was 
raised by those who attended it.49  With such resources the GEIA could afford to send 
nearly every year their deputation to London, whose large expenses were paid from the 
fund.  In July 1830, a meeting of the subscribers to this fund approved to subscribe £300 
from its fund in order to defray a part of expenses for the return of W. W. Whitmore, one 
of the most active free-trade supporters, to the House of Commons.  Clearly the 
Association could procure enough subscribed money to maintain its lobbying activities.50  
In general the GEIA’s subscription campaign went relatively well, securing stable financial 
sources.  This reflected its membership of gentlemen who were willing to pay the entry and 
annual subscriptions with a sense of clear purpose. 
 
                                               
45 Committee Minutes 1829-1847, 9 February 1829, p. 22. 
46 Ibid., p. 2 and 6 May 1829, p. 6.  
47 Ibid., 25 March 1830, ‘Report from the Committee of the Glasgow East India Association’, p. 32.  
48 Ibid, 10 February 1830, p. 23. 
49 Ibid., 25 March 1830, p. 34, and Glasgow Herald, 26 March 1830. 
50 Glasgow Courier, 29 July 1830, ‘East India Meeting’. 
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4.4.2. Letters, printed circulars and pamphlets 
 
As the free-trade interests of Glasgow had done in the previous movement, the GEIA 
employed a number of letters, circulars and pamphlets as their main vehicles to lobby 
against the renewal of the EIC’s exclusive charter.  In order to exchange their information 
and opinions, the GEIA regularly communicated by letter with provincial towns and 
outports in England, particularly with Liverpool, and less frequently with Newcastle, 
Manchester and so on.  As the centre of the free trade movement in Scotland, one of the 
main tasks of the organisation at this time was again to stir up the public opinion of other 
Scottish towns against the EIC. 
 
In early 1830, the Liverpool Committee urged provincial manufacturing towns and 
outports to send their petitions to Parliament in order that Parliament might be prepared to 
give a three-year advance notice to the company at the earliest possible period in 1831.51  
Following strong advice from the Liverpool Committee, the GEIA decided to petition 
Parliament, and to persuade the authorities of other Scottish towns to do so by exploiting 
the personal connections of individual members.  For this purpose, the following members 
agreed to do this task: J. Buchanan of Dowanhill (to Perth, Port Glasgow and Dundee) J. 
A. Anderson (to Greenock), J. Davidson (to Stirling), J. Muir (to Hamilton), J. Wright (to 
Lanark), R. Gray (to Dumbarton and Rutherglen), W. Graham (to Dumfries) and J. 
Fleming (to Montrose, Banff and Stonehaven).52  Further more, in April, 1830, J. 
Buchanan, J. G. Hamilton and A. G. Speirs agreed to use their connection to get the 
Counties of Dumbarton, Renfrew and Lanark to petition.53 
 
Among the three counties mentioned above, in the case of the County of Renfrew, it seems 
that the association used its close connection with the free-trade interests in Greenock.  The 
County of Renfrew decided to hold a public meeting on 24 April to consider the propriety 
of petitioning Parliament on the China trade.54  There, a motion to prepare a petition and 
transmit to Parliament was put forward by Mr. Bayne, one of the Magistrates of Greenock, 
                                               
51 Records of the Glasgow East India Association, Incoming Correspondence 1829-1830 (MS 891001/4, 
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52 Committee Minutes 1829-1847, 25 February 1830, p. 27 and 2 March 1830, p. 28.  
53 Ibid., 7 April 1830, p. 40.  Renfrew Country Council Commissioners of Supply Minute 1819-1830 
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and seconded by Mr. Speirs.55  This motion was passed and a petition of ‘Sir John 
Maxwell, Baronet Chairman of a Meeting of the Noblemen, Freeholders, Commissioners 
of Supply, Justice of the Peace, Magistrates of Towns, Landholders in general, Bankers, 
Merchants, Shipowners, Colonial Proprietors, and legal Practitioners of the Shire of 
Renfrew’ was prepared and submitted to Parliament.56.  In the case of the County of 
Lanark, the GEIA arranged an interview with Lord Belhaven, the Convener of the County 
of Lanark, on the subject of petitioning Parliament.  Although no record of this meeting 
can be found, the result of the meeting between the representatives and the Convener must 
have been favourable to the association as the monopoly of the EIC was eventually 
discussed in the general annual meeting of the Commissioners of Supply for the county, 
and thereupon it was resolved to petition both Houses of Parliament.57  For the County of 
Dumbarton, James Buchanan of Dowanhill made contact with his friend, Mr. Dennistoun 
of Dennistoun in April 1830.58  Dennistoun replied to him that they would make their best 
efforts to bring the subject of petitioning Parliament before the annual meeting of the 
County of Dumbarton at the end of April 1830.59  At the same time Dennistoun advised 
Buchanan to suggest that the deputy chairman or the secretary of the GEIA send a letter to 
Sir James Colquhoun, the Convener of the county, to address him on the matter.60  
Eventually, the GEIA received a ‘favourable letter’ from Colquhoun.61  Although the 
County of Dumbarton did not send its petitions to Parliament, the GEIA’s efforts 
succeeded in urging the merchants and manufacturers of the county to pay attention to this 
subject and getting them to appoint the committee to ‘watch over the proceedings of 
Parliament’.62   
 
In addition, while J. Buchanan was negotiating with the members of the County of 
Dumbarton, the latter suggested to him that the Glasgow Association should contact not 
only the Convener of the County of Dumbarton, but also that of every county in 
Scotland.63  In the special meeting of the directors of the association held on 15 April, the 
propriety of this proposal was fully discussed by them, but the advice was rejected.64  
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Although the details of the discussion were not recorded, probably because of the 
geographical adjacency of Glasgow and the three counties and the economic and personal 
connections between them, they thought that it would be more efficient and effective to 
confine their efforts to these three counties.  Among a number of petitions against the 
EIC’s monopoly sent to the House of Commons, no petitions from Scottish counties were 
recorded in its Journal of 1830 except the Counties of Renfrew and Lanark.   
 
In consequence, the GEIA’s communications with other Scottish towns and counties 
reveals the existence of the provincial lobbyists’ network in Scotland based on their 
personal connections during the free trade campaign of 1829-1833.  The Liverpool 
Association’s advice on petitioning Parliament was spread to other Scottish towns through 
the GEIA.  The association was a hub of the free trade movement of Scotland.  In the 
previous studies on the debates over the renewal of the company’s charter, Eyles and 
Greenberg referred to the communication between the major towns where the East Indian 
associations and the similar institutions actively organised their lobbying.65  But this 
section shows the examples of how effectively they persuaded their neighbours to join in 
the campaign.  Although the GEIA might have missed an opportunity to mobilise more 
support from distant counties, the Glasgow Association could exercise its influence on its 
neighbouring counties. 
 
During the period 1829-1833, newspapers, printed circulars and pamphlets were employed 
for exchanging information and ideas with other associations all over the United Kingdom 
and stirring up public opinion.  In general, the association used newspapers and circulars in 
order to provide other lobbying groups and the public with information about the 
proceedings and important resolutions of special and monthly meetings of the GEIA’s 
directors, and of public meetings held by the Glasgow citizens on the subject of the 
opening of the East India Trade.  Conversely, the GEIA received a number of circulars and 
pamphlets from other East India associations, especially the Liverpool Committee, often in 
order to redistribute them all over Scotland.  For instance, in January 1830, the Association 
received 250 copies each of the Resolutions of the Liverpool Committee passed on 18 
January 1830, of a statement of the reasons for the complete free trade with India and free 
settlement there as well as the opening of the China trade, and of the funds and finance of 
the EIC for the purpose of its use.66  In addition, the newspapers were employed for the 
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purpose of advertising public meetings to the inhabitants of the town in advance and 
pamphlets to be distributed by the association.   
 
Although Philips has argued in his work that ‘Its [a Deputation from the provincial ports 
and towns] pamphlet campaign was not, however, to be compared either in size and 
virulence with that of 1812-1813’, this was still one of the most important vehicles for the 
free-trade interests to express their ideas to the Public.67  Although in Britain there were 
several authors producing pamphlets in which they criticised the economic and political 
systems which operated under the company’s charter, the contribution of John Crawfurd to 
the free trade movement of this period was most remarkable, and the publication and 
distribution of his pamphlets were fully supported by the GEIA and other associations.   
 
John Crawfurd was a famous Scottish Orientalist, who had originally been employed in a 
medical post in the Indian Army by the EIC, and then resided in several places in India and 
Southeast Asia, including India’s Northern Provinces, Penang, Java, Siam, Cochin-China, 
Singapore and Burma, before he returned to England in 1827.68  In spite of his long service 
for the company, he was a strong advocate of free trade in the East Indies.  For instance, 
when he was a resident of Singapore during the period 1823-26, he contributed 
significantly to the negotiations for a treaty with the Malay rulers to secure Britain’s 
permanent possession of Singapore in 1824, which Webster calls the ‘products of attempt 
to bolster the Bengal export economy [which was dominated by the agency houses and 
other private merchants]’.69  After returning to his homeland, he put himself in the centre 
of the free trade movement and criticised the EIC’s privileges in the trade with the East 
Indies.  As his career shows, Crawfurd did not have significant commercial interests in the 
East India trade but was a philosophical challenger against the company.  However, in the 
General Deputation lobbying in London, he acted as a representative of the free trade 
interests in Calcutta who paid his annual salary of £1,500.70   
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Originally, it seems that the instructions from Calcutta to him were concerned mainly with 
political aspects of the affairs of the company.  When he was called to the Select 
Committee for the investigation on the China Trade in 1830, he expressed in regard to the 
interests of the inhabitants of Calcutta that ‘It has no view to the mercantile pursuits of my 
constituents; it is for political question only.’71  However, at the same time, he answered to 
the Committee that ‘I have no recollection what ever of any mention being made in my 
instructions, public or confidential, of the China question; but I have no doubt that the 
China question is also embraced in them.’72  The fact that the inhabitants of Calcutta were 
interested in the commercial aspects of the renewal of the company’s charter can be 
confirmed by 114 British and natives’ request to James Calder, the Sheriff of Calcutta, to 
hold a public meeting ‘for the purpose of petitioning Parliament to throw open the China 
and India Trade, and to prove, on the expiration of the existing Charter of the East India 
Company, for the unfettered application of British skill, capital and industry, to the 
commercial and agricultural resource of India.’73  Although for the British private traders 
in India, the equalisation of duties on the East Indian and the West Indian sugars was more 
significant than some parts of free trade supporters in the U.K., particularly those of 
manufacturing towns, these two groups had the same main purposes in their lobbying, that 
is to say, the opening of the China trade and the removal of legal restrictions on the 
residence of the British subjects and their acquisition of lands.  In this General Meeting it 
was decided that petitions to both Houses of Parliament would be prepared and transmitted 
to J. Crawfurd, their ‘general agent’, to deliver them to the important Parliamentary 
members.74 
 
In June 1829, the Central Committee on the East India and China Trade which had been set 
up in Liverpool decided to publish his pamphlet, A View of The Present State and Future 
Prospects of The Free Trade and Colonisation of India, and 5000 copies were distributed 
to Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, Bristol, Birmingham, Leeds and Crawfurd himself.75  
500 copies were allocated to the GEIA at its expense of ₤25, and 200 of them were 
distributed to the major booksellers in the city.76  In order to promote its sale, 
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advertisements for this pamphlet were inserted in different newspapers.77  Some of the 
remaining copies were forwarded to other Scottish towns and ports, such as Paisley and 
Greenock.78 
 
In this pamphlet, Crawfurd argued that ‘A thorough freedom of commercial intercourse 
between the European and Indian dominion of the Crown, and an unrestricted settlement of 
Englishmen in India, are the grand and essential instruments for improving our Eastern 
Colonies, and rendering them useful to the mother country.’79  After his brief descriptions 
of the growth of free trade and the stagnated condition of the Company’s trade with India 
after the opening of the India trade in 1814, he gave several examples of the ‘evil effects of 
the existing system’ by analysing the staple articles of trade between the United Kingdom 
and India.80  For example, he argued that the value of woollen exports from Britain to India 
and China by the EIC declined by 49 per cent from ₤1,064,222 in 1814 to ₤539,732 in 
1827 although his claim was actually exaggerated as the figures which he quoted were in 
nominal values.81  According to Davis’ calculation, the valuation of woollens exported in 
1824-1826 as a percentage of the 1814-1816 valuation was 75.4%.82  In other words, 
although the exports of woollens to India and China declined by a half during the period, 
the valuation of woollens also fell by approximately one fourth.  Therefore, the decline of 
the woollen export by the company seems to have been less significant than Crawfurd 
argued.  Nevertheless, it was expected by free trade supporters that a potentially larger 
demand for British woollens existed in China, especially the Northern part, than India and 
Southeast Asia because of its cooler and drier climate. Crawfurd argued that this inability 
of the company to supply their woollen products to China provided commercial rivals with 
the opportunity to deprive the British of their market.83  .   
 
Another example was the production of cotton wool in British India.  Out of the average 
annual consumption of cotton wool of 197,544,880 lbs. in the United Kingdom in 1827 
and 1828, 141,834,180 lbs. was imported from the United States, while only 11,987,040 
lbs. was Indian produce.84  He criticised this condition for the dependence of the British 
manufacturers of staple goods upon a rival country and stressed the necessity of 
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substituting India for the United States as a stable supplier of raw cotton.85  He concluded 
that ‘the chief remedy for the evil… is European settlement, or more explicitly introduction 
of European example- of European skills- of European enterprise, and of European capital’ 
and blamed the inability of many Indian commercial crops with their inferior qualities to 
compete with the products of other countries in the international markets on the existing 
regulations by which the British were prevented from holding lands in India and investing 
capital freely.86   
 
In 1833, the GEIA showed further support to Crawfurd: a special meeting of the GEIA 
decided to have 600 copies of Crawfurd’s work, Notes on the settlement or colonization of 
British subjects in India, which had been sent to Charles Grant, the President of the Board 
of Control, printed off at its expense.87 
 
Crawfurd also took a critical attitude towards the state of the company’s monopoly in the 
China trade.  In another work, Chinese Monopoly Examined, for instance, he compared the 
EIC’s sales price of teas with American sales price, and claimed that British subjects had 
been paying nearly twice as much as those who had purchased in the American market 
during the period 1819-1829.  In other words, that they made an unnecessary payment of 
over ₤1,700,000 to the company per annum during the period.  He argued that: 
 
… the whole amount thus taken from the pockets of the people is a profit to the East 
India Company, or applicable, as has been most absurdly pretended, to meet the 
political and territorial charges of the Indian Government.  In fact, by the largest 
portion of this impolitic of all taxes is wasted in expensive freights and extravagant 
establishments, the real profits are scarcely sufficient for the payment of the 
dividends laid by the Company’s capital stock.88  
 
For the opposition to the EIC, Crawfurd’s extensive knowledge of the East Indies and 
experience there were invaluable.  His deep involvement in the free trade movement of this 
period and strong influence on it can be found in a number of the communications with 
GEIA.  Nevertheless, compared with his activities in Southeast Asia, his significant 
contribution to the provincial mercantile and merchants’ lobbying for the abolition of the 
EIC’s monopoly has received little attention from historians.  As will be described in the 
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next section, Glasgow’s lobbyists’ outgoing and incoming correspondence reveal that apart 
from its members and the Liverpool Association, Crawfurd was the person with whom the 
GEIA communicated most frequently during the debates over the renewal of the EIC’s 
charter.  This Scottish man played a significant role in the formation of the provincial 
interests’ lobbying strategies.   
 
During the campaign, while Crawfurd was very favourably regarded by members of the 
GEIA, the association showed a different attitude towards James Silk Buckingham, another 
famous Orientalist at that time, who was the editor of such journals as The Oriental Herald 
and The New Quarterly Review.  Philips described him as one of the most influential free-
trade advocates for provincial ports and manufacturing towns during the period, but he 
actually failed to obtain full support from the Glasgow Association, although his lectures 
were warmly welcomed by the public in the city and many other places in Scotland.89  The 
GEIA’s minute book and its correspondence with James Silk Buckingham show that they 
had different opinions in respecting of the abolition of the EIC’s administrative functions.  
 
After years of international travel, Buckingham had settled in Calcutta and established the 
Calcutta Journal.  His fierce criticism of the EIC in the paper had eventually resulted in his 
exclusion from India by the company in 1823.90  After his return to England, he continued 
to agitate against the company through his publications and his lectures.  In January 1829, 
he started his lecturing tour and went around all over Britain in the next three years.  On 2 
August, he arrived at Glasgow and began his lectures the next day.91  The appearance of a 
series of his lectures in local newspapers and two extra lectures which he held showed his 
popularity in Glasgow.92   Nevertheless, the majority of the members of the GEIA 
considered that it was not necessary to support him as the association although it did 
subscribe to the Oriental Herald, of which Buckingham was an editor.93  On the one hand, 
some members of the association supported Buckingham.  A. G. Speirs and Laurence Hill 
attended at his lectures and praised him.  For instance, the former applauded him that: 
 
After the brilliant display of eloquence with which you have heard the subject of 
India and its administration treated today,… I am sure that I shall only be expressing 
the unanimous feeling of every one who hears me, when I beg to propose that we 
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tender to Mr. Buckingham our united and cordial thanks, for the vivid and convincing 
manner in which he has condensed and arranged the vast mass of information 
submitted to us today; and the triumph case which he has established against the East 
India Company; so as to satisfy the most scrupulous, that we ought to unite with the 
other great towns of the kingdom to prevent the renewal of their exclusive 
privileges... 94 
 
On the other hand, some members of the Association, such as Finlay, did not think of him 
so highly.  Finlay described him as:  
 
Mr. Buckingham who is beyond all compassion, the most confident and impudent 
Charlatan that has ever appeared in this Country.  At the same time I think He has 
been of some use by enlisting many of the most noisy and ignorant in the [?] and we 
should not act wisely if we rejected their aid because they are brought forward by a 
selfish, vain and vengeful Pretender… I shall myself take his Review although I 
believe that like all his other publications, it will not contain much that is valuable 
and bring little that can be depended on.95  
 
In November 1829, Buckingham informed the GEIA of the launch of his new journal, The 
New Quarterly Review and asked them to support the promotion of its sales.  He proposed 
to the association his plan to reduce the posting costs of his journals by sending a packet of 
letters to each of the East India associations in the different parts of the country, from 
which they deliver them to their immediate neighbouring areas.96  This proposal was 
rejected by the association, as they told him that they thought it was proper to avoid mixing 
up their activities as the associated body with those of any private individuals if they were 
not supported by the Central Committee in Liverpool.97  More importantly, on the 
instruction of Finlay, the secretary to the GEIA wrote to him that: 
 
… your objects and those of the Assoc[iatio]n cannot be made a common course of.  
You are opposed the East India Comp[an]y.  The Assoc[iatio]n merely object to their 
Monopoly, you deprecated the Government of the Comp[an]y & the mode of its 
administration in India.  The Assoc[iatio]n meddle not at all with the Government, 
neither praising nor condemning it, objecting merely to its union of Sovereign and 
Mercantile character and to its exclusive rights…98 
  
This reply clearly reflected the personal opinion of Finlay as his correspondence with the 
secretary shows.99  His view was supported by the majority of the members of the Glasgow 
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Association.100  Whilst Buckingham was interested in the political aspects of the East India 
question, the GEIA showed their little concern about it.  This attitude of the GEIA towards 
the debates over the renewal of the EIC’s charter was strongly criticised by Buckingham.  
He called the intention of the Glasgow Association an ‘imagined “modification”’ and 
argued that: 
 
The leaders in this Association were gentlemen who seemed to think it quite possible 
to carry the measure of opening the trade to India and China, end entirely destroyed 
the exclusive commercial Monopoly, and yet leave the Government of India in the 
hands of the East India Company.  They were for Free Trade only, but not for 
Colonization; as if it were possible for the benefit of the one to be fully reaped 
without the admission of the other; and they were for taking away the trading 
character of the India Company only, and leaving them all the revenues, patronage, 
and political power they possess; as if it had note been shewn, beyond all possibility 
of doubt, that the latter could not be supported by them at all, without profits derived 
from their Monopoly on Tea; and that on this issue must all stand or fall together.101 
 
It is clear that the GEIA had a different attitude towards the two celebrated Orientalists.  
On the one hand, the Glasgow Association gave their full support to publishing Crawfurd’s 
pamphlets and distributing them to Glasgow and its neighbourhoods.  This was due largely 
to Crawfurd’s personal influence on the provincial lobbying groups.  His deep knowledge 
of the East Indies and experience there and his analysis and arguments for the complete 
abolition of the EIC’s monopoly in the East India trade and the general free trade led him 
to establish his firm position in the free trade movement.  On the other hand, although 
Philips and Eyles stress Buckingham’s contribution to the provincial mercantile and 
manufacturing interests’ free trade movement, in fact, he failed to obtain the GEIA’s full 
support because of their different views on how they should treat an issue over the 
administrative function in India in their free trade campaign, as well as his personal 
character.102  Although Buckingham wanted to link the provincial lobbyists’ campaign 
with the EIC’s political issues, the GEIA was not interested in it.  In respect of admiration 
for Buckingham’s personal activities to promote free trade in the East Indies, there was a 
division between the public and the GEIA as an associated body in the town.  Compared 
with Crawfurd, who contributed to the provincial interests’ lobbying strategies, the 
significance of Buckingham’s role in the free trade movement was that he could stir up 
public opinion through his popular lecturing tours and publications. 
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In addition, apart from the publications of John Crawfurd’s works, in order to ‘enlighten 
the public as to the complete freedom of the East India trade’, the GEIA obtained a part of 
1000 copies of the substance of the speech of W.W. Whitmore, and distributed them in 
Glasgow.103  In March, 1831, acting on advice from the Liverpool Association, the 
Glasgow Association also decided to receive from London 500 copies of the articles on the 
China Trade, which seems to have been J. R. McCulloch’s Observations on the influence 
of the East India Company's monopoly on the price and supply of tea, from the Edinburgh 
Review and distribute them all over Scotland.104  
 
 
4.5. The Glasgow Deputation and the proceedings of the debate on the renewal of 
the EIC’s charter 1829-1833. 
 
Following the resolution of the public meeting of 22 April 1829, the GEIA sent its 
deputation to London to organize a joint campaign with deputations from other provincial 
manufacturing towns and outports.  The deputation consisted of Alexander Garden and 
Robert Dalglish; later Robert Douglass Alston, George Stirling and Robert Ewing were 
added to the posts.105  From the free trade advocates’ viewpoint, the timing of beginning 
their lobbying for the complete opening of the East India and China trade was favourable.  
For instance, W. W. Whitmore, one of their Parliamentary supporters, thought that ‘the 
present period properly favourable not only as the Catholic question had been disposed of, 
and the public mind required some succedaneums of excitement, but as the prevailing 
distress in the commercial district afforded the most favourable opportunity of impressing 
the necessity of new market for British manufacture.’106 
 
On 9 May, by appointment, the General Deputation from provincial manufacturing towns 
and outports held a conference with the Duke of Wellington at Downing Street, where the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (Henry Goulburn) and the President of the Board of Control 
(the Earl of Ellensborough) also attended.107  The deputies were supported by their 
Parliamentary friends, Whitmore and William Huskisson, who helped greatly in securing 
access to these key figures of national politics.  In particular, the latter, who represented 
Liverpool in Parliament and held the office of the President of the Board of Trade, had a 
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strong influence on the course of British economic policy, which began to adopt free trade 
gradually in the 1820s.108    
 
Prior to the conference, on 6 May, seven gentlemen from Glasgow, Liverpool, and other 
places held a meeting to agree the following points for the agenda of the conference, viz. 
(1) the abolition of restrictions on residence of British subjects, and the employment of 
British capital for produce in India, (2) the opening of the China trade to British subjects, 
and (3) the anticipation of benefit derived from abolition of the monopoly in the China 
trade by the reduction of the price of tea.109  Moreover, they aimed to urge Ministers to 
agree with their opinion that an enquiry should be made into the East India Trade and that 
a committee should be appointed for this purpose.110  In the conference between the joint-
deputation and the Ministry, the Provost of Glasgow and other deputies from Birmingham, 
Liverpool, Manchester and Bristol stated the distressing condition of each provincial 
manufacturing town and outport in detail, and urged the necessity of entering new markets 
in Asia.  Then, John Gladstone from Liverpool explained the events of 1813 and the 
positive impact of the partial opening of the East India trade after 1814.111 The statements 
of the deputies were concluded by James Cropper’s argument on the negative effect of the 
tea monopoly on prices and supplies.112  Although initially, at the meeting, the Duke of 
Wellington avoided an immediate answer, the Ministry later decided to set up a Select 
Committee to consider the renewal of the EIC’s charter.113   
 
This decision was regarded as a triumph of the lobbying activities of provincial towns and 
ports.  On 15 May, the deputies from the above places plus Calcutta gathered at Fenton’s 
Hotel in London.114  In this meeting, they issued their statement that ‘the strong opinion 
manifested in the manufacturing and commercial districts on the great question of the trade 
with India and China has, in the opinion of this meeting essentially contributed to the 
obtaining of his Majesty’s Government’s pledge that a Committee shall be appointed at a 
very early period of the next session of Parliament to enquire into the present state of the 
Trade with India and China and the whole questions connected therewith.’115  If the fact 
that the Ministry’s decision came only a few days after that meeting is taken into 
                                               
108 J. B. Williams, British Commercial Policy and Trade Expansion 1750-1850, 1972, pp. 451-453. 
109 Incoming correspondence 1829-1830, 6 May 1829, letter no. 4 
110 Ibid., 9 May 1829, letter no. 5. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid., 15 May 1829, letter no. 9. 
115 Ibid. 
 133 
consideration, the provincial lobbyists’ view seems to be right.  They also recommended 
the following points; (1) All provincial cities and towns interested in this subject should 
send their petitions to both Houses of Parliament at the beginning of the next session; (2) 
All major places should proceed their deputations to London again during the examination 
of the Select Committee; (3) A Central Committee should be set up in London during the 
time of the examination and in the meanwhile the Liverpool Committee should act as the 
Central Committee for their communication with those who were concerned with the 
subject of the renewal of the EIC’s charter.116  In Glasgow, the General Deputation’s initial 
achievement and the efforts of Alexander Garden, James Ewing and Charles Stirling who 
had acted as its deputation in London were applauded by other members of the Association 
after they had returned.117   
 
However, after the return of the deputation, the GEIA was not very active for the rest of 
the 1829.  On the contrary, it seems that the public expectation of the association in the 
free-trade movement immediately after its foundation was so high that its first-year 
achievement could not come up to the expectation of some of the members.  At the first 
annual general meeting, Finlay expressed his dissatisfaction that ‘a report had come to his 
ears that some people imagined the Committee had not displayed so much activity as might 
have been expected during the past year [1829],’ although at the same time he positively 
regarded it as a proof of the growth of public interest in the debates over the renewal of the 
EIC’s charter in the town.118  
 
After the interval, the lobbying activities organised by Glasgow and other provincial 
manufacturing towns and outports followed the recommendations of 15 May 1829.  In 
January 1830, following the communication with the Liverpool Central Committee, the 
members of the GEIA agreed to take measures to obtain petitions from the authorities and 
citizens to Parliament against the renewal of the charter, and for this purpose a Sub-
Committee ‘to draw up the petition to Parliament to be submitted to the Public Meeting 
and to make the necessary arrangement as to that meeting’ was appointed.119  During the 
period between February 1830 and 23 July 1830, nearly one-hundred and ninety petitions 
against the renewal of the company’s charter were submitted to the House of Commons by 
local authorities and other organisations.120   
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On 9 February 1830, following Robert Peel’s proposal, the Select Committee was 
appointed to investigate ‘the affairs of the Company and the trade between Great Britain 
and China’ in the House of Commons.121  Its members were selected from several quarters 
including the state, the EIC, and provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests.  More 
than forty witnesses were called to testify before the Select Committee from the company’s 
side and their oppositions.  In Glasgow, on 11 February, at a public meeting of the 
inhabitants of the city, the Lord Provost (Alexander Garden), Kirkman Finlay and James 
Oswald were appointed to the second deputation to London from the city in order to 
provide the Select Committee with the necessary evidence and arrange the witnesses for 
them.122 
 
One of the main points for the Select Committee was whether the present mode of the 
company’s monopoly in the China trade was advantageous for other British merchants or 
not.  In the Select Committee, some of the witnesses, mainly British private traders and 
American merchants who engaged in the trade with China and other parts of the East 
Indies, insisted that the present system of the China trade based on the EIC’s monopoly 
provided them with no advantage for their trading activities there, and rather they 
complained about it.123  In contrast, other witnesses, most of whom were from the 
company, insisted that the presence of the company in the local trade conducted by British 
private traders was protected by their presence.  For example, the attempt by the Chinese 
Government to search its own country’s ships were prevented by the influence of the 
company.124  
 
However, the most significant part of the Select Committee’s investigation was on the state 
of the purchase of tea by the EIC in China, and the system of importation and sales of tea 
in Britain.  On the one hand, in the Select Committee, many of the witnesses, including 
both those who were connected with the company and the British private and American 
traders, stated that ‘owing to the extent of the Company’s purchases, to their system of 
contract, and to their great regularity, they buy the Teas, particularly the Black, at an 
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advance of price.’125  However, on the other hand, a group of mainly British private and 
American merchants gave their evidence that the company’s monopoly in the tea trade led 
to a very heavy tax upon the public amounting to between around 1 million and 2.6 million 
pounds per annum.126   
 
The high prices of tea in Britain were also pointed out in the comparison with other 
European countries and the United States.  In this respect, the report of the Select 
Committee admitted that: 
 
The Company relying, as it appears, upon the profits of the Tea Trade to enable them 
to fulfil the obligations which Parliament has imposed upon them in their two-fold 
political and commercial character; while foreigners, on the contrary, have no such 
obligations.127   
 
In terms of British exports to China, many witnesses, mainly the private traders and the 
Americans, expressed their belief that the opening of the China trade would lead to a large 
increase in the exports of British manufacturing products.  Notwithstanding, in the Select 
Committee, James Cosmo Melvill, an auditor of the company, expressed his views that a 
large increase of the British exports would be restricted by the company’s obligation of the 
significant size of remittance from India to Britain, which was advantageously made 
through purchasing Chinese merchandise in his opinion.128  Furthermore, it was argued by 
Melvill and another company official that the large increase in British exports to India was 
achieved by fiscal regulations.129  For example, while the British textile manufacturers’ 
lobbying led the British government to prohibit or set the high rates of restrictive duties on 
the imports of cotton and silk manufacturing products of India in order to protect the 
British counterparts till the 1820s, while the British manufactures were sold in India in the 
system of free trade.  The British held the political power in India, but the situation was 
different in China where the Chinese governed.  Those who had interest in the EIC insisted 
that under the condition where British manufacturers did not have economic advantage 
deriving from Britain’s political dominance of India, a large increase in the exports of 
British produce could not be expected after the opening of the China trade.  
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During the investigation, a significant amount of time was devoted to the question of the 
opening of the tea trade with China.  Kirkman Finlay reported daily on its progress to his 
hometown, and a large part of their early communication was focused on the need to 
procure adequate witnesses for the provision of evidence related to the China trade.  The 
association also received from the Liverpool Committee a copy of John Crawfurd’s letter 
to ask them to send up any witnesses to London prior to the examination of the China 
trade.130  The communications between the GEIA, their deputation in London and other 
associations show that the GEIA had difficulty in obtaining witnesses in Scotland as it 
seems that in spite of the partial opening of the East India trade in 1814 the number of 
Scottish merchants who had their own personal experience in Asia, especially in China, 
was small.  Even if the members of the association found such men, information which 
they could provide was sometimes too old.  Nevertheless, from Glasgow and other parts of 
Scotland, in response to the requests from the association, two gentlemen, John Deans of 
Ayrshire, who had previously resided in the Eastern Archipelago as a merchant and agent 
for about twenty years, and Mr. Maxwell living near the city, who had also been engaged 
in the East India trade as a merchant and commission agent and had experience of visiting 
Singapore, Java and China, were asked to proceed to London.131  In the Select Committee, 
for instance, to the question that ‘Do you believe that tea could be supplied for 
consumption in this country at two thirds price it now bears, if the Company’s monopoly 
no longer existed?’, John Deans replied that ‘Judging from the price in other countries, I 
should think certainly it might for less, and particularly if we pay for it in our manufactures 
by a free trade.’132  He supported the advantages of the abolition of the tea monopoly.  
Furthermore, Deans supported the possible increase in the Chinese imports of British 
manufactured goods after the abolition of the EIC’s monopoly.  He expressed that ‘In time, 
I have no doubt it would, because we should imitate the manufacture of their favourite 
fabrics, and greatly extend the consumption of our manufactures; but it would take 
time.’133 
 
In order to make up for only these two witnesses from Glasgow and neighbouring areas, 
the directors of the GEIA suggested to Finlay in London some merchants who resided 
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there as potential witnesses.134  Among the witnesses called to the Select Committee during 
this period, Joshua Bates of the house of Baring, Brothers & Co and Charles Everett, both 
American commission merchants having been engaged in the China trade were on the list 
of possible witnesses given by the association to Finlay.  Bates was probably a familiar 
face among cotton manufacturing interests in the provincial towns as Baring, Brothers & 
Co. supplied American raw cotton to them as a part of their engagement in the North 
Atlantic trade.135  The evidence of Bates before the Select Committee was regarded by the 
GEIA as of some value: ‘it might not be more important than that of the others.  Yet from 
the high station he has attained in the mercantile world… what is now stated by him will 
have more weight.’136  The GEIA’s correspondence indicates that the provincial mercantile 
and manufacturing interests communicated with the partner of the famous house 
throughout the campaign although the details of their meetings were not recorded.137  
During the previous free trade campaign, few connections between the provincial outports 
and manufacturing towns, and the London East India houses could be seen, although some 
provincial manufacturing interest group which traditionally provided the EIC with 
commodities for its export supported the renewal of the company’s charter.  As Webster 
argues, after the opening of the India trade, the relationship between the provincial 
manufacturing interests and the gentlemanly capitalists became more complicated since 
some London East India houses developed closer relationship with the provincial interests 
by consigning their manufactures to the East Indies and providing them with financial 
advances.138  In consequence, these two metropolitan and provincial groups could share 
more interests and collaborate more easily in the lobbying for free access to the Asian 
markets than previously.  Eyles very briefly pointed out the collaboration between the 
London interests and the provincial lobbyists in his thesis.  He described the establishment 
of a free trade committee called ‘Association for Colonization to India, and free Trade to 
China’ in London in 1828 and F. Ferguson’s visit to Liverpool in October the same year, 
on the part of the committee, in order to give information on the renewal of the charter to 
the free trade interests of the city.139  Detailed information on this association is not 
available, but from his reference to his petitioning the Treasury for the importation of teas 
from Holland, it seems that this committee was connected to the private trading interests of 
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London.140  The communication between the provincial lobbyists and Joshua Bates gives 
us further evidence of the connection between the province and the metropolis against the 
model of the ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’.  These evidences support Webster’s argument. 
 
In addition, Abel Coffin, who had the experience of commanding a ship in the China trade 
three times and was recommended to J. Crawfurd by the Secretary of the Association, also 
gave evidence.141  The Report of the Select Committee revealed that many of the witnesses 
expected that the consumption of British manufactures would increase as a result of the 
opening of the China trade.  This was based upon the experience of the exports of British 
manufactures to China by American merchants as well as the large increase of British 
exports to India after the opening of the India trade.142   
 
As one of the deputies from Glasgow and the Chairman of the General Deputation in 
London, Kirkman Finlay’s effort to negotiate with other deputies, parliamentary members 
and others concerned with this subject, look for witnesses and provide necessary evidence 
to the Select Committee during the period were considerable.  After his return to Glasgow, 
the members of the association showed their gratitude that:  
 
Kirkman Finlay, who to a general and practical knowledge of business added an 
intimate acquaintance with all the details of this great national Deputation, who had 
been eminently serviceable in assisting to open to Indian Trade in 1813 its talented 
advocates, devoted his whole time, and gave all his energies to the promotion of the 
great measure, of throwing open the markets of India and China to the Inhabitants of 
this as they are already to those of every other country.143 
 
Finlay’s efforts in this free trade campaign can perhaps be compared with Charlton’s 
account of James Cropper’ leadership of the Liverpool Association at that time.  His 
leading position in the General Deputation symbolised the significant role of the GEIA in 
the national movement. 
 
Although the investigation of the China question by the Select Committee was ended, the 
GEIA continued its efforts for the complete opening of the East India trade.  During John 
Crawfurd’s visit to Glasgow in September, he insisted that Glasgow should continue to 
                                               
140 Liverpool Mercury, 12 December 1828. 
141 Outgoing Correspondence 1829-1836, 19 February 1830 and Report of Select Committee, 1830, pp. 115-
131. 
142 Report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Affairs of the East-India Company. 
China Trade, 1830, p. 47. 
143 Committee Minutes, 21 July 1830, p. 46. 
 139 
petition Parliament from session to session until they achieve their ultimate object.144  In 
November, when Grey’s Government replaced Wellington’s, the association began to 
prepare new petitions to Parliament and further lobbying activities in London although 
Charles Grant, who became the new President of the Board of Control, told the chairs of 
the EIC that the China monopoly was to cease.145  As the result of its communication with 
the Liverpool Association and following the examples of Liverpool, in a monthly meeting 
held on 20 January, the directors of the GEIA set up a sub-committee to prepare a draft of 
Resolutions as the foundation of the petitions.  They also agreed to send Oswald, Garden 
and Henry Dunlop as their deputies as soon as they could in order to ‘bring prominently to 
the notice of the Ministry the importance of a Free Trade to India & China’ in conjunction 
with the representatives from Merseyside.146  The deputation left Glasgow to get to London 
in time for the joint-deputation’s interview with Earl Grey on 5 February but, because of a 
snowstorm, their arrival was delayed and they missed Grey’s personal invitation. 147  
However, the House of Commons had appointed a Select Committee to examine the Indian 
branch of the question on the previous day.  To this examination, J. Crawfurd and some of 
those who engaged in the East India trade, such as Mr. Bracken of the house of Alexander 
& Co., one of the major seven agency houses in Calcutta before the financial crisis of the 
early 1830s, were called.148  The association expected most of these witnesses’ evidence to 
support free trade with India.149 
 
However, the question of the renewal of the EIC’s charter failed to attract wider attention 
in the country as the debates on the Reform Bills dominated national politics.  According to 
Philips, the Select Committee’s reports could not give a clear guide on the India Bill to the 
Government, which could also not afford enough time to take the question of the 
administration of British India into consideration.150  During the time of the heated debates 
on the Reform Bills in early 1832, the Glasgow Association made communication with 
Liverpool and J. Crawfurd in respect of the propriety of their agitations against the renewal 
of the charter.151   The members of the Glasgow Association insisted that they should 
continue to make public demonstrations until the Reform question was settled.  
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Nevertheless, after their communications, it decided to suspend its appeals to the Ministry 
for a while and not to send any deputation to London in that year.152 
 
Apart from the charter renewal, other subjects related to free trade were debated during this 
period.  These included the heavy duties incurred on British manufactures in Java, 
Netherlands’ India, and the objection against the exclusion of the American traders from 
Singapore.  This confirms Webster’s explanation that the British manufacturing interests 
related to Southeast Asia found their political voice through the East India associations.153  
The association’s lobbying activities on these issues emphasises the strong influence of J. 
Crawfurd’s opinion on these subjects.  During the special meeting of the GEIA’s directors 
with Crawfurd, they agreed to send the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs their 
memorials on the heavy duties on British manufactures in Java and on their desire to open 
the port of Singapore to the Americans.154  Over the question of Singapore, the association 
insisted that the restrictions, which were excluding the Americans from Singapore, 
prevented the port from playing its role as the hub of commercial intercourse in this region, 
as instead the American ships were using the Dutch small free port of Rhio nearby.155  
Moreover, the GEIA’s standpoint in respect of Britain’s general foreign trade policies was 
clearly shown in these subjects.   The GEIA’s memorial to Earl Grey in regard to Singapore 
best shows the preference of the merchants and manufacturers in Glasgow and its 
neighbouring areas for the liberalisation of Britain’s economic policies and the application 
of free trade to the international trade. 
 
… it is most important to the interests of the Commerce and Manufactures of this 
country that the greatest possible extension should be given to the industry and 
enterprise not only of His Majesty’s subjects but of the people of all other states, and 
in order to effect this desirable purpose, it is necessary that liberal concessions in 
regard to Commercial intercourse should be spontaneously made to Foreign States.  It 
appears clear to the Memorialists that those who have the greatest quantity of 
commodities to sell, and require consequently to purchase largely in other articles 
must be the most high benefited by the growth & universal application of regulations 
favorable to the most free & open commercial intercourse.156 
 
In February 1832, the Board of Control sent its letters relative to the Trade and Finance of 
India to the parties concerned with the East India question and requested their opinions on 
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this subject.157  The Chamber of Commerce of Glasgow was one of them, and their replies 
to the queries were drafted by the sub-committee of the association.158   
 
In the summer of 1832, when the General Election of members to the reformed Parliament 
was approaching, the East India associations of manufacturing towns and outports 
discussed an appropriate measure to increase the number of parliamentary supporters 
against the EIC’s monopoly.  In July, in the special meeting, this subject came up for 
discussion.159 After a long debates, the directors of the GEIA rejected the suggestions of 
some members of the Liverpool Committee that a declaration of opinions relative to the 
East Indies from the candidates or that their pledges should be asked for in order to clarify 
their attitudes towards the subject.160  Their decision was more moderate: they agreed that 
‘it is proper for the Committee to address the public at present on the India & China Trade 
with reference to the expected Election for Members to Parliament’, and their resolutions 
in which they appealed to the electors to consider this question were printed and 
circulated.161  Although the association was not very active for the election, it appears that 
the East India question was one of the issues in the election.  As the result of the 
Parliamentary Reform, two seats were allocated to Glasgow.  James Oswald, John 
Crawfurd and James Ewing, who were related to the association, stood with other 
candidates for the election.  Oswald and Crawfurd were politically liberal, whilst Ewing’s 
stance was ‘liberal’ Tory.  Apart from these three candidates, Daniel K. Sanford also made 
a long speech to support the abolition of the EIC’s monopoly at the meeting of electors.162  
 
While all of these candidates supported the complete abolition of the company’s monopoly, 
Ewing’s attitude to the free trade was more ambiguous than the others as his main 
commercial interests were located in the West India trade.   During the period of the 
election campaign, his views on free trade were criticised in the following terms: 
 
You are an opponent also, you say, of the East India and China monopoly- but what 
do you think of the West India monopoly?- Will you propose an equalizing duty 
upon the sugars from both countries, in order to place them upon the same footing?  
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This is another point on which you are silent, as well as upon the general principles 
of Free trade.163 
 
Like John Gladstone in Liverpool, whose case will be explained in the next chapter, this 
criticism shows Ewing’s contradictory position as a member of both the West India 
Association and the East India Association. Although he supported the opening of the East 
India and China trade, he also needed to defend the West Indian interests as one of the 
leading West Indian traders of the town.  In December 1832, James Ewing and James 
Oswald, members of the association, were elected as MPs for Glasgow.  Crawfurd’s defeat 
indicates that the abolition of the restrictions imposed on the East India and China trade 
was not a decisive influence in the result of the election in Glasgow.  Moreover, Ewing and 
Oswald had stronger local connections than Crawfurd.  Nevertheless, these two MPs were 
the members of the association.  As in the case of the 1812-1813, the GEIA had its own 
representatives in Parliament again. 
 
In January 1833, on the eve of Parliament assembling, merchants and manufacturers of 
Glasgow started to prepare for their final battle for the abolition of the EIC’s monopoly and 
the establishment of free commercial intercourse with the East Indies.  In January and 
February, the GEIA discussed with Liverpool the propriety of sending their Deputations to 
London, but concluded at the beginning of March that it was too soon to proceed.164  At the 
same time, the association and the two MPs reaffirmed the following points relative to the 
affairs of the East Indies: (1) the complete opening of the China Trade to British subjects, 
including the tea trade, should be achieved; (2) the association considered that it would be 
possible to secure large custom revenues from tea by changing the taxation system; (3) the 
abolition of the restrictions on British subjects travelling, purchasing and holding lands in 
India should be demanded; (4) the association also thought that the abolition of the 
restriction on direct travel from the U.K. to any ports in India except Calcutta, Bombay and 
Madras should be achieved; (5) it was proper for the GEIA not to interfere in the question 
of the best mode of the administration in India.165  Prior to the arrival of the deputation, the 
situation in London relative to the question of the renewal of the East India Charter was 
regularly relayed to Glasgow by the two MPs as well as J. Crawfurd. 
 
Although the association was confident that the China trade would be open, it thought that 
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the other points were still uncertain.166  Even the Government did not make their final 
decisions on some points.  For instance, in the middle of February, Charles Grant, the 
President of the Board of Control, sent an inquiry to W. W. Whitmore about the opinion of 
provincial commercial and manufacturing interests in regard to the ‘rules, restrictions and 
conditions under which they [the British subjects] should be allowed to settle in the interior 
of India.’167  Then, copies of Grant’s letter were sent to the parties concerned with this 
subject including the associations of Liverpool and Glasgow.  In Glasgow, the directors 
agreed that it was more proper for them to send Grant a joint answer than a separate 
reply.168  However, the Glasgow Association felt that ‘it was rather beyond our province to 
become Indian law maker.’169  Since the Glasgow Association were unable to prepare their 
own draft for this matter by themselves because of their lack of knowledge of the legal 
system in India, while they were waiting for John Crawfurd’s notes on the inquiry from the 
Board of Control, they also asked the Liverpool Association to write up the draft and send 
it to Glasgow for their consideration.170  Ewing, lobbying in London, was asked in the 
middle of March by Robert Gordon of the Board of Control about Glasgow’s ability to act 
as a bonding port to secure the duties on tea.171  In order to answer this question, the GEIA 
sent an inquiry to Greenock and Port Glasgow on the conditions of the bonded warehouses 
there.172  Moreover, Oswald and Whitmore agreed that a deputation from Glasgow should 
be sent to London immediately, since the President of the Board of Control would be 
willing to hear from them on the bonded warehouses of outports before the Easter 
recess.173  After observing the proceedings of the debates over the new India Bills in 
Parliament and the opinions of the Ministry, on 22 March, the GEIA appointed Kirkman 
Finlay, J. G. Hamilton, Henry Dunlop, Walter Buchanan and W. P. Paton as its deputation 
to London, who would act in conjunction with the deputation from Liverpool, and then 
acting on advice from Oswald and Whitmore, the association sent its deputation to 
London. 174   The Board of Control’s inquires to the provincial mercantile and 
manufacturing interests imply that for the Ministry not only the London mercantile 
interests and their alliance but also the provincial interests’ views were significant criteria 
in the formation of Britain’s imperial policies in Asia.   
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In London, the deputation from Glasgow continued their lobbying with other Deputations 
before the introduction of the Bill.  Finlay, one of the deputies, held discussions with the 
Board of Control daily, and he also privately submitted to the Government his opinions on 
the necessary arrangements for the opening of the China trade and the duties which should 
be levied on teas.175  The Government estimated that the consumption of tea would be 30 
million pounds, while in Finlay’s personal view, it would amount to 40 million pounds.176  
He insisted that the Government’s calculations on the consumption of tea after the opening 
of the China trade were underestimated in order to persuade them to open the China trade 
immediately and to levy moderate duties on the Chinese produce.  The directors of the 
association supported his argument and left this matter to Finlay’s discretion.177     
 
Although the GEIA’s lobbying activities against the discriminating duties on East and West 
India produce continued, its activities against the renewal of the EIC’s charter almost 
ended by the time the India bill was introduced into Parliament by Grant on 13 June 1833.  
In terms of the clauses of the new Charter Acts with which the GEIA was concerned, they 
were favourable to the free-trade supporters.  The company’s monopoly in the China trade 
was to be abolished, including the tea trade.  On 22 April 1834, the company was to 
abandon all of its commercial privilege and close their commercial business, and their 
commercial properties both in the homeland and abroad which were not retained for their 
Government in India were to be sold in order to settle its financial obligation.  The 
restrictions on British inhabitants purchasing and holding lands in India were also 
abolished. 
 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the lobbying activities of the GEIA during the period between 1829 and 
1833 have been analysed.  After the opening of the India trade in 1814, the East Indian 
interests of Glasgow organised few lobbying activities until the end of the 1820s because 
they did not have a proper institution that could represent their interests.  Nevertheless, the 
GEIA was re-established in order to organise their lobbying against the renewal of the 
company’s charter and deal with other subjects connected to their interests.   
                                               
175 Incoming correspondence 1833-1834., 22 April 1833, letter no. 37 and 30 April 1833, letter no. 39, and 
Committee Minutes 1829-1847, 10  March 1833, p. 99.  
176 Outgoing Correspondence 1829-1836, 10 May 1833. 
177 Ibid., and Committee Minutes 1829-1847, 10 May 1833. 
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In studies by Greenberg and by Eyles of the renewal of the EIC’s charter during this 
period, the roles of the Lancashire merchants and manufacturers have often been 
emphasised.  Nevertheless, it is clear that under the initiative of Kirkman Finlay, this 
Scottish organisation played a major role in this national campaign, although its policies 
often followed the opinions of Liverpool.  The records of the GEIA indicate the significant 
influence of John Crawfurd, who connected with British private merchants in the East 
Indies, not only in the case of the Glasgow Association but also over the theoretical 
arguments and general lobbying tactics adopted by free-trade supporters of the provincial 
manufacturing towns and outports as a whole.  Nevertheless, this Scottish Orientalist’s 
importance in this campaign attracted little attention from historians, compared with 
Buckingham.  In fact, Crawfurd was a man who linked the provincial mercantile and 
manufacturing interests with the private traders in the East who had close connection with 
the London gentlemanly capitalists in the 1829-1833 campaign. 
 
The means and general tactics of GEIA’s lobbying activities followed their previous 
attempts of 1812-1813.  The lobbying strategies of the provincial mercantile and 
manufacturing interests were decided through close communication among the provincial 
lobbying groups and their supporters.  Compared with Chapter 3, it is more difficult to 
measure the influence of their lobbying activities on the state’s decision.  The GEIA’s 
deputies could access Ministers through Parliamentary supporters like Huskisson and 
Whitmore.  The state’s decision on the appointment of the Select Committee just after the 
meeting between the General Deputation and the Ministers implies the effective lobbying 
of the provincial interest groups.  The records also indicate that the provincial lobbyists 
made significant efforts to find witnesses who could give favourable evidence for free 
trade, and their searching extended to the London mercantile community.  Moreover, 
inquiries from the Board of Control to the provincial lobbyist groups indicated that the 
provincial interest groups were significant enough for the state to consider their opinions. 
 
The analysis of the association’s subscribers has revealed that their economic interests 
were varied as those of the previous association’s subscribers had been.  However, whilst 
the West Indian interests were not one of the largest economic interest groups any more, 
those who were involved in the cotton industry maintained their significant position within 
the re-established association.  As Webster argued, their consigning manufactured goods to 
the East Indies by London agency houses, which developed after the opening of the India 
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trade, created their connection with the London interests.  The development of the 
connection between them was a background of the collaboration between the provincial 
mercantile and manufacturing interests and some of the gentlemanly capitalists in the 
metropolis and their nexus in Asia during this free trade campaign. 
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Chapter 5. Liverpool’s campaigns against the renewal of the East India 
Company’s Charter, 1812-1813 and 1829-1833 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Through the examination of the GEIA’s lobbying activities, the previous two chapters have 
argued that the provincial merchants and manufacturers exercised stronger influence on the 
formation of British imperial policies in the East Indies than the model of the ‘gentlemanly 
capitalist thesis’ supposed.  The main aims of this chapter are to reinforce the previous 
chapters’ evaluation of the effective campaigns of provincial lobbying groups during the 
periods 1812 to 1813, and 1829 to 1833 through an analysis of Liverpool’s lobbying 
activities, and to support a more general argument that provincial mercantile and 
manufacturing interests exercised stronger influence over this country’s imperial policies 
than is suggested in the model of the ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’. 
 
The port of Liverpool has been raised to its present proud pre-eminence…, and, 
within my own time, has been elevated from the rank of a third or fourth-rate town to 
that of a second.  Though Liverpool has a leg tied up, she is now running a race with 
the metropolis; they are neck and neck, and let but that leg be untied which now 
restricts the motion of one of the competitors, and we may venture to anticipate that 
the same enterprise which has carried Liverpool so far, will soon lead her beyond the 
port of London itself.1 
 
The above speech made by Samuel Hope, one of the bankers in Liverpool, described the 
position of the city in the first half of the nineteenth century clearly.  During the period, 
Liverpool participated in the general trend of the growth of Britain’s overseas trade.2  The 
port gradually established its significant position and overwhelmed the port of London in 
some branches of British overseas trade, notably the slave trade during the second half of 
the eighteenth century and then the import of raw cotton from the United States and other 
places during the nineteenth century.  Nineteenth-century Liverpool had a different 
economic structure from Glasgow.  As described, Glasgow’s economy was based on both 
foreign trade and manufacturing; in Liverpool, foreign trade and related sectors held a 
dominant position.  The growth of its economy increased its political influence, and put it 
                                               
1 The Liverpool East India Association, Report of the Public Meeting at Liverpool on Wednesday, January 
28,1829, 1829, p. 24. 
2 According to Davis’ calculation, the annual average of total exports (excluding re-exports) from Britain 
increased from ₤12,690,000 in 1784-6 to ₤44,474,000 in 1814-16, whilst that of total imports rose from 
₤20,386,000 to 64,741,000, respectively.  See R. Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas 
Trade, 1979, pp. 88-89 and 92-93.  The Irish trade is excluded from the values. 
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in the centre of the free trade campaign, and the Liverpool interests took a strong initiative 
to organize the two national campaigns from 1812 to 1813, and from 1829 to 1833. 
 
 Nevertheless, as will be described below, Liverpool’s mercantile community reflected the 
diversity of their commercial and political interests.  This chapter will explore how the 
character of Liverpool’s economy influenced its lobbying about the EIC’s monopoly and 
how Liverpool’s lobbying group led its effective campaign in spite of internal divisions in 
its mercantile society. 
 
In spite of Liverpool’s important role, previous research on its campaigns against the 
renewal of the charter is surprisingly sparse.  Regarding Liverpool’s campaigns during the 
Napoleonic Wars period, its lobby in the debates over the Orders in Council attracted more 
attention from such historians as Checkland and Tolley than did the East India question.3  
As Moss explained, they described the Liverpool merchants’ lobby for the opening of the 
East India trade as a part of dual campaign, but very briefly.  Checkland also described the 
campaign in John Gladstone’s biography, but was uninterested in the details of Liverpool’s 
campaign.  In terms of the second campaign, apart from Eyles’ brief explanation of 
Liverpool’s lobbyists’ campaign in his doctoral thesis, Charlton has examined its lobbying 
activities.4  Nevertheless, his work focused on the relationship between Liverpool’s 
lobbying for the opening of the East India and China trade, and the West India trade and 
slavery.  He did not explore the connection between provincial lobbying groups and the 
degree of their influence to any great extent.  Moreover, in terms of the collaboration of 
provincial interest groups, although these historians have pointed out that they petitioned 
Parliament and sent their General Deputation to London, the range of their collaboration 
was actually wider than has been described. 
 
In this chapter, the first four sections will examine Liverpool’s first campaign. The 
development of Liverpool’s economy after the second half of the eighteenth century and its 
economic structure will be described.  The problems of the town, particularly its economic 
conditions during the Napoleonic War period and the internal division of the Liverpool 
merchants over the country’s wartime economic policies, will be discussed.  Then the 
                                               
3 S. G. Checkland, ‘Economic Attitude in Liverpool’ in The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 5, No. 
1, 1952, pp. 58-75, B. H. Tolley, ‘The Liverpool Campaign Against the Order in Council and the War of 
1812’ in J. R. Harris (ed.) Liverpool and Merseyside: Essays in the Economic and Social History of the Port 
and Its Hinterland, 1969, Chapter 5. 
4 D. Eyles, ‘The Abolition of The East India Company’s Monopoly 1833’ unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Edinburgh, 1955, pp. 188-191. 
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opening of Liverpool’s lobbying activities and the commercial interests of its campaigners 
will be examined.  Fourthly, the proceedings of Liverpool’s movement will be analysed.  
Then in the remaining sections, the second campaign will be explored.  The backgrounds 
of the city’s lobbying activities, and then the economic condition of the city and the 
lobbying activities of the LEIA during the 1820s, especially the debates over the 
equalisation of sugar duties among the business society of Liverpool, will be dealt with 
first.  Second, how the LEIA started their campaign against the renewal of the company’s 
charter will be described.  Third, an analysis of the economic and political interests of the 
members of the Liverpool Committee will reveal their diversity.  Fourth, the proceedings 
of the second campaign will be examined from the Liverpool merchants’ viewpoints.   
 
The main archival sources for this chapter, which take up Liverpool’s free trade 
campaigns, are articles from such contemporary newspapers as the Liverpool Courier and 
the Liverpool Mercury, plus other local archival sources, including Liverpool Town Books 
and John Gladstone’s correspondence located at the Liverpool Record Office and the 
Flintshire Record Office respectively.  Many of these materials have been used by other 
historians.  Apart from these common sources, the analysis of this chapter draws on the 
GEIA’s records, which contain correspondence between Glasgow and Liverpool and other 
towns.  
 
This chapter shows that, in spite of their varied political and economic interests, the 
Liverpool Committee took the leadership in the two campaigns, and that it communicated 
with other towns closely in order to organise their lobbying effectively.  For analysing how 
provincial merchants and manufacturers, with their varied economic interests and different 
political views, formed their overall lobbying strategies, the correspondence of the GEIA is 
very useful.  This chapter also describes the significant role of their local parliamentary 
representatives for their lobbying that Cain and Hopkins’ model failed to explain.  The 
internal divisions within the Liverpool mercantile community did not affect their strong 
challenge to the dominance of the London mercantile elite over the East India and China 
trade. 
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5.2. Liverpool’s development and economic structure during the second half of the 
eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century 
 
Like other provincial manufacturing and commercial centres in England and Scotland, 
Liverpool experienced rapid economic social and demographic change in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  In the demographic aspect, the population of the 
town increased dramatically.  Its population was estimated at approximately 7,000 in 1708, 
then 77,653 by 1800 and had increased to 116,000 by 1811, that is, its population rose 
more than fifteen times.5  The economy of the city was dependent on its port.  By 1760, 
Liverpool merchants overwhelmed their London and Bristol counterparts in the slave 
trade.6  The triangular trade which connected Britain, the West African coasts and the West 
Indies was highly speculative and hazardous and needed a highly organised trading system, 
which contributed to the rise of banks in the town.  The multilateral character of the South 
Atlantic trade contributed to the development of a trading settlement system based on bills 
of exchange.  For remitting their profits to the home country from the West Indies, 
Liverpool slave traders could access the financial facilities of London West India interests, 
who dominated the West Indian economy.7  At the same time, the port facilities and the 
networks of roads and canals which connected Liverpool with local manufacturing towns 
were significantly improved by the early nineteenth century.   
 
Although Liverpool was famous for the slave trade before its abolition in 1807, its 
economic contribution to the growth of the town was significant but partial.8  At the end of 
the eighteenth century, Liverpool emerged as the leading British port in the trade with the 
United States.  The city became the hub of exports of manufacturing products from the 
North and the Midlands, and of imports of raw materials. Apart from the articles 
mentioned above, the cotton textiles of Lancashire, the woollen goods of the West Riding, 
the iron of South Yorkshire, the pottery of Staffordshire and the hardware of Birmingham 
were gathered to the port for export to the United States and the West Indies. In return, raw 
materials, especially raw cotton, were imported in order to meet increasing demand from 
                                               
5 R. Lawton, ‘The genesis of population’ in W. Smith and others (eds.) A Scientific Survey of Merseyside, 
1953, pp.121-2, and N. Collins, Politics an Elections in Nineteenth-Century Liverpool, 1994, p. 2. 
6 B. L. Anderson, ‘The Lancashire bill system and its Liverpool practitioners: The case of a slave merchant’ 
in W. H. Chaloner and B. M. Ratcliffe, Trade and Transport: Essay in Economic History in Honour of T. S. 
William, 1977, p. 62. 
7 R. B. Sheridan ‘The Commercial and Financial Organization of the British Slave Trade, 1750-1807’ in The 
Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1958, pp. 249-263, and Anderson, ‘The Lancashire 
bill system’  
8 E. F. Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersey: An Economic History of Port 1700-1970, 1971, Chapter 3. 
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English manufacturing towns.9  During the period 1820-1850, over 80 percent of Britain’s 
importation of raw cotton arrived at Liverpool every year.10  Although the West Indian and 
American traders were dominant elements of Liverpool’s overseas trade during this period, 
the city represented not only its own mercantile and shipping interests but was firmly 
connected with many manufacturing interests of the North and the Midlands.   The rapid 
growth of Liverpool was the most successful part of the British economy during this 
period.  
 
The city’s political and social characteristics also help us to understand Liverpool’s 
participation in the free trade campaign.  In terms of the local politics of nineteenth-century 
Liverpool, the Corporation members were dominated by the Tory Party.11  The 
conservative part of the town was best represented by the West Indian and the West 
African traders, who were the old part of the city’s economic interests and deeply 
connected with the colonial trade.  Nevertheless, S. G. Checkland argues that ‘The typical 
Liverpool merchants of the last quarter of the eighteenth century’ were ‘a mercantilist, a 
materialist and an empiricist’.12  On the one hand, they were inclined to believe that their 
trades benefited from England’s traditional mercantile policy of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries; on the other hand, they were critical of policies that restricted their 
trading activities.13  In spite of the abolition of the slave trade and the relative decline of 
the West India trade in the early nineteenth century, the West Indian traders still 
maintained their strong influence in Liverpool’s political life.  
 
Meanwhile, such non-conformists in the city as the Unitarians, the Quakers and the 
Presbyterians were excluded from local politics.  The descendants of the Scottish 
immigrants, many of whom were Presbyterians, were also outside the mainstream of local 
politics.  Such groups included some highly successful and respected merchants who 
conducted their trade with the United States and the West Indies, notably William 
                                               
9 B. H. Tolley, ‘The Liverpool Campaign Against the Orders in Council and the War of 1812’, in J. R. Harris, 
(ed.) Liverpool and Merseyside, 1969, Chapter. 5. 
10 D. M. William, ‘Liverpool Merchants and the Cotton Trade 1820-1850’ in J. R. Harris (ed.) Liverpool and 
Merseyside, Table 1. The original sources which he used were T. Ellison, ‘The Cotton Trade of Great Britain, 
1886, p. 85 and E. J. Donnell, Chronological and Statistical History of Cotton, 1873, passim. For instance, in 
1820, the total import of raw cotton into Britain was 571,651 bales, and 458,693 bales out of them went to 
Liverpool in fact, and a decade later, as the total import increased to 871,487 bales, the import into Liverpool 
also raised to 793,870 bales. 
11 S. G. Checkland, ‘American Versus West Indian Traders in Liverpool, 1793-1815’ in The Journal of 
Economic History, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, 1958, pp. 141-142, and N. Collins, Politics and Elections in 
Nineteenth-Century Liverpool, 1994, Chap. 1. 
12 See S. G. Checkland, ‘Economic Attitudes in Liverpool 1793-1807’, in The Economic History Review, 
New Series, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1952, p. 58. 
13 Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
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Rathbone, James Cropper and William Ewart.14  Along with the group of professionals, 
such as William Roscoe and James Currie, in the Philosophical and Literary Society, these 
non-conformist elements were related to the Whig elements and the radicals of the town, 
and were critical of the privileged group of old mercantile and shipping interests and the 
Tory Corporation.15   
 
As can be seen, Liverpool gained the status of the most important outport by the end of the 
eighteenth century.  The port was linked with the manufacturing towns of the North of 
England and the Midlands for the export of their manufacturing goods and the import of 
raw materials, and the contribution of the Liverpool merchants to the Atlantic trade was 
particularly remarkable.  The port and its merchants established themselves as strong 
competitors against the port of London and it merchants.   Politically, Tory dominance was 
increasingly challenged by the radicals during the early nineteenth century.  
 
 
5.3. Problems of Liverpool before the campaign of 1812-1813 
 
This section will explore Liverpool’s problems which led its inhabitants into the free trade 
campaign of 1812-1813.  At the same time, it will explore the internal division of the 
town’s mercantile community over the wartime economic policies during this period 
because in Cain and Hopkins’ model, the internal divisions of provincial interests were one 
reason for their failure of exerting their political influence on the state. 
 
While Liverpool experienced the general trend of rapid economic growth, its merchants 
felt uncertainty over the future of trading activities.  Foreign trade with the United States, 
the West Indies and the European Continent was damaged by the series of wars.  In 
addition, domestically the West India traders were under pressure from the anti-slavery 
movement.  According to Hyde and Parkinson, the initial outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars 
did not affect trade directly except its trade with Russia, but London’s financial crisis was 
transmitted to Liverpool in 1793 via the bankruptcies of several commercial and banking 
houses in the metropolis.16   The failure of Charles Caldwell and Co., one of the leading 
banking houses in Liverpool, damaged confidence and led to a ruinous contraction of 
                                               
14 S. G. Checkland, The Gladstones: A Family Biography 1764-1851, 1971, pp. 30-31. 
15 Ibid., and Checkland, ‘Economic Attitude’, pp. 66-74  
16 F. E. Hyde and B. B. Parkinson, ‘The Port of Liverpool and the Crisis of 1793’ in Economica, New Seri., 
Vol. 18, No. 72, 1951, pp. 366-367. 
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circulating medium.17  The crisis forced the Corporation to step in to rebuild confidence by 
obtaining an Act of Parliament to issue their own notes.  In contrast, political events such 
as Napoleon’s economic blockade of Britain after the Berlin-Milan Decrees of 1806 and 
1807 followed by the annexation of Holland, Westphalia and Northern Germany and 
Britain’s counter-blockade by the Orders in Council, directly caused a more serious 
disruption to Liverpool’s economy.   
 
This situation was worsened by the deterioration of Britain’s relationship with the United 
States when the Orders in Council, which restricted the Americans’ neutral trade, were 
issued and the Americans retaliated against the British by their counteracts.  As the leading 
British port of the American trade, the disruption of the American trade was particularly 
serious to Liverpool merchants.  According to William Rathbone’s estimation, the 
American trade amounted to five-sixteenths of Liverpool’s commerce in 1808.18  Their 
trading operations under the disputes between the two countries were very high risk.  
When the embargo was imposed by the U.S. Government, merchants had to keep a large 
stock of goods in anticipation of its removal in the near future.  When the embargo was 
temporarily lifted in May 1810, after raw cotton had hit the highest prices during the period 
1808-09, the flood of American commodities to Liverpool and the huge accumulation of 
stocks, as well as the lack of demand from the manufacturing areas of Lancashire, caused a 
collapse of prices.19  In the city, those concerned with trade with the United States were 
represented by the American Chamber of Commerce.  Among its members, the Rathbones, 
Croppers, Bensons, Hodgesons, Thornelys, Martins, Richardsons, and Binns, who operated 
their trade primarily with America, were against the Orders in Council.20 
 
The West India trade gradually lost its commercial importance after the late-eighteenth-
century prosperity.  The trade was dependent on tropical commodities and, unlike the 
United States, the small islands and their heavily indebted plantation economy could not 
offer a large market to British manufactures nor meet the increasing demands for corn or 
raw cotton from the rapidly growing manufacturing centres of Britain.  Moreover, the slave 
trade, which was under pressure from abolitionists all over the country, declined at the turn 
of the century.   The number of Liverpool’s ships engaged in the slave trade reduced from 
one out of every twelve ships in 1792 to one out of every twenty-four by the time of its 
                                               
17 Ibid., pp. 367-368 
18 B. H. Tolley, ‘The Liverpool Campaign’, p. 102 
19 Ibid., and S. G. Checkland, ‘American Versus West India Trade’ in The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 
XVII, No. 2, 1958, p.156 
20 S. G. Checkland, ‘America Versus West Indian Traders’, p. 150. 
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abolition.21  Devine argued that in Glasgow the relative decline of the West India 
merchants led to the establishment of the GWIA in 1807 in order to maintain and promote 
their interest.  The foundation of a similar association by Liverpool merchants in 1799, 
when the liquidity crisis occurred, may indicate their similar position at the turn of the 
century.22   The abolition of the slave trade in 1807 did not directly lead to economic crisis 
in the town, but certainly this political event damaged the West India merchants’ prospects.   
 
The wars with France also hit the West Indian traders of Liverpool.  In his research, 
Checkland pointed out the vulnerability of the West India trade in wartime conditions due 
to its more speculative nature than the American trade.23  The main markets for the West 
Indian commodities were on the European continent.  Although the Napoleonic Wars gave 
the West Indian interests an opportunity to exclude European rivals from this traffic, they 
needed continental markets, in which they could sell only small quantities at high prices 
under the French economic blockade.24  In such a commercial environment, they could not 
expect stability or large profits.  In this condition, it was essential for the West Indian 
interests to exclude the Americans from their trade.  Therefore, while many of the 
prestigious Liverpool merchants engaging in the American trade were hostile to the 
Orders, the West India merchants and planters were the main supporters of the Ministry 
and the Orders in Council.  For example, the political stance of John Gladstone, father of 
the later Prime Minister, William Ewart, had been a Whig at first.  However, as his 
economic interest in West Indian trade and plantations increased during the 1800s, which 
was combined with his patriotic attitude and his Episcopal beliefs, he became a supporter 
of the Conservative Government and the Orders.25 
 
                                               
21 E. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, p. 162 
22 T. M. Devine, ‘An eighteenth-century business elite: Glasgow-West India merchants, c. 1750-1815’ in 
Scottish Historical Review, 57 and Checkland, ‘American Versus West Indian Traders in Liverpool’, p. 145.  
23S. G. Checkland, ‘American Versus West India Trade’, p. 150. 
24 Ibid. 
25 S. G. Checkland, The Gladstones. Chapter 8 and 9. 
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Table 5-1. Trade and dock duties collected in Liverpool. (1810-16). 
  Number of Ships Tonnage  Duties (£) 
1808 5,225 516,836 40,638 
1809 6,023 594,601 47,580 
1810 6,729 734,391 65,782 
1811 5,616 611,190 54,752 
1812 4,599 446,788 44,403 
1813 5,341 547,426 50,177 
1814 5,706 548,957 59,741 
1815 6,440 709,849 76,915 
1816 6,888 774,243 92,646 
Note: In 1812, a new mode of levying rates on goods and tonnage was introduced. 
Source: T. Baines, History of the Commerce and Town of Liverpool, and The Rise of Manufacturing industry 
in The Adjoining Countries, 1852, pp. 6-7.  
 
The difficulty of Liverpool merchants before the renewal of the EIC’s charter is indicated 
in Table 5-1, which shows trade and dock duties collected in the port of Liverpool from 
1808 to 1816.  Between 1810 and 1812 (the events during the period included Napoleon’s 
annexation of Holland and North Germany in 1810, the resumption of the Americans’ non-
intercourse in 1811 and the general depression all over the country), both the number of 
ships and the total amount of tonnage declined significantly.  In addition, although the 
mode of levying Dock Duties was changed in 1812 and an annual revenue of around 
£60,000 had been expected, the figure was not achieved until 1815.26  Furthermore, the 
Liverpool Mercury reported that ‘Near 16,000 poor besides the Parochial Paupers, have in 
this town and within these last six weeks eaten of the bread of charity.’27 
 
In consequence, Napoleon’s economic blockade and the disputes between Britain and the 
United States over the Orders in Council were having a profound impact on Liverpool’s 
economy before the beginning of their lobbying for the opening of the East India trade, as 
was the case in Glasgow.  In the case of Birmingham, which has been examined by Moss, 
its manufacturers who dominated the local economy exported their goods to the United 
States, and also opposed the Orders.28  In the case of Liverpool, the situation was more 
complicated because the strong West India interests existed along with the American trade 
interests.  The Liverpool mercantile community displayed its serious divisions in the 
debates over the Orders in Council.   
 
 
                                               
26 T. Baines, History of the Commerce and Town of Liverpool, and The Rise of Manufacturing industry in The 
Adjoining Countries, 1852, p. 557. 
27 Liverpool Mercury, 14 February 1812. 
28 D. J. Moss, ‘Birmingham and the Campaigns against the Orders-in Council and East India Company 
Charter, 1812-13’ in Canadian Journal of History, Vol. XI, Issue 1, 1976, pp. 181-12. 
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5.4. The beginning of Liverpool’s campaign against the renewal of the Charter 
 
By the beginning of 1812, some merchants in Liverpool had started lobbying for the 
opening of the East India and China trade on an individual basis.  In February, General 
Gascoyne, one of two MPs for Liverpool, stated in the House of Commons that the 
merchants of Liverpool had the expectation that ‘a great alternation would be made in the 
arrangement of the carrying trade to and from India’, and that they had suggested that a 
Select Committee be set up to examine the issue.29  In March 1812, following requests 
from several inhabitants of Liverpool and other British towns, such as Birmingham, from 
where Thomas Attwood had written a letter to urge them to petition Parliament, the Mayor 
of Liverpool called a meeting to discuss the subject of the opening of the East India trade.30 
On 16 March, a Special Council and Meeting of the Trustees of the Dock was held by the 
Mayor and other council members in the Town Hall of Liverpool in order to discuss their 
petitioning Parliament against the renewal of the EIC’s charter.31  This was the first official 
meeting of the corporation on their petitions to Parliament against the East India Charter.  
In this meeting, two petitions were prepared by the corporation and the trustees, and then a 
committee was nominated to undertake their lobbying.32  The petition of the Trustees of 
the Dock was one of the characteristics of Liverpool’s campaign.  The trustees insisted in 
their petition that after the Liverpool Dock Act had been passed in the previous session 
they had started several works to expand and improve the dock facilities to meet not only 
current need but also to provide for the future requirements of the East India trade.33  On 
the next day, another petition was approved at a meeting of the merchants, ship-owners, 
tradesmen and other inhabitants of the town, which was led by the committee appointed in 
the previous day’s meeting.34  In this petition, they argued that free trade with the East 
Indies and China was ‘the common birth right of all his Majesty’s subjects’ and ‘subject 
only to such general regulations of trade as the policy of this country may require, or as 
may be necessary for maintaining the relation of these realms with foreign state, and 
securing to Government those revenues which may be required for its support.’35  They 
attacked the monopoly of the EIC as ‘highly injurious to the general interests of this at 
large as greatly discouraging the commercial spirit which from the nature and local 
                                               
29 The Parliamentary Debates, Vol. XXI, 6 February 1812, p. 676. 
30 Incoming Correspondence, 1812-1813, Letter No. 1. 
31 Liverpool Town Books (352 MIN/ COU I 2/8, Liverpool Record Office), 16 March 1812. 
32 The members of the committee were Aldermen, Thomas Earle, Henry Blundell Hollinshead, John Bridge 
Aspinall, Peter Whitfield Brancker, Thomas Molyneux, James Drinkwater, Thomas Hinde, Samuel Staniforth, 
Thomas Case, William Nicholson, William Rigg. 
33 Liverpool Town Books, 16 March 1812. 
34 Liverpool Courier, 18 March 1812, p. 3. 
35 Ibid. 
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situation of these Islands, is indispensable to their prosperity, and upon which their security 
at this moment essentially depends.’36 
 
An event during this meeting indicated the desperation of Liverpool’s American traders.  
The proceedings were interrupted by William Roscoe, whose radical views were shared by 
some of the major American traders of the city.37  He and his supporters went to the 
meeting to express to the public their argument against the Ministry’s foreign trade 
policy.38  This clearly reveals the debates within Liverpool itself.  He rejected the view that 
the opening of the East India trade would increase Britain’s resources for war with France.  
He argued that although such a hope seemed possible there were still two years left for the 
expiration of the company’s charter and several more years would be needed for the trade 
to be set up and eventually become fruitful.39  From his and his followers’ viewpoint, the 
East India trade would not be able to provide Britain with enough resources to carry on the 
war; only their trade with the United States could do it. 
 
Furthermore, Roscoe was sceptical of the argument that the abolition of the EIC’s 
monopoly would be a remedy for the depressed economy of the county.  He argued that ‘It 
was not the East India Company that had brought our ruin.  War was the foundation of the 
distress: and it was completed by the Orders in Council.’ 40  Then, he continued his 
argument that ‘it was ridiculous to suppose that the opening of the East India trade would 
remove the present calamities of the nation.  These had no connexion with present subject.’  
His speech was interrupted by the Mayor, who insisted that the purpose of the meeting was 
not to discuss the Orders in Council but the East India trade.  The Corporation were firm 
supporters of the government’s policy on the Napoleonic Wars and resented Roscoe’s 
criticism of the Ministry in the public meeting.  In spite of the Mayor’s interposition, 
Roscoe received praise from some sections of the audience at the meeting.  It was true that 
the depressed trading conditions of Liverpool led its merchants to their movements against 
the renewal of the EIC’s charter.  However, for some of the American merchants and other 
inhabitants of the town their prior political issue was not the East India trade but the 
removal of the Orders, as they did not think the trade to East India and China would be 
able to replace the United States immediately as a supplier of raw materials and market for 
British manufacturing goods.   Nevertheless, regarding their free trade campaign against 
                                               
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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the renewal of the charter, in spite of their different views, there was no actual split 
between those who were in conflict with each other over the issue of the Orders in Council:  
in the long view, the East India and China trade, which had been enjoyed by London 
merchants under the EIC’s monopoly, would also be attractive to them.  
 
Table 5-2. Membership of the committee appointed at the General Meeting held in 
Liverpool on 17 March 1812. 
Name Designation (1811 Directory) West India / American trader 
William Roscoe Banker  
John Gladstone Merchant (John & Robert Gladstone) W. I. (GD 1807) 
Cyrus Morrall Merchant A. (Morral & Boarland) (ACC) 
William Barton Merchant W. I. (GD 1807) 
John Richardson  A. (John Richardson & Co.) (ACC) 
George Irlam Merchant W. I. (GD 1807) 
Richard Pilford Merchant W. I. (GD 1807) 
Thomas Bourne Swedish Consul  
Joseph Leigh Merchant W. I. (GD 1807)  
John Tobin Merchant   
Thomas Fletcher Merchant WI (GD 1810) 
Adam Lodge Merchant A. (Lodge & Tooth) (ACC) 
Anthony Littledale Merchant  
Charles Lawrence Merchant W. I.  (GD 1807) 
Moses Benson Merchant W. I. *1 
Charles Turner Merchant W. I. (GD 1807) 
Joseph Brooks Yates Merchant W. I. *2 
Jacob Fletcher Merchant W. I. (GD 1807) 
Robert Bagott Merchant  
William Ewart Merchant W. I. (GD 1807) 
William Rathbourne Merchant A. (W. & R. Rathbone) (ACC) 
 
Note. ‘W. I.’ = a merchant who was listed in the members of the West India Association.   ‘A.’ = a merchant 
who was listed in the members of the American Chamber of Commerce.  ‘(GD)’= in Gore’s Directories.  
‘(AAC)’= in ‘The American Chamber of Commerce for the Port of Liverpool’.  
Source: Liverpool Courier, 18 March 1812, p. 3.  Gore’s Directories, 1807 and 1810, and W. O. Henderson, 
‘The American Chamber of Commerce for the Port of Liverpool, 1801-1908’ in Transactions of the Historic 
Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, vol. 85, 1985, Appendix A and B.  Gore’s Directories of 1807 and 1810 
contain the lists of the members of the West India Committees and those of the American Chambers of 
Commerce.  
*1 Checkland, ‘American Versus West Indian Traders in Liverpool’, pp. 141-142. 
*2  Parliamentary Papers, Minutes of Evidence before Committee of Whole House of Commons relating to 
Orders in Council 1812, vol. III, p. 375. 
 
At the same meeting, another committee was appointed to lead their free trade campaign.  
Table 5-2 shows the names of the members of the committee, their designations and 
economic interests.  Compared with the committee who had been appointed only from the 
council members on 16 March, this committee reflected the wider economic interests of 
Liverpool’s free trade campaigners more clearly as the members were elected from 
merchants, ship-owners and tradesmen of the city.  Because of the city’s commercial 
orientation, most members were merchants and no person whose main economic interest 
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was manufacturing was included.  The table is incomplete as the economic interests of 
Tobin, Littledale and Bagott are unknown. Nevertheless, it shows that many of the 
members or the companies in which they held stakes, were featured on either the list of the 
members of the Liverpool West India Association or the American Chamber of 
Commerce.  For example, John Gladstone and William Rathbone were prominent figures 
in the West India trade and the American trade respectively, and both of them held the 
office of chairman of each organisation during their lifetime.  Although historians such as 
Checkland and Tolley have explained the collaboration between the West Indian traders 
and the American traders, it is clear that, among 21 members, 12 were West Indian 
merchants and only 4 were American merchants.  In number, the West Indian interests 
clearly overwhelmed the American merchants.  As the debates over the Orders in Council 
showed, the West Indian interests had a mercantilist view:  they supported the state’s 
intervention into trading activities for the national interest.  Their involvement in the 
campaign for the abolition of the EIC was exactly characteristic of ‘the typical Liverpool 
merchant of the last quarter of the eighteenth century [who was represented by the West 
Indian merchant]’ to which Checkland pointed.41  In spite of their mercantilist view, they 
supported free trade in the East Indies for practical reasons rather than their free trade 
beliefs based on Adam Smith’s ideology.  This also indicated the diversity of economic 
and political interests within the provincial lobbyists.  Taking the number of the West 
Indian interests and the American traders’ attitude towards the opening of the East India 
trade in the public meeting of 17 March 1812 into consideration, the core of the Liverpool 
lobbyists was the West Indian merchants and planters. 
 
Thus the Committee of the Common Council and that of the Merchants, Ship-Owners, and 
Tradesmen were set up in Liverpool.  These two committees together formed the United 
Committee, which represented Liverpool’s interests in the opening of the East India and 
China trade.  Thomas Earle, one of the Aldermen, and William Ewart were selected as its 
chairman and deputy-chairman, and J. M. Brackenbury was recruited to fill the post of 
secretary.  The total sum of their campaign funds is not known, but the corporation decided 
that the necessary expenses for the purpose of opening the East India and China trade, up 
to £500, should be met from the Corporation Treasurer’s account.42  The rest of the 
expenses were made up by subscriptions from the public, which were collected at several 
                                               
41 S. G. Checkland, ‘Economic Attitudes in Liverpool 1793-1807’, in The Economic History Review, New 
Series, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1952, p. 58. 
42 Liverpool Town Books, 16 March 1812. 
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banks and the public coffee-rooms throughout the town.43  As Glasgow’s case in the 
previous chapters and Birmingham’s campaigns described by Moss show, Liverpool’s 
lobby was also strongly supported by its local authority. 
 
 
5.5. The proceedings of Liverpool’s movement against the Renewal of the Charter 
 
The mercantile community of Liverpool had clear internal divisions during this period.  
This section explains how the Liverpool lobbying group organised its campaign in spite of 
its differences.  In fact, because of the city’s significant political connection with the centre 
of national politics and other reasons such as its geographical advantage, its lobbying 
group led the national campaign. 
 
In the first week of April, following a call from the Committee of Birmingham, John 
Gladstone, the member of the Liverpool West India Association, was sent to London as a 
deputation from Liverpool.  He was later joined by John Bourne, who was then Mayor, in 
order to form the General Deputation with deputies from other outports and manufacturing 
towns.44  The deputies from Liverpool attended several meetings with other deputies and 
the Ministry. The three petitions from the Liverpool Corporation, the Trustees of the Dock, 
and its merchants, ship-owners and other inhabitants were presented to the House of 
Commons by General Tarleton, MP for the city, on 23 March.45  During the presentation of 
these petitions, he had a heated discussion with Thomas Creevey, a Liverpool-born radical 
Whig, and other members over the economic condition of Liverpool.  Tarleton had claimed 
that Creevey had overstated the number of people who were receiving charitable aid: the 
Whig man had previously stated that the number of such people increased from 8,000 to 
15,000.46  As has already been noted, the Liverpool Mercury claimed a similar number, 
near 16,000 people.  Creevey blamed this economic condition of Liverpool on the 
standstill of the American trade.  General Tarleton put a counter-argument by quoting the 
report which was understood to have been issued by the Corporation of the city.  He 
insisted that, although a number of Irish and Welsh workers who had worked for the 
construction of the dock were out of employment, no more than 3000 to 4000 people 
received aid from a soup committee for their relief.47   After their argument, General 
                                               
43 Liverpool Courier, 1 April 1812.  
44 Ibid. 
45 The Parliamentary Debates, Vol. XXII, 23 March 1813, pp. 111-118. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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Gascoyne, another Tory MP for Liverpool, stated that he would take a middle position.  He 
took it for granted that the diminution of the trade with America led to the downturn of 
Liverpool’s economy, but believed that it would be temporary.48  He believed that the 
depression of the colonial trade was the real problem in the distress of Liverpool.49  
Alexander Baring, who represented the London interests and was against the Orders in 
Council, thought the actual state of the town’s distress was distorted by the Liverpool 
Corporation, which were firm advocates of the Ministry’s policy: 
 
Mr. Baring was not disposed to place much reliance on the statement ready by the 
hon. General [Tarleton]; for it was known, that in all the petty corporate towns of the 
kingdom, the mayor and corporation were always eager, and mostly interested in 
supporting the measures of the ministers of the day, and were ready to proclaim them 
as the best possible for the interests of the country.  But he could not help remarking, 
the great injury that must result from misrepresentations of topics of this nature, and 
from states of the flourishing state of our commerce, when the fact was notoriously 
the reverse.50 
 
Their exchange of hot words over Liverpool’s economic condition in the presentation of 
petition for the abolition of the EIC’s monopoly was another example of the division of 
Liverpool community over the issue on the Orders in Council. 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of the disagreement among Liverpool merchants over the 
government’s policy related to Britain’s counter-blockade against France, the campaign of 
Liverpool merchants against the renewal of the charter was very active.  London 
merchants, traders and others held a meeting at the City of London on 23 April and passed 
their resolutions for the confinement of the East India trade to the port of London.   The 
United Committee of Liverpool immediately held a meeting on 27 April and expressed 
their ‘extreme surprise’ at the London movement.  Their resolutions were published in all 
local newspapers.51  The merchants, ship-owners and manufacturers of London had two 
main arguments.  The first point was that the opening of the East India and China trade to 
the outports would damage a number of London merchants, ship-owners, manufacturers 
and others who were currently engaged in the East India trade under the privileged position 
of the Port of London.  Second, the extension of the East India trade to the outports would 
not be able to secure the revenues because of the lack of suitable facilities at these ports.  
The Liverpool Committee refuted these claims.  First, as they argued in their petitions, 
                                               
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 23 March 1812, pp. 114-115. 
51 Liverpool Courier, 29 April 1812. 
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their demand for free access to the East Indies was grounded on the birth right of all British 
subjects, and all restrictions should be imposed on them on equal terms.52  They claimed 
that ‘to debar any portion of them from carrying on trade with the same facilities and 
advantages as their fellow subjects, or deprive certain places of the right of trade, in order 
to confer it on other places, would be a new and dangerous innovation on the Constitution 
and Law of the Land.’53  Then, in respect of the custom revenues, they insisted that ‘… it 
has, without monopolies or partial advantages, established a commerce which returns a 
very large proportion of the general revenues of the Majesty… such revenues are as 
faithfully paid as duly collected and accounted for in the port of Liverpool as in that of the 
Metropolis’.54  They thought that Liverpool, as one of the major ports of the country, had 
long-time experience of overseas trade with English colonies and foreign countries, not 
only with European countries and the United States, but also such tropical areas as the 
West African coast and the West Indies, and their experience of overseas trade and the 
advanced facilities of its port could guarantee the customs revenues to be secured after the 
opening of the trade with the East.  Although as described in Chapter 3, a part of the 
London merchants composing a part of the gentlemanly capitalists supported to a partial 
relaxation of the East India trade, the London mercantile community had a general 
consensus about the maintaining of its dominant position in the East India trade.  The 
Liverpool lobbyists’ immediate response to the claim of the London interests indicated 
their strong rivalry against them in the competition for the position of Britain’s leading port 
and their serious engagement in the debates over the renewal of the charter. 
  
After the General Deputation in London was informed that the Ministry had no intention of 
bringing the subject of the renewal of the company’s charter before Parliament in that 
session, the deputation was dissolved after their meeting of 11 May.   In this meeting, the 
General Deputation requested the United Committee of Liverpool to take over their roles 
until their reassembly during the next session of Parliament.55  The resolution referred to a 
geographical advantage that Liverpool was a ‘Town from its central situation being best 
adapted’ for the purpose of correspondence with the parties of London and provincial 
manufacturing towns and outports which were concerned with the renewal of the charter.56  
However, there were other reasons.  The first reason is that, as has been described above, 
Liverpool was deeply connected with the major industrial areas of Britain.  To say nothing 
                                               
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 24 June 1812. 
56 Ibid. 
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of such neighbours as Manchester and other Lancashire manufacturing towns, even 
Birmingham’s economy was deeply connected with the town.  With its own merchants and 
ship-owners’ desire to share the East India trade with their London rivals, it was expected 
that the Liverpool Committee would be able to execute their duties in the wider aspects of 
the renewal of the Charter.  Secondly, the town had a strong political and economic 
connection with London.  In fact, according to Checkland, Liverpool’s overcoming of a 
series of liquidity crises in the 1790s was partly attributed to its close connection with the 
Bank of England and the Treasury.57  In addition, in the meeting, J. M. Brackenbury, an 
agent to the American Chamber of Commerce of Liverpool and others, who had acted as 
the Secretary General to the General Deputation, was also requested to continue his role.58  
In consequence, Liverpool was presented as in the best position to know the opinions of all 
parties involved in this question.  Indeed the Liverpool Committee was granted a power to 
request that all provincial towns and outports obtain consent from it before translating their 
ideas into action, whilst the Liverpool lobbyists could communicate with the Ministry 
whenever they thought it was proper.59  Accordingly, the Liverpool Committee obtained 
the leadership in the free trade movement, despite the clear split in the Liverpool 
membership. 
 
Before their lobbying for free trade resumed, another important event happened in 
Liverpool.  When Parliament was dissolved in September, John Gladstone and other West 
India interests brought George Canning to the city as a candidate.  Canning was a very able 
politician with his oratorical skills, and became the Prime Minister in his later life.60  He 
had been the Foreign Secretary in the Ministry of Duke of Portland till he resigned over a 
duel with Lord Castlereagh in 1809.  He also had a long-term personal relationship with 
Lord Liverpool, the Prime Minister at that time, since studying together at Oxford.61  He 
and General Gascoyne, both Tory candidates, defeated Brougham and Creevy, the Whig 
opposition.  Because of their total defeat, the Whig supporters in the city became more 
determined in their opposition.  For instance, for the purpose of lobbying Parliament more 
effectively for Liverpool merchants’ commercial interests, in the same year, they set up the 
Liverpool office in London.62  To maintain the office, such commercial interest groups of 
                                               
57 Ibid., pp. 147-148.  In 1793, Liverpool merchants succeeded in petitioning Parliament for the Act to entitle 
the Liverpool Corporation to issue their own notes, whilst in the crisis of 1795 and 1799, loans of Exchequer 
bills were made to Liverpool’s West India interests. 
58 Liverpool Courier, 24 June 1812. 
59 Ibid. 
60 For his biographical information, see W. Hide, George Canning, 1973. 
61 Ibid., p. 17.   
62 Checkland, The Gladstones, p. 73. 
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Liverpool as the West India Association, the ship-owners and the Baltic Association 
decided to subscribe.  The American traders refused to do so for political reasons.63  
Nevertheless, in terms of the debates on the renewal of the EIC’s charter, the city acquired 
Canning as a powerful and able spokesman in Parliament for their campaign. 
 
Little is known about the activities of the United Committee of Liverpool till November 
1812.  The correspondence between Liverpool and other towns suggests that they took few 
actions during the period.  The Records of the GEIA do not contain any correspondence of 
this period between Glasgow and Liverpool except one letter regarding the General 
Deputation’s records on the West India produce.64  This is probably because of the 
Ministry’s decision on the postponement of the debates on the renewal of the charter in 
Parliament till the next session and the dissolution of Parliament and the General Election 
in autumn.  Moreover, the Bristol Committee criticised the Liverpool Committee for their 
‘inactivity’ and John Gladstone and George Canning were personally condemned by their 
political rivals in the city.  John Loudon MacAdam of Bristol told Gladstone that: 
 
All our efforts however are paralyzed by the inactivity of the central Committee of 
Liverpool from whom we have had no communication since the separation of the 
Deputies and whose silence has occasioned some speculation here- This has been 
increased by the reports most industriously propagated by your political opponents at 
Liverpool and eagerly disseminated here by their partisans, that you and Mr. Canning 
had made the oppositions to the E. I. monopoly stalking horse of your ambition and 
that, having succeeded in carrying Mr. Canning’s election, you and he have left the 
best interests of the Country to be made a property of by ministers and the East India 
Directors who they say are busily employed in  the discussion of Patronage and the 
other valuable spoil.65 
 
This indicated the continuity of political division in the city after the General Election.  
However, the United Committee of Liverpool became more active in December 1812.  
Immediately after the receipt of the above criticism, the United Committee of Liverpool 
exercised its leadership in preparing for the provincial lobbyists’ new campaign.  The 
committee circulated letters to other towns and outports in order to instruct them to prepare 
new petitions to Parliament as they regarded it proper to do so after the general election.  
The letter reminded these activists of the necessity of sending their deputation to London.66   
 
                                               
63 Ibid. 
64 Glasgow East India Association Outgoing Correspondence, 1812-1814, 24 November 1812, letter no. 29. 
65 S. G. Checkland, The Gladstones, pp. 71-72, and a letter from John Loudon MacAdam to John Gladstone, 
4 December 1812 (Glynne-Gladstone MSS 288, Flintshire Record Office). 
66 Add. MSS. 38410 Liverpool Papers, f.183-184, dated 1 January 1812. 
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After the general election, George Canning had influence on the measures which the 
Liverpool Committee adopted during their renewed campaign.  In late December, Canning 
suggested to them the necessity of sending a memorial to Lord Liverpool.67  Prior to the 
General Court of the EIC that would be held on 5 January 1813, where they expected some 
communication from the Ministry would be submitted, they accepted Canning’s advice and 
asked him to transmit their letter and his personal observations to Lord Liverpool.68  In this 
letter, they expressed their desire that the trade to both India and China should be opened, 
and also insisted that, in respect of the China trade, if they were given an opportunity, they 
could prove the secure collection of the custom revenues.69   
 
In the General Court of the EIC, it became clear that the Ministry desired that the India 
trade would be opened to the major ports of the country: London, Liverpool, Bristol, Hull, 
Glasgow, Dublin and Cork.  The China trade would remain in the hands of the company.70  
As has been described in Chapter 3, the priority of the provincial lobbyist groups was to 
gain the opening of the import trade to the outports, and their success in their lobbying for 
this purpose became obvious.  As he knew the Ministry’s intention, Canning started 
thinking that the free-trade-supporters would need to compromise on the part of the China 
trade.  John Foster secretly communicated his intention to John Gladstone.  He stated that: 
 
There are three great parties in Parliament upon this question, viz. the Majesty, the 
East India Company, and the friends to the Outports and an open trade, and it was 
clear to him that any two of these parties uniting would beat the other.- That it was 
pretty certain Ministers were not prepared at present to concede on open Trade to 
China, and it was quite certain the East India Company would join the Ministers on 
this question, and according to his decided opinion these two parties would carry that 
point. It therefore become a matter of prudence to consider whether it was expedient 
for the Outports to contend for the China Trade but to rest satisfied at present with 
accepting what was proposed by Ministers rather than take any hostile line of conduct 
which might possibly produce the effect of being serviceable to those who under any 
circumstances wised to confine the Trade excluding to the Port of London-71  
 
In fact, he personally thought that the company’s monopoly in the China trade should not 
be abandoned: 
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 As to the China trade, it had been said that it was necessary to the support of the 
government of India, but it remained to proved, even if pecuniary aid were necessary, 
that it should be derived from this branch of trade, and not from some other source… 
He [Canning] did not wish that the trade should open at present…72 
 
Checkland explained that ‘This advice was accepted: the China trade was abandoned and 
all efforts concentrated upon India.’73  Taking the result of debates on the East India 
Charter during this period into consideration, Canning gave sensible advice to the 
provincial lobbyists.  However, on this issue, they rejected his view.  As explained in 
Chapter 3, it is correct that the provincial lobbyists focused on the opening of the India 
trade more than the China trade in their lobbying campaign.  However, they did not give up 
their lobby for the China trade at this point.  Although the Ministry showed their clear 
intention on the renewal of the company’s monopoly in the China trade, public opinion in 
Liverpool and other manufacturing towns and outports continued to insist on the abolition 
of the company’s monopoly in this branch of trade.  In the middle of February, three new 
petitions by the Corporation, the Trustees of the Dock and the merchants and others were 
again prepared and submitted to Parliament.  The London correspondents of the Liverpool 
Courier also emphasised disadvantages of the EIC’s monopoly under pseudonyms, 
MERCATOR and AMICUS referring to the common arguments of free-trade supporters.74   
 
In spite of these attempts to stir up public opinion and lobby for the opening of the China 
trade, they failed to persuade the Ministry to change their mind, which became much 
clearer when the General Deputation in London held a meeting with the Ministry on 22 
February.75  Although Canning personally did not agree with the opening of the China 
trade, he supported the provincial lobbyists’ efforts for the opening of this trade.  In 
Parliament, after the introduction to the Bill for the renewal of the East India Charter, 
Canning and Ponsonby made attempts to win some last concessions in respect of the China 
trade.  On 14 June, Ponsonby moved an amendment of the Bill for reducing the term of the 
charter from twenty years to ten years.76  After his amendment was rejected, the House 
divided again on Canning’s motion to limit the monopoly of China trade to 10 years.  
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When their attempt failed, the free trade supporters of outports and manufacturing towns 
needed to be satisfied with their access to the East from which the China trade was to be 
excluded.  
 
Although the issue on the China trade was settled, Canning continued to defend Liverpool 
and other provincial interests in Parliament.  At the end of the debates on the renewal of 
the charter in Parliament, on 14 June, in the House of Commons, Alexander Baring, who 
represented the London mercantile interests, made an attempt to limit the import trade to 
the port of London.  In the debates, he argued: 
 
He thought it much better that the proposed alteration in the trade as it present existed, 
should be effected gradually, and to this end he conceived the best course to pursue, 
in the first instance, would be, at the same time that vessels were allowed every port 
of the empire to India, that in their return they should be confined to the port of 
London.77 
 
On the one hand, some members connected to the company and the gentlemanly capitalists 
in London, such as Pascoe Grenfell and Charles Grant, Senior, supported his amendment.78   
On the other hand, Canning strongly objected to his amendment together with Finlay and 
other members:  He argued that: 
 
If the amendment were adopted, its direct operation would be to pronounce trade to 
be synonymous with the prosperity of London only.  The out-ports would be doomed 
to wait like hand-maids upon the metropolis, and to receive, if he might use the 
expression, her cast off cloths as the gift of her bounty… It was not right that London 
should be allowed to prosper at the expense of the other ports of kingdom…79 
 
Canning showed his ability as a very able orator in this debates.  Regarding Canning’s 
speech, Bargen commented in his rhetorical analysis that: 
 
His use of sarcasm as a mode of persuasion was most effective.  He demonstrated an 
ability to cut through the various rationalizations presented on behalf of the Company, 
praising its patriotism and solicitude.  Canning’s speech was an outstanding example 
of nineteenth century parliament debating.’80  
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Furthermore, as other members supported the original bill, eventually, Baring’s 
amendment was rejected. 
 
Regarding Canning’s role in the provincial lobbying campaign, neither did he have a 
personal influence to reverse the Ministry’s decisions in Parliament, nor such a decisive 
influence on the provincial interest group’s lobbying strategies as Checkland described.  
Nevertheless, through him the provincial lobbyists were able to obtain precise information 
on the course of negotiation between the Ministry and the EIC as well as debates on the 
East India charter in Parliament.  After the introduction of the East India Bill, he acted as 
an effective orator and defended the provincial lobbyists’ interests from MPs who 
represented the company and other London gentlemanly capitalists’ interests, although his 
personal view on the China trade was different from his constituents.  It can be said that his 
significant role in the provincial free trade campaign was symbolised by the name of ship, 
the ‘George Canning’, which Kirkman Finlay sent to Calcutta after the first ship, the ‘Earl 
of Buckinghamshire’ for the direct trade from the Clyde to India, as described in Chapter 3.   
 
 
5.6. Liverpool and the Liverpool East India Association before 1829 
 
After the partial opening of the East India trade in 1814, merchants in Liverpool lost no 
time entering this trade.  Table 5-3 shows the number and the total tonnage of vessels that 
cleared from Liverpool for the East Indies during the period between 21 July 1813 and 9 
June 1818.  The figures indicate the initial expansion of Liverpool’s trade with the East 
Indies.  It is well known that the first ship sent from the port of Liverpool to the East was 
the ‘Kingsmill’ owned by J. Gladstone & Grant in 1814.  However, this was the only 
vessel sent from Liverpool to the East Indies in that year.   In 1815, Gladstone’s vessel was 
followed by another ship jointly owned by Cropper, Benson & Co. and Rathbone, 
Hodgeson & Co.  The following years saw the real expansion of the trade: the number of 
vessels increased from 2 in 1815 to 34 in 1817, and the total tonnage from 808 tons to 
13,925 tons.  Although the table shows the first half year of 1818 only and does not count 
the second half, the tonnage of this year already exceeded the level of the previous year.  In 
spite of the exclusion of private merchants from the China and tea trade, the Liverpool 
merchants’ involvement in the East India trade showed their initial success after the 
abolition of the slave trade in 1807, which had created uncertainty about the future of the 
West India trade, in which many Liverpool merchants held large stakes. 
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Table 5-3. The number and the total tonnage of vessels that cleared from Liverpool 
for the East Indies between 21 July 1813 and 9 June 1818. 
 No. of vessels Total tonnage 
1814 1 (0) 512       (0) 
1815 2 (0) 808       (0) 
1816 17 (1) 7410   (376) 
1817 34 (5) 13925 (1827) 
1818 33 (1) 14100   (453) 
Total 87 (7) 36755  (2656) 
 
Note: The figures include American vessels which cleared out from Liverpool, and their number and total 
tonnage are shown in the brackets.  Most of these American ships were owned by Liverpool merchants, such 
as Humberstone & Co., W. & J. Brown and Rathbone & Co. The 33 vessels in 1818 include 7 vessels which 
entered for loading, but not cleared out at the point of the publication of this data. 
Source: Gore’s Directory 1818, pp. 140-141. 
 
The East India interests in Liverpool were represented by the Liverpool East India 
Association (LEIA), whose name was changed to the Liverpool East India and China 
Association after the opening of the China trade.  The records of the Glasgow Association 
noted that ‘the Association in Liverpool has existed for many years, while this Association, 
is but yet in its infancy.’81  However, it is not clear whether this association had continued 
since the last free trade movement against the renewal of the EIC’s charter, or if it was re-
established after a short interval.  Webster’s latest study mentions that the LEIA had 
continuously existed since 1813, but K. Charlton’s earlier study stated that the association 
was established in 1818.82  Both scholars fail to specify the source of the evidence.  
However, major Liverpool associations and institutions during this period were recorded in 
the series of Gore’s Directory.  Other major associations of the town’s commercial 
interests, such as the Liverpool West India Association and the American Chamber of 
Commerce, appeared in the directories of the earlier years, but the LEIA was recorded only 
after 1818.83  There is no evidence of the existence of the Liverpool Association between 
1813 and 1817.  Therefore, it is probable that the Liverpool Committee was organised in 
1812, discontinued after the renewal of the company’s charter in 1814 and after a short 
interval, the LEIA was established in 1818 with John Gladstone as chairman.84   
 
                                               
81 MS 891001/2 Committee Minutes of the Glasgow East India Association, Special Meeting 23 March 1830, 
p. 37. 
82 A. Webster, ‘Liverpool and the Eastern Trade 1800-1850: A Paper for the CLAMS Conference on 
Liverpool and Empire’, 2006, p. 9 and K. Charlton, ‘Liverpool and the East India Trade’ in Northern History, 
Vol. vii, 1972, p. 56. 
83 Gore’s Directory, 1818. 
84 Ibid. 
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The early 1820s was a period when the LEIA had been very active before the real debates 
of the renewal of the company’s charter began in 1829.  The association pointed out that 
the following problems remained after the partial opening of the East India trade in 1814: 
 
(1) The restriction as to tonnage.   
(2) The restriction of British ships to certain ports. 
(3) The system of licensing, both as to ships and persons. 
(4) The restriction which prevents British merchants from trading between China and 
the European continent. 
(5) The restrictions imposed upon the importation of sugar into this country from the 
East Indies.85 
 
These points became agendas in Parliamentary debates, and a Select Committee was set up 
in order to examine the means of extending and securing foreign trade during the sessions 
1820-1821.86  A major gain for the free trade supporters during this period was the removal 
of the restriction on the tonnage of ships trading to the East Indies in 1823.  The EIC’s 
charter of 1813 had restricted the tonnage of British ships engaged in the trade between 
Europe and India to over 350 tons, but the size of ships owned in Liverpool did not 
normally exceed 200 tons.  As explained in Chapter 4,the provincial merchants also needed 
to spend time to establish their new trading networks in order to enter the East India trade 
after 1814.  Nevertheless, the size of ships was also one reason why only a few ships could 
proceed to the East Indies in the couple of years immediately after the relaxation of 
restrictions on the East India trade in 1814.  However, the British trade with the western 
coast of South America and the success of the American merchants in the East Indies and 
China showed the capability of smaller ships for long distance overseas trade.87  Moreover, 
they insisted that the smaller vessels availed themselves of more trading opportunities, and 
that although they tended to need comparatively greater expense they had the advantage of 
quicker and more flexible operations than larger vessels.88  An argument that smaller size 
of vessels ‘might be exposed to frequent depredation from pirates’ was refuted by the 
experience of the American merchants and by the fact that there was no difference in 
                                               
85 Report of a Committee of the Liverpool East India Association, appointed to take into consideration the 
Restrictions on the East India Trade, 1822, pp. 3-4. 
86 Parliamentary Papers, Report [Relative to the Trade with the East Indies and China] from the Select 
Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Means of Extending and Securing the Foreign Trade of the Country, 
and to report to the House, 1821. 
87 Ibid., pp. 4-5 and  Report of a Committee of the Liverpool East India Association, 1822, pp. 6-7. 
88 Ibid. 
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insurance rates between large and small vessels.89  As a result, the Select Committee 
admitted the inexpediency of the restriction upon the tonnage of vessels engaged in the 
East India trade with its recommendation for direct and circuitous trade ‘between any Ports 
within the limits of the EIC’s charter (except the dominion of the Emperor of China) and 
any Port or Ports beyond the limits of the said Charter, belonging to any State or Countries 
in amity with His Majesty’.90  
 
While the removal of the restriction on the tonnage of vessels was achieved, their 
campaign, in collaboration with other manufacturing towns such as Manchester, against 
the discriminatory duties on East India sugar in favour of West India produce, encountered 
greater difficulties as they needed to get over the very influential lobbying of the West 
Indian interests in London and other places of the U.K. including Liverpool itself.  The 
debates within Liverpool’s business community over the equalisation of the sugar duties 
were far more active than Glasgow.  It seems apparent that this difference derived from the 
fact that in Liverpool both the West Indian and the East Indian traders had their own 
associations which could represent their own interests.  In contrast, in Glasgow, while the 
West Indian interests organised a strong lobbying group, the East Indian interests did not 
have a means to express their views till the end of the 1820s. 
 
Although the Report of the LEIA of 1822 explained the above five points, the argument 
about the restrictions imposed on the import of East India sugar occupied the largest part of 
the pamphlet.  When the India trade was opened in 1814, the protecting duty of 10s per 
cwt. on East India sugar was established in favour of West India sugar.91  Moreover, the 
former was allowed to sell only in the U.K.  The latter was free to be sold in any part of the 
world.  In 1821, the West Indian interests tried to increase the protective duty by an 
additional 5s on clayed sugar and its equivalents.92    From the West India interests’ 
viewpoint, it was argued that the West India sugar should be protected from the 
competition of the East India sugar because the latter could be produced at lower cost than 
the former, and it was claimed that the equalisation of the duties would ‘ruin’ the West 
Indian planters, who had been suffering from the depression for some time past.93  For 
                                               
89 Report from the Select Committee on the Foreign trade, 1821, p. 4. 
90 Parliamentary Papers, Second Report from the Select Committee Appointed to Consider of the Means of the 
Improving and Maintaining the Foreign Trade of the Country, 1821, p. 4, and Third Report from the Select 
Committee Appointed to Consider of the Means of Improving and Maintaining the Foreign Trade of the 
Country, 1821, p. 208. 
91 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
92 Ibid. and Charlton ‘Liverpool and the East India Trade’, pp. 56-57. 
93 See the addresses of such opponents as C. Ellis and W. Huskisson against Whitmore’s motion for the 
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instance, William Huskisson, who was one of the MPs for Liverpool and represented the 
interests of the West Indian merchants and planters although he was a principal advocate of 
the policy of free trade during the 1820s, insisted that ‘if it was true that the production of 
slavery was more costly than that of free labour, that would be additional reason for not 
depriving him of the advantage of his protecting duty.’94  The report of the LEIA 
condemned this protection because the public were forced to pay higher prices than they 
would under free competition while the West Indian interests obtained the tax 
concessions.95  In fact, the association’s arguments were largely put forwarded by James 
Cropper, one of the most successful merchants in Liverpool and an advocate of the anti-
slavery movement.  He linked the question of West and East India sugar with that of 
slavery although the LEIA tended to avoid entering debates on slavery.96  During the 1820s 
and 1830s, he published several pamphlets in which he criticised the preferential 
treatments of West Indian planters and refiners, arguing that it actually encouraged their 
unhealthy and inefficient management.97  In his view, without the preferential treatments, 
the West India sugar which was produced under the inefficient slavery system could not 
compete with the East India sugar produced by ‘free men’.98  Moreover, as the reduction of 
duties on the East India sugar would increase production in the East Indies and the 
consumption of sugar at home, it consequently would not affect the King’s revenue.99  On 
the other hand, Thomas Fletcher, the member and the former chairman of the Liverpool 
West India Association, justified the advantages given to the West India sugar on the basis 
that the plantation systems and the sugar trade had been developed under the several trade 
restrictions.   He argued that ‘the colonialists have a right to their bargain, that is the 
exclusive supply of the British Dominions with sugar’ and also that ‘there is an urgent 
necessity to do something for the relief of the unfortunate proprietors of the sugar estates in 
our colonies’.100  In this debate, John Gladstone, who held stakes in both the West and East 
Indies, failed to reconcile these competing interests.  In a comparison between Gladstone 
and Cropper, Charlton summarised their arguments on the equalisation of sugar duties and 
                                                                                                                                              
appointment of the Select Committee on the duties on East Indian and East Indian sugars in The 
Parliamentary Debates, New Series, Vol. IX, 1824, pp. 444-467. 
94 Ibid., pp. 464-465. 
95 Report of a Committee of the Liverpool East India Association, 1822, pp. 17-58, and Charlton, ‘Liverpool 
and The East India Trade’, p. 58. 
96 Ibid., p. 56-58, and K. Charlton, ‘James Cropper and Liverpool’s Contribution to the Anti-Slavery 
Movement’ in Transaction of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, 1971, vol. 123, p. 59. 
97 J. Cropper, Relief for West Indian Distress shewing the Inefficienty of protecting duties on East-India 
Sugar, 1823. (London: Ellerton and Henderson). 
98 Charlton, ‘Liverpool and the East India Trade’, p. 56.    
99 Ibid., p. 58. 
100 Ibid, pp. 58-59.  He originally quoted it from Thomas Fletcher, Letter in Vindication of the Right of British 
West Indian Colonies… in Answer to Mr. James Cropper’s Letter to William Wilberforce Esq., M. P. 
(Liverpool, for the West India Association, 1829).  
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the abolition of slavery that ‘Cropper’s maintain throughout a cool style of argument, 
insisting always on the need for a public debate to be based on information and enquiry.  
Gladstone’s, on the other had, are full of minor debating points…’101  Gladstone supported 
the equalisation of the sugar duties on behalf of the East Indian interest, while he also 
defended the plantation system and slavery for the West India interest.102   
 
The equalisation of duties between West India sugar and East India sugar was not directly 
related to the renewal of the East India Company’s charter.  Nevertheless a bottleneck of 
the East India trade was the shortage of product for return cargoes to the U.K.  Under the 
condition in which the tea trade was still restricted to the company, sugar was one of the 
most promising agricultural products from the East which could solve this problem, along 
with indigo and raw cotton.  The removal of the restrictions on East India sugar was 
significant for private merchants as they needed products to fill up the holds of their 
inward vessels.  At the same time, although provincial manufacturers were not directly 
connected to the imports of sugar, they also had interests in this commodity because they 
needed the goods payable in exchange for their manufacturing products exported to the 
East.  However, during the 1820s, facing the strong West Indian interests, the LEIA and 
other East India interests around the country failed to achieve the equalisation of duties 
between the West and East India sugars.   
 
Consequently, before the debates over the renewal of the company’s charter started in the 
late 1820s, Liverpool’s East Indian interests had already led the free trade movements 
against some restrictions imposed on the East India trade.  This was because their lobbying 
association existed from the 1810s and Liverpool’s East Indian interests could organise 
their lobbying activities under it although it seems that there had been a short interval after 
the opening of the India trade until 1818.  Liverpool’s active lobbying during the 1820s 
was quite a contrast to the inactivity of Glasgow’s East Indian interests.  During this period, 
such liberalisation of the East India trade as the removal of the limitation of tonnage of 
British vessels in this trade and the legalisation of the direct and circuitous trade were 
achieved successfully, whilst facing the strong West Indian interests, the campaign led by 
James Cropper for the equalisation of sugar duties failed.  Nevertheless, as will be 
described below, their long experience of lobbying activities allowed themselves to lead 
the free trade movement against the renewal of the EIC’s charter between 1829 and 1833. 
 
                                               
101 Charlton, ‘Liverpool and The East India Trade’, p. 61 
102 Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
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5.7. The LEIA and the beginning of the debates over the renewal of the EIC’s 
charter 
 
As early as August 1827, the disadvantages of the renewal of the company’s charter were 
argued in Liverpool’s local newspaper, and the LEIA published their new report in 
1828.103  It was their first report since 1822 as they thought it was a proper time to warn the 
public of the approaching renewal of the company’s charter.  However, its campaign really 
started in early1829 with the arrival of J. S. Buckingham and a series of his lectures as a 
part of his national tour, and a public meeting organised by the LEIA.104  Philips and Eyles 
stressed that he was warmly welcomed by the public of Liverpool as in many other 
provincial towns and outports.105  His relationship with the Liverpool Association seems to 
have been better than that with the Glasgow Association.  On the one hand, in Glasgow, as 
has been described in Chapter 4, the GEIA did not support him, although individual 
merchants and manufacturers did and his lectures were very popular in the town.  
Moreover, there were differences in their opinions over the administrative system in India, 
and some members, notably Kirkman Finlay, did not regard him highly.  On the other 
hand, in Liverpool, Buckingham’s lectures were attended by the prominent figures of 
Liverpool’s free trade movement, such as Nicholas Robinson, the Mayor, and James 
Cropper, and the details of his lectures and views were reported to the citizens of Liverpool 
extensively in the Liverpool Mercury.106  In addition, the LEIA in 1830 subscribed to a 
fund to support Buckingham’s plan to voyage round the globe by the route of the East 
Indies.107  He showed his appreciation of this support from Liverpool merchants by 
donating £100 raised from his lectures to James Cropper, John Ewart and William 
Rathbone, leading Liverpool merchants, for the purpose of promoting free trade.108 
 
A series of Buckingham’s lectures inspired the enthusiasm of people in Liverpool for the 
opening of the East India trade.  His lectures were an ideal prologue for the public meeting 
on 28 January called by the Mayor, who responded to the request from ‘one hundred sixty 
of the most influential persons connected with the trade of the port’ for ‘the purpose of 
                                               
103 The Liverpool East India Association, Report of the Committee of the Liverpool East India Association, on 
the subject of the trade with India: presented to the Association at a general meeting, 21st March, 1828, 1828 
104 Liverpool Mercury, 3 August 1827. 
105 Philips, The East India Company, p. 289, Eyles, ‘The Abolition of the East India Company’s Monopoly’, 
pp. 198-199. 
106 Liverpool Mercury., 2, 16 and 23 January 1829. 
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taking into consideration of the best means of removing the restrictions imposed upon 
commerce by the present charter of the East India Company’.109  It seems that the members 
of the LEIA played a major role in organising this meeting, which was led by the two most 
influential figures in the mercantile society of Liverpool, John Gladstone and James 
Cropper.  The resolutions were introduced to the public by these two and other major 
merchants of Liverpool, including William Rathbone, William Ewart, Henry Booth, 
William W. Currie, J. T. Alston, Robert Benson, Thomas Brocklebank and Samuel Hope.   
 
Apart from the aspect of the moral improvement of natives by the free residence of British 
subjects, Liverpool merchants confined their arguments to the commercial aspects of the 
renewal of the company’s charter and did not intervene in the debates on the administrative 
mode in India.  Their ultimate aims in this campaign were the opening of free trade to 
China and the abolition of unnecessary restrictions imposed on the commercial activities of 
British merchants in the India trade.  Liverpool merchants believed that the opening of the 
China trade would lead to a great extension of markets for British manufactured products.   
However, the restrictions imposed on British subjects by the charter prevented British 
manufacturing goods from being exported to the East.  During the public meeting, Cropper 
pointed out that the import of raw cotton to Liverpool increased by 100 per cent in ten 
years while the export of plain calicoes to the East increased 93 per cent in thirty years.110   
They believed that there was a large demand for cotton manufacturing pieces from the 
huge populations of both India and China.  The opening of the China trade would give a 
new opportunity to provincial manufacturers to increase the export of their products from 
England, which could extend employment in manufacturing industry and consequently 
increase tea consumption in Britain.  In addition, Henry Booth introduced Cropper’s view 
that the further relaxation of the East India and China trade would improve employment 
and income in the poor economic condition of Ireland.111   
 
                                               
109 The Liverpool East India Association, Report of the public meeting at Liverpool on Wednesday, January 
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110 Liverpool Mercury, 30 January 1829. 
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Table 5-4. The Comparative Prices of English and Dutch teas in 1772 and 1827. 
  
London prices. 
1779 
Dutch prices. 
1772 
London Prices. 
1827 
Dutch prices. 
1827 
Bohea 1s. 10 1/4d. 2s. 0 8/15d. 1s.  7d. 0s. 5 2/5d. 
Congou 3s.   0 1/4d. 3s. 7 7/8d. 2s. 5 8/10d. 1s. 0 9/10d. 
Hyson 7s.   0 3/4d. 6s. 8 11/16d. 4s.11d. 2s. 7 1/8d. 
Average 4s.   0 3/4d. 4s. 1 11/16d. 2s.11 9/16d. 1s. 4 47/100d. 
Source: The Liverpool East India Association, Report of the Committee of the Liverpool East India 
Association, on the subject of the trade with India: presented to the Association at a general meeting, 21st 
March, 1828, 1828. 
 
Nevertheless, in terms of the China trade, the most significant point for the merchants of 
Liverpool was the opening of the tea trade.  In the report of the LEIA of 1828, the subject 
had been exclusively argued, and then it was quoted at the public meeting again.112  
Entering the most profitable branch of the East India and China trade was a long-term 
desire of Liverpool traders.  In 1828, an attempt to enter the tea trade was made by 
pointing out the difference in the price of tea in the U.K. and the European continent.  
Under the Parliamentary Act of 1745, the company was obliged ‘to keep the price of tea in 
this kingdom, upon an equality with the price thereof in other neighbouring countries of 
Europe, and if the EIC ‘shall, at any time, neglect to keep this market supplied with a 
sufficient quantity of tea, at reasonable prices, to answer to the consumption thereof in 
Great Britain’, the Lord Commissioner of Treasury had a power to issue licences to 
individual merchants to import tea from the European continent.113  In the 1770s, there was 
little difference between the London prices of tea and the Dutch prices as Table 5-4 shows.   
However, by 1827, the difference in price was noticeable:  In spite of the Commutation 
Act of 1784 prices of the Company’s tea fell by only 25 per cent, whilst Dutch tea prices 
fell by about 66 per cent.  According to those provisions, in 1824 the merchants of 
Liverpool made an application to the Treasury to import tea from the European 
continent.114  However it was rejected by Walpole, who claimed in his reply that the 
provisions had been repealed by the Customs Consolidation Act of 1825, and that other 
acts expressly banned the importation of tea, except from the place where the product was 
grown and imported by the company to the port of London.115  At the public meeting, 
Robert Benson expressed his wish that the government would restore the statutes which 
had been repealed inadequately.  At the end of the meeting, the Liverpool Committee was 
appointed for the purpose of obtaining support from the Mayor and the Common Council, 
                                               
112 The Liverpool East India Association, Report of the Committee of the East India Association, 1828.  
113 Ibid., pp. 5-6.  18th Geo. II. cap. 26, sec. 10 and 11, 
114 Liverpool Mercury, 30 January 1829. 
115 Add. MSS. 38765, Huskisson Papers, f. 143.  4th Geo. IV. cap. 80, sec. 9 and 6th Geo. IV. cap. 105, sec. 1. 
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gathering evidence, corresponding with similar institutions in other towns and preparing 
petitions to the legislature.  At the same occasion, they resolved that a subscription would 
be opened for these purposes. 
 
Consequently, as Philips explained in his classical work, at the beginning of the campaign, 
a series of lectures conducted by Buckingham were largely welcomed by both the LEIA 
and the citizens of the town, in contrast to the case of Glasgow.116  Immediately after his 
lectures, the first public meeting was held for the purpose of their opposing the renewal of 
the company’s charter, in which the member of the LEIA took initiatives and showed their 
strong interest in the opening of the China trade, especially the tea trade.  
    
 
5.8. The economic and political interests of the members of the Liverpool 
Committee 
 
During the previous campaign of 1812-1813, the Liverpool Committee had mainly 
consisted of West Indian and American traders although the former had held the majority.   
They had been seeking new overseas markets as they had been suffering from the 
dislocations of overseas trade caused by the Napoleonic Wars and the deterioration of 
Britain’s relationship with the U.S.  In this section, the economic interests of the members 
of the Liverpool Committee and their political stances during the period between 1829 and 
1833 will be analysed to explore the economic and social backgrounds of the this 
campaign. 
 
Appendix V shows the names and economic interests of the Liverpool Committee 
appointed at the public meeting.  The table has been created from Gore’s Liverpool 
Directory and Liverpool’s local newspapers of 1829.  In this directory, as was the case in 
other contemporary business directories, many Liverpool businessmen described 
themselves only as ‘merchant’ and did not specify what kind of merchant, and also 
manufacturers often called themselves ‘merchants’.  In addition, ‘Gentleman’ and such a 
title as ‘Esq.’ are not occupational descriptions.  Therefore, in order to complement the 
information, shipping information recorded in the local newspapers has been used.  The 
information on the imports to Liverpool in the Liverpool Mercury contains the names of 
countries and regions from which the ship returned and the owners of consignments.  The 
lists of senior members of Liverpool’s associations which were related to overseas trade 
                                               
116 Philips, The East India Company, p. 289. 
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have also been examined in order to identify their economic interests.   Nevertheless, this 
table does not show all the economic interests of the committee members.  For instance, 
according to his testimony in the Select Committee of 1830, although Thomas Thornely 
engaged in the East India trade and was ‘drawing bills from China upon houses of good 
credit in England,’ he does not appear.117  Another problem is that the table does not show 
the economic interests of those who were not involved in trading and shipping activities 
directly, for example bankers and maritime insurance brokers.  Nevertheless, in spite of 
these limitations, the table still shows some characteristics of the Liverpool Committee.   
 
First, although almost two decades had passed since the previous campaign during the 
period 1812-13, four out of twenty-one members of the Liverpool Committee of 1812-13 
still remained as members of the newly appointed committee: John Gladstone, John Leagh, 
William Rathbone V, and Joseph Brooks Yates. In particular, Gladstone, who represented 
the free trade interests of the town, had played a central role in the previous movement as a 
deputy from the city.  Their experience and know-how from the previous campaign was 
valuable to the Committee because a similar strategy was to be adopted for lobbying 
Parliament and the government and to stir up public opinion. 
 
Secondly, although the table is not perfect, it indicates that the Liverpool Committee 
consisted of not only the East India interests, but also several other different trading 
interests.  They actually engaged in different branches of overseas trade, i.e., trades with 
the West Indies, North and South Americas, European continent, Africa, and other regions.  
On the one hand, John Gladstone and James Cropper, who had held large stakes in the 
West India trade and the American trade respectively, entered the East India trade after 
1814, and they were also regarded as East India traders thereafter.  Alston, Finlay & Co., 
one of the five biggest ‘American Houses’ in Liverpool in 1829 along with Cropper, 
Benson & Co. (of James Cropper), was a Liverpool branch of James, Finlay & Co. of 
Glasgow, which was also engaged in the East India trade.118  T. & J. Brocklebank, a 
shipping company, entered the trade after 1814, and soon it became one of the main 
branches of their commercial activities.119    On the other hand, for example, J. B. Yates 
was regarded as a West India merchant, and merchants like John Bolton’s Bolton, Ogden 
& Co. and Charles Tayleur, Son & Co. had their main stakes in the Anglo-American trade 
                                               
117 Parliamentary Papers, First Report from the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company 
and the trade between Great Britain, the East Indies and China, 1830, pp. 267-269 
118 S. Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain: From the Industrial Revolution to World War I, 1992, p. 86 
and 106. 
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rather than trade with the East Indies.120  This indicated that Liverpool’s lobbyists had 
varied commercial interests.   
 
Furthermore, Table 5-5 shows that many of the committee members were the senior 
members (the chairs, secretaries, treasurers or committee members) of merchants’ 
associations in Liverpool or had experience of occupying these posts.  Many of them 
belonged to two or more different associations.  At least, apart from eight members who 
belonged to the LEIA, seven members were the senior members of the American Chamber 
of Commerce, two were those of the West India Association, three members were of the 
Mediterranean and Levant Association, another three were of the associations related to the 
South American trade, i.e. the Portugal and Brazil Association and the Liverpool, Brazil, 
South American and Mexican Association, and four members were of the Shipping 
Owners Association.  There is a possibility that further research would reveal additional 
numbers of such committee members.  This also confirms that Liverpool’s lobbying 
campaign was organised by a group consisting of several different commercial interests.   
 
Table 5-5. The Liverpool Committee members who had senior posts in Liverpool 
merchants' associations. 
East India Association (East India and China Association) J. T. Alston J. Garnett W. Potter 
  R. Benson J. Gladstone D. Willink 
  J. Ewart T. Leathom  
West India Association G. Grant     
  C. Horsfall     
American Chamber of Commerce E. Barclay R. Radcliffe J. A. Yates 
  R. Benson T. Thornely  
  T. Leathom D. Willink  
Liverpool, Brazil, South American & Mexican Association D. Willink     
Portugal and Brazil Association G. Grant   
  D. Heyworth   
Baltic Association J. Gladstone     
Mediterranean and Levant Association J. Garnett   
  T. Leathom   
  R. Radcliffe   
Ship Owners Association J. Gladstone J. B. Yates   
  G. Grant   
  C. Horsfall   
Source: created from Appendix V. 
 
In terms of politics, the committee consisted of men who had different political views.  The 
members who held office in the Liverpool Corporation, i.e. J. Bourne, W. W. Corrie, 
William Earle, C. Horsfall, N. Robinson and J. Ewart, were all Tory except for the last 
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named.121 Gladstone and John Bolton were also Tory and had been great supporters of 
George Canning, who had pursued moderate Tory policies, whilst merchants, Cropper, 
Rathbone and T. Thornely stood on the Whig-radical line.  Edward Baines, junior, who 
supported liberal policies (except notably, on factory legislation), was a son of Edward 
Baines, who was elected a Whig MP for Leeds after the Parliamentary Reform.122    
 
The Liverpool Mercury best described the free trade interests in Liverpool in their article 
on the public meeting as following: 
 
The requisition, in compliance with which the Mayor has called this meeting at the 
Town-hall, was most numerously and respectably subscribed, by Tories, Whigs, 
Radicals, and middle-course men, whose motto is “Medio tutissimus ibis.”  So 
unusual an amalgamation of parties reminds us of Swift’s observation, that “Money 
is neither Whig nor Tory.” 123 
 
Like Liverpool’s committee of the previous campaign and the Glasgow Association, 
respecting both commercial and political interests, the Liverpool Committee was 
heterogeneous.  During the 1820s, debates over British economic policies stirred up 
divisions in the Liverpool mercantile society as the question on the Orders in Council had 
done during the Napoleonic Wars of the 1800s and 1810s.   The East India interests and the 
anti-slavery lobbying group, and the West India interests in the city were not reconciled in 
their debates over the equalisation of the duties between the West India and the East India 
sugars and the abolition of slavery.  However, Liverpool merchants were again able to 
unite in the campaign against the renewal of the East India company’s charter.  
Disregarding the different commercial sections and political views, the campaign for the 
complete opening of the East India trade was supported by a large part of the commercial 
society of Liverpool in the wider context of the course of economic and political 
liberalisation during the 1820s. 
 
 
5.9. The proceedings of the free trade campaign organised by the Liverpool 
Committee from 1829 and 1833 
 
On 4 February 1829, in Liverpool the Common Council decided to deal with the subject of 
the East India trade at their special committee when they received the memorial from the 
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committee appointed at the public meeting, and also unanimously agreed to contribute up 
to £500 to the subscription.124  Ten days later, the members of the committee held a 
meeting with James Cropper and Samuel Hope, the representatives from the committee 
appointed at the public meeting, and after discussion the Common Council decided to set 
up a separate committee, which acted closely with the Liverpool Committee.125   
 
In April, the Liverpool Committee decided to send their deputation to London.  In order to 
urge other outports and provincial manufacturing towns to cooperate with a deputation 
from Liverpool for their interview with Ministers as to the East India and China trade, they 
sent circulars to them.  The Liverpool Committee’s communication with Manchester was 
particularly close because of their geographical proximity and economic connection 
between the two cities, which will be explained in the next chapter. 
 
Liverpool’s free trade movement against the renewal of the company’s charter was largely 
owed to William Huskisson, MP for the city.  He had served as the President of the Board 
of Control under Lord Liverpool’s Ministry, and was a key person in the economic reforms 
in the 1820s.  Under his (and George Canning’s) directions, Britain adopted such liberal 
economic policies as the relaxation of the Navigation Acts and tariffs, and the reciprocal 
treaties with other European countries.  Liverpool businessmen succeeded in recruiting 
such an able man for their own representative in Parliament after Canning, and then could 
exploit his strong influence on the national politics.  On 12 May, the Liverpool petition was 
presented by him with a similar petition from Manchester by the Marquis of Lansdowne to 
the House of Commons.126  He also made arrangements for the interview of the 
deputations from several outports and manufacturing towns by the Ministry.  When the 
Liverpool Committee wrote him to arrange the interview, he replied that the government 
had no intention of objecting to W. W. Whitmore’s motion for a Select Committee of 
inquiry, and that he personally agreed with the Liverpool Committee that it was a proper 
time to start their lobbying activities.127  Furthermore, he insisted that the Liverpool 
Committee should stir up public opinion across the whole of British society.  He advised 
them that: 
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They are not the interests alone of the commerce and industry of the country but 
those of the whole community which are involved in the considerations connected 
with the Charter of the East India Company, and it is therefore material that all 
classes should be made sensible that they have an interest in obtaining their 
relaxations which are more immediately called for by the commercial and 
manufacturing towns.128   
 
This advice persuaded the Liverpool Committee to urge free traders in other outports and 
manufacturing towns to attend the interview.  During the period of the free trade 
movement, assembling the deputies from the main commercial and manufacturing towns 
of the U.K. and petitioning Parliament (as well as the publication of several pamphlets, but 
in a smaller scale than in 1812-13) were adopted as the main strategies by the free trade 
interests.  At the interview, Huskisson assisted the General Deputation with Whitmore.129  
Later, James Cropper acknowledged his contribution to the lobbying activities for 
‘promoting an extension of trade with East India and the opening of that with China.’130  
The Liverpool lobbyists were able to exploit Huskisson’s connection with the Ministry for 
their lobbying. 
 
A few days after the interview, just before the dissolution of their meeting in London, the 
deputies held a meeting at Fenton’s Hotel, and as they had been appointed during the 
previous campaign in 1812 and 1813, the Liverpool Committee was again requested to act 
as the Central Committee for the purpose of communicating with all other associations.131  
 
In early 1830, the Liverpool Committee, as the Central Committee, decided to petition 
Parliament as a part of their lobbying activities, and to instruct the outports and 
manufacturing towns to petition Parliament.  It was necessary for the free trade interests to 
urge the Ministry to set up the Select Committee for inquiring into the East India questions 
in order ‘that Parliament may be prepared to give the notice [to the Company] at the 
earliest possible period in 1831.’132  Petitioning Parliament was more widely adopted by 
provincial outports and manufacturing towns than in the previous campaign. According to 
Philips, 257 petitions were laid before Parliament during the period 1829-1830, whilst 
there had been 135 petitions in 1812-13.133  When the Select Committee for ‘the affair of 
the Company and the trade between Great Britain and China’ was set up in February, the 
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Liverpool Committee expressed their dissatisfaction with the selection of the committee 
members.  In the Liverpool Courier, they argued that ‘these [select] committees so 
constructed, that the commercial community, -the party, in fact, most vitally interested in 
the question, were not adequately represented being favourable to the interest of the East 
India Company.’134  The Liverpool Committee argued that the chairs of the Select 
Committee had strong views in favour of the company.  At the same time, the committee 
organised direct lobbying in London under their leadership.  Liverpool urged other towns 
and outports to send their deputations to London again in order to lobby Parliament and the 
Ministry.  Glasgow, Calcutta, Manchester, Bristol, Leeds, Birmingham, Edinburgh, Hull, 
the Staffordshire Iron Trade, Plymouth and Darlington responded.135  Although the 
purpose of the General Deputation in London of the provincial commercial and 
manufacturing interests was lobbying Parliament and the Government, as Eyles argues, the 
significant point of this assembly was that they succeeded in demonstrating in the political 
centre of the country that all major commercial and manufacturing places of the country 
were in favour of the complete opening of the trade and that the abolition of the monopoly 
was the general wish of the British nation.136   
 
In January, 1831, a public meeting, called by Thomas Brancker, the Mayor, was held in the 
Session House, Chapel-street, Liverpool in order ‘to take into consideration the propriety 
of petitioning Parliament’ against the company’s charter and the China monopoly.137  In 
this meeting, the report prepared by the Liverpool Committee on the proceedings of the 
debates over the company’s charter since the beginning of their campaign in January 1829 
was read.  In spite of the unfavourable selection of the Select Committee and the report 
produced by them, it seems that Liverpool merchants had an optimistic view on the 
opening of the China trade after the investigation.  As in December 1830, Kirkman Finlay 
had already expressed his opinion in Manchester that ‘it [the China Trade] was considered 
a closed case in favor of the opening …’ and by January, it was expected that the China 
trade would be opened.138  But they still thought it was necessary to push their opinions.  
Cropper expressed his opinion in the meeting that: 
 
… after the full and conclusive evidence there adduced on that subject, he could 
hardly have supposed it necessary for the people of Liverpool again to assemble to 
assert their rights, for they might naturally have expected that after such conclusive 
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evidence of the injurious effects of the monopoly of the China trade, and the 
advantage which would attend its abolition, the question would at once have been 
given up to the country; but though the people of Liverpool knew so much of the 
advantage of free trade that they required no further evidence to convince them that 
free trade was better than monopoly, this was not the case with the inhabitants of 
other towns and places in the empire; and therefore it was the duty of the people of 
Liverpool to exert themselves, and to impress upon the minds of the country at large 
the necessity of a strenuous and unanimous opposition to the renewal of the charter 
of the East India Company.139 
 
There was nothing particularly new in their statements and resolutions in this meeting, but 
as Cropper addressed it, this was the last public meeting in Liverpool for the purpose of 
opposing the renewal of the EIC’s charter. 
 
After the public meeting, few articles on the renewal of the charter were published in local 
newspapers before 1833, but the Liverpool Committee continued their efforts.  On 21 
January, after considering John Crawfurd’s opinion, they took initiative to send their 
deputation to London and called on other towns to do so in order ‘to influence if possible 
by strong representation to the minister [Earl Grey] the nomination of a Sub-Committee or 
of the new members who may be required to compleat it, and which on the former 
occasion he [the Duke of Wellington] considered to have been as hostile to our views, as 
decency would permit.’140  On 5 February, the deputations from Liverpool, Calcutta, 
Manchester, Bristol and Birmingham held an interview with Earl Grey, Lord Althorp, the 
Chancellor of Exchequer, and Charles Grant, the President of the India Board.141  In this 
meeting, Cropper explained the advantages of the opening of the China trade based on the 
positive consequences derived from the opening of the India Trade, and then insisted on 
the ‘necessity of considering the China trade as quite distinct from the Government of 
India and their claim for the opening of the trade on the ground of their ‘natural rights’ and 
criticised the company’s monopoly for the higher prices of teas imposed on the consumers 
for making up the huge expenses of their management.142  Although the Minister avoided 
making any pledge to them as the Select Committee had just been reappointed the previous 
night, Crawfurd, who accompanied the Deputies, expressed his gratitude in respect of their 
selection in his letter that: 
 
                                               
139  Liverpool Mercury, 21 January 1831 
140 Cropper and Langton, from Liverpool, Crawfurd from Calcutta, Braidley and Ingleby from Manchester, 
Cave from Bristol and High and Low Bailiffs of Birmingham, accompanied by Patten, General Gascoyne, 
Ewart, and Whitmore, attended the meeting.  Minutebooks of the Chamber of Commerce of Manchester, 
Letter from Mr. Braidley dated 5 February 1831, p. 252 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
 185
The contrast between this audience [Earl Grey] and that granted by the Duke of 
Wellington and his associates was certainly great.  The Committee is formed and 
consists of 40 - 13 of them being new performers of whom are Liberals…  I have 
tried to exert heads - But of the 40 members 24 are I think with us and perhaps 16 
against us - Majority 8.143 
 
In the year of 1832, as the Parliamentary Reform question attracted the attention of the 
whole nation, Liverpool and other towns’ committees agreed not to raise the East India and 
China questions before the Reform question was ended.  Therefore, the free trade 
movement at the national level fell relatively silent.  Nevertheless, in February, Liverpool 
and other towns’ committees were contacted by the Board of Control for their opinions 
relative to India affairs.  Although Eyles explained in his thesis that the Board of Control 
contacted only the Manchester Committee for answers to a questionnaire on the East India 
trade instead of the Liverpool Committee, the Records of Manchester and Glasgow as well 
as the Parliamentary Paper show that Liverpool, Glasgow, Hull, Birmingham and Bristol 
also received queries from the Board.144  Although the Board of Control addressed eleven 
queries to them, they responded with similar answers as they communicated with each 
other to draw up the answers.  Such questions as the positive and negative impacts on their 
business after the opening of the India trade in 1814 and the effects of ‘the Union of 
Government with trade in India’ were debated by many free traders on several different 
occasions, but probably the most significant point of their answers was one related to the 
company’s commercial operations and the system of remittance from India to Europe.  
They argued that the company’s large commercial transactions as an importer of Indian 
produce dislocated commerce.  The Manchester Committee argued that: 
 
To make heavy remittances, without regard to profit must, of necessity, unduly 
advance prices at certain periods as places, and as unduly depress them at others- and 
these functions will be found, to exceed, in extent, the amount of the disturbing 
cause- and will produce father injurious effects through the uncertainly & hazard they 
occasion, to the commerce pursued on other principles, by the private merchants.145 
 
Liverpool and other towns responded that private agents were able to make remittances.  
For instance, in Liverpool’s answers, they argued that they ‘see no reason to doubt the 
practicability of effecting remittances to the country, bring through private agency and 
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otherwise to the full extent of the Company’s wants.’146  Then for the methods of 
remittance after the cessation of the company’s trade, Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow 
all referred to drafts on India, export financing in India, transporting specie and bullion, or 
their combinations as the means of remittance from India to Britain conducted by natives 
and European agents.147   
 
Matsumoto’s study pointed out that, after the abolition of the EIC’s monopoly, the 
company’s sales of drafts on India in the U.K. and its exporting finance for Indian 
commodities became the main means for remitting from India to the U.K. as the free trade 
advocates had expected.148  The annual average of the EIC’s supply of drafts on India in 
the U.K. during the period 1834-39 was approximately £1.72 million, which rose to £ 3.37 
million during the period 1850-1854.149  This reflected the good performance of British 
exports to India during the period after the total abolition of the company’s monopoly.  In 
contrast, although the remittance through the export financing for Indian commodities 
initially performed well and its annual average during the period 1834-39 hit £1.4 million, 
this means of remittance virtually ended in 1849, mainly as a result of the criticism against 
the company’s export financing.150  In addition, the annual average of remittance in the 
form of specie was only approximately £ 69,000 during the period 1834-1857.151  
Although, after 1834, remittance in the form of drafts on India became the main means of 
remittance from India, it could not sufficiently make up the company’s deficits in the home 
account.  After the cessation of its commercial functions, its deficits were initially made up 
by the profits from selling its commercial assets during the 1830s, and capital raised by 
issuing its bonds in the U.K during the 1840s.152  Moreover, after the 1850s, the Indian 
railway companies were required to make the instalments of capital to the Company’s 
treasury under their respective Deeds of Contracts with the EIC, and although the expenses 
for construction and management of the railways were paid from the pool of this capital, 
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the company could divert the surplus of the capital for repaying its debts.153  Therefore, the 
remittance system which was proposed by the free trade supporters of outports and 
manufacturing towns in reality could not fully meet the increasing level of remittances 
from India to the U.K.  
 
In July 1832, Thomas Langton, the secretary of the Liverpool Committee asked the 
Glasgow Association and the Manchester Committee, to consider the propriety of asking 
the candidates for their opinions in reference to the question of the East India monopoly in 
the General Election for the Reformed Parliament.  In Liverpool, ‘some [members of the 
Committee] think a pledge should be asked for, others see objections to this; some think an 
address to the Electors of the United Kingdom, signed with the names of Chairmen of the 
several towns would be the best form; some that resolutions in the style of the annexed 
would be preferable, whilst some doubt the propriety of taking any steps of the kind.’154  
Although both Glasgow and Manchester Committees recommended that the electors 
should take the significance of the East India and China questions into consideration in 
their votes, they did not take any further measures in this respect.155   In contrast, the 
Liverpool Committee thought that it was proper to ask candidates for their opinions before 
they contacted other associations.  Nevertheless, it is not clear whether in Liverpool the 
candidates were requested to declare for the complete opening of the East India and China 
trade or not.  However, in the election, the candidates were asked for their attitude towards 
the equalisation of the duties on the West Indian and East Indian sugar at least.  Thomas 
Thornely and William Ewart were in favour of the equalisation of duties, but Lord Sandon 
supported the West India interests, by insisting on the reduction of duties on their produce, 
and Sir Harold Douglas avoided replying to the question.156 This indicated that subjects of 
communication between the provincial lobbying groups were not confined to timing of 
sending petitions and their deputies to London.  Although they failed to reach consensus, 
they tried to exploit the opportunity of the General Election for their free trade campaign.  
 
Although due to the limitation of the available sources, it is more difficult to know 
Liverpool merchants’ lobbying activities in detail in 1833, especially after April, than the 
previous years, some of their activities can be known.  As described above, after January 
1833, the Liverpool Committee and the GEIA, and their parliamentary members closely 
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communicated with each other in order to seek the proper time for sending the deputation 
to London.  While they were waiting for detailed information of the Government’s plan, 
they continued their activities in some agendas related to the East India trade.  In the 
middle of March, according to Lord Sandon’s letter to the Mayor of Liverpool, they knew 
that the Government had decided that the China trade would be opened.157  Nevertheless, at 
the same time, it was their intention that the tea imported to the outports should be stored 
in warehouses within the wall of dock before auction sales in order to reduce the risk of 
smuggling and secure the customs revenues.158  The members of the Liverpool Association 
showed their strong objections as they thought that these conditions were ‘incompatible 
with that economical management of the China trade.’159  The Liverpool Committee 
lobbied against this point through their MPs and Whitmore although the free trade 
supporters eventually failed to persuade the Government to change these conditions in the 
new East India Charter.160 
 
Moreover, it may be reasonable to refer again to Charles Grant’s inquiry in February to 
Whitmore about the opinion of provincial commercial and manufacturing interests in 
regard to the ‘rules, restrictions and conditions under which they should be allowed to 
settle in the interior of India.’161  In this event, as has been described, the Glasgow 
Association asked the Liverpool Committee to write up a draft for them because the former 
did not have their knowledge of the legal system in India.162  The free trade interests of the 
outports and manufacturing towns tended to focus on the commercial aspects of the East 
India and China questions.  Nevertheless, the Liverpool Committee showed an ability to 
deal with the wider aspects of the question than Glasgow could although the questions of 
the British settlement in India were significantly related to the commercial activities.   
 
 
5.10. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the lobbying activities of the Liverpool merchants against the 
renewal of the charters during the period 1812 to 1813 and 1829 to 1833.   
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During the first period, Liverpool’s free trade campaign was organised by the two major 
commercial interests of the town of that time, the West India traders and the American 
traders.  Although historians such as Checkland and Tolley have previously discussed their 
collaboration, it has been demonstrated here that the West Indian interests dominated the 
Liverpool Committee.  Like other outports and manufacturing towns of the country, 
Liverpool merchants were struggling in the unstable commercial environment which had 
been mainly created by the Napoleonic Wars and the deterioration of the Anglo-American 
relationship as the result of their economic dispute over the Orders in Council: on the one 
side, the West India traders and planters, who held strong influence within the Corporation, 
were firm supporters of the Orders in Council, on the other side, many American 
merchants blamed the Orders for their difficulties and demanded that the state should 
repeal them.  Their different views surfaced during their lobbying activities, like the 
debates over the economic condition of Liverpool in the House of Commons.  George 
Canning’s capture of a parliamentary seat for the city was also a result of the conflict 
between the two groups.  Later this led to the American merchants’ refusal to subscribe for 
the foundation of the Liverpool Office in London.  Nevertheless, as far as the renewal of 
the East India Charter was concerned, in spite of their different views over the Ministry’s 
wartime economic policy, these remained as minor obstacles to the Liverpool lobbyists.  
They could maintain their consensus on the opening of the East India trade, as both of 
them needed to look for new markets under the depressed economic conditions, and 
Liverpool could lead the provincial lobbyists’ campaign.  This study shows that except for 
the interval period of 1812, the Liverpool Committee maintained close communication 
with other parties for organising their effective campaign as Glasgow did. 
 
Furthermore, the provincial interests’ political connection to London should not be ignored 
as the case of Liverpool shows.  In addition to the city’s traditional political connection 
with the state, which was revealed in such an event as the financial crisis of 1793, it was 
fortunate for Liverpool, which was requested to play a role as a central committee for the 
campaign during the interval, to obtain a very able man like Canning as their representative 
in Parliament.  As one of the best friends to the free-trade advocate, Canning, who was at 
the centre of national politics, could know the Ministry’s intention on the renewal of the 
charter well.  He played a role as one of the representatives for the provincial lobbyist 
groups in Parliament.  His opinions had strong influence on their lobbying strategies, but 
not as strong as Checkland described.  In fact, the provincial lobbyists rejected his advice 
that they should give up their lobby against the China monopoly in early January 1813.  
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Nevertheless, in spite of his personal opinion against the opening of the China monopoly, 
he sought for the best possible outcomes for the provincial interests in the debates over the 
renewal of the company’s charter in Parliament. 
 
In the campaign during the period 1829 to1833, Liverpool merchants took the lead again.  
Within the town, while the West India interests and the East India interests were opposed 
to each other in the debates over the equalisation of the sugar duties and the abolition of 
slavery, Liverpool merchants in different trading branches and with different political 
views succeeded in uniting again to secure the complete opening of the East India and 
China trade.  In the initial stage of the campaign for the total abolition of the company’s 
monopoly, the Liverpool merchants largely owed their lobbying activities, such as 
arranging their meeting with Ministers in London, to Huskisson before he was killed in the 
railway accident.  Although the main aims of their campaign were the opening of the China 
trade and the abolition of the licence system and free economic activities in India, 
Liverpool merchants especially showed their strong desire to enter the tea trade, probably 
more than any other British towns.  The city’s economic significance as the major British 
port along with the port of London and its ‘long-established’ East India Association gave 
its merchants strong initiative in the campaign.  The records of the GEIA shows that they 
held their close communication with other outports and manufacturing towns as well as 
their Parliamentary supporters for not only organising the General Deputation but also 
sending more effective petitions and memorials to Parliament and the Ministry and 
attempting to exploit the opportunity of the General Election for their lobbying. 
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Chapter 6.  The lobbying activities of the Manchester interests against the 
renewal of the East India Company’s charter, 1829-1833 
  
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter is the last of the case studies of the lobbying activities of British provincial 
towns against the renewal of the EIC’s charter.  In the following, the case of Manchester 
during the period 1829-33 will be investigated. 
 
While it is much more difficult to reconstruct the lobbying activities of Manchester in the 
first movement in detail because of a lack of historical sources, the minutebooks of the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce and Manufacturers (MCCM) provide one of the most 
comprehensive historical sources, along with those of the GEIA, for researchers interested 
in lobbying activities of provincial merchants and manufacturers for free trade in Asia after 
1820.  The main difference between the records of the MCCM and those of the GEIA is 
that, apart from the minutebooks, the latter contains a large collection of corresponding 
letters between the GEIA and other associations and individuals including material from 
Manchester.  Glasgow’s materials can provide additional information to the previous 
studies of Manchester’s campaign.  Moreover, by examining these different towns’ records, 
the similarities and differences of the lobbying activities of Manchester and other towns 
can be contrasted more clearly.  
 
The MCCM’s records were widely used in the previous studies of the free trade 
movements during this period conducted by such historians as Eyles, Greenberg and 
Redford.1  Through examining the MCCM’s lobbying for the abolition of the restrictions 
imposed on the tonnage of vessels for the India trade, Eyles pointed out Manchester’s 
prime concern after 1814 was to remove the remaining restrictions imposed on the India 
trade rather than the opening of the China trade.  Nevertheless, Eyles as well as the other 
two historians used these records for exploring the provincial lobbyists’ campaign of 1829-
1833 as a whole rather than specifically focusing on Manchester’s lobbying activities.  
Therefore, focusing on Manchester’s campaigners, this chapter will explore their 
collaboration with other provincial organisations and their contribution to the free trade 
movement of 1829-1833. 
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In this chapter, first of all, as background to the MCCM’s free trade movement, the growth 
of Manchster’s economy, especially, the cotton industry and related businesses, during the 
period 1780 to 1830 will be described.  Moreover, it will be explained that, although 
Manchester’s economy was largely dominated by businesses related to the cotton textile 
industry, their economic interests and political ideologies were not coherent before the 
1820s, and that the establishment of the MCCM was an attempt to collect these different 
economic interests of the town.  Second, the Manchester business community and its 
lobbying activities before the beginning of the debates over the renewal of the company’s 
charter will be discussed.  Third, the lobbying activities of the MCCM during the campaign 
of 1829-1833 will be examined in detail.  In this part, the economic interests of those who 
were involved in the lobbying activities will also be analysed as has been done in the 
previous chapters.   
 
 
6.2. Manchester during the period 1780-1830 
 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, Manchester became one of the largest 
provincial towns in Britain, along with Liverpool and Glasgow.  Its population grew 
rapidly from about 24,000 in 1773 to 108,000 in 1821, and reached 142,000 by 1831.2  
Manchester was synonymous with ‘cottonopolis’ after the Industrial Revolution.  The town 
became the very centre of the cotton industry in Britain after the 1780s.  The first steam-
powered mill was built by Richard Arkwright there in 1781.  The success of his business 
was followed by the rapid growth of the cotton industry in the town and its neighbouring 
area, although in spite of the diffusion of the factory system, the putting-out system was 
not replaced immediately by this new system.  In the weaving branch of the cotton industry, 
because of the technological limitations of the power-loom, which was not suitable to fine 
yarns before the 1820s, factories were slow to develop. 
 
In terms of the size of firms, even during the 1830s, the cotton industry consisted of a large 
number of small firms.3  Nevertheless, after the 1820s, the town experienced the 
rationalisation of the cotton industry, that is to say, the spread of the factory system and 
power-loom.  Because the competitive condition of the market during the 1820s reduced 
                                                   
2 D. Read, Peterloo: The ‘Massacre and its Background, 1958, p. 4. 
3 R. Smith, ‘Manchester as a Centre for Manufacturing and Merchanting Cotton Goods, 1820 to 1830’ in 
University of Birmingham Historical Journal, Vol. IV, 1953-1954, pp. 50-51. 
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their profit margin, the firms needed to adjust their business structure by increasing their 
size of production and turnover.4  Technological innovations enabled spinning and 
weaving branches to be integrated within a factory.5  This concentration of industry 
resulted in an increase in the size of firms.   
 
Historians such as R. Lloyd-Jones and M. J. Lewis, and M. Fores focused on the 
development of the commercial sector of the town in their studies during the 1980s.6   
On the one hand, Smith argued by pointing out the development of the warehouse system 
during the period that Manchester as an entrepot for the local cotton industry emerged after 
the end of the Napoleonic Wars.7  On the other hand, Lloyd-Jones and Lewis argued that 
the commercial activities played a more significant role in the economic activities within 
the town even before the 1820s.  In their research, Lloyd-Jones and Lewis used data from 
the Manchester Poor Rate Assessment Books and reconstructed its business structure in the 
first half of the nineteenth century.  In terms of the total value of property assets, 
warehouse businesses showed their much superior economic position to that of factories in 
the middle of the 1810s.8  They observed that ‘Manchester in 1815 was a warehouse town’ 
and ‘Manchester’s symbolic role as the centre of the factory may best be understood in 
terms of labour rather than capital.’9  From these studies on the structure of the 
Manchester’s economy, it can be understood that factory owners and warehousemen held a 
significant position in Manchester during the 1820s. 
 
In respect to the local politics, the cotton merchants (warehousemen) tended to support the 
‘Tory’ while most of the cotton manufacturers (spinners) were ‘Whig’ during the post-
Napoleonic Wars period.10  In spite of such a political difference, Manchester’s business 
community during this period was a firm supporter of the laizze-faire principle.  However, 
their support for free trade and the laizze-faire principle derived from their practical 
interests rather than their blind pursuance of economic ideology.  In fact, Lloyd-Jones and 
Lewis argued that in Manchester before the mid-1820s, hostilities and conflicts were 
observed between the economic interest groups over Britain’s foreign trade policy.11  For 
example, a part of the Manchester business community, mainly a group of warehouse 
                                                   
4 R. Lloyd-Jones and M. J. Lewis, Manchester and the age of the factory, 1988, pp. 110-111. 
5 Ibid., chap. 5. 
6 Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, Manchester, and M. Fores, ‘The Myth of a British Industrial Revolution’, in 
History, vol. LXVI, 1981.   
7 Smith, ‘Manchester as a Centre’, p. 63.   
8 Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, Manchester, p. 30, Table 3.5. 
9 Ibid., p. 32 and p. 37. 
10 Read, Peterloo, p. 7. 
11 Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, Manchester, chapter 5. 
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manufacturers, was against cotton spinners who exported their yarns to foreign countries 
and petitioned Parliament for its prohibition before 1820 because they thought the 
exportation of yarns could only benefit foreign cotton manufacturers and was against the 
interest of the domestic manufacturing industry.12  
 
Manchester was a centre of the radical movement in Britain, and the maintenance of public 
order was one of the major concerns among its middle class.  Social disturbances were 
usually caused by economic distress as the Peterloo massacre of 1819 showed.  
Manchester’s economy was dominated by the cotton industry and its related business, 
which increasingly depended on the international market.  Its economic structure was 
vulnerable to the fluctuation of the market.13  Trade depressions often severely damaged 
the living standards of a large number of cotton weavers and spinners and their families in 
the town, which resulted in popular riots.  A lesson from the Peterloo massacre for 
Manchester businessmen was the necessity of organising an institution which could 
overcome conflicts between the different economic interest groups and unite the interests 
of the town’s business community. 14   As a result, the MCCM was established in the 
following year.  This institution represented the interests of the Manchester business 
community and lobbied the government and Parliament for liberation of their economic 
activities from such restrictions as the monopoly of the East India Company and the Corn 
Laws. 
 
 
6.3. The Manchester business community and their lobbying activities before the 
beginning of the debates over the renewal of the company’s charter 
 
Before the nineteenth century, Indian cotton pieces with their superior quality and 
competitive prices were regarded as a threat to the domestic textile industry in Britain.  
Therefore, in the initial phase of the industrialisation, cotton manufacturers in Lancashire 
and South-Western Scotland demanded that the government protect their infant industry.  
In 1788, British cotton spinners criticised the EIC’s importation of Indian cotton products 
for damaging the domestic industry, and demanded the company reduce the importation of 
piece goods and increase that of raw materials, instead.15  Moreover, at the time of the 
                                                   
12 Ibid. 
13 The vulnerability of the industry can be indicated by the number of business failures during this period.  In 
fact, between 1815 and 1825, 60 per cent of the factory firms of the cotton industry failed (In the latter year 
new comers occupied 56 per cent of all factory firms). Ibid., p. 107.   
14 Ibid., p. 135. 
15 P. J. Marshall, Problems of Empire: Britain and India 1757-1813, 1968, pp. 85-86 and document 35. 
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renewal of the company’s charter in 1793, the cotton manufacturers organised their 
campaign against the company’s importation of the finished products from India.16  In 
January, 1791, ‘Muslin and Cotton Manufacturers and Cotton Spinners’ of the Manchester 
district in their meeting on the East India Company’s competition argued: 
 
That the cotton and muslin manufactures are of the greatest consequence to this 
kingdom, giving employment to nearly half a million of his Majesty’s subjects. 
... That the British manufacturers… are exposed to continual danger and immense 
losses by the importation of muslins and cotton goods from the East Indies, 
manufactured by persons- the price of whose labour does not exceed the amount of 
taxes paid to Government by individual labourers in Great Britain.  That such 
importation of manufactured goods is highly injurious to the nation, by transferring 
the price of labour from this country to the inhabitants of the East.17 
 
Furthermore, according to P. J. Marshall, when Lord Hawkesbury, the President of the 
Board of Control, made his inquiry to manufacturing towns in the same year as to ‘what 
goods they expected to be able to sell in the area covered by the company’s monopoly, if 
they were allowed to trade there on their own account’, they failed to answer him.18  These 
events indicate that the main interest of the British cotton industry at that time was still the 
protection of their industry from the import of cotton piece goods from India rather than 
the export of their own products to the East. 
 
Table 6-1. Labour Productivity in Cotton Spinning (Number of Operative Hours to 
Process 100lb. of cotton for 80’s cotton yarn) 
Indian hand spinners  Over 50,000 
Crompton's first mule in 1780 2,000 
Mules with around 100 spindles 1,000 
A pair of Power-assisted mules with 240 spindles driven at 2,250 
rpm in 1795  300 
The 600-spindle mules in 1825 at 3,000 rpm 135 
Most efficient machine machinery in 1970 40 
 
Source: S. D. Chapman, The Cotton Industry in the Industrial Revolution, p. 20, and H. Catling, The Spinning 
Mule, 1970, p. 54 (Original source). 
 
However, in the next two decades, their position changed.  Table 6-1 indicates the rapid 
increase of the productivity of spinning mules during the late eighteenth and the early 
nineteenth century.  At the end of the eighteenth century, the productivity of a power-
assisted mule was roughly one hundred and sixty times higher than that of Indian hand 
                                                   
16 Ibid., p. 86. 
17 Redford, Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade, pp. 108-109.  He originally quoted from Manchester 
Mercury, 25 January 1791. 
18 Marshall, Problems of Empire: Britain and India, pp. 96-7. 
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spinners of the eighteenth century.  Because of the increase in the productivity of 
machinery, and the diffusion of these technological innovations over the country, 
Lancashire’s cotton industry became able to compete with its Indian counterpart, especially 
in the market for coarser goods, by the time of the renewal of the company’s charter in 
1813.  Their view of India changed from one of strong competitors to that of potential 
market for British manufacturing products.  At the same time, as has already been 
explained, because of the intensification of the Napoleonic Wars and the outbreak of the 
Anglo-American War, British cotton manufacturers faced difficulty in exporting their 
products to their traditional markets in the European continent and North America.  
Moreover, increasing competition from foreign rival manufacturers under protectionism 
curtailed demand for British manufacturing products.  These political and economic factors 
encouraged British manufacturers to look for new markets for their products and 
alternative suppliers of raw materials in the East and Latin American countries.  
 
In the first free trade movement of 1812 and 1813, Manchester joined the campaign of 
provincial merchants and manufacturers.  They petitioned Parliament and sent their 
delegation to London in order to join the General Deputation for the abolition of the 
company’s monopoly.   Manufacturers in Manchester benefited significantly from the 
partial opening of the East India trade in 1814: exports of cotton cloths increased from 
about 0.8 million yards to over 43.5 million yards during the period 1814-1828, and of 
cotton twist from 121,000lbs. in 1823 to upwards of 4.5 million lbs. in 1828.  The total 
exports in official values expanded from £ 1.6million in 1814 to £ 5.8 million in 1829.19  
The Asian market also increased its relative importance for the export of British cotton 
goods.  During the period 1804-6, the Asian market (including China) occupied less than 1 
per cent of the total exports.20  However, two decades later, the share increased to 7.7 per 
cent, and three decades later, 10.8 per cent.    
 
During the 1820s, the merchants and manufacturers of Manchester led by the newly 
established MCCM, organised their campaigns against the limitation of the tonnage of 
vessels from the U.K. to the East Indies, and the equalisation of duty on West India and the 
East Indian sugar, along with Liverpool and other provincial manufacturing towns and 
                                                   
19 Huskisson Papers MSS 38765, f.175. 
20 Calculated from R. Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade, 1979, pp. 96, 98 and 99, 
Table 43, 45 and 46.   
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outports.21  In February, 1827, they set up a committee ‘to enquire into the state of our 
Trade and the East and to report thereon.’22  In this report, they expressed their pleasure at 
the large increase in the exports of cotton goods, which occupied approximately two thirds 
of the total amount of British exports at that time.23  On the other hand, they expressed 
their concern about increased competition in the traditional foreign markets under 
protectionism that: 
 
It could not be expected that other Countries would allow us to retain undivided, so 
important a branch of manufacture, and accordingly they have been straining equally 
with ourselves in promoting it backed by the efforts of their several Governments and 
are now advanced to great perfection in their production of the principal articles of 
Cotton Goods.24 
 
In particular, competition from the rival manufacturers of the United States was a great 
concern among British manufacturers.  In April, the MCCM drafted a petition to 
Parliament based on this report.  In this petition, they argued that ‘in many of the old 
markets the demand for our Cotton Goods has been curtailed by the increasing competition 
of foreign rivals aided in some instances, and especially in the United States of America, 
therefore necessary to maintain the actual extent of that manufacture.’25  Moreover, they 
referred to the equalisation of sugar duties.  They insisted that if the discriminating duty on 
the East India products in favour of the West Indian counterparts was abolished, it would 
bring an increase in demand for British cotton goods from the East and make up for the 
reduction of their sales in other regions.26   
 
However, although they sent their petitions and deputation to London in order to deal with 
the question of the sugar duties, compared to the lobbying activities organised by the 
Liverpool Committee, it seems that the MCCM’s lobbying activities tended to be passive 
and less enthusiastic.  Its deputies and petitions were undertaken only in response to the 
requests from the LEIA.  In addition, as far as can be known from Manchester’s 
minutebook of this period, the MCCM did not give any significant suggestions about the 
sugar duties to the LEIA in responses to their communication.  Many merchants and 
manufacturers in Manchester recognised that the country needed to import agricultural 
                                                   
21 M8/2/1 Minutebook of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and Manufacture 1821-1827, 17 April 1822, 
pp. 63-65,  Copy of petition against the Limitation of the Tonnage of Vessels from Great Britain to the East 
Indies, 24 April 1822, and pp. 66-67, pp. 81-82,  
22 M8 /2/2 Minutebook of the MCCM, 1827-1833, 28 February 1827, p. 6  
23 Ibid., 14 March 1827, Report regarding the East India Trade, p. 20. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 25 April 1827, pp. 38-39. 
26 Ibid. 
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products and raw materials in exchange for British manufacturing products, but unlike the 
East Indian interests of Liverpool and Glasgow, they were not directly involved in the 
trade.  Therefore, while in their neighbouring port of Liverpool the duty on East India 
sugar was widely debated and several pamphlets on this question were published, 
Manchester’s response to the question of the sugar trade was slower and weaker than the 
outport.  Moreover, Manchester showed a similar response during the debates on the 
renewal of the company’s charter during the period 1829-33. 
 
 
6.4. The MCCM and the debates over the renewal of the EIC’s Charter 
 
Although the MCCM supported such free trade movements as for the abolition of the 
restriction on the tonnage of vessels engaged in the East India trade and the equalisation of 
the duties during the early 1820s, it did not have significant activities against the renewal 
of the company’s charter until 1829.  Cotton piece-goods manufacturers in Lancashire 
during this period were disappointed by the company’s sales of their products in China; the 
company’s sales of cotton-pieces in this market could not increase as quickly as the private 
traders’ sales achieved in the India market.  The goods were sold in Canton at the 
company’s loss until 1827, and moreover, British buying of nankeens recorded their 
highest point in 1828, and only afterward British exports of cotton goods to China 
exceeded their purchases.27   
 
The cotton industry in Lancashire also had a problem within the supply side.  Mr. Winter, 
one of Manchester’s prominent businessmen, insisted on the necessity of acquiring new 
markets in the East Indies and China for manufactures because of technical innovations in 
manufacturing industry.  He referred to a new self-acting mule invented by Richard Robert. 
 
As a reason for finding new sources of employment to the working class, the great 
progressive improvement of machinery; and, as an illustration, stated that within 
these few weeks a mode has been invented of superseding manual labour hitherto 
necessary for Spinning frames, and that one child would now be sufficient for 
superintending 600 spindles.28 
 
Technical innovation in the industry led to the improvement of productivity and increases 
of output, but at the same time, the factory owners needed to seek new markets in order to 
meet their increasing output and to maintain employment.  As has been explained, middle-
                                                   
27 D. A. Farnie, The English Cotton Industry, p. 120. 
28 MS 891001/5 Incoming Correspondence, 1829-1830, letter no. 4.  
 199
class manufacturers were seriously concerned about the social unrest caused by 
unemployment of workers as well as high foods prices.   
 
In April 1829, the free trade campaign against the renewal of the EIC’s charter began in 
Manchester as in other provincial towns and outports.  On 15 April, in a meeting of the 
Board of the Directors of the MCCM, they discussed the necessity of holding a public 
meeting of the inhabitants of the town in order to discuss the expiration of the charter.   
 
Table 6-2 is a list of firms and individuals who signed for a petition along with the 
directors of the Chamber of Commerce to the town’s Boroughreeve and Constables for the 
opening of the public meeting in the town to discuss the subject of the renewal of the 
company’s charter.  In fact, many of the directors were the partners of these firms.  
Therefore, it seems that they best represented Manchester’s interests in the East India trade 
during the period.  They were involved in all major branches of the cotton industry and its 
related mercantile businesses in and around Manchester, i.e., cotton spinning, 
manufacturing, calico-printing, smallware manufacturing, and warehouse business.  Out of 
the 36 petitioners, at least 29 were engaged in these businesses.  In terms of the size of 
their firms, the group represented Manchester’s local economy.  For instance, according to 
Chapman’s study, the capital of Henry & James Barton was nearly four times as large as 
that of James Finlay & Co., the leading Scottish cotton manufacturers and their partner 
company. 29  Another example was Adam & George Murray employing over 1,000 
workers, one of the largest factory owners in Manchester.30  Therefore, the core part of 
Manchester’s East India interests reflected the town’s local economy, especially to the 
cotton industry. 
 
                                                   
29 S. D. Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain: From the Industrial Revolution to World War I, 1992, p. 
90 and p. 95. 
30 Lloyd-Jones and Lewis, Manchester, p. 6.  
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Table 6-2. List of the firms and individuals who requested the Boroughreeve and 
Constables of Manchester for the Public Meeting along with the Directors of the 
MCCM. 
Name Type of Business A Type of Business B 
Thomas & Robert Barns fine spinners cotton spinners 
H. J. & R. Barton merchants merchants 
Bindlosses & Preston silkmen  
Birley & Kirk cotton spinners & manufacturers by 
power 
cotton spinners/ manufacturers or, & dealers in 
cotton goods 
Joseph Clarke & Sons  cotton spinners/ manufacturers or, & dealers in 
cotton goods 
Crewdson & Worthington silk & cotton manufacturers manufacturers of silk & cotton 
Isaac Crewdson gentleman  
Henry Fielding & Brothers calico printers calico printers & print warehouses 
Gardner, Braidley & Co.   
Robert & William Garnett merchants cotton twist & weft dealers/ merchants 
William Grant & Brothers manufacturers & calico printers calico printers & print warehouses 
Samuel Greg & Co. spinners & manufacturers cotton spinners/ manufacturers or, & dealers in 
cotton good 
John Hall & Sons muslin, gingham & silk 
manufacturers 
manufacturers of muslin, &c. 
Hardman, Powell & Hardman merchants & calico printer calico printers & print warehouses/ merchants 
Hargreaves, Dugdale & Co. calico printers calico printers & print warehouses 
Hole & Wilkinson calico printers calico printers & print warehouses 
The Holywell & Douglas & 
Co. 
merchants cotton spinners/ merchants 
H. Houldsworth Junr. cotton spinner  
Hoyle & Newbery silk, & cotton manufacturers & 
furrier 
manufacturers of silk & cotton/ manufacturers of 
smallware 
Loyd & Price calico printers calico printers & print warehouses 
McConnel & Co. cotton spinners  
Millington, Son & Bailey merchants, manufacturers & printers calico print warehouses/ merchants 
Adam & George Murray cotton spinners cotton spinners 
The New Bridge Mills & 
Twist Co. 
 cotton spinners 
James Oughton & Co. Manchester & Scotch 
warehousemen 
 
J. & N. Philips   
Philips & Lee cotton spinners & merchants cotton spinners 
N. & F. Phillips & Co. merchants & smallware 
manufacturers 
manufacturers of smallwares/ merchants 
Joseph Plant & Co. fine spinners cotton spinners 
Potter, Mande & Co. calico printers calico printers & print warehouses 
Richard Hole   
Simpson, Haign & Co. calico printers calico printers & print warehouses 
Robert Smith & Brothers spinners & manufacturers. cotton spinners/ manufacturers or, & dealers in 
cotton goods 
Thomson, Chippendall & Co. calico printers calico printers & print warehouses 
Philips Wood & Co. hat manufacturers & merchants hat manufacturers/ merchants 
Wright & Lee manufacturers & spinners  
 
Note: ‘Type of Business A’ indicates businesses of the firms/individuals recorded in the main pages of the 
Postal Directory, and ‘Type of Business B’ indicates business in which the firms and the individuals were 
categorised in the section of the ‘List of Trades’ of the Postal Directory. 
Source: The Pigot & Son’s General Directory, Manchester, Salford, &c., 1829. 
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On 25 April, William Rathbone and John Garnett visited Manchester as a deputation from 
the LEIA and met the Board of Directors of the MCCM to inform them of their intention 
and request them to send a deputation to London.31  This is one example that indicated the 
close communication between Manchester and Liverpool during the campaign.  Two days 
later, merchants, manufacturers and other persons interested in the East India and China 
Trade held a public meeting at the Town Hall under the auspices of the MCCM.32  At this 
meeting, as in the cases of Glasgow and Liverpool, an East India Trade Committee was 
appointed, and later the petitions to Parliament were prepared and the members of the 
deputation from the town were appointed to join the free trade campaign in London.  The 
substance of the resolutions passed in the public meeting was almost identical to those of 
other towns: (1) The partial opening of the East India trade after 1814 proved itself to be 
beneficial to the British merchants and manufacturers; (2) They expected positive results 
which would derive from their free intercourse with the interior of India and China; (3) 
The company’s monopoly in the tea trade was very injurious to the public and did not give 
any advantage to the State Revenue; (4) The capital investment and civilisation and the 
diffusion of Christianity in India would be promoted by the settlement of British subjects: 
(5) The committee (Manchester East India Committee) were to be set up and Petitions 
were to be prepared and sent to Parliament. 
 
However, if the details of the public meeting are analysed, a couple of points which were 
particular to Manchester can be observed.33  Firstly, compared with Liverpool and 
Glasgow, the Manchester merchants and manufacturers showed their relatively minor 
interest in the China trade, especially the tea trade.  This was similar to the case of East 
India sugar.  Of course, Manchester’s merchants and manufacturers showed their strong 
interest in the export of their cotton yarns and pieces to China.  However, most of their 
arguments on the tea trade were based on those of Liverpool.  For instance, compared with 
the first public meeting for opposing the renewal of the charter held in Liverpool on 29 
January 1829, many speakers in this meeting referred to the tea trade, whilst only G. W. 
Wood did so in Manchester.34  This was reasonable if the economic interests of 
Manchester are taken into consideration.  Because the primary interests of merchants and 
manufacturers in the town were the cotton industry and the commercial activities related to 
                                                   
31 Minutebook of the MCCM 1827-1833, p. 135. 
32 Ibid., 27 April 1829, pp. 138-141 
33 Manchester Guardian, 2 May 1829, p. 3 and Wheeler’s Manchester Chronicles, 2 May 1829, p. 3 
34 Ibid., and Liverpool Mercury, 30 January 1829. 
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it, few businessmen held a direct interest in the tea trade and they had little knowledge of 
this branch of foreign trade.  In addition to it, although Ward’s study revealed that the habit 
of consuming tea among the working class became common during the period of the 
Industrial Revolution, this product was a luxury grocery.35  One anti-monopolist of 
Oldham mentioned in the Manchester Guardian that: 
 
The plant may or may not, for aught I know, be deleterious in its effects, but it is 
certainly an article [of tea] more of luxury than necessity: and one which the 
operatives would be quite willing to give up.  In fact, I could mention one extensive 
spinning establishment of this town, the operatives of which have expressed a 
willingness, and wish to acquiesce in this proposition.36   
 
Therefore, unlike their hostility to the Corn Laws, Manchester’s manufacturers, some of 
whom supposed the import of cheap food from abroad would reduce the labour costs and 
increase the competitive power of their manufacturing goods, were not very much 
concerned about the price of tea. 
 
The second point was the reverse side of the first point, that is to say, Manchester 
businessmen showed their strong interest in the problems related to India, especially the 
free settlement of British subjects and the employment of British capital and skills in India.  
After the opening of the India trade in 1814, the Indian market had already proved itself as 
a significant market for British cotton goods, and free access to the interior would lead to 
its further growth.  However, for the manufacturing interests of Manchester, the 
improvement and creation of commercial crops in India was as important as the creation of 
new markets for their own manufacturing goods.   In the public meeting, William Garnett, 
the Vice-President of the Chamber of Commerce, argued that: 
 
If there was one article of foreign product more interesting and important to 
Manchester than any other, it was cotton.  The improvement that had been effected in 
the cultivation of indigo was well known; and it was impossible to hold the opinion 
that the culture of cotton could not be similarly improved.  If English capital were 
transferred to Hindostan, we might obtain such a supply of cotton from that country 
as would render us independent of any foreign state in the world.37 
 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, American raw cotton increasingly dominated in 
the British market.  During the period 1806-10, 53 per cent of raw cotton was imported 
                                                   
35J. R. Ward, ‘The Industrial Revolution and British Imperialism, 1750-1850’ in the Economic History 
Review, New series, vol. 47, no. 1, pp.  44-65. 
36 Manchester Guardian, 27 February 1830, p. 4, ‘Tea Monopoly’. 
37 Ibid., 2 May 1829, p. 3. 
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from the United States, and two decades later, its percentage increased further to nearly 
three fourths.38  Like those of Glasgow and Liverpool, Manchester’s merchants and 
manufacturers regarded the total dependence on the import of raw cotton from the U.S. as 
an unfavourable situation when they took into consideration the possible deterioration of 
their relationship with America or the natural failure of the crop.  Their preference for a 
shift of the supply of raw cotton from America to India was further encouraged by 
American protectionism.  Garnett suggested that ‘When they saw what America was doing 
with her tariff, the object of which was to make her a manufacturing country, and by which 
British manufacturers were excluded and a bounty given to her own manufactures… it was 
a measure seriously affecting the [British] cotton trade.’39  They did not think that it was 
desirable to import most of their raw materials from the country where their manufacturing 
goods were excluded by the protective policy.  Their wish for the improvement of the 
cultivation of Indian cotton was materialised later by their petitioning the EIC for ‘the 
better Cultivation of Cotton in India’ in 1838.40  In addition, the export of commercial 
crops from India would provide the means to import British manufacturing products.41   
 
At the end of April and the beginning of May, in the meeting of the Manchester East India 
Trade Committee, a deputation from the town was appointed in order to form a joint 
deputation with representatives from other towns in London.42  In the capital, the 
provincial deputies prepared for their meeting with the Ministers on 9 May.  However, 
Manchester’s lobbying activities there were disturbed by the social unrest at home.  The 
outbreak of riots in Manchester forced the Constables, who formed part of the Manchester 
deputation, to return from London in order to deal with this crisis and they missed the 
meeting with Ministers although other members of the provincial deputation received a 
positive impression from them in this interview as explained in Chapter 4.43 
 
The proceedings of Manchester’s campaign for the opening of the East India trade were 
similar to those of Glasgow and Liverpool throughout the period because the ‘East India 
associations’ of the manufacturing towns and outports closely communicated with each 
other in order to act in concert with each other, as have been described in the cases of 
Glasgow and Liverpool.  Manchester sent a relatively large size of deputation to London 
                                                   
38 T. Ellison, The Cotton Trade of Great Britain, 1986, p. 86, originally published in 1886.  
39 Manchester Guardian, 2 May 1829, Garnett’s speech. 
40 M8/2/3 Minutebook of the MCCM 1833-1839, 17 December 1838, pp. 613-616. 
41 Minutebook of the MCCM 1827-1833, 25 April 1829, pp. 139-140. 
42 Ibid., 30 April 1829, pp. 146-148, and 2 May 1829, p. 149.  
43 Incoming correspondence 1829-1830, 6 May 1829, letter no. 4. 
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for organising the General Deputation whenever the Liverpool Committee thought it was 
desirable for them to do so.  In fact, the manufacturing towns and outports gathered in the 
capital four times during the period 1829-1833, and the Manchester Committee attended 
all these meetings. 
 
However, compared with Glasgow and Liverpool, the free trade movements in Manchester 
displayed a relatively lukewarm attitude towards the opening of the East India trade.  One 
of such events happened when they collected subscriptions.  In early 1830, when their 
lobbying activities resumed, the East India Trade Committee of Manchester appointed a 
Sub-Committee (the Finance Committee) to collect subscriptions from the public to defray 
the costs of their lobbying activities in London.44  Their funds for lobbying mainly came 
from two sources: the subscriptions from the Chamber of Commerce and the public.  The 
Manchester Committee needed to raise at least £1,000 from the subscriptions, but the 
Finance Committee reported that by 24 February, apart from £170 from the MCCM, they 
collected only about £250 from the public.45  Therefore, they decided to hold an urgent 
meeting.  However, in spite of its very urgency, the meeting was postponed twice because 
on both occasions sufficient number of members failed to attend.46  As a result, the 
President of the Chamber of Commerce sent a letter to the members of the Finance 
Committee in order to confirm the availability of their assistance as the Sub-Committee 
members.47  It seems that consequently the Finance Committee managed to collect the 
target figure as they could afford their part of financial responsibility for the costs of its 
deputation in London.  Nevertheless, it showed their less enthusiastic participation in the 
free trade campaign.   
 
In general, Manchester’s free trade campaign tended to be relatively passive, especially if 
their lobbying activities were related to the opening of the China trade.  The Liverpool and 
Glasgow Committees made good efforts to identify proper witnesses for the Select 
Committees investigating the China trade, and their witnesses actually gave their evidence 
before them, whilst, according to the records of the MCCM, neither did they send any 
witnesses to London, nor were even serious discussions over the choice of the witnesses 
held in their meetings. 
 
                                                   
44 Minutebook of the MCCM, 1827-1833, 23 January 1830, p. 171 
45 Ibid., 24 February 1830, p. 187. 
46 Ibid., 27 February 1830, pp. 188-189. 
47 Ibid. 
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In contrast, as the details of the first public meeting of 1829 indicated, the Manchester 
lobbyists showed their strong interest in their freer access to India and made more 
constructive efforts for this purpose in their campaign.  Manchester’s merchants and 
manufacturers usually just followed the instructions from the Central Committee of 
Liverpool and did not take initiative.  Nevertheless, in 1832 when Charles Grant, the 
President of the Board of Control, inquired of the manufacturing towns and outports about 
the ‘rules, restrictions and conditions under which they should be allowed to settle in the 
interior of India,’ the Manchester Committee completed their own answers to Grant’s 
queries.48  The answers of Manchester and those of Liverpool were similar, but a couple of 
differences can still be seen.  First, the Liverpool Committee answered more fully to the 
queries than the Manchester Committee.  Probably, this difference derived from the 
advantage of Liverpool merchants, many of whom were directly involved in the trade with 
the East and held a better position to access the information of the East than the merchants 
and manufacturers of Manchester.  Second, for example, in their answers to Query No. 5 
‘What is the system pursued by the Company in the conduct of their commercial 
transactions in England and have their proceedings proved prejudicial or advantageous to 
the general interests of India commerce?’, on the one hand, the Liverpool Association 
tended to link their answers to the China trade, more specifically the tea trade.  They 
answered that ‘The import of tea being the most important part of the Company’s 
commercial transactions in England…’49 On the other hand, the arguments of the 
Manchester interests focused on the India trade: ‘As the Company are large importer of 
Indian produce to England, the market is very much ruled by their determination to sell or 
to hold…’50  This supports the indication that Liverpool and Manchester held different 
main interests in their lobbying activities of this period. 
 
Similarly, the Manchester interests showed their strong initiative when questions were 
directly related to the cotton industry.  Their lobbying for the repeal of the duty on printed 
calicoes was one example. This duty, which was set up in the previous century, was ‘one 
of the last arrangements of the wool raw material regime’ and the object of this duty was 
                                                   
48 Ibid., ‘Queries of the India Board and joint answers from the Board of Directors of the Chamber of 
Commerce and the East India Committee,’ 23 May 1832, pp. 383-404. 
49 Incoming Correspondence 1832, April 1832, Answers of the Liverpool Committee Q. 5th, located between 
letter no. 37b and 38a 
50 Minutebook of the MCCM, 1827-1833, ‘Queries of the India Board and joint answers from the Board of 
Directors of the Chamber of Commerce and the East India Committee,’ 23 May 1832, pp. 383-404. 
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the imposition of the duty on the home consumption of printed calicoes.51  Lancashire’s 
cotton manufacturers thought that ‘Your [the manufacturers of Yorkshire and Wiltshire] 
ancestors were unjust to our trade, in the imposition of tax which is pressing down and 
shackling our industry…’52   
 
On 25 November 1830, a public meeting was held in the town ‘for the purpose of 
considering the propriety of supporting the application of the printers for the repeal of the 
Excise on printed calicoes’.53  In this meeting, George W. Wood, the President of the 
Chamber of Commerce, argued first that the imposition of this duty was unfair because 
neither were other textile industries, including woolen and silk, nor were other branches of 
the cotton industry subject to this kind of duty.  In addition, the Irish industry was excluded 
from it.54  Second, he insisted that the working class suffered most from this duty.   The 
rate of the duty was fixed at 5s. or 5s. 6d. per square yard.  This meant that the duty made 
up a larger part of the retail price in the case of cheap calicoes than expensive ones, and 
that the cloths used by more people were more heavily taxed.  The merchants and 
manufacturers of Manchester employed this moral argument to attract support from the 
working class.  Mr. Hindley declared in the meeting that ‘he stood there to assert the claim 
of seven million of British females, … because they could not speak to themselves.’55  
Manchester’s mercantile and manufacturing interests emphasised that the removal of the 
duty would increase the consumption of the cloths, which would consequently give more 
opportunities for the employment of surplus capital and additional means for labour.  Third, 
although the duty was levied on all printed calicoes, those for overseas consumption would 
get drawbacks of three fourths of the duty when they were exported.   However, Wood 
pointed out that as this current taxation and drawback system for the exported calicoes was 
cumbersome and not efficient, the customs house needed more inspectors and ran more 
risk of individual frauds.    
 
After the public meeting, on 4 December, in the meeting of the directors of the Chamber of 
Commerce, the repeal of the duty on printed calicoes was placed on the agenda.56  They 
decided to send a memorial to the Treasury to urge the immediate and complete repeal of 
                                                   
51M. D. Whitaker, ‘Raw Materials and the Division of Labor: Textile and Consumption in Urbanization from 
Manchester to Mohenjo-Daro, General Theory and Empirical Specification II’ 
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52 Wheeler’s Manchester Chronicle, 27 November 1830, p. 3. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Minutebook of the MCCM, 1827-1833, 4 December 1830, p. 237. 
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this duty.  At the same time, they resolved that they would send a letter to the LEIA, the 
Brazil and River Plate Association, the West India Association, the American Chamber of 
Commerce and the Levant Association in Liverpool asking for their assistance.  Although 
the answer from the West India Association was negative as they were ‘not being so 
interested’, they received from David Gladstone, the President of the LEIA, a positive 
reply that they would also send a similar memorial to London.57  In February, 1831, a 
petition for the repeal of the duty was transferred to London by the member of the 
Manchester Deputation.  Their lobbying activities contributed to the repeal of the duty in 
the same year.   
 
Finally, although Manchester’s merchants and manufacturers showed their strong interest 
in the further relaxation of restrictions imposed on the India trade and economic activities 
there, they avoided the political aspects of India.  Like Glasgow and Liverpool, they 
accepted the political status quo as long as their economic activities were not disturbed by 
the restrictions.   
 
Consequently, the MCCM and the Manchester East India Trade Committee’s lobbying 
activities against the renewal of the EIC’s charter strongly reflected the interests of 
Manchester’s local economy.  Although the Manchester lobbying group fully supported the 
national campaign for free trade with the East Indies and China, their main interests were 
different from the outports.  Whilst the LEIA and the GEIA showed their strong interests in 
the opening of the China trade, the Manchester interests were more concerned to the 
matters related to India in order to promote the country not only as a market for their 
products but also as a supplier of raw cotton.     
 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the lobbying activities of the MCCM and the Manchester East India Trade 
Committee against the renewal of the EIC’s charter during the period 1829-33 were 
examined.  In classical works, such as Greenberg’s British Trade and the Opening of 
China 1800-42, the significant contributions of the manufacturing interests of Lancashire 
to the opening of the China trade have been emphasised.  He claimed that ‘the decisive 
pressure against the East India Company’s monopoly came not from Canton but 
                                                   
57Ibid., 7 December 1830, pp. 239-240. 
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Manchester’.58  In contrast, in their explanation of the gentlemanly capitalists in the East 
India trade, Cain and Hopkins argues that ‘the end of the Company’s monopoly [in the 
China Trade] was not the outcome of pressure exerted by Manchester’s manufacturers…’ 
in order to refute the traditional explanation of the contribution of Lancashire’s 
manufacturers to the opening of the China trade.59 As they show, the Manchester and other 
Lancashire manufacturing interests have been synonymous with those who lobbied for the 
opening of the China trade.  It is true that Manchester’s merchants and manufacturers held 
large interests in China as a potential market for their cotton goods and organised their 
lobbying activities to achieve this purpose.  Nevertheless, although this short chapter has 
focused on the Manchester interests’ lobbying activities during the 1829-33 campaign only, 
the diversity of provincial interests in the free trade campaigns can be seen.  It seems that 
their prime interest in this campaign was not the Chinese trade, obviously not the tea trade, 
but the free settlement of British subjects and employment of British capital and skills in 
India for the further increase of the exports of British manufacturing goods to the country 
and the creation of the alternative source of raw cotton for their cotton industry.  Compared 
with the opening of the India trade in 1814, the year of 1834 is often characterised by the 
opening of the China (or tea) trade.  In this respect, as Eyles notes ‘It is therefore not 
surprising that they [the free trade interests of Manchester] were not so intensely interested 
in the Charter monopoly as were Liverpool… ’, Manchester gave fewer contributions to 
the complete abolition of the company’s monopoly in the China trade than Liverpool and 
Glasgow, where more merchants or merchant-manufacturers were directly engaged in 
overseas trade.60  Nevertheless, in a broad sense, the Manchester interests’ contribution to 
the provincial merchants and manufacturers’ influential campaign for free trade with Asia 
was undeniable, particularly for further relaxation of restrictions imposed on the India.   
 
                                                   
58 M. Greenberg, British Trade and The Opening of China, 1800-42, 1951, p. 179. 
59 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-1914, p. 325 
60 Eyles, ‘The Abolition of The East India Company’s Monopoly’, p. 188. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined the lobbying activities of the provincial mercantile and 
manufacturing interests against the renewal of the EIC’s charter during the periods 1812-
1813 and 1829-1833 in order to reassess Cain and Hopkins’ explanation of British 
imperialism in Asia during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
 
The significance of Cain and Hopkins’ ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’ was that it re-
balanced the economic interpretation of British imperialism against Robinson and 
Gallagher’s accounts based on examination of peripheral events of the empire, which many 
historians had accepted as one of the best methodologies till the 1980s. Although Cain and 
Hopkins did not deny the importance of peripheral factors for the study of British 
Imperialism, they paid more attention to the metropolitan economy.  The novelty of their 
account of British imperialism was that they devalued the significance of the Industrial 
Revolution and the role of provincial manufacturing interests in the expansion of the 
British Empire, and stressed the significance of non-industrial capitalists based in London 
and South-east England.  
 
After the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the development of a ‘fiscal-military state’ created 
the close connection between the landed aristocracy and gentries with political power and 
the merchants and bankers of the City of London with wealth.1 Cain and Hopkins defined 
this group as the gentlemanly capitalists.  In order to meet large military expenditure, the 
City financed the government through the issuing of national bonds.  As a result, the 
commercial elite of the City increased its political influence on the state’s economic and 
imperial policies.   In their model, the position of provincial manufacturing interests was 
outside the gentlemanly capitalists’ circle: economically, there was a split between the 
gentlemanly capitalists and the provincial manufacturing interests, and politically, the 
provincial interests could exercise minor influence on national politics.    
   
In the 1980s and the 1990s, Cain and Hopkins’ interpretations of British imperialism based 
on the ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’ were widely debated.  As a result, the attention of 
historians in recent years has shifted from the political influence of the British 
manufacturing interests as a result of the Industrial Revolution to the economic and 
political supremacy of gentlemanly capitalists in British history.  Nevertheless, in 
                                               
1 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-1914, pp. 71-84. 
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particular, the marginal role of provincial manufacturing interests was criticised by 
Daunton and Cannadine, and more recently, Webster and Bowen attempted to revise this 
model.2 On the issue of free trade with the East Indies, Webster’s works on the provincial 
interests’ campaigns against the London interests’ Indian central bank schemes, after the 
abolition of the EIC’s monopoly, was particularly important.  He suggested the application 
of a more complex relationship between the gentlemanly capitalists and the provincial 
interests to British imperialism in Asia during the first half of the nineteenth century than 
did Cain and Hopkins’ original model.  In this chapter, conclusions and implications will 
be drawn for the following three points of issue related to Cain and Hopkins’ thesis, that is 
to say, (1) the degree of influence of the provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests 
over Britain’s imperial policies, (2) the relationship between the ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ 
in London and provincial interests, and (3) the Scots contributions to the formation of the 
British Empire. 
 
Prior to the introduction of the ‘gentlemanly capitalists thesis’, some historians had already 
analysed the economic and social backgrounds of the EIC’s proprietors, directors and civil 
and military servants, which were examined further by Bowen and Imada.3  Chapter 2 has 
re-interpreted them in terms of the ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’, and shown that although 
the company gradually increased its administrative functions after the second half of the 
eighteenth century, it consisted in part of the gentlemanly capitalists and those who were 
connected to them.  Chapter 2 also explained that the EIC’s territorial acquisitions in India 
and a source of huge landed revenues led to a change in the contemporary British 
perception of India from just one of a monopolistic commercial institution to a significant 
national interest.  As a result, while the company was suffering from political and 
economic turmoil both at home and in India, the state gradually intervened in Indian affairs 
during the 1770s and the 1780s through a series of statutory reforms, for instance North’s 
Regulation Act and Pitt’s India Act.  
 
While the company developed its political functions, it failed to adjust to keep up the 
growth of the East India trade during this period.  The company’s import trade as a means 
                                               
2 M. J. Daunton, ‘Home and Colonial’ in Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1995, pp. 344-358, 
D. Cannadine, ‘The Empire Strike Back’, in Past and Present.  147, 1995, pp. 190-191, H. V. Bowen, 
‘Sinews of trade and empire: the supply of commodity exports to the East India Company during the late 
eighteenth century’ in The Economic History Review, Vol. LV, No. 3, 2002, pp. 466-486, and A. Webster, 
‘The strategies and limits of gentlemanly capitalism: the London East India agency houses, provincial 
commercial interests, and the evolution of British economic policy in South and South East Asia 1800-1850, 
in The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. LIX, No. 4, 2006, pp. 743-764. 
3 Bowen, ‘Sinews of trade and empire’, 2002. 
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of remittance from India to Britain could no longer meet demand.  As a result, Britain’s 
dominance of the East India trade had been undermined by foreign rivals, particularly the 
Americans.  As the necessity of relaxation of the restrictions imposed on the East India 
trade was recognised in Britain and in the East, the EIC’s monopoly in the East India trade 
was heavily criticised.  Nevertheless, in Britain, whilst a group of London merchants 
demanded the relaxation of the East India trade, the London mercantile community sought 
for a way to maintain its dominant position in the East India trade after the relaxation of 
the East India monopoly.  From the provincial interests’ viewpoint, the campaign against 
the renewal of the EIC’s charter was their attempt to break not only the company’s 
monopoly but also the London mercantile interests’ dominance over the East India trade. 
 
In respect of the degree of their influence over imperial policies, Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 
have demonstrated that the provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests organised 
effective lobbying activities for the opening of the East India and China trade and 
succeeded in exerting undeniable influence over the state’s decisions in both the first and 
second campaigns.  This is a clear contrast with Cain and Hopkins’ argument on the 
gentlemanly capitalists’ superior influence on the national politics.  During the 1800s and 
the early 1810s, criticisms against the EIC’s monopoly were intensified under the 
depressed condition of the domestic economy caused by Napoleon’s economic blockade 
and Britain’s disputes with the U.S. over the Orders in Council.  In early 1812, while the 
EIC and the Government were negotiating about the renewal of the charter, in Glasgow, 
Liverpool, Birmingham, and other provincial towns and outports, merchants and 
manufacturers who were looking for new markets and sources of raw materials in the East 
Indies started their lobbying against the renewal of the EIC’s charter.  They prepared for 
petitioning Parliament and sending their General Deputation to London for direct 
negotiation with the Ministry. 
 
It is true that the EIC and the Ministry had already agreed on relaxation of restrictions 
imposed on the East India trade, including the opening of the export trade from the U.K., 
before the provincial lobbyists organised the General Deputation in London.  Therefore, 
the main issues during the campaign of 1812-1813 were the opening of the import trade to 
outports and that of the China trade.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the GEIA’s records reveal 
that, in the initial negotiation between the General Deputation and the Ministry, the 
provincial lobbyists recognised the possibility of persuading the Ministry to change its 
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opinion on the import trade.4  Therefore, the provincial interests set this issue as a main 
target, and continued their lobbying until they achieved it.   
 
Regarding the Ministry’s decision on the opening of the import trade from India to outports, 
Webster emphasised the significance of the opinions of the Board of Trade in its decision-
making.5  Although Webster assumed that provincial merchants and manufacturing 
interests had lobbied the Board of Control during the campaign, he failed to show clear 
evidence for this.  He placed greater stress on the government’s need to apply an economic 
policy of overcoming inflation and securing a stable source of cheap raw materials in order 
to maintain internal stability and carry on the war with France.6  Chapter 3 provides clear 
evidence that the provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests strongly lobbied the 
Board of Trade in order to get its support for the opening of the East India and China trade.  
The GEIA sent a letter and copies of resolutions passed at a General Meeting to the Earl of 
Bathurst and George Rose, the President and Vice-President of the Board respectively, in 
March 1812.  Furthermore, in the following month, the General Deputation held a meeting 
with Rose, who expressed his opinion that both the India trade and the China trade should 
be opened.  Moreover, maintaining social stability and securing raw materials were 
strongly demanded by the provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests at that time, as 
the examples of petitions from Glasgow and Dudley to Parliament show.7  Provincial 
manufacturers who employed a large number of workers at their factories were seriously 
concerned about social stability in their towns, and those who suffered from an unstable 
supply of raw materials, particularly raw cotton, were also provincial interests.  Although 
he paid more attention to the significance of the government’s wartime economic strategies 
for the decision on the opening of the import trade to the outports, these economic 
strategies were actually a response to the demands from the provincial interests.  Therefore, 
it is appropriate to emphasise the significance of the provincial lobbying more than 
Webster has done. 
 
Perceval’s verbal confirmation for the opening of the import trade to the outports during 
his interview with the General Deputation in May 1812 was the outcome of their lobbying 
activities, although it was ‘nullified’ by his assassination.  Moreover, Buckinghamshire 
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addressed the company in December 1812 to the effect that ‘The importance attached to 
these representations [from the provincial interests], induced His Majesty’s Government to 
revise the arrangement which had been in contemplation… the merchants belonging to the 
outports had established a claim against the absolute restriction of the import trade to the 
port of London…’8  This clearly indicated that the arguments made by the provincial 
lobbying groups persuaded the Ministry to reject the EIC’s arguments and revise their view 
on the restriction of the import trade.  These events contrasted with the failure of the 
company or London’s mercantile interests to have a significant impact on this question.  In 
terms of the opening of the China trade, the provincial interests continued their lobbying 
for its opening during the first half of 1813, but the Ministry did not change its views, and 
the trade remained in the company’s hands.  Despite this intransigence by the Government, 
the lobbyists had learned significant lessons in this period, and they were put to good use 
in the second campaign, when they succeeded in abolishing the company’s remaining 
monopoly.  
 
In terms of the influence of the provincial merchants and manufacturers on the state’s 
decision on the total abolition of the company’s monopoly during the period between 1829 
and 1833, Chapter 4 shows that it is more logical to regard the Ministry’s decision on 
setting up the Select Committee for enquiring into the state of the India and China trade in 
1829 as a result of the provincial interests’ lobbying because their decision came just after 
the meeting between the Duke of Wellington and the provincial deputation.  The Report of 
this Select Committee was an influential factor in the debates over the abolition of the 
company’s remaining monopoly in the China trade, and in fact, it supported those who 
claimed that the opening of the China trade would have more positive impacts on British 
overseas trade, such as increasing the consumption of British manufacturing goods there.  
As the records of the Glasgow Association show, the provincial merchants and 
manufacturing interests made strong efforts to find witnesses who could give evidence that 
would support their arguments before the Select Committee.  For instance, the GEIA sent 
John Deans and John A. Maxwell, who had been engaged in trading activities in Java and 
Singapore respectively, to London as witnesses, and before the committee, they gave 
evidence related to the tea trade and opinions on the possible benefits from the abolition of 
the EIC’s remaining monopoly.  Moreover, the fact that some inquiries regarding the 
opening of the trade were made by the Board of Control to the outports and provincial 
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manufacturing towns during the time of the debates indicated that the state was taking their 
opinions seriously. 
  
The economic and political interests of those who joined in these two free trade campaigns 
were varied.  As examined in Chapter 3, in the campaign of 1812-13, the group which 
supported the lobbying of the Glasgow Association mainly consisted of West Indian and 
American merchants, as well as those who were related to the cotton textile industry. In his 
case study of Birmingham’s campaign, Moss failed to point out the diversity of provincial 
lobbyists’ interests within the town because the economic structure of Birmingham based 
on manufacturing industry was simpler than Glasgow whose economy was based on both 
overseas trade and the cotton industry.9   In Liverpool’s case, these Atlantic traders also 
collaborated with each other as Checkland and Tolley have pointed out.  As Chapter 5 
makes clear, however, the West India interests clearly outnumbered the American 
merchants in the committee appointed at the General Meeting.10  In fact, the presence of 
such varied economic interests had some negative effects on the free trade campaign.  For 
instance, the presence of a large number of West Indian merchants in the free trade 
campaign restricted the provincial lobbyists from maximising the merits of the opening of 
the East India trade as they needed to take the West Indian interests into consideration in 
order to prevent the opening of the East India trade from damaging the West India trade.   
No previous research has pointed out the influence of one particular economic interest 
group within the provincial lobbyists on their whole lobbying strategies.  The necessity of 
their considering the merits of the West Indian interests led to the fixing of different rates 
of sugar duties, by which the East India sugar was disadvantaged against its West Indian 
counterpart, after the partial opening of the East India trade in 1814.  Furthermore, whilst 
they demanded protection for their existing economic interests in the West Indies, 
Glasgow’s case detailed in Chapter 3 and 4 showed that, in spite of a number of West 
Indian traders’ contribution to the campaign of 1812-1813, few West Indian houses 
actually entered the East India trade.  However, during the campaign, this issue did not 
affect the unity of the provincial lobbyists.   
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The case study of Liverpool in Chapter 5 also shows that the conflicts between the West 
Indian and American merchants over the abolition of the Orders in Council which resulted 
in the division of the mercantile community.  This division prevented the American traders 
from supporting the establishment of the city’s London Office during the period.  
Nevertheless, this was a minor incident in the course of their strong challenge against the 
London merchants’ hegemony over the East India trade.   
 
As described in Chapter 5, in the 1820s and the 1830s, there was a collision of interests 
between the West Indian and the East Indian merchants over the questions of the 
equalisation of the sugar duties and that of the abolition of slavery.  Particularly, in 
Liverpool, James Cropper linked these two questions and led a campaign through 
publishing several pamphlets on them.  The members of the local West India association 
defended the advantages given to the West Indian production and slavery in their West 
Indian plantations.  The conflict between these two different economic interest groups over 
the equalisation of sugar duties continued after the total abolition of the EIC’s charter.  
However, although a number of merchants in Glasgow and Liverpool held interests in the 
West India trade and the West Indian plantations, this division within the mercantile 
society of these provincial towns did not affect their lobbying for the abolition of the 
company’s remaining monopoly generally.  In fact, some of those who held economic 
interests in the West India trade, for instance James Ewing of Glasgow and John Gladstone 
of Liverpool, were also involved in the campaign of 1829-1833 although they were not in 
the major economic interest group, as they had been in the previous campaign.  
Furthermore, as the analysis of provincial lobbyists’ economic interests shows, their 
lobbying activities were supported by a large part of the provincial commercial societies, 
including those that had little or no business interests in the East India and China trades.  
This indicated that the provincial lobbyists’ campaign was organised not only for breaking 
the EIC’s monopoly and the dominance of the London mercantile community in the East 
India trade, but also as part of a more general movement for economic and political 
liberalisation during this period. 
 
In addition, the case studies in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 have shown that the economic 
structure of each town reflected its motives for being involved in the free trade campaigns.  
The lobbyists of Glasgow and Liverpool reflected their strong interests in entering the 
China trade, especially the tea trade, but those of Manchester gave more attention to the 
questions related to India in order to achieve further increase in the export of their 
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manufacturing goods and develop that country as a source of raw materials for its textile 
industry.  Cain and Hopkins argued that one reason for the unsuccessful Fair Trade 
movement and Tariff Reform campaign organised by the provincial manufacturing 
interests during the 1880s and 1900s was the diversity of economic interests and their lack 
of unity.11  Nevertheless, in spite of such conflicts among the different economic interest 
groups within the provincial towns and the different motives of those who joined in these 
two free trade campaigns, the provincial lobbying groups succeeded in uniting and 
organising their two campaigns against the renewal of the company’s charter. 
 
Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 have also described the ways in which the provincial campaigners 
employed different means of lobbying: they sent several letters and printed circulars to 
other British towns and influential politicians to stir up public opinion and to persuade 
them to support their campaigns; they published a number of pamphlets and distributed 
them throughout the country; the substance of their meetings and resolutions were 
published in several different newspapers.  For instance, the resolutions passed in the 
General Meeting held in Glasgow were widely published not only in Glasgow and 
Edinburgh, but also in London’s several newspapers.12  Moreover, whilst a number of 
provincial manufacturing towns and outports sent petitions to Parliament repeatedly, the 
major provincial lobbying associations such as those of Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester, 
Birmingham and Bristol organised their joint-deputation in London to lobby the Ministry 
and other influential political figures directly.  In order to afford these lobbying activities, 
the provincial lobbyists organised subscription activities. 
 
These two lobbying campaigns were largely dependent on close communication among the 
provincial towns.  The timing of sending their petitions and deputies to London and the 
contents of their answers to the inquiries of the Board of Control were carefully decided by 
the provincial lobbying groups and their supporters after exchanging their views.  
Moreover, Chapter 5 has argued that the provincial lobbyists could receive effective 
support from their towns’ Parliamentary members, like George Canning and William 
Huskisson, who were at the centre of Britain’s national politics during the 1810s and 1820s.  
In Canning’s case, he also had a personal connection with Lord Liverpool through their 
common educational background although he was then outside the Ministry.  Such a 
prosperous provincial city as Liverpool with its wealthy and economically powerful 
mercantile community was attractive enough for those able politicians with political 
                                               
11 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-1914, p. 215. 
12 Committee Minute Book 1812-1813, 25 March 1812, pp. 3.2-4. 
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ambition to represent it in Parliament.  They provided the provincial lobbyists with 
valuable information on the state’s views and its negotiations with the company.  In 
Huskisson’s case, he also helped the free trade supporters to arrange interviews with the 
Ministers in London.  The provincial lobbyists’ direct negotiations with the Government 
were clearly a key factor in their successful lobbying.  In addition, as Glasgow’s case 
studies have shown, some provincial lobbyists such as Kirkman Finlay in 1812 and James 
Oswald and James Ewing in 1832 were elected as MPs for the city and directly represented 
the provincial campaigners’ interests in Parliament. These factors indicate that there was a 
less clear cut division between those who were in the centre of national politics in 
Westminster and the provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests than the model of 
gentlemanly capitalism has suggested. 
 
Chapter 4 has shown that during the campaign of 1829-1833, the arguments of the 
provincial lobbying groups were strongly supported by such men as Crawfurd and 
Buckingham.  Both of them had experience of staying in the East and held deep knowledge 
of the local conditions.  The role of Crawfurd, who originally represented the interests of 
private merchants in Calcutta and later stood as a candidate in Glasgow for the Reformed 
Parliament, was particularly significant in the campaign. The arguments of the provincial 
lobbying groups for the opening of the East India and China trade largely depended on 
Crawfurd’s contributions.  His opinions often held decisive influence on the provincial 
lobbyists’ overall strategies.  In his pamphlets, he demonstrated the merits of opening of 
the East India trade and China trade.  He explained that the abolition of the EIC’s 
monopoly in the China trade (the tea trade) would increase the exports of British 
manufactured goods and reduce the price of tea.13 He also criticised the dependence on the 
import of raw cotton from the U.S., and insisted that the introduction of skills and capital 
from Britain to India would improve the production of cotton wool, and would 
consequently contribute to the stable supply of raw materials to the British staple 
industry.14  His pamphlets were distributed throughout the U.K. through the provincial 
lobbying networks.  Compared with him, Buckingham gained popularity from the public 
and several provincial lobbyists through his lecturing tour as Philips and Eyles have 
described, but he failed to get strong support from the GEIA.  Glasgow’s lobbyists were 
not interested in his arguments on the EIC’s administrative functions, as their lobbying 
strategies confined their campaign to the economic aspects of the East India question and 
                                               
13 J. Crawfurd, A view of the Present State and Future Prospects of The Free Trade and Colonization of India, 
1829, pp. 6-8, and Chinese Monopoly Examined, 1830, p. 84 
14 Crawfurd, A view of the Present State, p. 26 and p. 40. 
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they avoided intervening in Indian politics.  More significantly, examining the Glasgow 
records carefully, Crawfurd had much stronger influence on the provincial interests’ 
overall lobbying strategies than Buckingham.15  Like such men as Stamford Raffles, who 
established Singapore, Crawfurd’s significant role in British Imperialism in Southeast Asia 
during the 1820s is well-known.  Nevertheless, in spite of his significant influence over the 
provincial free trade supporters’ arguments and their lobbying strategies, his presence in 
the campaign has attracted much less attention from historians than has Buckingham’s.  In 
fact, he was a key figure who linked the provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests 
at home with British private mercantile interests in Asia in the campaign. 
 
Regarding the renewal of the charter of 1813, Cain and Hopkins argued that ‘The decision 
was not taken at the behest of a lobby representing Britain’s new manufactures…, but with 
one eye on placating provincial outports and the other on the ambitions of London 
merchants whose commercial interest had outgrown the bounds set by Company control.’16  
Nevertheless, this thesis shows that Cain and Hopkins’ conclusion ignored the provincial 
interests’ well-organised lobbying strategies, effective means of lobbying, and access to 
the centre of national politics through their influential parliamentary supporters.  Similarly, 
their argument that ‘The end of the Company’s last monopoly was… the result of efforts 
made by merchants based in London and India who were keen to open markets for Indian 
cotton goods and opium in south-east Asia and the Far East’ also undervalued the roles of 
the provincial lobbying groups in the total abolition of the EIC’s monopoly.17   
 
Second, regarding the relationship between the gentlemanly capitalists and the provincial 
interest, the conclusion of this thesis better supports Webster’s more complex model of the 
relationship between the East India interests in London and the provincial mercantile and 
manufacturing interests during the first half of the nineteenth century, especially after 1814, 
than that of Cain and Hopkins.18  There is no evidence that the provincial lobbyists and the 
mercantile interests of London collaborated in the free trade campaign of 1812-1813.  
Rather, the latter petitioned Parliament to protect the company’s monopoly when the 
provincial lobbyists intensified their campaign as they feared the opening of the trade 
would harm their dominant position.  Nevertheless, as Chapter 4 has shown, during the 
period between 1829 and 1833, the free trade campaign of the outports and provincial 
                                               
15 Philips, The East India Company, p. 289, and Eyles, ‘The Abolition of The East India Company’s 
Monopoly 1833’, pp. 198-199. 
16 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000, 2001, p. 282.   
17 Ibid. 
18 Webster, ‘The Strategies and Limits of Gentlemanly Capitalism’. 
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manufacturing towns was joined by John Crawfurd whom the Calcutta interests asked to 
represent them in the U.K.  In fact, the Calcutta agency houses, which dominated the 
mercantile community of Calcutta, were the nexus of the gentlemanly capitalists in the 
Metropole.  Moreover, the GEIA recommended potential witnesses which included men 
from the London mercantile community, for instance, Joshua Bates of the house of Baring, 
Brothers & Co.  The records of the GEIA also show that Kirkman Finlay had meetings 
with Bates during the campaign.  Such evidence clearly shows the much more complex 
relationship than has previously been assumed between the gentlemanly capitalists in 
London and the provincial interests. 
 
This change stemmed from the development of a new connection between the 
manufacturing interests of the provinces and the London mercantile community by 
establishing a trading pattern in which the provincial manufacturers consigned their goods 
to London agency houses for export to the East after the opening of the India trade in 1814.  
The records of the GEIA and other sources show several examples of the GEIA’s 
manufacturing interests who actually consigned their goods to the East Indies.  
Furthermore, Larpent said before the Select Committee in 1833 that   
 
… a very large proportion, probably to the extent of three-fourths, is conducted in 
that manner [advance by agency houses to manufacturers]… I believe from what I 
have seen of our own operation, that taking advances is not the system there 
[Manchester] to any considerable extent; at the same time, I believe that their 
shipments have not been upon so large a scale as the Glasgow ones.19   
 
His testimony clearly shows that a large part of Glasgow’s manufacturers consigning their 
products to the East were provided with advances by the London agency houses.  
Webster’s study pointed out the provincial mercantile interests’ alliance with some men of 
the City which successfully demolished the Indian central bank scheme pursued by other 
mercantile interests of London in 1836.  This does not fit the model of Cain and Hopkins’ 
thesis, in which the separation between the gentlemanly capitalists of the metropolis and 
the provincial manufacturing interests is stressed.    This study has revealed that a similar 
trend of collaboration between the provincial mercantile and manufacturing interests and a 
part of the London mercantile interests could also be seen during the provincial lobbyists’ 
campaign against the renewal of the EIC’s charter. 
 
                                               
19 Parliamentary Papers, Minutes of Evidence Before the Select Committee of the House of Commons on 
Manufactures, Commerce and Shipping, 1833, vol. VI, p. 142. 
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Thirdly, in terms of the Scots contribution to the formation of the British Empire, Devine 
and Fry’s recent comprehensive works on the Scots experience in the British Empire 
emphasised the significance of the Scots’ immigration, colonial governing, commercial 
activities and military service.20  Devine’s older works also focused on Glasgow’s 
merchants’ involvement in the tobacco trade and the West India trade during the second 
half of the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century.21  Nevertheless, Cain and 
Hopkins’ Anglo-centred view paid little attention to it.  Furthermore, in terms of research 
on the renewal of the company’s charter, all previous studies conducted by Moss, Eyles, 
Charlton, and other historians have focused on the political influence of the mercantile and 
manufacturing interests in England.22   
 
Part of the role of this thesis has been to address this imbalance.  It has revealed that the 
Glasgow Association was one of the most active provincial lobbying groups for the 
opening of the East India and China trades along with the LEIA.  As described in Chapters 
3 and 4, because early-nineteenth-century Glasgow held an important position in both 
British overseas trade and manufacturing industries, especially those related to cotton 
textiles, its inhabitants’ interest in the opening of the East India and China trade was high.  
Glasgow’s merchants and manufacturers largely owed their two free trade campaigns to 
the leadership of Kirkman Finlay, who most keenly pursued the opening of this branch of 
overseas trade in the city and became the chairman of the joint deputation of 1829.  During 
the two campaigns, Glasgow was the centre of the free trade movement in Scotland, and 
the GEIA made attempts to stir up public opinion not only within Glasgow but also in 
other Scottish towns, especially in its neighbouring areas.  Whilst previous studies such as 
those of Moss, Eyles and Greenberg explained the communication between major 
provincial towns’ lobbying institutions, Glasgow’s case studies have demonstrated that the 
GEIA effectively persuaded its smaller neighbouring towns and counties to join the free 
trade movement.23  
 
However, its influence was not confined to north of the Border.  The GEIA held frequent 
communications with other provincial associations, particularly the LEIA, which acted as 
                                               
20 T. M. Devine, Scotland’s Empire, 2003, and M. Fry, The Scottish Empire, 2001. 
21 T. M. Devine, The Tobacco Lords: A Study of The Tobacco Merchants of Glasgow and Their Trading 
Activities, 1975, and ‘An eighteenth-century business elite: Glasgow-West India merchants, c. 1750-1815’, in 
Scottish Historical Review, Vol. 57, 1978, pp. 40-67 
22 See Moss, ‘Birmingham and Campaign’, Eyles, ‘The Abolition of The East India Company’s Monopoly 
1833’, pp. 184-198, K. Charlton, ‘Liverpool and the East India Trade’ in Northern History, Vol. VII, 1972, 
pp. 55-72. S. G. Checkland, The Gladstones: A Family Biography 1764-1851, 1975, pp. 59-62 and pp. 71-72. 
23 Moss, ‘Birmingham and Campaign’, pp. 179-180, Eyles, ‘The Abolition of The East India Company’s 
Monopoly’, pp. 184-198, and M. Greenberg, British Trade and The Opening of China 1800-42, pp. 179-184. 
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the central committee for the whole provincial campaigners, and the opinions of the 
Glasgow Association were usually taken into consideration in the formation of lobbying 
strategies, including the timing of sending petitions and deputations to London and the 
choice of the witnesses for the Select Committees.  In addition, before the summer of 1812, 
among the 55 places which petitioned Parliament for the opening of the East India trade, 
22 were Scottish towns.  This also indicated the Scots involvement in the free trade 
campaign.   
 
After the partial opening of the East India trade in 1814, the East Indian interests of 
Glasgow did not have an organisation which could represent them.  As a result, they failed 
to join in other provincial East Indian interests’ campaigns in such debates as the 
equalisation of the sugar duties during the 1820s.  Nevertheless, as the result of the revival 
of the East India Association in 1829, its merchants and manufacturers could play a major 
role in the free trade movement of the outports and provincial manufacturing towns again.  
As the GEIA’s records show, the GEIA continued their lobbying activities in order to 
promote their trading with the East even after the opening of the China trade.24  As soon as 
the EIC’s monopoly was abolished, Kirkman Finlay sent the first ship from the Clyde to 
Canton in 1834.25  During the nineteenth century, his firm gradually increased its stakes in 
the trade with Asia and tea and other plantation business.   
 
This thesis has examined the provincial merchants and manufacturers’ two free trade 
campaigns against the EIC’s monopoly during the periods 1812-1813 and 1829-1833 in 
order to examine the three issues related to Cain and Hopkins’ ‘gentlemanly capitalist 
thesis’.  First, regarding the degree of influence of the provincial mercantile and 
manufacturing interests on Britain’s economic and imperial policies, in these two 
campaigns, the provincial lobbyists could exert stronger influence on the state’s decision 
on its East Indian policies through their elaborated lobbying strategies, effective lobbying 
means and political connection to the centre of the national politics than Cain and Hopkins 
and Webster argued.  Second, in terms of the relationship between the ‘gentlemanly 
capitalists’ in London and provincial interests, there is no evidence for the collaboration 
between the provincial interests and the London merchants during the 1812-1813 
campaign.  Nevertheless, as the connection between the provincial manufacturing interests 
and the London agency houses grew after the opening of the India trade, in the 1829-1833 
campaign, the provincial lobbyists and some of the London mercantile interests showed 
                                               
24 C. Brogan, James Finlay & Company Limited: Manufacturers and East India Merchants 1750-1950, p. 11. 
25 Ibid. 
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their collaboration. Therefore, this thesis supports the application of Webster’s more 
complex model than the original model of the ‘gentlemanly capitalist thesis’ to British 
imperialism in Asia during this period.  Finally, in respect of the Scots contribution to the 
formation of British Empire to which Cain and Hopkins paid little attention, during the two 
nationwide campaigns, the Glasgow lobbyists were very active, and the GEIA played a 
significant role in the opening of the East India trade. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I. The General Committee of the GEIA (1812-13) and their economic interests. 
First name Last name Company 1 Interest 1 Company 2 Interest 2 Company3 Interests3 
Dugald Bannatyne Johnstone, Bannatine & 
Co. 
Clothing Manufacturing     
James Black  West India Trade     
Robert Bogle R. Bogle jun. & Co. West India Trade Shotts Iron Co. Iron 
Manufacturing 
  
John Brown       
James Buchanan Dennistoun, Buchanan & 
Co. 
West India Trade     
Archibald Buchanan James Finlay & Co. Foreign Trade & Cotton-
spinning 
    
Alexander Campbell John Campbell Sen. & Co. West India Trade Newark Sugar Refinery Sugar New Lanark Cotton 
& Co. 
Cotton Manufacturing 
Colin Campbell John Campbell Sen. & Co. West India Trade New Lanark Cotton Co. Cotton 
Manufacturing 
  
Robert Carrick Carrick Brown & Co. Commercial Financing Henry Hardie & Co. Linen Draper Brown, Carrick & 
Co. 
Muslin 
Manufacturing, 
Bleaching, etc. 
David Connell David & James Connell West India Trade     
Cunninghame Corbett Hastie, Corbett & Co. West India Trade     
Adam Crooks Leitch & Smith West India Trade     
James Crum Alexander & James Crum Yarn Warehouse     
William Dalgleish William & James Dalgleish Manufacturing     
Robert Dalgleish Dalgleish, Falconer & Co. Calico-printer     
Robert Dennistoun G. & R. Dennistoun &Co. West India Trade Newark Sugar Refinery Sugar New Lanark Cotton 
Co., Robert 
Hamphreys & Co 
Cotton-Spinning 
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First name Last name Company 1 Interest 1 Company 2 Interest 2 Company3 Interests3 
Buchanan, Steven & Co., 
Dennistoun, Buchanan & 
Co. 
West India Trade 
 
Sandyhills Coals Co., etc. Coal Mining Reynolds, Monteath 
& Co., etc. 
Cotton-Spinning James Dennistoun 
[two 
possibilities] 
possibly, James & 
Alexander Dennistoun 
 
 Banking     
Thomas Edington Clyde Ironworks Pig Iron Industry Thomas Edington & Sons Iron Warehouse  Coal Mining 
James Ewing James Ewing & Co. West India Trade     
Kirkman Finlay James Finlay & Co. Foreign Trade & Cotton 
Manufacturing 
    
Francis Garden Francis Garden & Co., 
Garden, King & Co., etc. 
West India Trade     
John Gordon Stirling, Gordon & Co., 
John McCall & Sons. 
West India Trade Sugar House Co. Sugar James Finlay & Co. Foreign Trade & 
Cotton Manufacturing 
Robert Hagard  West India Trade     
John Hamilton John Hamilton & Co., 
Hamilton, Garden & Co. 
West India Trade     
James Hopkirk Findlay, Hopkirk & Co. Tobacco Trade Hopkirk, Cunninghame & 
Co., Hamilton, Hopkirk & 
Co 
West India 
Trade 
  
Peter McAdam       
John McCall John McCall & Co. West India Trade     
John McCaul John McCaul & Sons West India Trade     
John McIlwham James & John Meikleham Muslin Trade     
Daniel Mackenzie  Commerce     
Henry Monteith Henry Monteith, Bogle & 
Co. 
Yarn Warehouse     
John More Cashier of the Royal Bank 
of Scotland 
Commercial Financing Cotton Mill at 
Hutchesontown 
Cotton 
Manufacturing 
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First name Last name Company 1 Interest 1 Company 2 Interest 2 Company3 Interests3 
Alexander Newbigging A. & J. Newbigging Tobacco trade, Linen 
Industry 
Archibald Newbigging & 
Co. 
Calico-printer   
James Oswald Alexander Oswald & Sons Commerce Linwood Mill & Co. Cotton 
Manufacturing 
South Sugar House 
Co. 
 
Alexander Oswald Alexander Oswald & Sons Commerce Oswald, Dennistoun &Co. Tobacco trade Linwood Mill & Co. Cotton Manufacturing 
Robert Owen New Lanark Co. Cotton-Spinning     
William Penny  Manufacturing     
James Pollock       
Andrew Reid  Manufacturing     
Ebenzer Richardson  Manufacturing     
Basil Ronald  Clothing Manufacturing 
(Glover and breeches 
maker) 
    
William Sterling William Sterling & Sons Calico & Linen Printing     
Charles Stirling Stirling, Gordon & Co. West India Trade     
Robert Thomson Robert Thomson &Sons Cotton Manufacturing     
David Todd Todd, Shortridge & Co., 
Todd & Stevenson 
West India trade, 
Linen Printing, Cotton 
Spinning 
    
John Wardrope  American Trade, 
Tobacco Trade 
    
Alexander Wighton Watson & Wighton West India Trade     
Source: The Glasgow East India Association Committee Minute Book, 1812-1813, pp. 1-3-2.  Glasgow Postal Directories, 1812, 1813 and 1815.  Minute book of Dennistoun, Buchanan & 
Co. Glasgow 1796-42.  Glasgow Herald, 11October 1811, 16 October 1812, 15 October 1813, ‘List of the Magistrates & Towns Council of Glasgow.   G. Stewart Curiosities of Glasgow 
Citizenship, 1881.  The Rambling Reporter, Reprint of Jones's Directory; or, Useful Pocket Companion For the Year 1787. With An Introduction, and Notes of Old Glasgow Celebrities, 
1868. J. MacLehose, Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men, 1886.  C. D. Donald (eds.)  Minute Book of the Board of Breen Cloth 1809-1820, 1891.  Scottish Record Office, 
Court of Session Productions c.1760-1840, 1987.  J. R. Anderson The Burgesses & The Guild Brethren of Glasgow 1751-1846, 1935.  T. M. Devine ‘An eighteenth-century business elite: 
Glasgow-West India merchants, c. 1750-1815’ in Scottish Historical Review 57, 1978, Appendix I and II.  Devine, The Tobacco Trade, Appendix I and II.   
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Appendix II. List of names of subscribers for the GEIA and the sums of their subscriptions in 1812 and 1813, and the descriptions of their main 
businesses. (£-s.-d.) . 
Name of Subscriber 1st sub 2nd sub Total Description of business from Directory Description of business from other sources. 
Chamber of Commerce 105-00-00 210-00-00 315-00-00   
Finlay, James &Co. 052-10-00 103-00-00 155-10-00 merchants CM, foreign trade 
Monteith, Henry, Bogle & 
Co. 
021-00-00 025-00-00 046-00-00 yarn warehouse  
New Lanark Co. 021-00-00 021-00-00 042-00-00  CM 
Campbell, John, Sen. & Co. 021-00-00 010-10-00 031-10-00 merchants WI 
Dennistoun, Buchanan & Co. 021-00-00 010-10-00 031-10-00 merchants WI 
Stirling, Gordon & Co. 021-00-00 010-10-00 031-10-00 merchants WI 
Stirling, William & Sons 021-00-00 010-10-00 031-10-00 calico-printers calico & linen printing 
Leitch & Smith 021-00-00 010-10-00 031-00-00 merchants WI 
McIlwham, John 021-00-00 010-10-00 031-00-00 manufacturer muslin trade 
Findlay, Duff & Co. 021-00-00 005-05-00 026-05-00 brokers and commission merchants WI 
Scott, William, jun. 021-00-00  021-00-00   
Dennistoun, G. & R., & Co. 021-00-00  021-00-00 merchants WI 
Corbett, Buchanan & Co. 021-00-00  021-00-00 merchants  
Blair, Steven, & Co. 021-00-00  021-00-00   
Nielson & Hunter 021-00-00  021-00-00 merchants WI 
Crum, Alexander & James 021-00-00  021-00-00 print & muslin warehouse  
Connell, D. & J. 010-10-00 005-05-00 015-15-00 merchants WI 
Douglass, Brown & Co. 010-10-00 005-05-00 015-15-00 merchants  
Ewing, James 010-10-00 005-05-00 015-15-00 merchant WI 
Edgar, Thomas & James 010-10-00 005-05-00 015-15-00 merchants WI 
Buchanan, J. & G. 010-10-00 005-05-00 015-15-00 cotton-brokers  
McCaull, John 010-10-00 005-05-00 015-15-00 merchant WI 
McCall, John, & Co. 010-10-00 005-05-00 015-15-00 merchants WI 
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Name of Subscriber 1st sub 2nd sub Total Description of business from Directory Description of business from other sources. 
Perston, M. & J. 010-10-00 005-05-00 015-15-00 manufacturers  
Hopkirk & Cunningham 010-10-00 005-05-00 015-15-00 * WI 
Shield, Thomas, & Co. 010-10-00 003-03-00 013-13-00 calico-printers  
Harley, William & Co. 010-10-00 003-03-00 013-13-00 manufacturers  
Watson, Weighton & Co. 010-10-00 003-03-00 013-13-00 merchants WI 
Tod, Shortridge, & Co. 010-10-00 002-02-00 012-12-00 calico-printers linen-printing 
Eccles, R., & Co. 010-10-00  010-10-00 merchants WI 
Richardson, Ebenzer 010-10-00  010-10-00 manufacturer  
Martin, James, & Co. 010-10-00  010-10-00 merchants OR iron mongers WI (if they were merchants) 
Muir, Brown 010-10-00  010-10-00 manufacturers  
Hunter & Wilkie 010-10-00  010-10-00 manufacturers  
Bartholomew, John 005-05-00 005-05-00 010-10-00 manufacturer  
Smith & Wardlaw 010-10-00  010-10-00 agents  
Dalgleish, William & James 010-10-00  010-10-00 manufacturers  
Thomson, Robert & Son 010-10-00  010-10-00 cotton works  
McGovern, Robert, & Co. 010-10-00  010-10-00   
Garden, Francis & Sons 010-10-00  010-10-00 * WI 
Playfair, P., & Co. 010-10-00  010-10-00 merchants WI 
Leckie, William 010-10-00  010-10-00  Leckie, W. & Co., merchants 
Bogle, R., & Co. 010-10-00  010-10-00 merchants WI 
Oswald, Alexander, & Sons 010-10-00  010-10-00  Alexander Oswald, merchant 
Dalgleish, Falconer & Co. 005-05-00 005-05-00 010-10-00 calico-printers  
Gillespie, Colin 005-05-00 005-05-00 010-10-00 merchant  
Newbigging, Archibald 010-10-00  010-10-00 * AT, linen, calico-printer 
Black, James, & Co. 010-10-00  010-10-00 merchants  
Culcreuch Cotton Company 010-10-00  010-10-00 cotton-yarn-warehouse  
Campbell, Rivers & Co. 010-10-00  010-10-00 * WI 
Hamilton J. & Co. 005-05-00 005-05-00 010-10-00 merchants WI 
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Name of Subscriber 1st sub 2nd sub Total Description of business from Directory Description of business from other sources. 
McCulloch, Penny & Co. 010-10-00  010-10-00 manufacturers  
Wardrop, John 005-05-00 003-03-00 008-08-00 merchant AT 
Leisslie, James, & Co. 005-05-00 002-02-00 007-07-00 *  
Reid, Andrew 005-05-00 002-02-00 007-07-00 manufacturer  
McGrigor, Peter, & Sons 005-05-00 001-01-00 006-06-00 calico-printers  
McHaffie, D. 005-05-00 001-01-00 006-06-00   
Eason, Alston & Co.  005-05-00 005-05-00 * WI 
Brown, George  005-05-00 005-05-00 *  
Rutherford, George &Co. 005-05-00  005-05-00   
Smith, A. 005-05-00  005-05-00  WI 
Hamilton, James, & Co. 005-05-00  005-05-00 tobacconists  
Crombie & Carnegie 005-05-00  005-05-00 cotton-printers  
Middleton & Tenent  005-05-00 005-05-00 manufacturers  
Muir, R. H. 005-05-00  005-05-00   
More, John  005-05-00 005-05-00 cashier, Royal Bank  
Dennistoun, J.& A.  005-05-00 005-05-00 merchants foreign commerce 
Russell, William  005-05-00 005-05-00   
Hall, John 005-05-00  005-05-00 wine & rum merchant OR merchant  
Duncan, John 005-05-00  005-05-00   
Thomson, Baily & Co. 005-05-00  005-05-00   
Knox, John 005-05-00  005-05-00 yarn-warehouse OR writer  
Knox, William, & Co.  005-05-00 005-05-00   
Stewart, John 005-05-00  005-05-00   
Urie, Mathew 005-05-00  005-05-00   
Forster & Corbett 005-05-00  005-05-00 manufacturers  
Ure, John 005-05-00  005-05-00   
Houldsworth, Henry 005-05-00  005-05-00 cotton-spinner  
Kelly, William 005-05-00  005-05-00 Manchester warehouse OR cotton-yarn warehouse  
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Sharp, J. 005-05-00  005-05-00 dry-salter (James S.) OR merchants (John F.S. & 
Co ) 
 
Kippen, W. 005-05-00  005-05-00 manufacturer  
Edington, Thomas & Sons 010-10-00 005-05-00 005-05-00 Phoenix iron warehouse coal mining 
McAdam, P. 005-05-00  005-05-00 merchant  
Graham, T. & R., Stevenson 005-05-00  005-05-00 manufacturers  
Paterson, James, jun. 005-05-00  005-05-00   
Grant, A. 005-05-00  005-05-00   
Campbell, Colin 005-05-00  005-05-00 merchant (J. Campbell sen. & Co. OR Campbell 
Fraser & Co) 
 
Graham, James, jun. 005-05-00  005-05-00 yarn-warehouse  
Parker, C. 005-05-00  005-05-00 merchant  
Croil, James 005-05-00  005-05-00 merchants  
Wingate, James 005-05-00  005-05-00  Wingate, J., & Son, manufacturers 
Cross, Hugh, & Co. 005-05-00  005-05-00 manufacturers  
Graham, William, & Bros. 005-05-00  005-05-00 *  
Lillie & Johnston 005-05-00  005-05-00 insurance brokers  
Scott, James, Jun. 005-05-00  005-05-00   
Tassie, Walter 005-05-00  005-05-00 *  
Laird, James 005-05-00  005-05-00 merchant  
Wallace, Archibald 005-05-00  005-05-00 merchant  
Ellis, J. 005-05-00  005-05-00   
Adamson, Frederic 005-05-00  005-05-00 manufacturer  
Stupart, John  003-03-00 003-03-00  Stupart, John & Co., merchants, 
Robertson Hastie  003-03-00 003-03-00 hosiers  
White Kerr  003-03-00 003-03-00 yarn-merchants  
Patt McMillan  003-03-00 003-03-00   
Robertson, Buchanan & Co.  003-03-00 003-03-00 merchants  
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Spiers, Brown & Co.  003-03-00 003-03-00 stocking warehouse  
Senior, Joshua  003-03-00 003-03-00 wholesale Manchester warehouse  
Graham, Robert  003-03-00 003-03-00   
Forrester, Willis & Co.  003-03-00 003-03-00 hardware-men  
Croil, James  003-03-00 003-03-00 merchants  
Dickson & Stewart  002-02-00 002-02-00 wine and spirit-cellars  
McNair, James  002-02-00 002-02-00 sugar-refiner OR manufacturer  
M'Nab, M'Millan & Co.  002-02-00 002-02-00   
Pennie, D.  002-02-00 002-02-00   
Croil, William.  002-02-00 002-02-00 merchant  
Hamilton, A., Jun.  002-02-00 002-02-00 Bank of Scotland office  
Shand, W. & A.  002-02-00 002-02-00 manufacturers  
Brash & Reid  002-02-00 002-02-00 booksellers and stationers  
Dawson, Lewis, Jr.  002-02-00 002-02-00 manufacturer  
Anderson & Campbell  002-02-00 002-02-00 manufacturers  
Monteith, A.  002-02-00 002-02-00 grocer  
Duncan, Andrew  002-02-00 002-02-00   
Alston, Thomas, & Son  002-02-00 002-02-00 manufacturers  
Robertson, James  002-02-00 002-02-00 merchant  
Ferrie, Adam 002-02-00  002-02-00 merchant   
Smith, Thomas, J.  002-02-00 002-02-00 Saddlers (Thomas S. & Co.) OR spirit-cellar 
(Thomas S.) 
 
Sorley & M'Callum  001-01-00 001-01-00 iron-monger  
Struthers, Robert  001-01-00 001-01-00  Struthers, Robert, & Co., brewers 
Brown, John  001-01-00 001-01-00   
Lowry, R. M.  001-01-00 001-01-00 merchants  
McNicol, Ronald  001-01-00 001-01-00 merchant  
Robertson, J. & J.  001-01-00 001-01-00 iron and nail merchants  
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Name of Subscriber 1st sub 2nd sub Total Description of business from Directory Description of business from other sources. 
Mclaren & Stalker  001-01-00 001-01-00 agents  
Gilmore, Morris & Co.  001-01-00 001-01-00 merchants  
Urea, Walter  001-01-00 001-01-00 calenderer  
Kirkland, Samuel  001-01-00 001-01-00   
Brown, A. & J.  001-01-00 001-01-00 grain-merchants  
Pinkerton, George  001-01-00 001-01-00 spirit-cellars  
McCulloch, Davidson & Co.  001-01-00 001-01-00 manufacturers  
Rutherford, Samuel  001-01-00 001-01-00 manufacturer   
Mitchell & Russell  001-01-00 001-01-00 watch-makers  
King, John  001-01-00 001-01-00 manufacturer OR cotton-spinner  
McCulloch, A., & Sons.  001-01-00 001-01-00   
Pollock, J. & M. 001-00-00  001-00-00 manufacturers  
Notes: WI=West India merchant, AT=American Tobacco merchant, and CM=Cotton manufacturer.  Asterisk marks (*) indicate names are listed in the directories but without the 
descriptions of their businesses 
Source: Glasgow East India Association Committee Minute Book, 1812-13, Glasgow Postal Directories, 1812, 1813 and 1815, List of Company and Individual subscriptions in 
Abstract of the Minute Book of the Glasgow West India Association. 
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Appendix III. List of members of the GEIA and the descriptions of their designations and main businesses (1829-1833). 
First name Middle name Family name 
Other 
information 
(title, 
address, etc.) 
Postal Directories 
(Designation/firm and 
year of Directory) 
Merchant House 
Matriculation Book 
(Designation and year 
of registration) 
Burgess and Guild 
Brethren of Glasgow 
(Designation and year of 
registration) 
Advertisements 
of shipping In 
Glasgow 
Courier 1829  
100 Glasgow men 
(Description of 
business and Chapter 
number) 
Records of the 
GWIA and other 
sources 
(Dennistoun, 
Buchanan & Co., 
James Finlay & 
Co.) 
James Graham Adam  calico printer (1829) calico printer (1838) merchant (1844) 
 
   
John  Agnew  John Agnew & Co., 
merchants (1829) 
merchant (1832)  John Agnew & 
Co. (EI, SA) 
  
Robert  Allan 103 
Hutcheson 
Robert Allan & Co., 
manufacturers (1829) 
home trader (1830) merchant, manufacturer, 
Commercial Court (1828) 
   
James  Allan      The Allan Line 
(shipping business) 
(Chap. 2) 
 
George  Alston  merchant (1829) home trader (1813) merchant (1801)    
Robert Douglas Alston  insurance broker (1829) insurance broker (1813) merchant (1808)     
John  Anderson  merchant (1829) X  John Anderson 
& Co. (SA) 
  
James A. Anderson  merchant (1829) 
manager, Glasgow Union 
Bank (1833) 
banker (1822)  weaver and then readmitted 
as merchant (1821)  
 The Glasgow Union 
Banking Company 
(Chap. 3) 
 
Robert  Bartholomew Rothsay 
(1843) 
J. Bartholomew & Co., 
merchants spinning works 
& weaving works (1829) 
merchant (1832)  merchant (1830)    
John  Bartholomew  J. Bartholomew & Co., 
merchants spinning works 
& weaving works (1829) 
home trader (1825) partner of John 
Bartholomew & Co., 
merchants (1818) 
   
Thomas  Bartholomew  J. Bartholomew & Co., 
merchants spinning works 
& weaving works (1829) 
merchant (1832) merchant (1830)    
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First name Middle name Family name 
Other 
information 
(title, 
address, etc.) 
Postal Directories 
(Designation/firm and 
year of Directory) 
Merchant House 
Matriculation Book 
(Designation and year 
of registration) 
Burgess and Guild 
Brethren of Glasgow 
(Designation and year of 
registration) 
Advertisements 
of shipping In 
Glasgow 
Courier 1829  
100 Glasgow men 
(Description of 
business and Chapter 
number) 
Records of the 
GWIA and other 
sources 
(Dennistoun, 
Buchanan & Co., 
James Finlay & 
Co.) 
David  Bell  pullicate manufacturer 
(1829) 
foreign trader (1821) merchant manufacturer 
(qualified as merchant) 
(1818) 
   
Robert  Black   home trader (1825) merchant (1821)     
James  Black J B & Co. at J. Black & Co., 
manufacturers. ratified as 
merchant(1832) 
home trader (1825) 
or  
home trader (1825) 
  James Black & Co. 
(calico printers) 
 
William  Bleaymire  Ellis, Bleaymire & Co., 
manufacturers (1829) 
X merchant (1810)    
James  Bogle Junior  merchant (1832)  merchant, of Michael Scott 
(1829) 
Robert Bogle & 
Co. (WI) 
 WI (the GWIA) 
Francis  Brand Liverpool 
(1843) 
at Archd. M'Indoe & Co. 
calico printers (1829) 
     
Henry  Brock  accountant (1833) accountant (1834) merchant (1832)    
Hugh  Brown Linwood 
(1843) 
  merchant (1815)    
Alexander  Brown Junior  X     
James  Buchanan DH Dennistoun, Buchanan & 
Co., merchants (1829) 
    WI, EI (Dennistoun, 
Buchan & Co.) 
James  Buchanan Junior DH, 
Liverpool 
(1841) 
 X    WI, EI (Dennistoun, 
Buchan & Co.) 
James  Buchanan J F & Co James Finlay & Co., 
merchants (1829) 
X    cotton 
manufacturing, EI, 
EU, US (James 
Finlay & Co.) 
John  Buchanan   X   Possibly, King & 
Buchanan, and the 
Western Bank  
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First name Middle name Family name 
Other 
information 
(title, 
address, etc.) 
Postal Directories 
(Designation/firm and 
year of Directory) 
Merchant House 
Matriculation Book 
(Designation and year 
of registration) 
Burgess and Guild 
Brethren of Glasgow 
(Designation and year of 
registration) 
Advertisements 
of shipping In 
Glasgow 
Courier 1829  
100 Glasgow men 
(Description of 
business and Chapter 
number) 
Records of the 
GWIA and other 
sources 
(Dennistoun, 
Buchanan & Co., 
James Finlay & 
Co.) 
Walter  Buchanan  merchant (1832) foreign trader (1825) merchant, of Buchanan 
Falconer and Co., 
manufacturers (1813) 
 Buchanan, Hamilton & 
Co. (est. 1824, East 
India traders) (Chap. 17) 
 
William  Buchanan   calenderer (1825) merchant (1813) 
or 
merchant, by purchase 
(1813) 
   
John  Calder  A & J Calder, 
manufacturers (1829) 
 weaver (1828)    
Charles  Carnie  Thomas Shield & Co. 
calico printers (1829) 
 merchant (1808)    
William  Church  William Church & Co. 
manufacturers (1829) 
foreign trader (1830) merchant, of Harper & 
Church, manufacturers 
(1810) 
   
Hugh  Cogan  J. Bartholomew & Co., 
merchants spinning works 
& weaving works (1829) 
home trader (1825) partner in John 
Bartholomew & Co., 
merchants (1818) 
   
Robert  Cogan  John & Robert Cogan 
(1829) 
home trader (1825) merchant, of J. & R. 
Cogan, manufacturers 
(1823) 
   
John  Cogan  John & Robert Cogan 
(1829) 
home trader (1825) merchant (1818)    
Arthur  Connell  A. & J. Connell, 
merchants (1829) 
foreign trader (1817) merchant, of D. & J. 
Connell, merchants (1817) 
  WI (the GWIA) 
James  Cook  James Cook & Co. 
engineers & machine 
makers (1829) 
engineer (1825) merchant, engineer (1829)    
Alexander  Couper    weaver, St. Rollox (1825)    
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First name Middle name Family name 
Other 
information 
(title, 
address, etc.) 
Postal Directories 
(Designation/firm and 
year of Directory) 
Merchant House 
Matriculation Book 
(Designation and year 
of registration) 
Burgess and Guild 
Brethren of Glasgow 
(Designation and year of 
registration) 
Advertisements 
of shipping In 
Glasgow 
Courier 1829  
100 Glasgow men 
(Description of 
business and Chapter 
number) 
Records of the 
GWIA and other 
sources 
(Dennistoun, 
Buchanan & Co., 
James Finlay & 
Co.) 
John  Cree  merchant and ship agent 
(1829) 
merchant (1832) merchant (1821) John Cree (WI, 
EI, NA, SA, 
EU) 
  
John  Cross S C & Co. Stewart, Cross & Co., 
merchants (1829) 
 merchant (1833)    
John  Crum  J. & W. Crum, calico 
printer & bleachers 
(1829) 
home trader (1817) merchant (1817)     
Andrew Stephenson Dalglish  Dalglish, Falconer & Co., 
calico printers (1829) 
foreign trader (1825) merchant (1824)  (Dalglish, Falconer & 
Co. (calico printers) 
Chap. 25) 
 
George  Dalglish  Dalglish, Falconer & Co., 
calico printers (1829) 
merchant (1843) merchant, of Dalglish, 
Falconer & Co. (1828) 
 (Dalglish, Falconer & 
Co. (calico printers) 
Chap. 25) 
 
Robert  Dalglish  Dalglish, Falconer & Co., 
calico printers (1829) 
foreign trader (1817) weaver, then readmitted as 
merchant (1796) 
 (Dalglish, Falconer & 
Co. (calico printers) 
Chap. 25) 
 
James  Davidson Ruchill 
(1843) 
James Davidson & Co., 
manufacturers (1829) 
home trader (1817) merchant (1841) 
or 
merchant (1844) 
   
John  Dempster  merchant (1829) merchant (1832) merchant (1823)  John Dempster 
(WI) 
  
James  Dennistoun  banker (1829) possibly, home merchant 
(1790) 
merchant (1817)  James & Alex. 
Dennistoun (trade in 
American cotton)  
(Chap. 26) 
 
John  Dennistoun MP (1843) Jas. & Alex. Dennistoun, 
merchants (1829) 
home trader (1825) merchant (1845)  James & Alex. 
Dennistoun (trade in 
American cotton ) 
(Chap. 26) 
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First name Middle name Family name 
Other 
information 
(title, 
address, etc.) 
Postal Directories 
(Designation/firm and 
year of Directory) 
Merchant House 
Matriculation Book 
(Designation and year 
of registration) 
Burgess and Guild 
Brethren of Glasgow 
(Designation and year of 
registration) 
Advertisements 
of shipping In 
Glasgow 
Courier 1829  
100 Glasgow men 
(Description of 
business and Chapter 
number) 
Records of the 
GWIA and other 
sources 
(Dennistoun, 
Buchanan & Co., 
James Finlay & 
Co.) 
John  Denny  John Denny & Co., calico 
printers (1829) 
     
Alexander  Downie  A. & J. Dawnie, 
drysalters & merchants 
(1829) 
drysalter (1826) merchant, of Alex. & John 
Downie (1831) 
   
Richard  Duncan  cashier of Thistle bank 
(1829) 
possibly, home trader 
(1817) 
merchant (1804)    
Charles  Dunlop  James Dunlop & Sons, 
cotton spinners (1833) 
   James Dunlop & Sons 
(cotton spinners & 
weavers) (Chap. 29) 
 
Henry  Dunlop  James Dunlop & Sons, 
cotton spinners (1829) 
foreign trader (1830) merchant (1829)  (James Dunlop & Sons 
(cotton spinners & 
weavers) 
Chap. 29) 
 
William  Dunlop  James Dunlop & Sons, 
cotton spinners (1829) 
merchant (1833) tailor (1814) 
or 
merchant, serving 
apprentice with Malcolm 
Dun, weaver (1799) 
 James Dunlop & Sons 
(cotton spinners & 
weavers  
(Chap. 29) 
 
William  Dunn   foreign trader (1829) hammerman in Glasgow, 
and then readmitted as 
merchant (1831) 
   
Septimus  Ellis  Ellis, Bleaymire & Co., 
manufacturers (1829) 
home trader (1798) merchant (1798)    
James  Ewing Levenside 
(1843) 
James Ewing & Co., 
merchants (1829) 
foreign trader (1804) merchant (1808) James Ewing & 
Co. (WI) 
 WI (the GWIA) 
David  Ferguson  Bogle, Ferguson & Co., 
yarn warehouse (1829) 
home trader (1825) merchant, of Bogle, 
Ferguson and Co. (1825) 
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First name Middle name Family name 
Other 
information 
(title, 
address, etc.) 
Postal Directories 
(Designation/firm and 
year of Directory) 
Merchant House 
Matriculation Book 
(Designation and year 
of registration) 
Burgess and Guild 
Brethren of Glasgow 
(Designation and year of 
registration) 
Advertisements 
of shipping In 
Glasgow 
Courier 1829  
100 Glasgow men 
(Description of 
business and Chapter 
number) 
Records of the 
GWIA and other 
sources 
(Dennistoun, 
Buchanan & Co., 
James Finlay & 
Co.) 
Thomas G. Ferguson 91 Hucheson Ferguson & Taylor, 
manufacturers (1829) 
     
James  Finlay  James Finlay & Co., 
merchants (1829) 
foreign trader (1821) merchant (1821)   cotton 
manufacturing, EI, 
EU, US (James 
Finaly & Co.) 
Kirkman  Finlay  James Finlay & Co., 
merchants (1829) 
home trader (1798) merchant (1796)   cotton 
manufacturing, EI, 
EU, US (James 
Finlay & Co.) 
John  Finlay Deanston 
(1843) 
James Finlay & Co. 
merchants (1829) 
merchant (1831) merchant (1824)   cotton 
manufacturing, EI, 
EU, US (James 
Finlay & Co.) 
Matthew  Fleming  Matthew Fleming & Co., 
manufacturers (1829) 
home trader (1808) merchant (1797)    
John  Fleming   foreign trader (1817)  John Fleming 
(EI) 
  
Alexander  Fletcher  John Todd & Co., calico 
printers (1829) 
foreign trader (1830) merchant, of John Todd & 
Co., calico printers (1830) 
   
Robert  Freeland Junior Manufacturer (1829) foreign trader (1829) merchant (1815)    
Alexander  Garden  Henry Monteith & Co., 
bandana & yarn 
warehouse, dye works 
(1829) 
home trader (1817) merchant (1810)    
Robert  Gilmour    merchant (1824) 
OR 
weaver, manufacturer 
(1825) 
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First name Middle name Family name 
Other 
information 
(title, 
address, etc.) 
Postal Directories 
(Designation/firm and 
year of Directory) 
Merchant House 
Matriculation Book 
(Designation and year 
of registration) 
Burgess and Guild 
Brethren of Glasgow 
(Designation and year of 
registration) 
Advertisements 
of shipping In 
Glasgow 
Courier 1829  
100 Glasgow men 
(Description of 
business and Chapter 
number) 
Records of the 
GWIA and other 
sources 
(Dennistoun, 
Buchanan & Co., 
James Finlay & 
Co.) 
William  Gilmour  William Gilmour & Co., 
wholesale woollen 
drapers (1829) 
home trader (1819) merchant (1798)    
Alexander  Glasgow  Frew & Glasgow, 
manufacturers (1829) 
foreign trader (1826) merchant (1817)    
Alexander  Graham  William Graham & Co., 
merchants (1829) 
foreign trader (1829)   Wm. Graham & Co. 
(manufacturers)  
(Chap. 41) 
 
William  Graham Junior William Graham & Co., 
merchants (1829) 
foreign trader (1817) X  William 
Graham & Co. 
(EU) 
spinner and weaver, 
Wm. Graham & Co. 
(manufacturers), The 
Lancefield Spinning Co. 
(Chap. 41) 
 
Robert  Gray Junior  home trader (1817) merchant (1807)    
John G Hamilton  Henry Monteith & Co., 
bandana & yarn 
warehouse, dye works 
(1829) 
home trader (1825) merchant and writer (1816)    
James  Hamilton   home trader (1817) 
or 
foreign trader (1829) 
    
John  Henderson   home trader (1817)     
Robert  Henderson  R. & J. Henderson, 
merchants & drysalters 
(1829) 
home trader (1817) merchant (1808)    
Laurence  Hill  writer (1829) writer (1814) writer, qualified as 
merchant (1814)  
 Writer  
(Chap. 44) 
 
Henry  Houldsworth  Henry Houldsworth & 
Sons, cotton spinners 
(1829) 
foreign trader (1817)   H. Houldsworth & Sons  
(Chap. 45) 
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First name Middle name Family name 
Other 
information 
(title, 
address, etc.) 
Postal Directories 
(Designation/firm and 
year of Directory) 
Merchant House 
Matriculation Book 
(Designation and year 
of registration) 
Burgess and Guild 
Brethren of Glasgow 
(Designation and year of 
registration) 
Advertisements 
of shipping In 
Glasgow 
Courier 1829  
100 Glasgow men 
(Description of 
business and Chapter 
number) 
Records of the 
GWIA and other 
sources 
(Dennistoun, 
Buchanan & Co., 
James Finlay & 
Co.) 
William  Hunter  W. & M. Hunter, 
merchants (1829) 
foreign trader (1825) merchant (1816) 
or 
merchant (1808) 
William & 
George Hunter 
(EI) 
  
Andrew  Hunter  Andrew Hunter & Co., 
manufacturers (1829) 
home trader (1817) 
or 
home trader (1804) 
X    
Duncan  Hunter    merchant (1815)    
William  Hussey Junior William Hussey & Son 
(1829) 
merchant (1836) merchant (1838) 
 
   
James  Hutchison  James Hutcheson & Co., 
manufacturers (1829)  
or 
bookbinder (1829) 
manufacturer (1823) merchant (1813) 
or 
merchant (1804)  
   
Alexander  Johnstone MP (1843) Johnstone, Galbraith & 
Co., manufacturers & 
merchants (1829) 
foreign trader (1830) weaver, and then 
readmitted as merchant, J. 
G. & Co., merchants 
(1830) 
   
John  Ker  manufacturer (1829) merchant (1831)  merchant at Ballantine & 
Ker (1821) 
   
Robert  Knox   showl manufacturer 
(1829)  
or 
writer (1829) 
home trader (1829) merchant (1813)    
John  London   foreign trader (1829) merchant (1817) 
or 
merchant (1817) 
   
James  Lumsden  James Lumsden & Son., 
wholesale stationers 
(1829) 
foreign trader (1830) merchant (1829) 
 
 James Lumsden & Son 
(stationery business) 
(Chap. 51) 
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First name Middle name Family name 
Other 
information 
(title, 
address, etc.) 
Postal Directories 
(Designation/firm and 
year of Directory) 
Merchant House 
Matriculation Book 
(Designation and year 
of registration) 
Burgess and Guild 
Brethren of Glasgow 
(Designation and year of 
registration) 
Advertisements 
of shipping In 
Glasgow 
Courier 1829  
100 Glasgow men 
(Description of 
business and Chapter 
number) 
Records of the 
GWIA and other 
sources 
(Dennistoun, 
Buchanan & Co., 
James Finlay & 
Co.) 
John  Lumsden 21 Queen st. James Lumsden & Son., 
wholesale stationers 
(1829) 
 pocketbook maker, 
qualified as hammerman 
(1810) 
 James Lumsden & Son 
(stationery business)  
(Chap. 51) 
 
William  Mathieson  merchant, at James Ewing 
& Co.'s (1829) 
foreign trader (1824) merchant, at James Ewing 
& Co. (1823) 
James Ewing & 
Co. (WI) 
 WI (the GWIA) 
John  May  Ewing, May & Co., 
merchants (1829) 
foreign trader (1817) merchant, partner of 
Messrs. Ewing, May & 
Co., merchants 
   
John  McDonald   X     
William  McDonald        
Dugald  McFie Dunoon 
(1843) 
merchant (1829) foreign trader (1829) merchant (1824) Dugald Macfie 
(US) 
  
Archibald  McIndoe  Archd. M'Indoe & Co., 
calico printers (1829) 
calico printer (1834) merchant (1817)    
Laurence  McKenzie  L. M'Kenzie & Co., 
manufacturers (1829) 
 weaver (1821)    
John Gregory McKirdy  Peter Bogle & Co. (1833) merchant (1832) merchant (1829)    
Robert  McLellan  Henry Monteith & Co., 
bandana & yarn 
warehouse, dye works 
(1829) 
home trader (1817) merchant, of Messrs. 
Henry Monteith, Bogle & 
Co. (1816) 
 H. Monteith & Co. 
(Turkey-red, print works 
at Barrowfield) 
(Chap. 88) 
 
John  McNair   possibly, home trader 
(1790)  
weaver (1786) John M’Nair 
(EI, SA)  
  
John  McNair Junior commission merchant 
(1829) 
foreign trader  (1829) merchant (1808) John M’Nair 
(EI, SA)  
  
John  Miller 131 Ingram st John Miller jun. & Co., 
merchants (1829) 
  merchant, of John Miller, 
junior & Co. (1829) 
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First name Middle name Family name 
Other 
information 
(title, 
address, etc.) 
Postal Directories 
(Designation/firm and 
year of Directory) 
Merchant House 
Matriculation Book 
(Designation and year 
of registration) 
Burgess and Guild 
Brethren of Glasgow 
(Designation and year of 
registration) 
Advertisements 
of shipping In 
Glasgow 
Courier 1829  
100 Glasgow men 
(Description of 
business and Chapter 
number) 
Records of the 
GWIA and other 
sources 
(Dennistoun, 
Buchanan & Co., 
James Finlay & 
Co.) 
William.  Milroy  Milroy, Turnbull & Co., 
manufacturers (1829) 
 merchant, of Milroy, 
Turner & Co., 
manufacturers (1828) 
   
William  Mirrlees  saddler (1829) merchant (1834) hammerman (1802) 
OR 
merchant (1844) 
   
Patrick  Mitchell  calico printer (1829) calico printer (1825) merchant (1823)    
Henry  Monteith Carstairs 
(1843) 
Henry Monteith & Co., 
bandana & yarn 
warehouse, dye works 
(1829) 
possibly, home trader 
(1790) 
merchant (1786)  H. Monteith & Co. 
(Turkey-red, print works 
at Barrowfield) 
(Chap. 88) 
 
Duncan  Morrison 95 Hutcheson Duncan Morrison & Co., 
manufacturers (1829) 
merchant (1833) weaver (1812)     
Hugh  Morrison  manufacturer (1829) merchant (1819) merchant (1813)    
William  Morrison  merchant (1829) merchant (1832) merchant (1828) William 
Morison (EI, 
SA, US) 
  
John  Muir  Muir, Brown & Co., 
manufacturers (1829) 
   Muir, Brown & Co. 
(Chap. 45) 
 
Thomas  Muir Madeira 
(1844) 
      
James  Oswald MP (1843) Alex. Oswald & Sons 
(1829) 
James Oswald & Co. 
spinners, mill at 
Barrowfield (1833) 
home trader (1813) merchant (1808)    
James  Paterson   home trader (1790) 
or 
home trader (1817) 
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First name Middle name Family name 
Other 
information 
(title, 
address, etc.) 
Postal Directories 
(Designation/firm and 
year of Directory) 
Merchant House 
Matriculation Book 
(Designation and year 
of registration) 
Burgess and Guild 
Brethren of Glasgow 
(Designation and year of 
registration) 
Advertisements 
of shipping In 
Glasgow 
Courier 1829  
100 Glasgow men 
(Description of 
business and Chapter 
number) 
Records of the 
GWIA and other 
sources 
(Dennistoun, 
Buchanan & Co., 
James Finlay & 
Co.) 
William Patrick Paton  commission merchant and 
agent (1829) 
foreign trader (1830) merchant (1830)    
Mathew  Perston Junior M. & J. Perston, 
manufacturers (1829) 
foreign trader (1830) merchant, manufacturer 
(1823) 
   
John  Reid  gingbam & pullicate 
agent (1829) 
X merchant & agent (1817)    
James  Reid   merchant (1834)     
John  Robertson   manufacturer (1831)     
Laurence  Robertson  Royal Bank (1829) banker (1829) merchant, Royal Bank 
(1828) 
   
Rowand  Ronald        
Michael  Rowand  cashier, Ship Bank (1829) banker (1817) merchant (1808)  Ship Bank 
(Chap. 26) 
 
Thomas  Sammuel  merchant (1829) home trader (1817) merchant (1815)    
George  Scheviz  merchant, at Campbell, 
River & Co. (1829) 
foreign trader (1817) partner of Campbell, 
Rivers and Co., merchants 
(1816) 
 Campbell, River & Co. 
(Shipping house) 
(Chap. 41) 
 
John  Scott L.L.D. (1844) 
London 
(1843),  
      
William  Shand 49 Miller st. W. & A. Shand, 
manufacturers (1829) 
 merchant (1808) W. & A. Shand 
(EI) 
  
William  Shedden 111 Ingram 
st. 
Shedden, William & Co., 
manufacturers (1829) 
home trader (1821) merchant (1808)    
John  Smith Youngest 
Clutherland 
(1843) 
 X     
 243 
First name Middle name Family name 
Other 
information 
(title, 
address, etc.) 
Postal Directories 
(Designation/firm and 
year of Directory) 
Merchant House 
Matriculation Book 
(Designation and year 
of registration) 
Burgess and Guild 
Brethren of Glasgow 
(Designation and year of 
registration) 
Advertisements 
of shipping In 
Glasgow 
Courier 1829  
100 Glasgow men 
(Description of 
business and Chapter 
number) 
Records of the 
GWIA and other 
sources 
(Dennistoun, 
Buchanan & Co., 
James Finlay & 
Co.) 
William  Snell 20 Ingram st. sen. of William Snell & 
Co., manufacturers (1829) 
 merchant (1813) 
or 
weaver  (1809) 
   
Robert  Speir  R .& T. Speirs, 
manufacturers (1829) 
merchant (1832) merchant, at R. & T. Speirs 
(1822) 
   
A. G. Speirs  Culcruch Cotton Co. 
(1829) 
     
George  Stevenson  Stevenson & Sons, cotton 
spinners (1829) 
merchant (1833)     
George  Stirling  William Stirling & Sons, 
merchants (1829) 
home trader (1827) merchant, partner of Wm. 
Stirling & Sons, calico 
printers (1815) 
 William Stirling & Sons 
(printing & dyeing 
trade)  
(Chap. 88) 
 
John  Stiven  Stiven, Blair & Co., 
manufacturers (1829) 
possibly, home trader 
(1790) 
merchant, of Stiven Blair 
& Co. (1829) 
   
James  Struthers  Thom & Struthers, yarn 
warehouse (1829) 
foreign trader (1829) merchant (1808)    
Charles  Tennant  C. Tennent & Co. 
manufacturers of 
bleaching powder & 
drysalters (1829) 
home trader (1817) merchant (1807)    
John  Tennant  C. Tennent & Co. 
manufacturers of 
bleaching powder & 
drysalters (1829) 
home trader (1817) merchant (1817)    
Charles James Tennant  C. Tennent & Co., 
manufacturers of 
bleaching powder & 
drysalters (1829) 
home trader (1829) Merchant, of Charles 
Tennant & Co. (1829) 
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First name Middle name Family name 
Other 
information 
(title, 
address, etc.) 
Postal Directories 
(Designation/firm and 
year of Directory) 
Merchant House 
Matriculation Book 
(Designation and year 
of registration) 
Burgess and Guild 
Brethren of Glasgow 
(Designation and year of 
registration) 
Advertisements 
of shipping In 
Glasgow 
Courier 1829  
100 Glasgow men 
(Description of 
business and Chapter 
number) 
Records of the 
GWIA and other 
sources 
(Dennistoun, 
Buchanan & Co., 
James Finlay & 
Co.) 
Alexander  Tennent  James Oswald & Co. 
(1833) 
merchant (1832)  merchant, cotton broker  
(1828) 
   
Andrew  Tennent  merchant (1829) home trader (1815) merchant (1807) Andrew 
Tennent (EI) 
  
Robert  Thom   spirit-dealer  (1829) 
OR possibly, 
Thom & Struthers, 
Rothay yarn warehouse 
(1829) 
wine merchant (1837) merchant (1815)    
William  Thomson   X     
Robert  Thomson Senior Robert Thomson & Sons, 
Adelphi cotton works 
(1829) 
(R. Thomson, jun.) home 
trader (1806) 
merchant (1795) 
or 
merchant (1799) 
or 
merchant (1786) 
   
Robert  Thomson Junior Robert Thomson & Sons, 
Adelphi cotton works 
(1829) 
(R. Thomson, tertius) 
home Trader (1817) 
merchant, cotton spinner 
(1829) 
   
Charles  Todd 79 Queen st. merchant (1829) home trader (1825) merchant (1827)    
Daniel  Walkinshow  Walkinshaw, Adam & 
Co., merchants (1829) 
home trader (1825) merchant, partner of 
Walkinshaw, Barlas & Co., 
merchants (1817) 
Walkinshaw, 
Adam & Co., 
merchants (EI) 
  
Andrew  Whyte W U & Co. White, Urquhart & Co., 
manufacturers (1829) 
(Andrew Whyte), home 
trader (1817) 
weaver (1808) 
or 
merchant (1802) 
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First name Middle name Family name 
Other 
information 
(title, 
address, etc.) 
Postal Directories 
(Designation/firm and 
year of Directory) 
Merchant House 
Matriculation Book 
(Designation and year 
of registration) 
Burgess and Guild 
Brethren of Glasgow 
(Designation and year of 
registration) 
Advertisements 
of shipping In 
Glasgow 
Courier 1829  
100 Glasgow men 
(Description of 
business and Chapter 
number) 
Records of the 
GWIA and other 
sources 
(Dennistoun, 
Buchanan & Co., 
James Finlay & 
Co.) 
Andrew  Wingate   Wingate, Son & Co., silk 
& shawl warehouse 
(1829) 
 or 
Black & Wingate, 
manufacturers (1829) 
home trader (1804) Merchant (1800)    
John  Wright Junior Walker & Co., Lanark 
Cotton yarn warehouse 
(1829) 
merchant (1835) merchant (1828)    
James  Wright   foreign trader (1823) merchant, of Findlay, 
Connal & Co., merchants 
(1823) 
 Managed the cotton 
department of Findlay, 
Connal & Co. (having 
several brunches 
including the cotton 
department and yarns 
and calico 
manufacturing )  
(see Chap. 22) 
 
Notes: In the column of ‘Merchant House Matriculation Book’ and that of ‘Burgess and Guild Brethren of Glasgow’, X indicates that there are too many same names recorded in the 
book to identify.   In the column of shipping advertisements in The Glasgow Courier, WI represents West India trade, EI, East India trade, NA, North American trade, SA, South 
American trade, US, U.S. trade, and EU, European trade.  
Source: Glasgow East India Association List of Members from 1829 (MS 891001/16), Subscription Book from 1829 to 1833 (MS 891001/17), Postage Book from 1829- 1845 (MS 
89001/18), Glasgow Postal Directories, 1829 and 1833, Merchants’ House of Glasgow Matriculation Books, and Anderson, The Burgess and Guild Brethren, The Glasgow Courier, 
1829 and J. MacLehose, One Hundred Glasgow Men, Abstracts of the Minute Books of the Glasgow West India Association.  (The name of James Bogle appeared on 7 March 1823: 
Arthur Connell, on 17 December 1823 and 14 June 1827: James Ewing, during the period between 7 March 1823 and 14 June 1827: William Mathieson, during the period between 11 
December 1832 and 23 January 1833: George Scheviz, on 24 January 1824), Minute Book of Dennistoun, Buchanan & Co. Glasgow 1806-42 (MS Murray 605, Glasgow University 
Special Collection Department), 14 February 1825, and C. Brogan, James Finlay & Company Limited: manufacturers and East India merchants, 1750-1950, 1951, pp. 10-12. 
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Appendix IV. List of the Magistrates & Town Council of Glasgow, 1828-1833. 
  1828-1829 1829-1830 1830-1831 1831-1832 1832-1833 
Provost Alexander Garden Alexander Garden Robert Dalglish Robert Dalglish James Ewing 
Merchants rank bailie William Gray Hugh Robertson Matthew Fleming John Smith, ygst. James Martin 
  Robert Paterson John Buchanan John Smith, ygst. John May Hugh Cogan 
Youngest merchants bailie 
 
Charles Stirling, jun.  
(refused/declined the position) Matthew Fleming David Ferguson James Martin John Somerville 
Crafts rank bailie Archibald M'Lean, jun. James Graham Robert Ferrie George Burn William M'Lean 
Youngest trades bailie James Graham Robert Ferrie George Burn William M'Lean William Wilson 
Eldest bailie of the town of Port-Glasgow and Newark William Hamilton David Gilkison David Gilkison James Barclay, eldest Archibald Falconer, eldest 
Councillors from the Merchants John Buchanan David Ferguson John Buchanan   John Buchanan 
  Robert Dalglish Robert Dalglish Robert Dalglish   Robert Dalglish 
  Donald Cuthberson Donald Cuthberson Donald Cuthberson   Donald Cuthberson 
  William Graham William Gray William Gray   James Campbell 
  William Hamilton Robert Paterson Hugh Corgan   David Ferguson 
  Robert Hinshaw Robert Hinshaw James Martin   Matthew Fleming 
  Alexander M'Grigor Alexander M'Grigor Alxander M'Grigor   William Gilmour 
  John May John May John May   John Leadbetter 
  John Muir John Muir John Muir   John Muir 
  George Scheviz George Scheviz George Scheviz   Henry Paul 
  John Smith, ygst. John Smith, ygst. John Robertson   Jon Smith, ygst. 
  Hugh Robertson Stewart Smith Stewart Smith   Stewart Smith 
Councillors from the Traders John Alston Archibald M'Lellan, Jr. John Alston   John Alston 
  George Burn George Burn James Graham   Joseph Brown 
  William Craig William Craig William Craig   Archibald M'Lellan 
  Walter Ferguson Walter Ferguson Walter Ferguson   Alexander Mitchell 
  Robert Ferrie James Paterson *1 James Paterson *1   James Paterson *1 
  William Frew William Frew William Frew   John Niel 
  John Fulton William Snell William Snell   William Snell 
  William M'Lean William M'Lean William M'Lean   John Small 
  William M'Tyer William M'Tyer Henry Taylor, Jr.   Henry Taylor, Jr. 
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  William Rodger William Rodger William Rodger   William Rodger 
  Alexander Wood Alexander Wood Alexander Wood   Alexander Wood 
           
Dean of guild Stewart Smith Stewart Smith James Ewing James Ewing James Hutchison 
Deacon Convener William M'Lean John Alston John Alston Archibald M'Lellan Archibald M'Lellan 
Treasurer Peter Mirrlees William Hamilton Archibald M'Lean Laurence Craigie, jun. Robert Ferrie 
Note:  *1 James Paterson on the list may be a member of the association.  Names in bold type indicate that they were the members of the GEIA 
Source: R. Renwick (ed.) Extracts from The Records of The Burgh of Glasgow with Charters and Other Documents, Vol. XI, A.D. 1823-1833, 1916, pp. 300-301, 345-346, 397, 401-
402, 442-444, 498, and Glasgow Herald, 18th, October, 1828, 16th, October, 1829, 22nd, October, 1830, and 15th October, 1832 
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Appendix V. List of the members of the Liverpool Committee in 1829 and their designations, the regions with which their firms traded, and 
Liverpool merchants’ associations to which they belonged. 
Sir name First name Other name Gore's Directory Liverpool Mercury 1829  Liverpool’s Associations (from Gore’s Directory) 
Alston J(ohn) T(homas) merchant Alston, Finlay & Co. (EI, SA, 
US) 
EICA (1832) 
Baines, Jun. Edward  -   
Barclay T(homas) B(rockhurst) merchant  ACC (1825, 1835) 
Benson Robert  merchant (Cropper, Benson 
& Co.) 
Cropper, Benson (EI, US) ACC (1818) 
EIA (1818, 1825) 
Bolton John  merchant Bolton, Ogden & Co. (US) 
 
 
Booth Henry  corn merchant   
Bourne John  Esq. (J. Bourne & Co. coal 
proprietors & iron merchant) 
  
Brocklebank Thomas  merchant T. & J. Brocklebank (E, EI, SA) EIA (1825) 
Cropper James  merchant Cropper, Benson & Co. (BA, E, 
EI, US) 
 
Currie W Wallace merchant & fire office agent   
Earle, Jun. William  merchant T. & W. Earle & Co. (E, US, WI)  
Earle, jun. Hardman  broker (Salisbury, Turner. & 
Earle.) 
  
Earle, jun. Willis  merchant   
Ewart John  broker (Ewart, Myers & Co.) Ewart, Myers & Co. (US, WI) EIA (1818, 1827) 
Garnett John  merchant  EIA (1818) 
MLA (1825, 1829, 1832) 
Gladstone John  Esq. J. Gladstone, Grant & Wilson 
(EI) 
Gladstone, Grant & Co. (WI) 
BA (1818) 
EIA (1818) 
SOA (1818) 
Grant George  merchant J. Gladstone, Grant & Wilson 
(EI) 
Gladstone, Grant & Co. (WI) 
PBA (1818) 
SOA (1818) 
WIA (1834, 1835) 
Heyworth Ormerod  merchant (Ormond 
Heyworth & Co.) 
O. Heyworth & Co. (SA, E) PBA (1818) 
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Sir name First name Other name Gore's Directory Liverpool Mercury 1829  Liverpool’s Associations (from Gore’s Directory) 
Hodgson Adam  merchant   
Hope Samuel  banker (Samuel Hope & Co.)   
Hornby Joseph  merchant (Joseph, Thomas & 
William Hornby & Co.) 
J., T. & W. Hornby & Co. (E, EI)  
Horsfall Charles   C. Horsfall, Son & Co. (AF, EI, 
SA, WI) 
SOA (1825, 1829, 1832) 
WIA (1834) 
Leathom Thomas  merchant  ACC (1818, 1829) 
EIA (1825) 
MLA (1825, 1829, 1832, 1834, 
1835) 
Leigh Joseph  rope maker / Esq. (Russian 
Consul) (J. Leigh & Co) 
Leigh & Co. (E)  
Littledale Thomas  Esq. (Thomas & Harold 
Littledale & Co.) 
T. & H. Littledale (WI)  
Maxwell Alexander   W., A. & G. Maxwell (E, SA, 
US) 
 
Melly A  merchant (Melly, Prevost & 
Co.) 
Melly, Prevost & Co, (E, US)  
Myers William  broker Ewart, Myers & Co.  (US, WI) 
W. Myers (US) 
 
Potter William  merchant (Taylor &P.) Taylor, Potter & Co.(EI, WI) EIA (1825) 
EICA (1837) 
Radcliffe Richard  attorney  ACC (1825, 1829) 
MLA (1825) 
Rathbone William  gentleman Rathbone, Brothers & Co. (AF, 
EI, US) 
 
Robinson Nicholas  Esq. N. Robinson (E)  
Roscoe Edward  iron merchant (Mather, 
Roscoe & Co.) 
  
Rotherham William  cutler/merchant (W. 
Rotheram &Co.) 
W. Rotheram (E)  
Rushton Edward  gentleman   
Smith John     
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Sir name First name Other name Gore's Directory Liverpool Mercury 1829  Liverpool’s Associations (from Gore’s Directory) 
Tayleur Charles  merchant (Charles Tayleur, 
Son & Co.) 
C. Tayleur, Son & Co. (SA, US)  
Thornely Thomas  (Thomas & John Daniel 
Thornely, merchants) 
T. & J. D. Thornely (US) ACC (1837) 
Ward William  merchant   
Willink Daniel  Esq. merchant & consul for 
the Netherlands 
D. Willink (E, EI, US, WI) ACC (1818) 
EIA (1825) 
EICA (1829) 
LBSAMA (1825) 
Willis Daniel  Daniel & Thomas Willis D. & T. Willis (E, EI)  
Yates Joseph B(rooks) - J. B. Yates & Co. (WI) SOA (1827, 1834, 1835) 
Yates John A(shton) broker  ACC (1818, 1825) 
Note: AF= ‘Africa’, BA= ‘British America’ and ‘Newfoundland’, E= ‘Mediterranean’, ‘Holland’, ‘France’, ‘Spain’, ‘Portugal’, ‘Azores’, ‘Germany’, ‘Prussia’, and ‘Russia’, EI= ‘East 
India’, SA= ‘South America’ and ‘Brazil’, US= ‘United States’, WI=’West India’ and ‘Bahamas’.  
ACC= American Chamber of Commerce, BA= Baltic Association, EIA = East India Association (late EICA= East India and China Association), LBSAA= Liverpool, Brazil, South 
American and Mexican Association, MLA= Mediterranean and Levant Association, PBA = Portugal and Brazil Association, SOA= Ship Owners Association, WIA= West India 
Association. 
Source: Gore's Liverpool Street Directory, 1818, 1825, 1827, 1829, 1832, 1834, 1835, and 1837, ‘Imports’ in The Liverpool Mercury 1829 (EI- From 2/January till 25 December, and 
others from 2 January till 26 June).      
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